"The rise of populism in Europe can be traced through online behaviour…"

POPULISM IN EUROPE: DENMARK

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DEM⊙S

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A note on terminology

This paper is the third in a series of country briefing papers released in 2012 about the online support of populist political parties and street-based groups in Europe. These papers are based on a dataset of approximately 13,000 Facebook supporters of these 'nationalist populist' parties in 12 European countries, which was published in the Demos report, *The New Face of Digital Populism*, released in November 2011.[1]

Throughout this paper, we refer to two primary datasets by the following terminology:

· *Danish People's Party (DPP) Facebook supporters*: The primary data source used in this report is a survey of 542 Facebook supporters of the DPP, collected by Demos during July and August 2011. All references to DPP supporters refer to this group unless otherwise stated.
· *Populist parties and movements (PPAM)*: In order to draw comparisons between DPP Facebook supporters and the Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties elsewhere in Europe, throughout this paper we refer to the data set collected for *The New Face of Digital Populism*. This includes 10,667 Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties and movements in 11 Western European countries. We refer to these as PPAM throughout.

We also draw on European-wide survey data from the Eurobarometer survey and the European Values Study. These studies are cited where relevant below.

Executive summary

Over the last decade, nationalist populist parties and movements have been growing in strength across Europe. These parties are defined by their opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, and concern for protecting national and European culture, particularly from immigrants from Muslim majority countries. On economic policy, they are often vocal critics of globalisation and the effects of international capitalism on workers' rights. This is combined with 'anti-establishment' rhetoric used to appeal to widespread disillusionment with mainstream political parties, the media and government. Often called 'populist extremist parties' or 'the new right', these parties do not fit easily into the traditional political divides.

One of the most successful of these parties is the Dansk Folkeparti (or 'Danish People's Party', DPP). The DPP is the third largest political party in Denmark and was a junior member of the previous coalition government from 2002 until 2011. Although it suffered a slight set back in the September 2011 general election, it still managed to capture over 12 per cent of the national vote. Interest in populist movements has been considerable in Denmark, which is evidenced by the fact that Aarhus was chosen for a rally in March 2012 to create a Europe-wide movement of 'defence leagues' based on the English Defence League. Moreover, the terrorist attack carried out by Anders Breivik in 2011 further heightened concerns in Scandinavia about the possible ideological relationship between anti-immigration populist movements and potential violent extremists.

Like many populist parties, the DPP has been effective at mobilising young Danes by using online communication to amplify its message, recruit new members and organise.

Indeed, the online social media following on Facebook of the DPP and the leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, is greater than its official membership list of around 10,000[2] (according to Facebook's advertising tool, 20,160 people 'like' Pia Kjærsgaard). Millions of people relate to politics in the twenty-first century through a mix of online and offline political activity, particularly members of a younger, digital generation. This research aims to understand this new form of political engagement. The importance of Facebook and other social media websites to nascent political movements can no longer be underestimated.

This report presents the results of a survey of 542 responses from Facebook fans of the DPP. It includes data on who they are, what they think, and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world activism.

Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media website used in Denmark and by supporters of the DPP. For two months in summer 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals who were supporters of three DPP related groups on Facebook. On clicking the advert, individuals were redirected to a survey, which they were invited to complete. The survey and adverts were presented in Danish, and were then translated back into English for the purposes of this report. The data were then weighted in order to improve the validity and accuracy of any inferences made about the online population. Although online recruitment in social research is widespread, self-select recruitment via social network sites brings novel challenges. Because this is an innovative research method with both strengths and weaknesses, we have included a methodology section in an annex to this report.

Results

It is important to stress that the DPP's support-base cannot be adequately understood through Facebook alone, and many DPP supporters are of course not on Facebook. The findings in this report refer specifically to DPP Facebook supporters—an important, but specific, sub-group of its overall support base. It is with this important caveat that these results are presented.

These are the main results of our survey:

· *DPP Facebook supporters are predominantly young and male.* Nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of supporters are male, and 51 per cent are under 30. However, they are more representative of the Danish population than supporters of similar parties in Western Europe, who show an even greater propensity to be under 30 and male.

· *DPP Facebook supporters tend to be reasonably well educated, but disproportionately likely to be unemployed.* Nearly one in five (17 per cent) are unemployed, a figure well above the national average of 8 per cent. Unlike supporters of similar parties in other Western European countries, those over 26 are even more likely to be unemployed than those under 26 (22 per cent compared with 13 per cent). Those over 26 are considerably more likely to be unemployed than the national average for that age (22 per cent compared with 6 per cent).

· *DPP Facebook supporters are active formal party members and demonstrators.* Nearly one in four (24 per cent) are formal members of the party; and 19 per cent report having been on a demonstration in the last six months, well above the national average. However, only half of the DPP's Facebook fans report having actually voted for the party at the last election (even when accounting for the relative youth of the sample, this is considerably below the average across Europe). Facebook is clearly an important means through which the group mobilises but there appear to be many generally sympathetic 'fans' who do not actually vote for the party in elections.

· *DPP Facebook supporters are democrats who think politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns, and renounce violence.* Only 10 per cent agreed with the statement 'it does not matter who you vote for', one of the lowest figures for agreeing with this statement of all the parties we surveyed in Western

Europe. More significant, 51 per cent agreed that politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns, a higher proportion than that for supporters of similar parties in Western Europe we surveyed. Only 15 per cent of DPP Facebook supporters agreed with the statement 'violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome', compared with an average score of 26 per cent across our European data set. However, it is important to stress that agreeing that violence is acceptable to ensure a certain outcome does not mean that DPP Facebook fans are more or less prone to actually commit violence.

· *The top concerns of DPP Facebook fans are immigration and Islamic extremism.* In this respect, they differ from the average Danish citizen. However, DPP supporters' other concerns are very similar to those held nationally: 19 per cent of DPP supporters cited the economic situation as a top two concern, and 17 per cent cited healthcare. Interestingly, among the under 30s the economic situation and healthcare were as or more important than Islamic extremism. When asked why they joined the party, a similar picture emerges: almost a third of respondents cited reasons related to anti-immigration. Although it has often been argued that the Mohammed cartoon crisis helped the DPP, when asked what accounts for the DPP's electoral success, immigration was the top response whereas the Mohammed cartoons were only eighth in the list.

· *DPP Facebook fans are untrusting optimists.* DPP supporters are more optimistic about their own future than the average Danish citizen, and similarly pessimistic about the future of Denmark as a whole. However, they have low levels of trust in other people: 38 per cent agree with the statement that other people can be trusted, compared with 76 per cent for the average Danish citizen.

· *DPP Facebook fans have low levels of trust in the judiciary and the media.* In general, DPP supporters have very low trust in most of the important political and social institutions of the country than the average Danish citizen does (although they have higher levels

of trust in the government, of which the DPP was part). However, the most marked difference between them and the average Danish citizen is in their levels of trust in the media (12 per cent compared with 50 per cent) and the justice and legal system (48 per cent compared with 84 per cent).

Implications
Our task in this report is to illuminate the phenomenon of online supporters of the DPP and present the results objectively. We do not offer lengthy recommendations because formulating a response is a task for Danish citizens and politicians. This is perhaps a more difficult task given the fluid and dynamic way many people now express their political preferences online, and the way social media allow for groups and individuals to network and mobilise faster than ever. We hope this research can inform that task.

It is clear that Denmark's immigration policy is a key driver of support for the DPP despite findings from the Eurobarometer Survey suggesting that this concern is not shared among the majority of the Danish population. This said, unlike supporters of similar parties in Western Europe we surveyed, national identity and immigration are not the only issues that motivate supporters of the DPP. Economic policy, welfare and healthcare are all important concerns, and supporters believe the DPP is responding to them.

If mainstream politicians wish to appeal to the supporters of parties like the DPP, they must be bold in articulating and defending the benefits of immigration and candid in what is expected of immigrants who come to Denmark. They must also learn to speak about the importance of identity without resorting to xenophobia and the demonisation of minorities. However, it is important to note that focusing entirely on immigration would ignore the variety of concerns that motivated DPP supporters.

The DPP's support-base is varied. Those on Facebook are active and motivated, and can mobilise in support of the group. Like many other young people across Europe, they use

online channels as a form of political engagement, information and activism. The DPP has been good at relating to this form of political involvement. This is a challenge for other mainstream parties.

More generally, DPP Facebook supporters believe that politics is an effective way to address their concerns. In many respects this is to be welcomed. On the basis of these results, supporters of the DPP are not a small fringe of radical or extreme individuals; many are obviously close to the mainstream. Despite having low trust in a range of other important social institutions — such as the legal system, the press and religious institutions — DPP supporters are almost as likely to trust political parties and more likely to trust the government than the Danish population in general. Evidence from the UK Citizenship Survey suggests that low levels of trust in social institutions are correlated with the likelihood of justifying violent extremism. Maintaining or restoring trust in political institutions is an extremely important challenge for most of Western Europe. In our Europe-wide survey, we found that those online supporters who are also involved in offline politics appear to be more democratic, have more faith in politics, and be more likely to disavow violence. While the causal relationship between these attitudes is not clear, this is still powerful evidence to suggest that encouraging more people to become actively involved in political and civic life is an important way forward.

1   Background

The Danish People's Party

The Danish People's Party (DPP) was founded in 1996 as a successor of the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet). The Danish Progress Party was originally focused on fighting high taxation and bureaucracy, although the party was sometimes associated with very right wing, even racist, views with respect to Muslim immigrants to Denmark.[3]

The DPP was formed in order to create a more moderate and palatable political party that responded to concerns about integration and immigration. It immediately found political support at its first general election in 1998, where the DPP secured over 7 per cent of the vote. Their support continued to grow and in the 2001 general election they won 13 per cent of the national ballot, making them the third largest party in Denmark. In 2002, they became part of the Conservative People's Party-led Coalition Government. The following two elections in 2005 and 2007 saw the DPP increase its parliamentary representation, although not dramatically. In the 2007 election, the party secured 13.9 per cent of the national vote and 25 seats in Parliament (out of 179 seats).

In the most recent election (September 2011) the DPP suffered a slight electoral setback, gaining only 12.3 per cent of the national vote. Moreover, the governing coalition of which it was a part was replaced by a new centre-left 'Red Alliance' coalition government led by the Social Democrats. However, even though the party is no longer in government, the 2011 result demonstrated that the party is now established as a significant political party.

Policies

The DPP's policies relate primarily to the protection of Danish identity and heritage, with particular focus on limiting immigration and rejecting multiculturalism. As stated in their programme, the DPP aims 'to assert Denmark's independence, to guarantee the freedom of the Danish people in their own country, and to preserve and promote representative government and the monarchy'. The party's leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, openly acknowledges that a multi-ethnic Danish society would be a 'national disaster'.[4] Meanwhile, the DPP's integration spokesperson, Martin Henrikson, has stated that one of the primary aims of the party was 'to bring down the immigration from Muslim countries to zero'.[5]

For many of the party's supporters, the Mohammed cartoon scandal crystallised the party's rejection of multiculturalism and exemplified the need to constrain immigration flows from Muslim majority countries. The DPP openly supported the cartoon's publication, framing it as an exemplar of free speech. They also used the incident to suggest that Muslim populations were irrational, and Islamic beliefs implacably opposed to liberal, democratic values that societies like Denmark had fought to develop. The party's youth wing (DF Ungdom) even went as far as endorsing a Mohammed cartoon drawing contest at an annual summer camp.[6]

DF Ungdom has a history of organising controversial campaigns targeted at Denmark's Muslim population. In 1999, it launched an initiative to prevent Halal meat from being served in Danish schools. While in 2007, they organised a campaign aimed at Muslim women, under the banner of fighting for women's rights, called *Befri jer selv* (Free yourselves), which tried to encourage Muslim women to live more like 'real' Danish women.[7]

The party also campaigns on an aggressive approach to integration for newly arrived immigrants, ensuring the education system instils appreciation for and knowledge of Danish history, culture and language. This concern with the preservation of Danish identity and cultural heritage also extends to a strong critique of what the party sees as the sovereignty eroding aspirations of the European Union.

In May 2011, the DPP played a key role in persuading the Danish Government to challenge the Schengen Agreement by proposing to restore border and custom controls along Denmark's borders with Sweden and Germany.

Similar to other more established populist parties, the DPP goes beyond discussing immigration and identity. The party advocates the expansion of the welfare state, particularly for older people. It also considers itself to be socially conservative, supporting the institution of 'the family', the monarchy, the Church of Denmark, animal rights and the environment. In this sense, the DPP remains fairly similar to other populist parties that are increasingly combining left-wing economic and social policies (such as the protection of workers' rights against economic globalisation) with populist rhetorical discourse, thereby transcending the traditional left—right political divide.

The party is led by the charismatic and popular Pia Kjærsgaard, who has led the DPP more or less since the founding of the party. Prior to entering politics, Kjærsgaard worked as a care assistant in an old people's home, and is often known for her 'housewife' image (she is often referred to as 'Mamma Pia' by the DPP youth wing). She presents herself as being in touch with the concerns of ordinary Danes, who have been—she believes—abandoned by privileged elitist politicians. A highly influential political figure in Danish politics, Kjærsgaard has admitted that she has become 'very powerful', despite being 'just a housewife and mother'.[8]

Impact

This nuanced political message means the DPP is supported by a varied constituency that extends beyond a simple protest vote against the mainstream political parties. The DPP was able to absorb much of the traditional electoral base of the Progress Party (roughly half of those who had cast their vote for the Progress Party in 1994 declared they would vote for the DPP), while at the same time gradually absorbing traditional Social Democrat constituents usually aligned to the left of

the political spectrum.[9] Other studies of DPP voters have also acknowledged the overrepresentation of working class constituencies, with certain commentators observing that 'the party has a stronghold among young males with working-class backgrounds or with low education'.[10]

The political breakthrough of the DPP has had a significant effect on Danish politics, especially given the party's involvement in the centre-right coalition government between 2002 and 2011. Although it did not hold any formal cabinet level positions, the DPP's continued support for the coalition was premised on its influence over the government's immigration policy. Wielding disproportionate influence as political makeweight, this conditional relationship led to the DPP formulating most of the immigration law endorsed by the coalition since 2002, which is widely considered to be the toughest in Europe. This has included laws restricting rights to asylum, cuts to welfare benefits for migrants, 24-hour customs controls, and even laws preventing hostels from housing migrants who do not hold permanent residency status.[11] Such moves have been condemned by the United Nations, with commentators arguing that Denmark had contravened European and international human rights legislation.

The radical right in Denmark

Nevertheless, the more important concern, especially post-Breivik, is whether or not extreme and violent far-right groups draw on the same ideological currents as more mainstream political parties such as the DPP. Denmark has a number of small groups that profess views which are far more extreme than those promulgated by the DPP. For example, Denmark's National Socialist Movement, an openly Nazi organisation, runs a small number of closed events, but these are considered minor even compared with five years ago. Other Nazi groups are closely connected to football teams, such as White Pride, a hooligan group based in Århus. In 2007 Charlotte Johannsen, a young student

in Aarhus, spent eight months undercover with White Pride after they beat up a friend of hers on a night out. She revealed them to be a relatively small but extremely violent group who would systematically plan attacks on immigrants or left-wing youth around the city. Johannsen suggested that these groups were more closely connected to the DPP than the party would admit: a few White Pride members had been members of DPP's youth wing, DF Ungdom. They were only thrown out of the party when this came to light. Most of these small groups, however, now view the DPP as 'sell-outs', who are playing the political game.[12]

In their 2008–2010 report, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) state that recruitment and advertisement among the violent far-right is ongoing and that the internet is a crucial part of this. The report acknowledges that one of the main recruitment bases is the football hooligan environment, and that there have always been strong links between the far-right in Denmark and other countries (in particular Sweden and Germany).[13]

Aside from the threat of terrorist violence, PET notes that conflicts between far-right and far-left extremists constitute a cause for concern. Such clashes are increasingly common and are becoming more organised. The tendency of these groups to source weapons only adds to the potential levels of violence.

Recently there have been a number of attempts to form specifically anti-Islam and anti-Islamist groups in Denmark. In March 2012, European Defence Leagues—modelling themselves on the English Defence League—demonstrated in Århus. Although the demonstration itself was small, the Danish Defence League (DDL) is considered to be the largest of the new defence groups outside the UK.[14] Indeed, Johannsen's book reported that members of White Pride went on a trip to London where they met members of the British National Party's youth wing. It is the latest of a number of similar groups, including Århus Against Mosques and Stop the Islamisation of Denmark (a fraction of Stop the Islamisation of Europe). Similar to the English

Defence League, these groups are attempting to define themselves as anti-fascist supporters of liberal values, which they perceive as being under threat from a creeping 'Islamification' of European society. However, some of these smaller groups, such as Vederfølner, expressed scepticism of the EDL's acceptance of non-white (Sikhs and Black British) and homosexual members, suggesting this has hampered their ability to recruit effectively among the more far-right individuals and groups on the fringes in Denmark (even if they are still supportive of the EDL's message and activities).[15]

A new party has recently been established that seeks to re-create a more traditional Danish society, called Danskerne's Parti (The Danes' Party). The party was set up in June 2011 by a 21-year-old student, Daniel Carlsen, who grew up in Århus. He joined Denmark's National Socialist Movement (DNSB) at the age of 16, where he helped them improve their membership and profile. He later left to start Danskerne's Parti, taking some DNSB members with him. Carlsen—young, articulate, and charismatic—has been cited by other far-right groups and experts in the field as representing a new type of far-right movement. Carlsen has been trying to gather the far-right under one, unified banner to fight against immigration in Denmark, and some believe this could be the only party on the far-right fringes that has the potential to grow in the near future.[16] Carlsen himself claims to be 'an ethnic nationalist',[17] and believes in cutting off immigration completely and repatriating any non-Westerners currently residing in Denmark, regardless of how long they have lived there. He believes his party differs from other far-right groups, in that they're an actual political party, rather than a street movement, and he says they have close links to Svenskerne's Parti (The Swedes' Party) in Sweden and the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party; NPD) in north Germany, both self-styled national socialist parties. According to Carlsen their aim is to start standing at local elections and develop the party from the local grass roots up, specifically citing the German NPD as inspiration for this strategy.

The relationship between these street-based, loose movements and formal political parties is not clear, but is the subject of concern for anti-fascist protest groups. So far, most of the overlap has been based on individuals. For example, Lars Larsen, leader of Vederfølner, is the son of the previous leader of the Progress Party; while Morten Messerschmidt, member of European Parliament for the DPP, was famously found chanting Nazi songs in Tivoli.

2 Who are Danish People's Party Facebook supporters?

This chapter presents the socio-economic, age and gender data of DPP Facebook supporters. Where possible, we present this information in the context of broader Danish society and make comparisons to similar groups in Western Europe as presented in the Demos report *The New Face of Digital Populism*.[18]

Demographics and geography

Using Facebook's own publicly available advertising tool (see methodology in the annex for details) it is possible to identify the age and gender of all Danish users of Facebook, in addition to deriving the basic demographic information of Facebook members who express a preference for the DPP.

Across the country as a whole, Danish Facebook users display a near even gender split (49 per cent male and 51 per cent female), but among DPP's Facebook supporters, 64 per cent are male and 36 per cent are female (n=15,660). This gender imbalance towards males is shared with similar far-right groups or populist parties and movements (PPAMs) across Western Europe, which tend to be more male dominated.

DPP's Facebook supporters also tend to be young (table 1). One-quarter were under 20; and 51 per cent were under 30. Although Facebook users in general tend to be a young demographic, they are not this young: in Denmark, 43 per cent of all Facebook users are under 30.

Nevertheless, across both these basic demographic measures, when compared to the supporters of similar groups across Western Europe, the DPP supporters were slightly older with a more balanced gender split. In this they differ considerably from Facebook supporters of the Swedish Democrats, of whom 63 per cent were between 16 and 20 years old.

Table 1 **Age of DDP Facebook supporters (n=15,640) and supporters of Western Europe PPAMs (national statistics in brackets)**

Age group	DDP total (Denmark total) (%)	Western Europe PPAMs (European total) (%)
16–20	24 (17)	32 (19)
21–25	17 (14)	19 (17)
26–30	10 (11)	12 (14)
31–40	19 (21)	17 (21)
41–50	17 (18)	12 (15)
51+	13 (19)	8 (13)

We cannot precisely pinpoint where DPP Facebook supporters are located, but we asked survey respondents what was the nearest large city to their location within 50km. Copenhagen was the closest city for 44 per cent, followed by Århus (19 per cent), Odense (15 per cent), Aaloborg (10 per cent) and Esbjerg (10 per cent).

Education and employment

We asked online supporters at what institution they gained their highest level of educational attainment, and whether they had had any vocational education ('professional education' in table 2). Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare different education systems so the cut-off between high school and university is not entirely clear. Notwithstanding the problems with comparison, almost half of DPP supporters (48 per cent) reported participating in higher education.

At 17 per cent, the DPP unemployment rate was around the same for members of similar parties in Scandinavia—Norway (16 per cent) and Finland (19 per cent)—although higher than for Sweden (11 per cent), which might be accounted for by the very young age demographic of Swedish Democrat supporters.

Table 2 **Highest educational attainment of DPP Facebook supporters, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=542)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
'Folkeskole'	33	31	35	27	32
Highschool or university	43	55	55	35	48
Professional education	22	14	9	37	19

The unemployment rate of DPP Facebook supporters is also higher than the national average in Denmark. Most notably, 22 per cent of DPP supporters at or over the age of 26 were unemployed, considerably higher than the national average for that age group (6 per cent).

Table 3 **Employment status of DPP Facebook supporters (n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 26 (national statistics in brackets)[19]**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 26 (%)	Over 26 (%)	Total (%)
Employed	52	43	34	67	48
Unemployed	15 (8)	19 (8)	13 (15)	22 (6)	17 (8)
Student	30	35	52	5	33

Membership and involvement

To determine the extent to which DPP Facebook supporters are involved in offline activity, we asked respondents a number of questions about their involvement with the party, including whether they voted for the DPP, were formal members of the DPP and had participated in any DPP-related demonstrations or street protests in the past six months (table 4). Only one-quarter of DPP Facebook supporters reported being formal members of the party, and under half reported having voted for the party at the last election. Just one in five reported

having taken part in a street demonstration or protest in the past six months (although this was considerably above the national average of 8 per cent).

It is interesting to note that in all these measures that the extent of 'offline' involvement by DPP Facebook fans is considerably less than for fans of other similar parties in Western Europe. DPP membership levels were slightly below the PPAM average of 32 per cent, and the voting propensity was significantly lower than the PPAM average of 67 per cent. However, a large number of respondents would have been too young to vote at the time of the last general election. The high proportion of respondents over the age of 30 who voted for the DPP (78 per cent) indicates the potential for voting levels to rise significantly as the younger members mature.

Table 4   **Offline involvement of DPP Facebook supporters (n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 30 (national statistics in brackets)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Formal members of DDP	20	29	23	26	24
Voted for DDP in the 2007 election	48	47	32	78	48 (14)[20]
Taken part in a march or demo in last 6–12 months	22	16	23	12	19 (8)[21]

3 Social and political concerns

We asked DPP Facebook supporters a number of questions about their social and political views, trust in people and political institutions, and views about the future for themselves and their country. Where the information is available, we have drawn comparisons with national averages based on either the Eurobarometer Survey (in autumn 2011) or the European Values Study 2010, in order to make more meaningful inferences.[22] We also draw out comparisons with supporters of PPAMs.

Top two biggest concerns

When asked to rank their top two social and political concerns from a list of 18 current issues, the most common responses from DPP Facebook supporters were immigration and Islamic extremism (table 5). In this respect, they mirror the top concerns of the supporters of similar parties across Western Europe.

However, overall the Facebook supporters of the DPP share the concerns of Danish society in general. Although immigration (36 per cent) and Islamic extremism (21 per cent) were DPP supporters' top two concerns, they were almost as concerned about the economic situation and healthcare as the Danish general population. The high scores for healthcare are similar to most of Scandinavia, but not other parts of Western Europe: Norway, Denmark and Finland were the three countries with the highest concerns about healthcare. In Denmark, the DPP campaigns heavily on the issue, and this is likely to have contributed to the high score.

Table 5 **Top two biggest concerns of DPP Facebook supporters n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 30 (national statistics in brackets)[23]**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Immigration	36	35	34	38	36 (4)
Islamic extremism	25	17	18	28	21 (N/A)
Economic situation	20	19	23	13	19 (22)
Healthcare	10	25	18	14	17 (14)
Crime	10	21	14	19	15 (5)

Politics and voting

We also asked DPP Facebook supporters questions to tell us their views about the effectiveness of democracy in order to gauge the level of disillusionment they feel with mainstream political channels. Overall, the findings are surprising, with DPP Facebook supporters generally positive about voting and the effectiveness of politics.

Only 10 per cent of DPP Facebook supporters agreed with the statement 'it does not matter who you vote for' (table 6), which compares with a PPAM average of 16 per cent. This is in keeping with a Scandinavian trend to register below-average levels of agreement on this measure: Norway (13 per cent), Sweden (9 per cent) and Finland (6 per cent).

Table 6 **Extent to which DPP Facebook supporters agree that it does not matter who you vote for, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=542)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	6	4	6	4	5
Agree a little	7	2	4	6	5
Disagree a little	9	6	7	7	7
Disagree entirely	72	84	79	75	77

Perhaps as significant was the extent to which DPP Facebook supporters agree with the statement that 'politics is an effective way to respond to my concerns' (table 7): 41 per cent of DPP Facebook supporters agreed with the statement compared with just 35 per cent of supporters of other PPAMs. This might be partly as a result of the electoral success of the party.

Table 7 **Extent to which DPP Facebook supporters agree that politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=542)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	17	11	15	13	14
Agree a little	26	27	27	26	27
Disagree a little	14	16	14	16	15
Disagree entirely	13	7	8	13	10

Only 15 per cent of DPP Facebook supporters agreed with the statement 'violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome', nearly half the average score of supporters of other PPAMs (26 per cent). Once again, this reflects a general trend among all Scandinavian countries for fewer people to agree that violence is acceptable: Sweden (14 per cent), Norway (14 per cent) and Finland (21 per cent). Moreover, there are only marginal (if any) differences in the response to this question based on gender or age.

Before proceeding it is important to stress that the results of this question should not be misinterpreted. Agreeing that violence is acceptable to ensure a certain outcome does not mean that DPP Facebook supporters are more prone to actually commit violence. There are unfortunately no baseline data on this question for Danish or European general populations, making inferences about the relevance of the responses difficult.

Personal and national optimism

As might be expected, the majority of DPP Facebook supporters were pessimistic about Denmark's future: 61 per cent disagreed either a little or entirely with the statement 'Denmark is on the right track' (table 8). Nevertheless, DPP supporters demonstrated significantly higher levels of optimism than the PPAM average of 10 per cent. This trait was also evident to a lesser degree among the other Scandinavian countries: Norway (12 per cent), Sweden (14 per cent) and Finland (16 per cent).

　　Comparing this to a similar question asked in the Eurobarometer Survey, we can conclude that DPP Facebook supporters are more pessimistic about Denmark's future than the average Danish person. However, it is not an enormous difference. According to the Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) question 'At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in Denmark?', half of all correspondents said the wrong direction; and only 36 per cent said the right direction.

　　When asked whether they thought their own life would be better or worse in 12 months time, DPP supporters displayed significantly higher levels of personal optimism than the Danish general public: 46 per cent of DPP supporters compared with 28 per cent of the Danish general public thought the next 12 months would be better (although 18 per cent compared with 4 per cent thought they would be worse) (table 9). Unsurprisingly therefore, DPP supporters showed significantly higher levels of optimism than the PPAM average (27 per cent).

Table 8　**Extent to which DPP Facebook supporters agree that Denmark is on the right track, by gender and whether under or over age 30 (n=542)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	8	7	7	8	8
Agree a little	19	20	16	28	20
Disagree a little	27	36	35	22	31
Disagree entirely	33	27	30	30	30

Table 9　**DPP Facebook supporters' personal outlook for the next 12 months (n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 30 (national statistics in brackets)[24]**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Better	46	46	49	39	46 (28)
Worse	20	15	17	18	18 (4)
Same	31	38	31	40	34 (68)

Attitudes toward the European Union

Consistent with the majority of respondents from PPAMs in other Western European countries, DPP Facebook supporters are much more likely to have negative opinions of the European Union (EU). When asked what the EU means to them, the most common responses were 'waste of money', 'not enough control at the external borders' and 'loss of cultural and national identity' (table 10), which are similar to the average responses of supporters of other PPAMs when asked this question. In contrast, the top three responses for the Danish public as a whole were: freedom to travel, work and study anywhere in the EU (59 per cent), peace (41 per cent) and democracy/bureaucracy (both at 36 per cent).

Table 10　**DPP supporters' attitudes towards the European Union (n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 30 (national statistics in brackets)[25]**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Waste of money	53	56	54	56	55 (22)
Not enough control at external borders	54	52	49	61	53 (21)
Loss of cultural and national identity[26]	44	53	45	53	48 (15)
More crime	46	47	44	50	46 (18)
Bureaucracy	36	35	33	40	36 (36)

Trust in institutions and people

Trust in other people, as well as social institutions, is generally considered to be an important indicator of social capital in democratic societies. Similar to respondents from other PPAMs in Europe, DPP Facebook supporters display very low levels of trust towards social and political institutions compared with their national compatriots (table 11).

On almost every measure tested, DPP Facebook fans were less trusting than the Danish public of all public institutions, which is a trend that appears common across online supporters of many PPAMs. Interestingly, however, despite their disillusionment with mainstream politics, DPP Facebook supporters had similar levels of trust in political parties as the Danish public in general. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they have more faith in the government than the national average: when this survey was taken the DPP was part of the centre-right coalition government. Taken in conjunction with the data on voting and the efficacy of politics above, this is another indication that DPP supporters combine disillusionment with mainstream politics and institutions with an embedded commitment and belief in democratic political channels for obtaining power.

Asked whether they trust other people, 38 per cent of DPP supporters said they thought that most people can be trusted (table 12). This is slightly more than the average figure for PPAM supporters (33 per cent) who believe that most people can be trusted, but significantly less than the average for the Danish general public (75 per cent).

Table 11 — **Whether DPP supporters and the Danish general public tend to trust institutions (n=542)**

Institution	Tend to trust		Tend not to trust	
	DPP supporters (%)	Danish public (%)[27]	DPP (%)	Danish public (%)
Police	75	89	21	10
Army	67	76	23	18
Trade unions	51	66	42	27
Justice and legal system	48	84	46	14
Government	46	42	49	55
Political parties	33	35	58	62
European union	18	50	75	42
The press [28]	12	50	74	47
Religious institutions	12	38	78	51

Table 12 — **Whether DPP supporters agree that people can be trusted (n=542), by gender and whether under or over age 30 (national statistics in brackets)[29]**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
In general most people can be trusted	41	35	36	42	38 (75)
In general most people cannot be trusted	39	44	44	35	41 (24)

4 Why do people support the Danish People's Party online?

The preceding chapter provides some indication of why DPP Facebook supporters are drawn to the party, but we also wanted respondents to describe what motivates their support in their own words. This chapter presents our findings regarding respondents' answers to an open-response question asking why they supported the DPP. Out of the 542 total survey responses, only 68 people responded to this question, which is a low response, but it does provide some useful insights.

Table 13 provides a breakdown of the different categories that we used to code and classify the responses that we received. Responses could be placed in multiple categories if deemed relevant. The three most common responses were identification with the party's values and its anti-immigration stance, and disillusionment with mainstream political parties. We discuss the five most frequently cited categories below, and give examples of some of the responses DPP supporters gave.

Group values
Respondents who were classified in this category cited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, beliefs, aspirations or ideas of the DPP as reasons for supporting the party. Nearly two-thirds of respondents cited this as a reason for joining (suggesting it is positive identification with the party rather than reactive protest that is motivating DPP's Facebook supporters).

Table 13   Reasons given by DPP supporters for joining the party, by gender and age group (n=68)

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Age 16–20 (%)	Age 21–25 (%)	Age 26–30 (%)	Age 31–40 (%)	Age 41–50 (%)	Age 51+ (%)	Total (%)
Group values	40	84	64	50	87	58	75	59	64
Anti-immigration	48	10	30	12	26	47	16	26	27
Identity	21	27	41	0	50	0	24	0	24
Disillu-sionment	8	23	29	0	0	21	0	18	16
Anti-Islam	26	5	18	25	0	5	4	18	14
Integrity	14	12	12	0	0	42	0	30	13
Anti-EU	15	1	6	13	0	5	4	18	7
Economic	5	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	2
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Some of the respondents noted the unique position of the DPP, highlighting a mix of left-wing and right-wing views:

Animal welfare means a lot to me and I also consider myself a nationalist (in the good way, not in some Nazi way) so they were the party that came closest to my opinions.[30]

Others were more explicit about their extreme views:

I thought it was about time I did something about Denmark's domestic policies and stopped just being a 'closet racist'. Plus there are no Nazi parties that have a genuine influence so you take what you can get.[31]

Anti-immigration

Respondents were classified in this category if they explicitly mentioned immigration when explaining why they supported the DPP. Nearly one-third who responded to the question cited immigration as a motivation, which was higher than the PPAM average of 18 per cent. The proportion of people who were hostile to immigration in other Scandinavian countries varied: Norway (9 per cent), Finland (11 per cent) and Sweden (36 per cent). These are some examples of responses from people in this category:

To make Denmark the best place, where traditions and values don't have to suffer under immigration.[32]

Because they battle against liberalism. And because I'm going to war to fight for their countries instead of these refugees fighting for their own countries. A big part of my honour is being stifled by these immigrants and their demands. I'd happily see them all sent home or just sent away![33]

Identity

Respondents were classified in the identity category when they referred to a love of Denmark, commitment to the preservation of traditional Danish national and cultural values, or wish to represent the interests of 'real' Danes when asked about their reasons for supporting the party.

Around one-fifth fall into this category, similar to the average across other PPAMs (18 per cent). One respondent explained:

What DPP stands for is the right thing politically, for me and for Denmark's future… otherwise the world will eat us—we will lose the 'Danish' and what us Danish people stand for.[34]

Disillusionment

Respondents were placed into the disillusionment category when they expressed disenchantment with major political institutions, the political elite or with the direction of their country.

Respondents often juxtaposed their disillusionment with other mainstream parties with the perceived honesty of the DPP:

They dare speak the truth and are not worried about becoming unpopular which a lot of other parties are.[35]

Anti-Islam

Although only 14 per cent specifically mentioned anti-Islamic sentiments or concerns about Islam as reasons for joining the party, responses falling under this category were often extremely angry and lengthy when compared with the other reasons. This could suggest that the issue of Islam invokes particularly strong emotions among a small proportion of supporters.

These are some of the responses we received:

I joined due to personal reasons. I'm sick of Muslims and the way they live their life in Denmark and how they behave.[36]

We have to do something about all these Muslims who are taking over our country. This is something I spend all my time on and [I] would happily talk to you about the massive Muslim problem that our whole world is experiencing.[37]

Became a member when I'd had enough of all these Muslims. They only come to our country to overtake it. A lot of them don't pay taxes but still receive benefits and often early pensions even though they could easily work—I mean a bit of torture doesn't mean you can't sit on the tills in a supermarket. Granted me and my wife have gotten [an] early pension too, but we have earned it and did our best before we both had to stop work due to stress. Those Muslims are so far out and that's where we should send them as well![38]

Specific supporter views

We asked Facebook supporters of the DPP two additional questions relating to Denmark-specific issues. First, we asked to what extent they agreed with the decision to maintain border controls with Sweden and Germany. In May 2011, the DPP played a key role in persuading the Danish Government to challenge the Schengen Agreement by proposing to restore border and custom controls along Denmark's borders with both countries. It was also reported that the DPP had reached a 'gentleman's agreement' with the Danish Government over plans to support a Franco–Italian proposal to change clauses in the Schengen Agreement.[39]

Citing the need to curb the rise in the occurrence of cross-border 'crime tourism', the initial move came into effect on 5 July 2011, when 50 additional customs officials were installed at check-points along the German and Swedish borders. Heavily criticised by the European Commission and neighbouring countries, the decision was subsequently repealed by the new centre-left government of Helle Thorning-Schmidt. Nevertheless, an online poll conducted by the national newspaper Jyllands-Posten revealed that 75 per cent of its readership supported the Government's unilateral decision to reinstate cross-border controls.[40]

As set out in table 14, our survey responses revealed there was strong overall agreement among DPP supporters with the view that it was necessary to maintain border controls with Sweden and Germany, an agreement that did not change greatly according to demographic background or age. Corroborating previous online survey findings, two-thirds of the respondents agreed with this decision.

Table 14 **Whether DPP supporters agree with the decision to maintain border controls at Denmark's borders with Sweden and Germany, by gender and whether under or over age 30**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree	71	80	74	79	75
Disagree	27	16	24	19	22

Second, we asked supporters what factors they thought were important in contributing to the DPP's electoral success at the 2007 general election. Table 15 sets out the responses. Perhaps as expected most of the options were considered to be important by supporters. In line with most of the results, it is the DPP's policy on immigration that is considered most significant, with two-thirds saying it played a very important role. The party's approach to Islam and crime were also considered very important by over half of respondents. In contrast, although several commentators have argued that

the Mohammed cartoon crisis was a major factor in the DPP's success, this is not a view shared by the supporters themselves: it was only eighth in the list. It is also of note that the DPP's policy of supporting the elderly was the fifth most important factor, and the party's support for the welfare system the seventh.

Table 15   **DPP supporters' perception of the role of various factors in the success of the DPP in the 2007 election**

	Very important role (%)	Quite important role (%)	Not very important role (%)	No role (%)
Attitude towards immigrants	66	15	6	1
Struggle against radical Islam	56	19	6	5
Tough position against crime	54	21	7	5
Support for traditional Danish values	51	22	9	5
Support for the elderly	44	27	10	5
Struggle for more border control	44	18	16	7
Support for the Danish welfare system	36	26	13	10
Role in the scandal over the Mohammed cartoons	34	21	17	12
Disagreement with the EU	29	30	18	7
Support of Christianity and the Danish church	25	13	27	20
Focus on the environment	13	22	28	21

This suggests that two important conclusions can be drawn. First, that the party is much more than an anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism movement: their broadly left-wing position on welfare and tough approach to crime sits alongside these issues of culture and identity, and is a significant part of the party's appeal. Second, it is noteworthy that three of the top five concerns listed by DPP Facebook fans in chapter 3 (table 5) are also the factors they cited as contributing to their success in 2007. This suggests that the DPP, in general, has a sound understanding of the worries that its supporters have, and is seen to be responding to them directly.

5   What is the relationship between online and offline activism?

In *The New Face of Digital Populism* we ran a series of analyses to determine what background and attitudinal characteristics were more likely to inspire online activists to get involved in the 'real world' through voting, becoming a formal party member, or attending a street demonstration or protest.[41] For this report we ran the same analysis using cross tabulations with DPP Facebook supporters. As mentioned in chapter 2, 48 per cent of DPP Facebook supporters reported voting for the DPP, 24 per cent reported being formal members, and 19 per cent reported participating in a demonstration in the previous six months.

It is important to note that the sample size in these results is relatively small, which means statistically significant results cannot be generated. However, it does provide some useful insights into the varying motivations of different types of DPP supporter.

From Facebook to the voting booth

Voters and non-voters were equally likely to be male or female, but non-voters were much more likely to be younger than voters (86 per cent of non-voters are under 30, compared with 44 per cent of voters) and more likely to be students (48 per cent compared with 17 per cent). This suggests that some younger fans might be interested in the party in general and its ideas, but not to the extent that they would vote. It is important, however, to stress that respondents were asked about the 2007 general election, when a significant number would not have been eligible to vote.

People who actually voted for the DPP at the last election were less likely to think other people could be trusted than those who did not (31 per cent compared with 44 per cent). There were

some noticeable differences in the top two concerns. Non-voters were more likely to cite healthcare (27 per cent compared with 8 per cent), education (19 per cent compared with 2 per cent) or climate change (16 per cent compared with 2 per cent) as one of their top two concerns. Meanwhile, voters were more likely to cite immigration (50 per cent compared with 24 per cent) and Islamic extremism (34 per cent compared with 10 per cent) as a top two concern. This suggests that although a wide variety of concerns characterise Facebook fans of the DPP, immigration and Islamic extremism are the issues that most mobilise them to vote.

From Facebook to card-carrying party member

Respondents who reported themselves to be formal party members were slightly more likely to be female than non-party members. There were only very minor variations in demographic background (employment, education, age) among respondents, which were not significant enough to report.

Formal party members were more likely than non-members to cite multiculturalism as a top concern; non-party members were more likely to cite immigration, rising prices and the economic situation. Formal party members were also more likely than non-members to trust the police, the justice and legal system, trade unions and political parties.

Interestingly, members showed similar levels of personal optimism as non-members, but much higher levels of national optimism (49 per cent compared with 21 per cent agreed Denmark was on the right track).

There were also some significant differences in the top two concerns that respondents cited. Members were substantially more likely than non-party members to cite immigration (55 per cent compared with 30 per cent), Islamic extremism (31 per cent compared with 18 per cent) and crime (22 per cent compared with 14 per cent). Whereas non-party members were more likely to cite healthcare (20 per cent compared with 9 per cent), education (14 per cent compared with 0 per cent) and climate change (12 per cent compared with 1 per cent).

From Facebook to the streets

In line with other supporters of PPAMs, demonstrators were more likely to be male than non-demonstrators (62 per cent compared with 53 per cent), and more likely to be under 30 (79 per cent compared with 62 per cent who were over 30). There was little difference between the educational and employment background of the two groups. Interestingly, and in contrast to other country results, demonstrators exhibited higher levels of generalised trust than non-demonstrators (52 per cent compared with 34 per cent), and greater personal optimism than non-demonstrators.

The issues that appear to push supporters onto the streets are also unusual compared with those reported in other countries. The top three concerns listed by demonstrators were climate change (23 per cent), immigration (22 per cent) and the environment (21 per cent), which differs from supporters overall, for whom environmental issues are significant but not to such a degree. Similar to other results, it appears that there are other issues than those relating to identity that motivate DPP supporters.

Annex: Methodology

The methodology employed for the collection and analysis of this data is set out in detail in *The New Face of Digital Populism*.[42] We therefore limit this section to DPP-specific issues.

For *The New Face of Digital Populism* we collected data from Facebook supporters of nationalist populist political parties or street-based movements drawn mainly across Western Europe. We ran a Facebook advert targeted at supporters of all parties and/or party leaders' Facebook pages over the summer of 2011. Each advert invited Facebook supporters of the group in question to click on a link, which redirected them to our online survey.

Our campaign ran over a three-month period, with no single advert being available for more than six weeks. On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, which set out the details and purpose of the survey along with an invitation to take part. The size of target population varied from country to country, depending on the size of the Facebook membership of the group in question. Table 16 gives the details of the data collected for the survey on the DPP.

Table 16   **Data collected for survey on Danish People's Party**

	Date of survey	No of specific Facebook interest groups targeted	Size of population targeted	No of unique impressions	Total Facebook link clicks	Total survey responses	Final data set
DPP	Jul-Aug 2011	3	15,640	2,222,395	2,109	626	542

The 'unique impressions' column lists the number of unique occasions the advert was displayed on the target audience's Facebook sidebar. The click per impression ratio was relatively stable, at around 1 per cent. The click to survey completion ratio was around 30 per cent. This non-response rate may be the result of some respondents deciding not to take part in the survey on reading the consent form. Our method to correct for non-response rates is discussed in the full methodology given in *The New Face of Digital Populism*. The size of the final data set was lower than the number of surveys completed because we removed incomplete surveys.

Data analysis and limitations

We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is a popular mode of communication for supporters of many of the groups and parties we surveyed.

In order to increase the predictive validity of our results, we applied a post-stratification weight, using the known demographics of the online population to correct the sample's balance of gender and age in line with the makeup of the group as a whole. To do this, we gathered background data on the composition of DPP's Facebook group membership using Facebook's advertising tool (which is freely available for any user to access). We gave each participant a weighted value on the basis of the prevalence of their demographic profile (age and gender) in the population at large. Although we achieved demographic representativeness — which can correct for systematic age or gender related bias — it is possible certain attitudinal self-selection biases exist, because this was a self-select survey. It is with this caveat that the results are presented.

While the use of a post-stratification weight is an improvement on the use of unweighted data, it cannot be automatically claimed as a reliable basis for making inferences about the offline group. The use of social network surveys is subject to a well-known technical and methodological critique focusing on the nature of self-entry interest classification on Facebook, the lack of content reliability on social networking sites, and the lack of internet access and usage in the broader population, all of which are capable of biasing the results of the survey.

Therefore, we take care not to claim, at any point in the text, that our sample represents or reflects the official views of the group, or indeed of its offline membership.

Throughout the paper, we compare the DPP results to the pan-European study results presented in *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

In the background chapter, we undertook a short literature review of both Danish and English language material. We also undertook a number of interviews in Denmark with activists (from both far-right and anti-fascist groups), academics, and other stakeholders. These interviews have informed our work throughout.

In chapter 2, the gender and age of each of the groups in question were collected directly from the publicly available Facebook group level data using the advertising tool mentioned above. This provides the most accurate results on the Facebook membership for each group. Results related to education, employment and involvement in the group are based on our weighted results.

In chapter 3 we give weighted results and provide comparative data where they are available from the 2010/11 Eurobarometer or European Values Survey. Where the questions are not worded identically, or there were additional answer options, this is expressly identified.

Chapter 4 is based on the analysis of an open text question about why individuals joined the group in question. This open question allowed respondents to answer as they wished. A Danish translator coded the responses. We reviewed the content of the responses and created nine categories for the responses, together with a category 'other'. Responses could fall into multiple categories. We removed data relating to respondents who were not supporters of DPP.

In chapter 5, we ran a cross tabulation analysis, in which we compared those Facebook supporters who

claimed to be party members against those who did not; those Facebook supporters who had protested or marched in the previous six months compared with those who had not; and those who reported voting for the DPP compared with those who did not. The sample size was too small to undertake a logistic regression.

Ethical considerations

As this research focused on adolescents over the age of 16, no Criminal Records Bureau check was necessary; consequently, none was sought. Similarly, it was not necessary for us to obtain informed consent from participant parents or guardians as Social Research Association ethics guidelines suggest such clearance should not be sought and is not required where investigating participants aged over 16. We sought and gained individual informed consent from all participants, who agreed to a consent statement presented at the start of the survey—failure to sign acceptance of this statement prevented them from participating further in the research. Although we targeted the survey only at people aged over 16, a small number of individuals stated they were under 16 when responding to the question about age. We immediately deleted data relating to these people.

We stated on the Facebook advert that we were representing Demos, and were undertaking a survey of Facebook members of the group in question. On clicking the advertisement link, the participant was redirected to the survey landing page. On that page we pointed out that leaders of each group had been informed about the survey. Before running the survey, Demos emailed each of the groups in question to let them know about the survey. On the landing page we also stated that we would be letting the party in question know about the results before they were made public. Before release, we emailed the parties and groups in question with the results where they pertained to their members.

We did not brief participants fully on the study's aims before completing the survey in order to avoid the exhibition of demand characteristics. We provided only a broad overview of the research at the start of the survey, and gave more detailed information on the project's aims only after the last question had been completed. We provided the contact details of the lead researcher to all participants to cover the eventuality that they had questions not covered by the debrief notes, but few participants made use of it.

We told participants that they could withdraw from the research at any time before completion as part of a preface presented alongside the consent statement. Later we reminded them of this right when they completed the survey via a paragraph in the debrief notes, offering the possibility of immediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants opted to withdraw in this way.

We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant to the storage and handling of data; all data were kept digitally encoded in an anonymous format, and we didn't store any data capable of identifying any participants.

We prepared for the eventuality that the research uncovered information with serious security implications, particularly relating to participant support for violence; we took precautions to absolve the researcher of moral responsibility towards the disclosure of information to agents of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the survey did not ask for precise details of acts of violence or illegal political protest. In order to preserve participant confidentiality (the deliberate exclusion by data capture systems of IP addresses) we removed from the researcher the means to identify and incriminate individual participants.

Notes

1   J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, *The New Face of Digital Populism*, London: Demos, 2011, www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulism (accessed 16 Feb 2012).

2   S Meret, *The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support*, 2009, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/20049801/spirit_phd_series_25.pdf (accessed 2 Apr 2012).

3   T Givens, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

4   'Pia Kjærsgaard's tale om udlændingepolitik, Årsmødet 1997' (Pia Kjærsgaard's speech about foreign policy, annual meeting 1997), danskfolkeparti.dk, 4 Oct 1997.

5   'Dansk Folkeparti wants end to Muslim immigration', *Islamophobia Watch*, 31 Jan 2012, www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/2012/1/31/dansk-folkeparti-wants-end-to-muslim-immigration.html (accessed 28 Mar 2012).

6   B Whitaker, 'Muslims angry at new Danish cartoon scandal', *Guardian*, 10 Oct 2006, www.guardian.co.uk/media/2006/oct/10/broadcasting.cartoonprotests (accessed 2 Apr 2012).

7   See www.befrijerselv.nu/ (accessed 13 Apr 2012).

8   C Bowlby, 'Do Denmark's immigration laws breach human rights?', *BBC News*, 10 Feb 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12366676 (accessed 2 Apr 2012).

9   Meret, *The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective*.

10   J Andersen, 'The Danish People's Party and new cleavages in Danish politics', 2004, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/14109015/widfeldt_-_FINAL.pdf (accessed 2 Apr 2012),

11   Bowlby, 'Do Denmark's immigration laws breach human rights?'

12   Demos fieldwork interviews, Jul 2011.

13   Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Politiets Efterretningstjeneste), *Report 2008–2010*, Jun 2011.

14   M Townsend, 'Far-right militants fail to strike blow against Islam on their Danish awayday', *Guardian*, 31 Mar 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/01/english-defence-league-european-summit-aarhus (accessed 4 Apr 2012).

15   Demos interview with Lars Larsen, leader of Vederfølner, Jul 2011.

16   Interviews with Danish experts of far-right, Jul 2011.

17   Demos interview with Daniel Carlsen, Aug 2011.

18   Bartlett et al, *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

19   Eurostat, Data Explorer, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ (accessed 2 Mar 2011). Eurostat figures provided are for September 2011. Eurostat unemployment rates by age relate to the age groups 'less than 25' and 'between 25 and 74'. Demos unemployment rates by age relate to the age groups '16–25' and '26+'.

20   Inter-Parliamentary Union, 'Denmark: Folketinget (The Danish Parliament) — Elections in 2007', www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2087_07.htm (accessed 28 Mar 2012).

21   Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who answered 'yes' to the question: 'Have you taken part in a political march, protest, or demonstration in the last six months?'. European Social Survey (Round 5) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who answered 'yes' to the question: 'During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you taken part in a lawful public demonstration?'

22   Eurobarometer Survey (in autumn 2011) or the European Values Study 2010.

23   Demos survey respondents were asked 'Please rank your three biggest concerns in order of importance from the list below'. They were able to provide a maximum of three responses. The Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of survey respondents who ranked the relevant concern as their first or second biggest concern. Eurobarometer (autumn 2011 — Split B) respondents were asked: 'And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?' They were able to provide a maximum of two responses. The Eurobarometer figure provided is the percentage of respondents who ranked the relevant concern as their first or second biggest concern. Demos survey respondents were able to select some options that were not available to Eurobarometer respondents and vice versa.

24   Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) respondents were asked, 'Will the next 12 months be better, worse or the same when it comes to your life generally?'

25 Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) respondents were asked, 'What does the European Union mean to you personally?'. Respondents were allowed to select multiple options.

26 Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'loss of cultural and national identity'. Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'loss of cultural identity'.

27 Demos survey respondents were asked, 'To what extent do you trust the following: [institution]?'. Eurobarometer respondents were asked, 'For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it [institution]'. In each case respondents selected either 'tend to trust' or 'tend not to trust'. The percentages cited for 'government', 'European Union', 'political parties' and 'the press' are derived from Eurobarometer (autumn 2011). The percentages cited for all other institutions are derived from Eurobarometer (autumn 2010) as they do not appear in the later survey.

28 Demos survey respondents were asked whether they trusted 'the mainstream media'. Eurobarometer respondents were asked whether they trusted 'the press'.

29 Demos survey respondents were asked, 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In general, most people cannot be trusted.' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'agree entirely', 'agree a little', 'disagree entirely', 'disagree a little' or 'neutral'. The Demos survey figures provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 'disagree entirely' or 'disagree a little'; or selected 'agree entirely' or 'agree a little'. The national statistics provided are drawn from Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences, *European Values Study 2008*, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://

zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5 (accessed 13 Apr 2012). Respondents who took part in the EVS were asked, 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options 'most people can be trusted', 'cannot be too careful' or 'don't know'. The EVS figures provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 'most people can be trusted' and 'cannot be too careful'.

30 'Går meget op i dyrevelfærd. Da jeg også betegner mig selv som nationalist (på den gode måde, ikke som nazister og des lige) var det det parti som kom tættest på mine holdninger.'

31 'Jeg syntes det var paa tide at jeg gjorde noget ved Danmarks indenrigspolitiske problemer selv istedet for bare at vaere skabsracist—og saa er der jo ikke noget nazistisk parti som har nogen indflydelse—man tager hvad man kan faa.'

32 'For at gøre Danmark til et bedre sted. Hvor Danske værdier og traditioner ikke skal lide under indvandring.'

33 'Fordi de har de rigtige holdninger, og tør tage kampen op mod liberalismen!—Og fordi jeg tager i krig, i stedet flygtningene selv slås for deres land!—En stor del af min ære bliver krænket af muslimernes tilstedeværelse, grund deres evendelige krav om dit og dat, og ser dem gerne alle sendt hjem, eller bare væk.—Gerne med etableringsydelsen i baglommen!'

34 'Det DF står for er mig politisk det rette for Danmarks fremtid….ellers æder verden os—vi mister det 'danske', og det vi dansker står for.

35 'Hehe I burde have brugt en stavekontrol… bare et lille tip. DF TØR åbne munden og pege på de problemer vi har i samfundet, både i det offentlige, i retssystemet, i udlændelovgivningen og indenfor dyrevelfærd. De er ikke

bange for, at blive upopulære. Det kunne mange andre partier lære af.'

36   'I har stavet forkert til "Hvorfor"—skide useriøst og uprofessionetl! Jeg blev medlem af DF af personlige årsager, da jeg er skide træt af muslimer, den måde de opfører sig på og deres måde at leve deres liv på i DK.'

37   'I 2004 tror jeg, men havde ikke mulighed for at betale kontigentet året efter og er dermed ikke medlem af DF mere... indtil d.1 august hvor jeg OG min kone melder os ind igen. Vi skal have gjort noget ved alle de muslimer der har besat vores land. Det bruger jeg al min tid på, og skriver jævnligt til jeres presseansvarlig ang. det massive muslimproblem som hele verdenen oplever.'

38   'Dengang jeg fik nok af de skide muslimer! De kommer kun her til landet for at overtage det! Plus mange af dem betaler ikke skat men modtager offentlige ydelser som kontanthjælp og er førtidspensionister, selvom de godt kan arbejde! Lidt tortur skader jo ikke ens evne til at scanne varer i Netto! Godt nok er min kone Birthe og jeg også førtidspensionister, men vi har gjort os fortjent til det, fordi vi gjorde hvad vi kunne før vi begge gik ned med stress. Nu går dagen med at kigge på Hammerslag og vande planterne i haven. Nåh ja, de der muslimer, de er langt ude, og det er også der de bør sendes hen!!'

39   'Schengen state Denmark to re-impose border controls', BBC News, 11 May 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13366047 (accessed 2 Mar 2012).

40   L Eriksen, 'Denmark's populist border controls reintroduced but many remain sceptical', *Guardian*, 12 May 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/denmark-border-controls-reintroduced-populist (accessed 2 Mar 2011).

41   Bartlett et al, *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

42   Ibid.

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Nationalist populist parties and movements are growing in support throughout Europe. These groups are known for their opposition to immigration, their 'anti-establishment' views and their concern for protecting national culture. Their rise in popularity has gone hand-in-hand with the advent of social media, and they are adept at using new technology to amplify their message, recruit and organise.

The Dansk Folkeparti (or 'Danish People's Party' — DPP) is one of the most successful of these groups in Western Europe. It is the third largest party in Denmark and was a member of the coalition government from 2002 until 2011. The DPP's policies relate primarily to the protection of Danish identity and heritage, with particular focus on limiting immigration and rejecting multiculturalism, publicly stating that a multi-ethnic Danish society would be a 'national disaster'. Their attitude was crystallised during the scandal following the publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed — they openly supported the move as an example of free speech.

This report presents the results of a survey of Facebook fans of the Danish People's Party. It includes data on who they are, what they think, and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world activism. It also compares them with other similar parties in Western Europe, shedding light on their growing online support, and the relationship between their online and offline activities. This report is the third in a series of country specific briefings about the online support of populist parties in 12 European countries, based on our survey of 13,000 Facebook fans of these groups.

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