Occasional Paper Series

No. 1

U.S. Military Aid to Central Asia, 1999–2009:

Security Priorities Trump Human Rights and Diplomacy

Lora Lumpe

Central Eurasia Project

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

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October 2010

Occasional Paper Series No. 1

Series Editor
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OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS

Published by
Open Society Foundations
224 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019 USA
www.soros.org

Design and typography by Judit Kovács | Createch Ltd.

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Lora Lumpe is a consultant working for the Open Society Foundations on issues relating to the intersection of military aid and human rights. Her books include *Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of US Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2002), *Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms* (London: Zed Books, 2000), *Small Arms Control* (London: Ashgate, 1999), and *The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for Investigators and Activists* (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1998).

Acronyms

CENTCOM	(U.S.) Central Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FMF	Foreign Military Financing (grant program)
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSA	Freedom Support Act (grant program)
FY	fiscal year
IMET	International Military Education and Training (grant program)
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange Training
NADR	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (grant)
NDN	Northern Distribution Network
PL	public law
SCO	Security Cooperation Office
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement

As a part of a broader U.S. effort to promote development and build partnerships in Central Asia, CENTCOM works to build the capabilities of indigenous security forces as well as the mechanisms for regional cooperation. Besides providing training, equipment, and facilities for various Army, National Guard, and border security forces through our Building Partnership Capacity programs. . . . CENTCOM is also working to ensure continued access to Afghanistan through Central Asia.[1]

—General David Petraeus, Commander, CENTCOM, April 1, 2009

Summary

This briefing paper tracks the evolution of, and trends in, U.S. military and police aid to Central Asian countries pre- and post-9/11.* In particular, it seeks to identify assistance associated with agreements with countries in the region to provide base and transit access to United States and allied militaries for the war in Afghanistan. While the United States does not pay "rent" for military bases, this report includes a primer on the relevant U.S. military aid programs (both traditional and new) that are used as compensation for basing and other access rights, including for Central Asian participation in the recently launched Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a land-based supply route for U.S. and allied forces that runs through Central Asia to Afghanistan.

The U.S. government has no comprehensive budget for the assistance it provides to the police, militaries, and other Central Asian security forces; however, in the fullest accounting available to date, this report documents that the United

* This briefing paper is supplemented by Occasional Paper No. 2, which provides a timeline of U.S. military cooperation with Uzbekistan.

States provided at least $145 million in military aid through 19 different budgets and programs in one year (fiscal year 2007). This amount is nearly half of the total of $329 million that the U.S. government gave to Central Asian governments in 2007, and it is six times the amount the U.S. government spent to promote rule of law, democratic governance, and respect for fundamental human rights in that same year.

The report references efforts by Congress to legislate restrictions on aid over the past decade, due to the level of political repression practiced by Central Asian governments, and it notes executive branch policies and responses that work around the legislated restrictions.

Namely, it shows that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established many new military and police assistance programs and that it now provides more military aid to Central Asia than the Department of State (DOS), the traditional budgetary source of U.S. military assistance. Moreover, the DOD enjoys unusual autonomy in distributing this aid: U.S. military commanders are able to dispense training and equipment almost at their discretion, and the U.S. military is not required to make budgets for several of its aid programs public. The paper extrapolates from these realities to suggest that the U.S. military has acquired an oversized impact on U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia.

Introduction and Overview

In the 1990s, U.S. priorities touching upon military or police assistance to the Central Asian republics centered mainly on nonproliferation (nuclear and biological), police reform (mainly to counter narcotics trafficking) and border control (to counter trafficking and to ease tensions among states in the region). DOD-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction ("Nunn-Lugar" programs) provided assistance to security forces to help safeguard nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and biological warfare facilities. And State Department accounts funded export and border control capacities.

In addition, the United States provided military assistance in order to "engage" and help move the Newly Independent States closer into the West's orbit.[2] For instance, the DOD and Department of State jointly launched the Warsaw Initiative Fund in 1994 to encourage and facilitate participation by the Central Asian (and other) states in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Then-Secretary of Defense William Perry stressed that such "preventative defense" would help foment democracy in Central Asia.[3]

Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s, freed from waging the Cold War and facing a subsequent lack of over-arching focus (and rationale), several of the regionally focused combatant commanders—including the head of the Central Command (CENTCOM, the U.S. military's geographic command that includes Central Asia)—sought to increase and use resources under their control to promote greater engagement with foreign militaries in their areas of operation. Their goals were manifold, but chief among them were to promote stability, develop relationships that might help head off future crises, and develop their forces' intelligence capabilities and skills in order to respond to any future crises.[4]

As a result of all of the above trends and initiatives, and despite on-going serious human rights violations and political repression by governments in the region, by the mid-to-late 1990s U.S. Special Operations Forces were training soldiers in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbek and Kazakh military were taking part in NATO exercises with support from the DOD, and most of the Central Asian states were receiving Foreign

Military Financing (FMF) and grant military training aid (IMET). While modest compared to the level of U.S. aid enjoyed by military and paramilitary forces in other parts of the world, the United States had established a significant level of military cooperation in the half decade prior to 9/11.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Pentagon raised the priority of organizing, training, and equipping foreign countries' forces to a core mission of the U.S. military. A primary reason for this shift was to ensure U.S. forces' access to the theaters of conflict.[5] Four of the five Central Asian states (all but Tajikistan) provided immediate tangible support for the war effort in Afghanistan, including over-flight rights and the leasing of military airbases, and Tajikistan signed a transit agreement with NATO in 2004.[6]

As throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government refuses to explicitly pay rent for access to overseas military bases.[7] Rather, it cements agreements with foreign governments for access—to airfields, ports, transit routes, airspace, or logistics depots—with military aid. Nearly every data table in this report shows a spike in military assistance for fiscal year 2002, in direct compensation for the post-9/11 agreements. A second wave of access negotiations and agreements was launched in 2008, with the U.S. military's opening of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistics supply route through Central Asia to Afghanistan. Compensation for these agreements is also discernable in the tables profiling traditional (State Department-financed) aid, although less obviously so than in 2002.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the DOD increasingly viewed traditional forms of military assistance (those funded in State Department accounts by the annual State/Foreign Operations Appropriation Acts, including FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET)) as unreliable—that is, driven by U.S. politics, rather than by the needs of U.S. military strategy. So it quietly set about developing a parallel system of "security cooperation" programs, the budgets and recipients of which the DOD could better control.[8]

Indeed, over the years Congress has legislated numerous restrictions to prevent traditional, State Department–funded military and development aid from going to militaries that grossly abuse their own citizens (including restrictions on aid to Central Asian countries), to militaries that displace democratically elected leaders, to countries that are "decertified" for failing to cooperate in the drug war, or to governments that fail to exempt U.S. personnel on their soil from possible prosecution at the International Criminal Court.

While the foreign aid committees of Congress were drafting these laws, however, the military committees of Congress were granting the DOD new authorities in other laws to use more and more of its vast Operations and Maintenance budget to carry out a variety of "security cooperation" initiatives. This trend began in the early 1990s when Congress authorized the DOD to spend $12 million per year for counternarcotics training of Latin American armed forces. Around the same time, Congress (through annual National

Defense Authorization Acts) allowed the DOD to deploy Special Operations Forces to countries of its choosing for Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events, and it permitted the establishment of the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund—walking around money that the chiefs of the regional commands could spend to reach out to local presidents and their militaries. Such programs have grown exponentially following 9/11 and the launch of the Afghan and Iraq wars: Congress has granted the DOD several new authorities each year, most of them on a continuing basis.[9] Many of the new DOD-funded programs have evaded congressionally mandated restrictions relating to human rights. In fact, one of the major justifications the DOD has cited for these new authorities is a need, post 9/11, for "flexibility" (read: no congressionally mandated policy restrictions).[10]

When General Anthony Zinni, then CENTCOM Commander, first traveled to Uzbekistan in May 2000 he was reportedly concerned about being empty-handed; however, CENTCOM managed to find $20,000 worth of surplus U.S. military equipment to give to local military commanders.[11] Table 7 (p. 34), while still incomplete, demonstrates that the "uncounted" military aid from the Pentagon to countries in Central Asia was nearly three times the level provided through the State Department's "counted" programs in fiscal year (FY) 2007. This new reality has implications for efforts—by Congress, local or international civil society, or others—to try and leverage democratic and human rights reforms by the Central Asian governments. It also has changed the relative importance and power of U.S. ambassadors and the CENTCOM combatant commander in countries of the region.

The Military Aid Process —Embassy and Command

U.S. ambassadors, as the highest ranking emissary of the U.S. government to each Central Asian country, should have a full picture of all U.S. military activities taking place in and planned for that country. However, that is not necessarily the case. The geographic combatant commands (like CENTCOM) now have staff in some embassies who report not to the ambassador or chief of mission, but rather solely to the military command.[12] Beginning in the early 2000s, the power of the combatant commanders in their respective areas of responsibility came to rival and, in many instances, surpass the influence of U.S. ambassadors in countries in their region.[13] This trend paralleled their increased ability to dispense military aid directly via new programs and authorities granted by Congress.

Inside of each U.S. embassy is a Security Cooperation Office (SCO), staffed by military officers chosen by the DOD in concurrence with the State Department and the chief of mission.[14] The SCO determines the DOD's priority military aid wish list for the recipient country. These classified "Country Plans" are forwarded on to the State and Defense Departments, as well as to CENTCOM. The SCO is also responsible for managing all U.S. military aid and security cooperation functions in collaboration and concert with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at the Pentagon.[15]

CENTCOM—the U.S. Central Command—is one of six regional commands of the U.S. military and is the command responsible for the Middle East and Central Asia.[16] It holds the master plan, in terms of U.S. military assistance to Central Asian forces and their governments. Within CENTCOM, the Security Cooperation Division (under the Directorate for Plans and Policy—J5) is responsible for planning, development, coordination, and execution of CENTCOM's Theater Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Programs.[17] The Theater Security Cooperation plan (also classified) matches the legal

authorities and monies available to the perceived needs or desires of host countries, as well as CENTCOM's goals and strategy.

In addition, the J5 division monitors the status of U.S. basing, access, and over-flight rights and the status and activities of U.S. forces deployed to countries in the region. It formulates and monitors relevant U.S. agreements, including Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (bilateral logistics aid treaties), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs, which regulate U.S. military presence in a host country) and Article 98 Agreements (pledging that countries will not turn U.S. forces over to the International Criminal Court).[18]

CENTCOM—and the SCOs—work with many other parts of the U.S. military establishment, namely the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (the Pentagon's arms sales and military aid bureau), Defense Logistics Agency, Joint Forces Command (on combined military force exercises), Transportation Command (on NDN), and Special Operations Command (on military training), in addition to the military services and U.S. National Guard.

Relative Size of U.S. Military Program Management Costs in Central Asian Countries, 2006–2010

The budgets allocated to various U.S. embassies for management of military programs in-country provide a way of assessing the level of U.S. military assistance and involvement in that country.

The following matrix shows that Kazakhstan had the largest military program during this time. Interestingly, the figures show that even after Uzbekistan was prohibited by law from receiving additional State Department–funded military aid (in 2005), the U.S. military program management office remained relatively robust.

	FY 2006	FY 2008	FY 2010
Kazakhstan	$524,000	$579,000	$670,000
Kyrgyzstan	$206,000	$373,000	$419,000
Tajikistan	$263,000	$330,000	$350,000
Turkmenistan	$171,000	$147,000	$171,000
Uzbekistan	$437,000	$438,000	$472,000

To put these figures in perspective, major regional U.S. allies in Africa (like South Africa and Senegal) have military program management budgets of about $450,000.

Source: State Dept, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY 2008, pp. 695–7 and for FY 2010. Figures for 2010 are requested, not actual.

Trends in Traditional (Appropriated) Military Aid

Historically, Congress has funded military assistance in the annual State Department/ Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. The State Department presents an annual detailed budget request to Congress, and in response Congress' foreign aid subcommittees draft a law to appropriate this aid for the coming fiscal year, setting parameters in some cases on which countries may receive how much and which types of weapons aid and training. The State Department allocates the appropriated funding, and the DOD implements the actual military aid or training programs. (The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security implement some of the police and border control programs.)

As Table 7 (p. 34) demonstrates, State Department–funded programs no longer constitute the bulk of military assistance to Central Asian countries—by a long shot. However, much more information is available about these programs than is available about DOD-funded programs, including projected and actual expenditures (disaggregated by country), rationales, and plans.

The four State Department funding accounts that underwrite military or police aid to countries in the region are:

- Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
- Freedom Support Act (FSA, renamed by the Obama Administration to Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia)

These programs are authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended annually by Congress). Among other relevant provisions, this permanent law includes generic restrictions on weapons aid and training to any government that commits gross

human rights abuses (section 502B), a requirement for background vetting of particular foreign military units receiving U.S. military aid to ensure that such aid is not going to units credibly alleged to have committed serious human rights violations with impunity (the "Leahy Law," section 620J), and various reporting requirements to provide some transparency around these programs.

In addition, through annual laws (State Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts), Congress imposes conditions and restrictions on military aid to particular countries. In 2002, Congress first legislated conditions on Uzbekistan's FMF, requiring a certification of progress in human rights and democratization before military assistance could go forward. The language was sufficiently vague that the secretary of state felt able to make the certification. In the years that followed, subsequent State/Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts tightened and extended the language to Kazakhstan and to all programs funded by that act (i.e., FMF, IMET, NADR, and FSA). Congress included a waiver for Kazakhstan, which the Bush Administration used, but did not include one for military aid to Uzbekistan. As a result of the administration's inability since mid-2004 to certify adequate progress by Uzbekistan in human rights and democracy, military and police aid for Uzbekistan has largely been cut off since 2005.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Foreign Military Financing is a financial grant that can be applied to the purchase of weapons, military training, or related services through the Foreign Military Sales program. FMF credits are placed into an account administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at the DOD.

President Bill Clinton signed a finding in March 1997, naming four of the five Central Asian states (all but Tajikistan) as eligible to receive military grants and/or to purchase military items or services, as authorized by the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Control Acts.[19] The four began receiving FMF that year,[20] and Tajikistan became eligible to receive U.S. weapons aid and sales in April 2002, following the end of a five-year civil war.[21]

Among the perennial objectives of the FMF program are to "promote professionalism" and "support democratically-elected governments that share values similar to those of the U.S. with respect to democracy, human rights and regional stability."[22] However, budget documents lay bare the U.S. government's priorities. In 2003, the State Department's foreign aid budget request openly related the provision of FMF to Central Asian countries to access and cooperation in the Afghan war.[23]

Table 1: Foreign Military Financing to Central Asia, FY 2000–FY 2010 (U.S.$)

	FY 2000	FY 2002	FY 2004	FY 2006	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Kazakhstan	1,500,000	4,750,000	—	3,465,000	1,339,000	4,500,000	3,000,000
Kyrgyzstan	1,000,000	11,000,000	4,075,000	1,881,000	843,000	800,000	3,500,000
Tajikistan	—	3,700,000	1,995,000	495,000	372,000	740,000	1,500,000
Turkmenistan	600,000	—	500,000	297,000	—	150,000	2,000,000
Uzbekistan	1,750,000	36,207,000	2,980,000	—	—	—	—

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, "all spigots" tables from various years. With the exception of the data for FY 2010, all data was taken from tables reporting back on preceding years' actual expenditures of State Department–funded foreign aid. FY 2010 data is State Department estimated.

Following the invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent shift of focus away from Afghanistan, the State Department became more critical of the democracy and human rights records of these states,[24] and aid levels declined.

An uptick in FMF taking place in 2010 is presumably related to the negotiation of the NDN, although the State Department does not publicly state it. While FY 2010 levels are nowhere near the levels of FMF provided around access agreements in FY 2002, in the interim, the DOD has gained the right under U.S. law to expend billions of dollars annually to support foreign militaries. Most likely, the real compensation is now coming from the DOD's pots of money (see section on the DOD below).

One of the largest programs this aid is funding is the refurbishment of a fleet of Huey II helicopters for Kazakhstan.[25] The DOD gave many of the helicopters to Kazakhstan through its Excess Defense Article program (see section on EDA below).

Table 1 reflects the cutoff of FMF to Uzbekistan that occurred in FY 2005, following the Congress' passage of legislation the previous year requiring the secretary of state to certify that the government had made "substantial progress" in its human rights and democratization record before such aid could continue to flow. (FMF that Congress had previously appropriated for Uzbekistan continued to be expended for weapons and training purchases following the cutoff of new aid [see section below on Foreign Military Sales].)

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Funding through the State Department's International Military Education and Training (IMET) account is used to provide military training in hundreds of different subject areas, including theoretical and tactical training in infantry operations, airborne operations, intelligence, counterterror operations, English language instruction, and instruction in the operation of a particular weapon system. Some courses—called E-IMET (for "Expanded IMET")—focus on civil-military relations, management and budgeting of militaries, and human rights.

The overarching rationale the State Department provides for Central Asian IMET programs is to "enhance military relationships" and "promote democratization, emphasize rule of law and the protection of human rights, [and] enhance professionalism." Table 2 shows that funding levels have held steady in recent years. The most noteworthy development was a decision by the State Department to re-start a small E-IMET program for Uzbekistan in 2010, following a change in law in December 2009.[26]

Table 2: International Military Education and Training Funds for Central Asia, FY 2008–FY 2010 (U.S.$)

	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Kazakhstan	998,000	858,000	785,000
Kyrgyzstan	992,000	872,000	1,000,000
Tajikistan	518,000	282,000	600,000
Turkmenistan	298,000	269,000	350,000
Uzbekistan	—	—	200,000

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, "all spigots" tables from various years. With the exception of the data for FY 2010, all data was taken from tables reporting back on preceding years' actual expenditures of State Department–funded foreign aid. FY 2010 data is State Department estimated.

Beginning in 2002, the focus of IMET aid to Central Asian countries became schizophrenic—at least in terms of stated rationales in countries with very poor records on human rights and political liberty. On the one hand, military training was intended to help Central Asian states "combat terrorist insurgents and eliminate internal terrorist cells" and on the other hand "facilitate armed forces reform and promote a better understanding of the role of the military in developing democracies."[27]

IMET is one of several sources of financing available for the provision of training and professional military education to Central Asian officers. Other sources of funding can be FMF, the Pentagon's Combating Terror Fellowship Program or host nation cash. In addition, much military training is conveyed through combined exercises—those involving U.S. and foreign troops. The annual Foreign Military Training Report, required by law, includes data and some explanatory text on training funded by IMET (including a breakdown of courses taken by host nation personnel), as well as several (but not all) Pentagon sources of funding for training.[28]

Chart 1: Number of Soldiers from Each Country in U.S. Military Training Program



Source: DOD and State Department, Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, Reports 2000–2008, <www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm>. This data omits several types of military training, including combined and multinational training exercises and training paid for with FMS or host nation money.

Chart 1 demonstrates the ebbs and flows in terms of the number of Central Asian trainees per year (these figures undercount trainees, by leaving out several categories; see source note on chart). It shows that training shot up for Uzbekistan in 2002, following the U.S. base agreement, and that levels for Turkmenistan have been consistently low.

Freedom Support Act (FSA)/Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia

The Freedom Support Act of 1992 (PL 102-511) authorized money from several agencies to support political transformation and open markets in the independent states of the former Soviet Union—including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While largely counted only as development assistance (e.g., child survival and health), in fact money under this heading is also channeled through USAID and the State Department for international narcotics law enforcement and antiterrorism assistance. Under the Obama administration, this aid spigot has been renamed as "Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia."

Table 3 charts the total level of FSA granted for each country during the even years of the past decade. (Table 7, which seeks to form a composite picture of police and military aid from all spigots in FY 2007, pulls out only the amount from FSA used for antiterrorism and police training.)

Table 3: Freedom Support Act (later changed to Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia) (U.S.$)

	FY 2000	FY 2002	FY 2004	FY 2006	FY 2008	FY 2010
Kazakhstan	44,826,000	47,315,000	33,342,000	24,750,000	14,879,000	10,400,000
Kyrgyzstan	30,064,000	71,989,000	36,238,000	29,029,000	25,046,000	46,000,000
Tajikistan	9,926,000	56,372,000	24,451,000	23,760,000	25,789,000	42,500,000
Turkmenistan	6,195,000	11,398,000	5,700,000	4,950,000	5,455,000	12,500,000
Uzbekistan	20,042,000	118,190,000	35,888,000	17,820,000	8,405,000	8,250,000
Central Asia Regional	—	—	—	1,703,000	2,976,000	11,000,000

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, "all spigots" tables from various years. With the exception of the data for FY 2010, all data was taken from tables reporting back on preceding years' actual expenditures of State Department–funded foreign aid. FY 2010 data is State Department estimated.

One interesting fact observable in this table is the relatively high level of FSA funding going to Central Asian countries prior to 9/11. In fiscal year 2002, Uzbekistan's and Tajikistan's aid under this account grew by nearly 500 percent over FY 2000 levels. Also significant is the growth of a "Central Asia Regional" account line starting just as the Bush administration was unable to make the human rights certification necessary to keep FSA

funds flowing to the central government of Uzbekistan. The Bush administration continued to allocate some FSA funds to Uzbekistan, as the table shows, to local government authorities and non-government entities. As with State Department–funded military aid programs, the levels are up in FY 2010 but—with the exception of Turkmenistan—not to the extraordinary levels of FY 2002.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)

The State Department's Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account provides lethal and nonlethal equipment to all five Central Asian states, related to border control and antiterrorism efforts and some demining funds to Tajikistan. This account was the first that the State Department re-started for Uzbekistan, despite the absence of a waiver provision for the military aid cut off that is required by law until the Secretary of State is able to certify adequate progress on human rights and democratic governance in Uzbekistan.

Table 4: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) (U.S.$)

	FY 2000	FY 2002	FY 2004	FY 2006	FY 2008	FY 2010
Kazakhstan	1,050,000	2,655,000	2,000,000	2,041,000	2,992,000	1,900,000
Kyrgyzstan	—	—	500,000	2,917,000	2,488,000	1,590,000
Tajikistan	50,000	7,500,000	300,000	1,970,000	3,164,000	1,725,000
Turkmenistan	235,000	7,000,000	—	400,000	1,050,000	1,075,000
Uzbekistan	—	4,300,000	—	—	200,000	600,000
South/Central Asia Regional	—	—	—	—	—	4,300,000

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, "all spigots" tables from various years. With the exception of the data for FY 2010, all data was taken from tables reporting back on preceding years' actual expenditures of State Department–funded foreign aid. FY 2010 data is State Department estimated.

Trends in Nonappropriated Military Assistance

This section highlights trends in three long-standing programs that are not appropriated by Congress but are often overlooked indicators of U.S. military activity in a country or region.

Excess Defense Articles

The Foreign Assistance Act (section 516) permits the president to give away surplus U.S. weapons, munitions, medical equipment, and other military supplies—referred to as "Excess Defense Articles" (EDA). All five Central Asian countries have been approved to receive EDA, but legislation passed in 2005 that conditions U.S. military aid to Uzbekistan explicitly included EDA in the scope of the aid to be cut off if the secretary of state could not certify human rights progress.[29]

According to an online database managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, four of the five countries have received some equipment via this channel.[30] The first country to benefit was Uzbekistan, in 2000, when then CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni made his first trip to the country.[31]

- According to the EDA database, Zinni's gift to the *Uzbek* military included such mundane items as kitchen equipment, hand tools, mountaineering equipment, clothing, "individual equipment," and textiles.
- *Turkmenistan* received a free patrol boat that same year, through the Navy's surplus stocks, and *Kazakhstan* received office furniture and computers.
- During 2004, 2005, and 2007, *Kazakhstan* received 8 UH-1H "Huey" helicopters from the Army.
- And in 2007 *Tajikistan* was approved to receive *$2.6 million* worth of "personal clothing, gear and equipment."

Foreign Military Sales

The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, in which the U.S. government acts as an arms broker between U.S. weapons manufacturers and foreign government purchasers. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), through its extensive apparatus in the Pentagon and in foreign embassies, negotiates contracts for weapons, services, training, and construction of related facilities. Foreign governments can use their own cash or U.S.-provided credit (usually FMF—Foreign Military Financing) to pay. Table 5 shows the amount of FMS contracted by and shipped to Central Asian governments since 1998.

Table 5: Value of Weapons, Services, and Related Construction Exported Under the FMS Program to Central Asian States, 1999–2008

	FMS	FMS Construction
Kazakhstan	$16,671,000	$4,482,000
Kyrgyzstan	$19,241,000	$5,482,000
Tajikistan	$5,503,000	—
Turkmenistan	$3,342,000	—
Uzbekistan	$52,080,000	—

Source: DOD, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *FMS Factbook 2008.*

Legislative efforts to disassociate the U.S. government from abuses being carried out in Uzbekistan resulted in a cutoff of additional FMF beginning in 2005. However, the FMF credits that had been approved in prior years were not touched by these sanctions, and the Uzbek government contracted with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for multiple FMS weapons deliveries (one-fifth of its total—approximately $12 million) throughout the past half-decade following the aid cutoff.

In terms of the types of equipment and services being conveyed through this program, information obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in early 2008 showed that in FY 2007 the Pentagon had transferred the following to Central Asia (the amounts below are included in Table 5).[32]

Uzbekistan

- $4.8 million of "technical assistance"
- more than $2 million worth of fast patrol boats, other miscellaneous spare parts for boats and ships
- more than $1 million of training[33]

Turkmenistan

- $85,000 of training and technical assistance

Tajikistan

- $128,000 of miscellaneous support equipment and logistics management

Kyrgyzstan

- $2.5 million of communications equipment
- $1.5 million of military construction
- $1.7 million of logistics and "other supplies"

Kazakhstan

- $1.7 million of military vehicles
- $3.6 million of technical assistance, other services, other supplies, aircraft spare parts, and training

Direct Commercial Arms Sales

Direct commercial arms sales are deals negotiated directly by U.S. arms manufacturers, rather than by the DOD, and these sales are in addition to weapons sales through the FMS program. In these deals, the buyers usually have to come up with the financing themselves (rather than rely on a U.S. government aid program). Industry-direct sales to Central Asian countries are a very recent phenomenon. While this sub-region still accounts for a trivial portion of global U.S. industry-direct arms sales, activity has increased markedly in the past five years. During 1999–2003, U.S. arms manufacturers exported only $625,000 in weaponry and nonlethal military equipment through this channel—all of it to Turkmenistan. In the following four-year period, U.S. arms corporations delivered $515 million of such equipment to countries in the region. (See Chart 2)

Of this total, the majority ($350 million) is attributable to Kazakh imports in 2008—most likely in support of commercial communications satellite launches from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. In addition, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have had significant weapons imports of more than $50 million each in a given year.

Chart 2: Value of U.S. Industry-Direct Weapons Sales to Central Asian Countries



A State Department report for FY 2008 gives a snapshot of *what* it is licensing U.S. arms makers to export to the region. U.S. companies were granted export licenses in FY 2008 for a small number of non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and for a wide range of equipment to Kazakhstan totaling nearly $16 million, including:[34]

- $1.6 million of explosives and propellants (most likely rocket fuel for Baikonur launch site)
- $72,000 of tank and military vehicle parts
- $119,000 of navigational systems
- $346,000 of military training equipment and simulation devices
- $3.1 million of military electronics
- $6.9 million of fire control, range finder, optics, and guidance and control equipment
- $3.4 million of spacecraft systems and associated equipment

These export licenses are valid for four years, and U.S. arms companies may use them any time during that period to carry out the authorized export (and then, when the weapons are delivered, the value of the export will eventually show up in Table 6).

As Table 6 makes clear, even at the height of concern about human rights and governance in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, industry-direct arms sales continued and expanded. The U.S. government did not apply a U.S. arms embargo to any Central Asian countries. Doing so would have prohibited both the U.S. government and private companies from receiving permission to export arms or military equipment.[35]

Table 6: Value of Weapons Imported through Direct Commercial Sales, by Recipient Country

	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008
Kazakhstan	$14,000	$600,000	$4,102,000	$13,133,000	$355,491,000
Kyrgyzstan	$24,000	$6,636,000	$55,289,000	$230,000	$25,287,000
Tajikistan	—	$221,000	$582,000	$1,098,000	—
Turkmenistan	$118,000	$9,000	$74,000	$7,000	—
Uzbekistan	$358,000	$51,439,000	$134,000	$393,000	$81,000

Sources: DOD, DSCA, *FMS Factbook 2008*, includes data on direct commercial arms sales that are compiled by the State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DTC), from shippers' export documents and completed licenses returned to the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls from ports of exit by the U.S. Customs Service; State Department, Section 655 Report for FY 2008.

The DOD's Walking around Money—The Uncounted Aid

Gordon Adams, former associate director for international affairs and national security programs at the Office of Management and Budget, estimated that 15 different Pentagon programs would provide $8.6 billion in military aid worldwide during 2009—outstripping the similar programs that operate under State Department authority.[36] It turns out he was undercounting. A 2009 DOD handbook on "security cooperation" identifies at least 49 programs and authorities (read: pots of money) that the DOD can now utilize to arm and train foreign forces.[37] The military committees of Congress, acting at the behest of the Pentagon, include in their annual DOD funding bills provisions that grant the Pentagon the right to use certain amounts of DOD Operations and Maintenance funds for foreign military aid programs.[38] Many of the new DOD-funded programs that Congress has authorized in the past decade directly parallel State Department–funded programs. But with these, the Pentagon is "the decider" (in President Bush's words) about who gets aid, as well as the implementer.

While U.S. law caps these authorities at certain amounts, there are no public reports on most of these programs, so determining actual expenditure levels and programming is difficult.[39] As a result, piecing together the entire picture of U.S. military aid to, and involvement with, Central Asia is very complex and perhaps not even possible. This opacity also means that such funds could be used when Congress directs a cessation of other military aid accounts for a particular country.

In addition to the specific and constantly growing budgetary discretion that regional combatant commanders have obtained in the past two decades, there are numerous nonspecific funds that they can use to reward friends and allies and/or buy or maintain access to local ports, bases, and logistics depots. Because there is no public reporting

required on the expenditures of most of these funds, meaningful public oversight is not possible, and even Congressional oversight is questionable.[40]

Congress has applied some human rights provisions to the new military aid programs funded by the DOD laws and budget. Namely, since 1999, Congress has included a version of the "Leahy Law" in each of the annual DOD appropriations acts. This provision requires that the Pentagon have a process for background vetting that is intended to ensure that U.S. forces are not training any units of a foreign security force that have been credibly alleged to have committed a gross violation of human rights. The DOD, however, does not consider many of the programs whereby it conveys skills, equipment, or resources to foreign militaries to be "assistance" and, therefore, does not vet participants in those programs.[41]

Given the large number of DOD-funded programs and the paucity of information about them, only brief descriptions of each military assistance channel and highlights of the relevance of the program for Central Asia are possible. This listing includes only those DOD funding programs and initiatives that are known to have been, or are likely to be, used in one or more Central Asian country.

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements

These bilateral agreements allow for the exchange of logistical support between the DOD and allied nation militaries to meet the needs of troops stationed abroad—either for exercises or military contingencies. Generally, the equipment the DOD may provide is limited to food, billeting, clothing, communication services, medical services, spare parts/components, training services and ammunition, but Congress passed a law in 2006 that allowed for the provision of firearms and military vehicles under this program to military forces participating in Iraq and Afghanistan combined operations. Payment may be in cash or in kind. CENTCOM has signed acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[42]

Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)

ALP is a U.S. Air Force–funded program.[43] It runs for two years and consists of English language training, introduction to flight training, undergraduate pilot training, and other related training. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have participated in the ALP program.[44]

Combatant Command Initiative Fund (CIF)

Section 166a of Title 10 U.S. Code allows the Joint Chiefs of Staff to allocate $75 million annually to combatant commanders for "special interest programs" like force training, joint exercises, military education, and training for foreign countries. There is no public report on how much each commander spends and for what purposes.[45]

Combatant Commander's Traditional Activities

Section 168 of Title 10 U.S. Code, which Congress added in 1995, authorizes the combatant commanders to spend DOD funds on traveling military contact teams and military liaison teams, both of which train local military forces, as well as personnel exchanges, seminars, and conferences.

Combined Operations/Exercises

Since 2001, CENTCOM has cosponsored (along with the U.S. Joint Forces Command) a Regional Cooperation Exercise for Central and South Asian countries. These computer-assisted, command base (as opposed to field) exercises often lead with a focus on disaster relief in order to placate local political sensitivities, but they are intended also to improve regional coordination on counterterrorism and security issues as well as humanitarian crisis response.[46] The Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan hosted Regional Cooperation '09 in August 2009. Some 240 military personnel from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the United States participated, and for the first time in many years Uzbekistan sent observers, as did Turkmenistan.

CENTCOM also contributes to Central Asian participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace and related exercises. Among these are NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center exercises—such as "Ferghana 2003," hosted by Uzbekistan, and "Zhetysu 2009," the ninth field exercise in this series and the first hosted by Kazakhstan.

In addition, in September 2008 Kazakhstan hosted its latest NATO "Steppe Eagle" exercise. These annual exercises have been held since 1997 to improve compatibility between Kazakh and NATO peacekeeping units and also practice antiterror missions. Steppe Eagle 2008 was held near Almaty from September 15 to 27 with the participation of troops from the United States and United Kingdom. The annual drill is meant to improve Kazakh commanders' coordination skills and to evaluate the readiness of the "Kazbat" peacekeeping units to take part in NATO-led operations.[47]

Counter-Drug Support

In 1990, Congress gave the DOD permission to use $12 million out of its budget to undertake counter narcotics training in Latin America, making this one of the first DOD-funded military aid programs. In FY 2007, the DOD provided $38.6 million in counter-drug military aid to countries in Central Asia—more than was appropriated for military aid through all of the State Department–funded military aid programs in that year (see Table 7).

Defense Personnel Exchange Programs

These exchanges include foreign personnel attending the various U.S. military service War Colleges (Army, Navy, Air Force) and the U.S. military academies in what used to be called "PME" or professional military exchange.

Drawdowns

The Foreign Assistance Act (Section 506) authorizes the President to provide up to $100 million of U.S. military articles, services, and training per fiscal year to friendly countries for military purposes, and an additional $200 million of articles, services, and training for nonmilitary purposes—which are taken to include not only disaster response and relief, but also nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and counternarcotics. The transfers are at no cost to the recipient, including free delivery. Thus far, no transfers to Central Asian countries have been reported to Congress under this provision.

Humanitarian Civic Assistance/Mine Action

The DOD's humanitarian and civic assistance programs are "aimed at increasing the DOD's visibility, access and influence, while building and/or reinforcing security and stability in the host nation."[48] This program is one of the many funds—or tools—available to the CENTCOM commander. Funding levels for this program are appropriated annually by Congress, usually around $100 million. Requests for these funds generally begin in-country from the U.S. embassy's Security Cooperation Organization to the combatant command, where they are consolidated and prioritized and then forwarded to the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Tajikistan received medical supplies under this program in FY 2008.

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)

The Pentagon requested and Congress authorized this program in 1991 for the stated purpose of allowing U.S. Special Operations Forces to practice their language skills and gain familiarity with foreign militaries and overseas terrain. Typically, each year since 1997, two Central Asian nations have received one or more JCET deployment. In FY 2007, U.S. Special Operations Forces associated with CENTCOM trained Tajik National Guard units, Tajik Border Guard units, and a Tajik National Guard Special Forces Battalion; Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism troops, the Kyrgyz Committee for National Security Alpha Unit, and a Kyrgyz National Guard Panther Battalion.[49]

National Guard State Partnership Program

This program deploys National Guard units from U.S. states to train with their partner country's military establishment in furtherance of the military cooperation objectives and goals of CENTCOM and the U.S. ambassador. The program started with Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union in 1993 and has now expanded to 62 countries, including the following U.S. state National Guard/Central Asian country partnerships: Arizona/Kazakhstan; Louisiana/Uzbekistan; Montana/Kyrgyzstan; Nevada/Turkmenistan; and Virginia/Tajikistan.[50]

Nunn-Lugar (also known as Cooperative Threat Reduction Account)

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1992, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, authorized funding to safeguard and destroy weapons and infrastructure for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inherited by states of the former Soviet Union. The program has provided hundreds of millions of dollars of funding to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—the lion's share to the latter—to transfer and decommission nuclear and biological weapons and facilities. The program expanded to include enhancing local land and naval forces to help protect against smuggling of WMD-relevant components.

Regional Centers for Security Studies

Most relevant for Central Asian military officers is the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. According to the DOD, as of December 2009, nearly 1,000 officers from Central Asia had attended courses at the Marshall Center.[51] Generally, participation in seminars at the Marshall Center is paid for by either IMET or the Combating Terror Fellowship Program.

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program

Largely mirroring the IMET program, in 2002 the DOD gained authority to use Operations and Maintenance money—currently up to $75 million per year—to fund foreign participation at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, and mobile courses (taught locally) tailored to their host nation's perceived counterterrorism needs. All five Central Asian countries have received multiple fellowships.

Reimbursement to Countries for United States Expenses

The National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006 (section 1208) authorized the use of $1.5 billion in DOD funds that year to reimburse key cooperating countries for logistical and military support provided by that nation to or in connection with U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism. The provision is repeated annually, with about the same amount of funding. Kyrgyzstan has received payment—presumably for the use of Manas airbase—from this account.

Section 1206–Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 permitted the secretary of defense to spend up to $200 million in DOD Operations and Maintenance funds to provide grant training and equipment to foreign military forces in that year in support

of counterterrorism operations. The secretary of state must consent. The program has been extended for each subsequent year, with up to $350 million now available per year. Kazakhstan received $20 million of equipment under this authority in FY 2007; Kyrgyzstan received $12 million of military equipment the following year.

Special Operations Support to Combat Terrorism

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005 authorized the secretary of defense to spend up to $25 million annually to support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals who are supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by the U.S. Special Operations Forces in combating terrorism. Information on these expenditures is classified.

Support of Coalition Forces in Combined Operations (Coalition Readiness Support)

In 2008 Congress established title 10 USC 127(c), which authorizes the DOD to expend up to $100 million annually for logistics, supply, and services to allied foreign forces to support their participation in combined operations. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008 authorized the use of up to $400 million in FY 2008 DOD funding to support coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Reports to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on these expenditures are not made public.

Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF)

The State and Defense Departments launched the Warsaw Initiative Fund shortly after NATO created the Partnership for Peace, in order to facilitate and encourage participation by the former Soviet states and Eastern European countries in NATO activities. All five Central Asian countries are eligible. Under the existing statutory authorities, the DOD can use WIF to support participation in military exercises, conferences, exchanges, seminars, and studies.[52] The program spent just over $29 million in FY 2009.[53] It is not clear how much of this money was allocated to Central Asian militaries, but given PFP's priority focus on Central Asia, it is almost certainly a significant amount.

In FY 2010, the DOD plans to use a similar amount to support participation in more than 20 bilateral and multilateral exercises, as well as more than 200 separate exchanges, meetings, and events. According to DOD estimates in 2010, in FY 2011 and 2012, "the program will continue to focus on integrating the countries of South Eastern Europe and Eurasia with the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as promoting interoperability with Central Asian countries. The program will provide bilateral support to promote defense reform and institution building, improve U.S. and NATO interoperability, and build capacity in Partner countries."[54]

CENTCOM can move money from these accounts to fund participation by Central Asian militaries in regional combined exercises, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), military conferences, and other events. According to a reporter who traveled extensively with the commander of CENTCOM in the late 1990s–early 2000s, the command got very creative in financing its plans, drawing on Cooperative Threat Reduction funds—intended for elimination of weapons of mass destruction—for joint exercises.[55]

In addition, to the long list of ways the DOD can contribute material, weaponry, training, and experience to Central Asian militaries, it can also reward friends and allies by doing business with them—i.e., awarding them commercial contracts. In relation to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) transportation agreement launched in 2008, in July 2009 the Pentagon waived "Buy America" procurement regulations, and in January 2010 it began the process for amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Rules to allow for the purchase from Central Asian countries of any locally made product (except weapons and ammunition) and building materials. In addition, the DOD has held discussions with Central Asian countries about reconstruction of Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, have been pressing for access to that market—presumably in return for granting access to the NDN.[56]

2007: Getting the Whole Picture? And Putting It in Context

Table 7 seeks to provide country-by-country breakdowns for all types of U.S. military and police aid going to Central Asia in a given year. A one-time reporting requirement by Congress caused the DOD to release information about some pots of DOD funding in FY 2007, providing some pieces of the puzzle. But large gaps remain. Of the two-dozen programs identified in the last section, only eight have data in this table.

What is clear already, however, is that DOD funding to Central Asian militaries eclipses that provided by the State Department budgets—by nearly a 3 to 1 margin. Thus far it is possible to document more than $100 million in Pentagon-supplied military aid to the region in FY 2007, while $38 million flowed from the State Department.

The table also indicates that, even though DOD programs were not statutorily limited by State/Foreign Operations legislation that resulted in a suspension of State Department–funded military aid accounts to Uzbekistan in 2005, the DOD provided very little by way of military aid to Uzbekistan—at least in the discernible accounts. However, this data may simply reflect unwillingness on the part of Uzbekistan to engage with the U.S. military following the State Department's cut off of some aid.[57] Moreover, there is still a lot of DOD-funded military aid that is not discernible.

While much of the DOD-funded military aid provided to Central Asian governments appears to be fairly innocuous (e.g., disaster preparedness, border control), the lack of clarity about the totality of U.S. military aid is problematic, as it contributes to an imbalance in overall U.S. government approach to the region. When factoring in the many forms of DOD-funded aid, the U.S. aid portfolio shifts rather dramatically. And relatively higher levels of U.S. military aid can create stronger local perceptions of U.S. government support for the regions' corrupt and repressive governments.

Table 7: Composite U.S. Military and Police Aid for Central Asia, FY 2007 (U.S.$millions)

		Central Asia Regional	Kazakh	Kyrgyz	Tajik	Turkmen	Uzbek	
DOS								**37.89**
	FSA[58]	—	1.93	2.13	8.13	0.55	0.007	12.75
	FMF	—	3.20	1.43	0.25	0.25	—	5.13
	IMET	—	1.22	1.16	0.36	0.42	—	5.13
	NADR (ATA)[59]	—	0.79	0.58	2.40	—	—	3.77
	NADR (EXBS)[60]	—	1.31	0.75	0.60	0.60	0.49	3.75
	Peacekeeping	7.36	—	—	—	—	—	7.36
USAID								**0.87**
	FSA[61]	—	0.24	—	0.33	—	0.30	0.87
DOD								**103.05**
	CENTCOM CIF	na	na	na	na	na	na	
	Counter narc[62]	3.60	11.70	13.10	6.20	4.00	—	38.60
	Counter terror	—	19.30	—	—	—	—	19.30
	CTFP[63]	—	0.38	0.05	0.09	0.005	0.027	0.55
	Counter prolif	—	0.25	—	0.17	—	—	0.42
	Officer education[64]	—	0.35	0.41	0.12	0.039	0.029	0.95
	Other exercises	na	na	na	na	na	na	
	Section 1206	—	20.00	—	—	—	—	20.00
	Section 1208[65]	—	—	17.40	—	—	—	17.40
	Warsaw Initiative Fund	na	na	na	na	na	na	
	CENTCOM JCET training[66]	—	—	1.29	1.94	—	—	3.23
	EDA				2.6			2.6
TOTALS		10.96	60.67	38.30	23.19	5.86	0.85	**144.81**

Sources: State Department, European/Eurasian Affairs, Report required under Section 104 of the Freedom Support Act, January 2008, Tables "FY 2007 FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia" and "FY 2007 Non-FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia;" DOD, "Section 1209 Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs Carried out by the Department of Defense", August 2008 (a one time report required by NDAA for FY 2008, section 1209); State Department, Legislative Affairs, "Report on the Uses of Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Peacekeeping," as required by State/Foreign Operation Appropriations Act for FY 2006, section 584, Tables on "FY 2007 Allocations Cumulative, as of June 30, 2009"; State Department, Political Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2008," January 31, 2008, vol.1, sections 3 and 4; DOD Excess Defense Articles on-line database; and DOD, "Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, FY 2007—Report to Congress," as required by 10 USC 2249c.

Table 8 provides some context for the military aid figures, by allowing comparison to the overall level of aid that the U.S. government appropriated to Central Asian states.[67] The State Department's Freedom Support Act report for FY 2007 indicates total U.S. government funding of $329 million in FY 2007, meaning that known military expenditures ($144.8 million identified in Table 7) represent at least 40 percent of U.S. government support to states in the region.

Table 8: Total U.S. Government Aid to Central Asia, FY 2007 (U.S.$millions)

	Central Asia Regional	Kazakh	Kyrgyz	Tajik	Turkmen	Uzbek	Total Aid
Freedom Support Act	2.77	20.00	30.18	23.92	9.35	15.00	101.22
Non-Freedom Support Act	4.82	145.59	24.23	22.80	10.49	20.21	228.14
Combined Aid	7.59	165.59	54.41	46.72	19.84	35.21	329.36

Source: State Department, report required under Section 104 of the Freedom Support Act, January 2008, Tables "FY 2007 FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia" and "FY 2007 Non-FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia."

Table 9 allows a comparison between the amount expended on military programs in the region ($144.8 million) and that spent in support of political reform ($23.97 million). The U.S. government spent at least six times as much in FY 2007 on Central Asian militaries as it did on Central Asian democratization.

Table 9: Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society Funding for Central Asia, FY 2007 (U.S.$millions)

		Central Asia Regional	Kazakh	Kyrgyz	Tajik	Turkmen	Uzbek	Total
DOS								**3.24**
	Embassy Democracy Programs	—	0.30	0.37	0.51	1.11	0.25	2.54
	NED Programs	—	0.25	0.20	—	—	0.25	0.70
USAID								**20.73**
	Civil Society	0.65	3.59	3.26	2.57	1.87	3.77	15.71
	Political Competition Consensus Building	—	1.02	0.72	0.60	0.40		2.74
	ROL, Human Rts	—	0.54	0.81	—	—	0.93	2.28
Totals		0.65	5.70	5.36	3.68	3.38	5.2	**23.97**

Source: State Department, report required under Section 104 of the Freedom Support Act, January 2008, Tables "FY 2007 FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia" and "FY 2007 Non-FSA Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia."

The State Department has always—through the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations—claimed that one benefit of U.S. military aid programs to Central Asia is a politically moderating and modernizing effect. Examining the real or potential countervailing impacts from U.S. military aid provided to authoritarian regimes is beyond the scope of this paper, but there is obviously tension between promoting political transformation (one of the State Department's avowed goals) and maintaining stability and access to the region (the Pentagon's principal goal).

The end result through the 2000s was to provide military aid in at least a 6 to 1 ratio to democracy funding, while acknowledging "backsliding," "missteps," and "disappointments," etc. on democratic and human rights reforms,[68] but continually asserting that the military aid leads to professionalism of the armed forces and to bringing them into the U.S. value system.[69]

With the launch of the NDN, and ratcheting up of military aid to the region, the Obama administration's State Department asserted that,

> Increasing U.S. engagement with the often authoritarian governments in Central Asia does not mean abandoning our core values. In all interactions with the region, the U.S. will seek opportunities to constructively promote democratic institutions and respect for human rights, and the U.S. will take every opportunity to remind U.S. partners in the region of the sincere belief that democracy is the true path to lasting stability and prosperity.[70]

However, in a statement that makes clear the Pentagon's approach to the countries of the region, the civilian (political) leadership of the Pentagon told Congress in December 2009 that,

> The Department of Defense's primary goal in Central Asia is to support the war in Afghanistan. We provide this support in two ways. First, we use a network of air and ground routes, known as the Northern Distribution Network, to ship supplies through Central Asia to our troops in Afghanistan. *Second, we assist the sovereign countries of Central Asia in maintaining their own security in a way they find acceptable.*[71] [emphasis added]

Findings and Conclusions

The data and analysis in this brief, along with a timeline of U.S. military cooperation with Uzbekistan contained in Occasional Paper Series No. 2, suggest the following:

- There is a great disparity—in dollar terms—between the U.S. government's support for fundamental democratic and human rights reform in Central Asia and its support for programs primarily aimed at furthering the DOD's and CENTCOM's strategic objectives (namely, stable partners in the region and access to the theater of conflict).[72] Data compiled in this report from across DOD and State Department programs show that, in 2007, military aid to states in the region overall was at least six times the amount provided for human rights, democracy, and civil society support. One country—Uzbekistan—received more in U.S. aid for democratization than for its military and other armed forces. [p. 35]

- Even when there are legislative restrictions on some forms of engagement or on some particular types of military aid (as has been the case with Uzbekistan since mid-2004), there remains considerable machinery in U.S. embassies working to promote military cooperation in Central Asia (mainly through CENTCOM staff and embassy-based Security Cooperation Organizations).[73] [p. 12].

- Traditional, State Department–funded military aid to Central Asia peaked in 2002 (in direct compensation for access to military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) at approximately $80 million and is exhibiting a noticeable uptick in 2009-2010, presumably related to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) agreement (although not explicitly stated, as it was in 2002). [pp. 14–17].

- In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the DOD has sought, and Congress has granted, more than a dozen new legal authorities, increasing the ways that CENTCOM (and the other U.S. regional military commands) can spend funds from the Pentagon's general coffers to provide direct assistance to foreign militaries. As a result, in FY 2007, the DOD provided more than $100 million in military aid to Central Asian countries, nearly three times as much as the State Department funded. The Pentagon is prioritizing the development of more authorities and programs in this area, making it likely that the DOD will continue to be the dominant source of funding for foreign military aid and will, therefore, play a dominant role in policy decisions about the provision of this aid.[74] [pp. 25, 34].

- There is very little transparency around DOD-funded programs that provide military assistance to Central Asian (and other) forces. Transparency is hindered by the fact that the DOD does not consider many of the contact, training, and financial support programs for Central Asian (and other) forces outlined in this report to be "assistance," but rather an extension of U.S. military operations. [p. 26].

- There is no unified U.S. foreign military aid budget that catalogues all of the military assistance and cooperation the U.S. government is actually providing to the armed forces of each of the Central Asian states.[75] CENTCOM's Directorate for Policy and Plans, with responsibility for developing and executing CENTCOM's Theater Security Cooperation plan is likely to have the fullest picture of U.S. military assistance to Central Asia. These plans are classified. [p. 11].

  A unified budget would present a more fulsome accounting of U.S. taxpayer money going to foreign forces and permit monitoring and evaluation of outcomes, allow meaningful Congressional oversight, and permit Congress and the Executive Branch to make informed choices about the overall balance of the U.S. foreign aid portfolio—that is, the actual mix of military to non-military aid. [p. 33].

- In FY 2007, based on the accounting here, at least two out of every five dollars the U.S. government provided to Central Asia was some form of military or police aid. Given how little is known about Pentagon-funded programs, it is quite likely that this figure undercounts the actual percentage of military to non-military assistance provided to the region. [pp. 34–35].

- Much of the training and assistance the DOD provides to Central Asian militaries is not objectionable on human rights grounds (e.g., professional military education at the Marshall Center, English language training, and joint exercises to prepare a military response to disasters). In terms of equipment, most of what is observable is communications, military transport (trucks, boats, helicopters), radios, night vision goggles, and uniforms. However, improving the capacity and capabilities of Central Asian military and other armed forces to take part in counterterror operations is at the heart of these U.S. aid programs, and this equipment and many of the skills conveyed could be equally applied to internal repression.

  At a minimum, background vetting requirements for DOD-funded military assistance need to be fully implemented and extended to all types of military-to-military assistance and cooperation to ensure that the U.S. government is not providing direct assistance to any elements of these governments' forces that are credibly alleged to have participated in acts of repression or torture. [p. 26]

- Legal conditions placed by Congress on State Department–funded military aid programs to the region do not directly affect DOD-funded military aid programs; however, in the case of Uzbekistan, the DOD appears to have followed the lead of the State Department's military aid cessation. [Table 7, p. 34].

- Legal conditions placed by Congress on State Department–funded military aid programs to the region do not affect the expenditure of previously granted Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or the foreign government's own funds for purchases of military equipment or training from the U.S. government or U.S. corporations. Following the cut-off of most U.S. military aid to Uzbekistan in mid-2004, that government purchased more than $12 million of military equipment and training through U.S. government channels with previously granted funds and more than $50 million of weapons and training directly from U.S. companies. [pp. 21–3]

  Five years after State Department–funded aid to Uzbekistan was cut off due to the secretary of state's inability to certify necessary progress on human rights and political liberty, those restrictions are beginning to be relaxed, with no significant improvements occurring. [Occasional Paper Series No. 2, p. 6]

- Compensation to Central Asian states for their participation in the NDN project emphasizes the facilitation of commercial relations and contracts rather than the provision of large-scale traditional military aid. The U.S. has changed "Buy America" procurement regulations to allow purchase of construction and other

materials from local sources, and it is facilitating Central Asian participation in contracts for reconstruction in Afghanistan. These contracting relationships have just as much potential—and perhaps even more—to affect local political dynamics than do military assistance arrangements, and transparency and accountability around these commercial ties are equally necessary. [Occasional Paper Series No. 2, pp. 12–14].

Notes

1. General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commander, CENTCOM, prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, 2009, pp. 36–7.
2. The Clinton administration's national security strategy called on the U.S. military to engage with the militaries of former Warsaw Pact countries and to enlarge the NATO alliance by bringing these countries in. The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," February 1996.
3. Jim Garamone, "Perry Pushes Preventative Defense," American Forces Press Service, May 29, 1996.
4. Dana Priest, *The Mission* (New York: WW Norton, 2003).
5. DOD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Transformation and Security Cooperation," Remarks by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, September 8, 2004, www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=145.
6. NATO Backgrounder, "Partners in Central Asia," November 2007, p. 5.
7. Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 47.
8. A DOD directive defines security cooperation as "Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs [those funded by the State Department], that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and *provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.*" DOD Directive 5132.03, "DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," October 24, 2008.
9. For an up-to-date listing and description, see DOD, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, "DISAM's On-Line Green Book—Chapter 1: Introduction to Security Cooperation," www.disam.dsca.mil/DR/greenbook.asp (accessed February 2010).
10. See, for instance, DOD, General Counsel, Legislative Proposals for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, p. 5, where the DOD proposes that it be allowed to spend up to $750 million of its budget annually on a military aid program established two years previously (so-called "Section 1206" aid). According to this proposal, "To ensure that commanders have adequate flexibility to meet operational needs, this section also would eliminate Foreign Assistance Act restrictions" (where the body of human rights law is contained). In addition, the Pentagon proposes, *in extremis*, to allow the

President to waive any human rights or other law that could get in the way of the Pentagon providing military aid to a foreign government's forces.

11. Dana Priest, *The Mission* (New York: WW Norton, 2003), p. 107.

12. DOD Directive 5105.75, "Department of Defense Operations at U.S. Embassies," December 21, 2007.

13. According to a journalistic account in 2003, "The huge imbalance between the diplomatic civilian resources being offered by the United States and the largesse of the U.S. military and CIA worried every U.S. ambassador in the [Central Asian] region." Dana Priest, *The Mission*, pp. 16 and 103.

14. SCOs go by different names in different embassies. The embassy and host nation agree on one that will arouse the least political sensitivity. For whatever reason, the SCOs in U.S. embassies in all five Central Asian countries are called the OMC—Office of Military Cooperation.

15. DOD Directive 2055.3, "Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection of USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel," March 11, 1985.

16. Twenty countries fall under CENTCOM's "area of responsibility," broken down into five sub-regions. The South & Central Asian States branch (under CENTCOM's Policy and Plans Directorate) serves as the principal staff point for the development and oversight of military aid activities in Central Asia and provides political-military advice to the Commander on these countries. U.S. Central Command, Regulation No. 10–2, "USCENTCOM Organization and Functions," February 7, 2007, pp. N-22, 23; see also www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-history/.

17. U.S. Central Command, Regulation No. 10–2, "USCENTCOM Organization and Functions," February 7, 2007, pp. N-22, 23.

18. For more, see Georgetown University Law Library, International Criminal Court—Article 98 Agreements Research Guide, www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/article_98.cfm.

19. The White House, Presidential Determination No. 97–19, "Eligibility of NIS Countries: Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to Be Furnished Defense Articles and Services Under the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act", March 11, 1997.

20. DOD, DSCA, FMS Factbook FY 2003 pp. 42, 44.

21. The White House, Presidential Determination No. 02–15, April 18, 2002.

22. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY 2004, p. 161.

23. "In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Kazakhstan provided the U.S. with over-flight permission and has offered basing privileges....The Kyrgyz Republic is providing crucial support for the coalition against terrorism, most notably in authorizing the basing of Coalition aircraft and military personnel on Kyrgyz territory....The Government of Tajikistan immediately offered over-flight and landing rights and use of their air bases.....Turkmenistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, has been the second largest conduit for international aid into Afghanistan....Uzbekistan is a key strategic partner in the war on terrorism and one of the most influential countries in Central Asia. It has allowed U.S. and Coalition forces to use a base in Karshi-Khanabad and has been supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals. It routinely votes with the United States at the UN and is the first country worldwide to bring into force the Article 98 agreement." (State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2004, pp. 347, 351, 377, 382, 387).

24. In 2007 State Department budget documents refer to "rampant corruption" in Kyrgyzstan that feeds "public cynicism about the political process." "Tajikistan's democracy and human rights record remains poor and there has been recent democracy backsliding as illustrated by the flawed presidential election in November 2006." In Turkmenistan "nearly all independent democratic activity is prohibited." In Uzbekistan, "corruption is endemic and has permeated virtually every facet of public life." State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation for FY 2008, pp. 555, 577, 580.

25. State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation Document for Foreign Operations, FY 2011, Annex on Regional Perspectives, p. 580.

26. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Division F (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010), Section 7075 changed the definition of "assistance" covered by the human rights prohibition on military aid to Uzbekistan to no longer include E-IMET (PL 111–117; enacted December 16, 2009).

27. State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation Document for Foreign Operations, FY 2003.

28. Section 656 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) requires the State and Defense Departments to prepare a report to Congress (and make it available on the Internet) by January 31, each year on U.S. training of foreign military forces, except those of NATO or ANZUS member countries, or Japan. It includes some DOD-funded training, but not all of it. See www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm.

29. State Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2006 (PL 109–102), Section 586.

30. www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/search.asp.

31. Dana Priest, *The Mission*, p. 107.

32. DOD, DSCA, letter to Federation of American Scientists dated July 29, 2008, releasing data on FMS in FY 2007, www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/factsandfigures/government_data/section655_FY2007.html.

33. Congress prohibited IMET grants for military training for Uzbekistan in 2004, but it did not cut off the use of previous aid or national money to purchase military training through FMS. Purchased training is not included in the Foreign Military Training Report, so there is generally no way to track it.

34. State Department, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, "2008 Section 655 Report," www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/documents/rpt655_FY08.pdf.

35. See historical list of embargoed destinations at www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/index.html.

36. Gordon Adams, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, March 5, 2009.

37. DOD, Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management, "DISAM's On-Line Green Book—Chapter 1: Introduction to Security Cooperation," www.disam.dsca.mil/DR/greenbook.asp (accessed Feb 2010).

38. The annual DOD funding laws amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code, where the military's authority is spelled out. In its latest strategic review, the DOD indicated that it would continue to press for new initiatives to provide military assistance to foreign nations in coming years. See DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, pp. 24–31 and 57–72.

39. Some of these programs are required to present annual reports on their assistance to foreign militaries after the fact (i.e., for the preceding FY) to Congress, but most are not.

40. When the head of CENTCOM and another regional combatant commander wanted to gain greater U.S. government support for their engagement and outreach to local militaries in the year 2000, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs reportedly argued against sharing information with Congress, saying that doing so would make the funding vulnerable to politics. "Just leave it in a big pot here at the [Department of Defense] so it doesn't get scrutinized as it goes through Congress." Dana Priest, *The Mission*, p. 114.

41. The DOD exempts security cooperation programs linked to Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and to the Global War on Terror more broadly from background vettings, as these are considered

part of "combat operations." In addition, in trainings conducted by NATO, but funded by the DOD, vetting does not occur. Michael Rohrback, Senior Analyst, Government Accounting Office, July 2010, personal communication.

42. DOD, DISAM, "International Arms Cooperation," undated power point presentation, slide 65, available at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/RESEARCH/presentations.asp.

43. ALP is authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Sections 9381–9383.

44. DOS/DOD, Foreign Military Training Reports, various years.

45. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 (Section 902) increased the amount available for this fund from $25 million per year to $75 million. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report (110-335) directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with the Combatant Commanders, to submit a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees by October 31, 2009, providing a detailed description of the activities funded by the CCIF during fiscal year 2009, and an assessment of the benefits derived from those activities.

46. Gen. David Petraeus, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, 2009.

47. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43627.htm?selectedLocale=en.

48. DOD, DSCA, Report to Congress for FY 2008, Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA), www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm.

49. Annual JCET report to Congress, for FY 2007.

50. www.ng.mil/media/factsheets/SPP.pdf.

51. David Sedney, DASD, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 15, 2009.

52. DOD, DSCA, "Memorandum: Warsaw Initiative Fund Guidance", DSCA 05-18, August 12, 2005.

53. DOD, DSCA, Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide FY 2011 Budget estimate, Feb 2010.

54. DOD, DSCA, FY 2011 Budget Estimates, February 2010.

55. Dana Priest, *The Mission*, p. 102.

56. The most relevant body within CENTCOM for these commercial contracts is the Joint Contracting Command. Gen. David Petraeus, Commander, CENTCOM, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2010, p. 51.

57. See, for instance, State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation Document for Foreign Operations, FY 2008, p. 580; and State Department, Transcript of Remarks to the Press by Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 2, 2008, uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/tr060208.html.

58. Only State Deptartment FREEDOM Support Act funds directed toward "Law Enforcement Assistance" are included here. The rest of FSA funds administered by DOS appear to support non-military/police endeavors.

59. Anti-Terrorism Assistance programming.

60. Export Control and Border Security.

61. Only AID FSA funds directed toward "Transnational Crime" are included here. The rest of FSA funds administered by AID appear to support non-military/police endeavors.

62. This includes funding authorized under sections 1004 of the NDAA for FY 1991 and 1033 of the NDAA or FY 1998 relating to authority to provide support for counter-drug activities.

63. Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, initiated in FY 2002.

64. Includes foreign officer participation in Aviation Leadership Program and attendance at U.S. Military Service Academies and regional security studies centers (primarily Marshall Center).

65. Section 1208 of the NDAA for FY 2006 authorizes the DOD to reimburse coalition countries for logistical, military, or other support to U.S. military operations.

66. Joint Combined Exchange Training between U.S. Special Operations Forces and host nation forces.

67. The data provided under "Non Freedom Support Act" omit a good deal of relevant DOD funding, included in Table 7, because that aid is not specifically appropriated. While this is not complete, it does provide context for Table 7.

68. See State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation Document for Foreign Operations, FY 2004, p. 348 (in reference to backsliding in Kazakhstan); FY 2008, p. 573 (backsliding in Tajikistan); FY 2010, p. 517 (backsliding in Kyrgyzstan); FY 2004, p. 387 (disappointments in Uzbekistan); FY 2010, p. 548 (missteps and "legacy of Soviet repression" in Turkmenistan); and FY 2006, p. 433 (Uzbekistan "falling significantly short").

69. Neither the State Department nor the DOD ever provides evidence for these claims. For a good assessment, see the RAND study commissioned by OSI, with a case study on Uzbekistan: Seth G. Jones, Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins, *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

70. State Department, Congressional Budget Presentation for FY 2010, p. 211.

71. David Sedney, DASD for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 15, 2009.

72. Regarding DOD/CENTCOM objectives, see David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 15, 2009; General David Petraeus, Commander, CENTCOM, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2009, pp. 36–7.

73. See the box on p. 12, showing the relatively large size of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation OMC at a time when Uzbekistan was prohibited from receiving standard types of U.S. military aid.

74. Past legislative proposals by the DOD to create new security cooperation programs, www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/proposals_old/index.html. For future plans in this area, see DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, pp. 24–31 and 57–72.

75. A recent Congressional report, based on input from the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, includes a lengthy accounting of numerous U.S. government agencies' budgeted security assistance to Central Asia, but it includes budget lines for only a few of the DOD funds listed in this report that are known to convey training and equipment to Central Asian forces. See Jim Nichol, "Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests," *CRS Report for Congress*, March 11, 2020, pp. 64–65.

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