Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly-arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with challenges and opportunities. The crucial tests facing Europe’s commitment to open society will be how it treats minorities such as Muslims and ensures equal rights for all in a climate of rapidly expanding diversity.

The Open Society Foundations’ At Home in Europe project is working to address these issues through monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of Muslims and other minorities in Europe. One of the project’s key efforts is this series of reports on Muslim communities in the 11 EU cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Leicester, London, Marseille, Paris, Rotterdam, and Stockholm. The reports aim to increase understanding of the needs and aspirations of diverse Muslim communities by examining how public policies in selected cities have helped or hindered the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims.

By fostering new dialogue and policy initiatives between Muslim communities, local officials, and international policymakers, the At Home in Europe project seeks to improve the participation and inclusion of Muslims in the wider society while enabling them to preserve the cultural, linguistic, and religious practices that are important to their identities.
Muslims in Rotterdam

At Home in Europe Project

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................. 5
Preface ..................................................................................... 7
Muslims in Rotterdam ............................................................. 9
  List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................. 14
  Definitions and Terminology ........................................... 16
  Executive Summary ............................................................. 19
  1. Introduction .................................................................... 24
  2. Population and Demographics ......................................... 32
  3. City Policy ....................................................................... 41
  4. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Identity, Belonging and Interaction ................................................ 49
  5. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Education 65
  6. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Employment 80
  7. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Housing 93
  8. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Health and Social Services ............................................................. 102
  9. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Policing and Security ............................................................. 112
  10. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Participation and Citizenship ...................................................... 120
  11. The Role of the Media ....................................................... 131
  12. Conclusion ..................................................................... 139
  13. Recommendations ........................................................ 142
Annex 1. Bibliography .............................................................. 146
Annex 2. List of Stakeholders Interviewed ................................. 154
Annex 3. List of Organisations in Rotterdam ............................ 155
Open Society Foundations Mission Statement

The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities in more than 70 countries, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.
Acknowledgements

This city report was prepared as part of a series of monitoring reports titled ‘Muslims in EU cities’. The series focuses on eleven cities in the European Union (EU) with significant Muslim populations. Each report focuses on the following neighbourhoods within each city: Slotervaart, Amsterdam; Borgerhout, Antwerp; Kreuzberg, Berlin; Nørrebro, Copenhagen; Hamburg-Mitte, Hamburg; Evington, Spinney Hills, Stoneygate, Leicester; 3rd Arrondissement, Marseille; 18th Arrondissement, Paris; Feijenoord, Rotterdam; Järvaflätet, Stockholm; the London Borough of Waltham Forest, London.

The reports have been prepared by the At Home in Europe Project of the Open Society Foundations in cooperation with local/national based experts. The At Home in Europe Project would like to acknowledge and thank the following individuals who have been engaged with the research since 2007:

Kim Jansen
Researcher

Deniz Gökçe Gemici
Interview and Focus Group Coordinator,
Gemici Consultancy

Merel van der Wouden
Assistant Researcher, Intern at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES),
University of Amsterdam

Under the supervision of the Interview and Focus Group Coordinator, the interviews and focus groups were conducted by a team based in Rotterdam. The team is comprised of the following: Anna Brons, Erol Tütüncü, Hatice Çakır, Kemal Şimşek, Müfer Şener, Mustafa Koyuncu, Şerife Alpaslan, Ufuk Akkanoğlu, Yasin Yazır

A number of academics, city officials/policy makers, and individuals working in civil society organizations reviewed the draft versions of this report for which we are highly appreciative. Their names are available in Appendix 2 of this report. Particular thanks are offered to Professor Jan Rath, Director of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam, who has supported the Dutch studies throughout the entire research phase. His support has been invaluable.

In May 2009, the Open Society Foundations held a closed roundtable meeting in Rotterdam inviting expert critique and commentary on the draft report. We are grateful to the many participants who generously offered their time and expertise. These included representatives of Rotterdam City Council, minority groups, civil society organizations and relevant experts. We would also like to thank the team at RADAR for organising and hosting the roundtable meeting.
A number of other individuals, based in Rotterdam, also agreed to be interviewed by the Open Society Foundations Office of Communications team, to whom we offer thanks.

The At Home in Europe Project has final responsibility for the content of the report including any errors or misrepresentations.

**Open Society Foundations Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nazia Hussain</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tufyal Choudhury</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Dik Nielsen</td>
<td>Advocacy Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hélène Irving</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Gurubi Watterson</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csilla Tóth</td>
<td>Programme Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katy Negrin</td>
<td>Consultant Editor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

A central belief of the Open Society Foundations (Foundations) is that all people in an open society count equally and should enjoy equal opportunities. The Foundations works to mitigate discrimination, in particular harm done to minorities through discriminatory treatment, and to ensure that access to equal opportunities for all is an integral part of social inclusion policies of governments.

The At Home in Europe project of the Open Society Foundations focuses on monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of minorities in a changing Europe. Through its research and engagement with policymakers and communities, the project explores issues involving the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims and other marginalized groups at the local, national, and European levels.

Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with one of its greatest challenges: how to ensure equal rights in an environment of rapidly expanding diversity. Europe is no longer — if it ever was — a mono-cultural and mono-faith continent; its emerging minority groups and their identities as Europeans are an essential part of the political agenda and discourse.

Through its reports on Muslims in EU cities, the At Home in Europe project examines city and municipal policies that have actively sought to understand Muslim communities and their specific needs. Furthermore, the project aims to capture the type and degree of engagement policymakers have initiated with their Muslim and minority constituents by highlighting best practices in select western European cities. An underlying theme is how Muslim communities have themselves actively participated in tackling discrimination and whether the needs of specific groups warrant individual policy approaches in order to overcome barriers to equal opportunities.

The city reports build upon Foundations’ earlier work on minority protection, in particular the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program reports on the situation of Muslims in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. All of these studies make it clear that further research is needed. The limited data currently available on Europe’s Muslim populations are extrapolated from ethnic and country of origin background. This lack of precise data limits the possibilities for creating nuanced, specific policies on the most relevant issues for Muslims, and developing sensitive and integrated social inclusion policies.

The At Home in Europe report series includes an overview and individual reports on 11 cities in seven European countries. The project selected the cities on the basis of literature reviews conducted in 2006, taking into account population size, diversity, and the local political context. All 11 city reports were prepared by teams of local experts on the basis of the same methodology to allow for comparative analysis.
Each city report includes detailed recommendations for improving the opportunities for full participation and inclusion of Muslims in wider society while enabling them to preserve cultural, linguistic, religious, and other community characteristics important to their identities. These recommendations, directed primarily at specific local actors, will form the basis for the Foundations advocacy activities.
Muslims in Rotterdam
# Table of Contents

- List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................. 14
- Definitions and Terminology ....................................................... 16
- Executive Summary .................................................................... 19

1. Introduction .............................................................................. 24
   1.1 Methodology ........................................................................ 26
   1.2 Terminology ......................................................................... 30
   1.3 Guide to Reading this Report ............................................... 30

2. Population and Demographics .................................................. 32
   2.1 Demography ........................................................................ 32
   2.2 Patterns of Immigration and Settlement ............................... 38

3. City Policy .................................................................................. 41
   3.1 Religious Diversity and Relations between
       Church and State ................................................................... 41
   3.2 Municipal Relations with Muslim Communities ................. 42
   3.3 Administrative Structure of Rotterdam ............................... 44
   3.4 Perception of Muslims in Political and
       Public Discourse ................................................................ 46

4. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Identity,
   Belonging and Interaction .......................................................... 49
   4.1 The Debate on Dutch Identity .............................................. 49
   4.2 Municipal Initiatives and Policy in Rotterdam .................... 50
   4.3 Civil Organisations ............................................................. 52
   4.4 Belonging .......................................................................... 53
   4.5 Identity ............................................................................. 55
   4.6 Trust and Social Cohesion .................................................... 58
   4.7 Interaction ......................................................................... 59
   4.8 Perceptions of Prejudice and Exclusion ............................... 62

5. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Education ..................... 65
   5.1 The Dutch Educational System .......................................... 65
   5.2 Faith Schools in the Netherlands ........................................ 66
   5.3 Educational Achievements of Muslims ............................... 67
   5.4 At-risk Youth and the Division in the Second
       Generation ............................................................................ 70
   5.5 Parental Involvement in Children’s Education .................... 71
10.1 Citizenship and Access to Welfare Benefits .......... 120
10.2 Muslim Participation in National and
        Municipal Elections ........................................ 121
10.3 Levels of Trust in Governmental Institutions .......... 122
10.4 Civil Participation ............................................. 124
10.5 Participation of Women ..................................... 128
11. The Role of the Media .......................................... 131
    11.1 Islam in the Media ......................................... 131
    11.2 Muslims’ Involvement in the Media ................. 133
    11.3 Initiatives to Increase Diversity in the
            Local Media ............................................. 134
    11.4 Media as Source of Information .................... 135
    11.5 Muslim Media and Other Media Sources Used
            by Muslims ............................................. 137
12. Conclusion ...................................................... 139
13. Recommendations ............................................. 142
    13.1 Identity, Belonging and Interaction .............. 142
    13.2 Education .................................................. 142
    13.3 Labour Market ............................................ 143
    13.4 Housing ..................................................... 143
    13.5 Health and Social Services ......................... 143
    13.6 Policing and Security .................................. 144
    13.7 Participation and Citizenship ................... 144
    13.8 Media ....................................................... 145
Annex 1. Bibliography ............................................. 146
Annex 2. List of Stakeholders Interviewed .................... 154
Annex 3. List of Organisations in Rotterdam ................. 155

Index of Tables

Table 1a. Foundations questionnaire respondents, Muslim men ..................... 28
Table 1b. Foundations questionnaire respondents, Muslim women ................ 28
Table 1c. Foundations questionnaire respondents, non-Muslim men ............... 29
Table 1d. Foundations questionnaire respondents, non-Muslim women .......... 29
Table 2. Turkish and Moroccan populations in Rotterdam according to
                   age group, 1 January 2008 ........................................... 35
Table 3. Population of Rotterdam according to national background, 2000, 2004 and 2008

Table 4. Would you say that this is a neighbourhood you enjoy living in?

Table 5. How strongly do you feel you belong to this city?

Table 6. How strongly do you feel you belong to this country?

Table 7. Would you agree that in this local area people from different backgrounds get on well together?

Table 8. How much religious prejudice do you feel there is in this country today?

Table 9. How satisfied would you say you are with the local primary schools?

Table 10. How satisfied would you say you are with the local secondary schools?

Table 11. Work sectors in Rotterdam and Feijenoord

Table 12. Income levels (after taxes and compulsory insurance) in the neighbourhoods of Feijenoord, 2005

Table 13. Employment of Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam, 2007

Table 14. Employment of Muslim and non-Muslim men, %

Table 15. Employment of Muslim and non-Muslim women, %

Table 16. Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your city?

Index of Figures

Figure 1. Feijenoord in the curve of the river Maas

Figure 2. Do you want to be seen by others as Dutch?

Figure 3. Over the past 12 months, how often have you experienced prejudice or unequal treatment based on your religion?

Figure 4. How long have you lived in the local area?

Figure 5. Do you own or rent your home, or have some other arrangement?

Figure 6. How satisfied would you say you are with the local social housing services?

Figure 7. How satisfied would you say you are with the local health services?

Figure 8. To what extent do you think that hospitals and medical clinics respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?

Figure 9. How satisfied would you say you are with local policing?

Figure 10. Did you vote during the last local council elections?

Figure 11a. In past 12 months, have you taken active part in running youth activities?

Figure 11b. In past 12 months, have you taken active part in running any religious activities?

Figure 11c. In the past 12 months, have you played a role in a social welfare organisation or activity?
## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

### Statistical agencies and research centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Statistical Agency (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Centre for Research and Statistics (Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek) for Rotterdam and its surrounding area Rijnmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMES</td>
<td>Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (Instituut voor Migratie- en Etnische Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRR</td>
<td>Scientific Bureau for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Institutions and organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 1</td>
<td>Article 1 (Artikel 1, National Antidiscrimination Agency: name refers to the first article of the Dutch constitution, which is the ban on discrimination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGB</td>
<td>Commission for Equal Treatment (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRI</td>
<td>European Commission against Racism and Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGD</td>
<td>Municipal Health Services (Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOS</td>
<td>Youth, Education and Society Service (Dienst Jeugd, Onderwijs en Samenleving)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIEM</td>
<td>Knowledge Network for Integration Policy and Ethnic Minorities (Kennisnet Integratiebeleid en Etnische Minderheden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBR</td>
<td>National Bureau for Combating Racial Discrimination, renamed Art. 1 in 2006 (Landelijk Bureau ter bestrijding van Rassendiscriminatie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOV</td>
<td>Learning and Meeting Project for Women (Leer en Ontmoetingsproject voor Vrouwen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>Rijnmond Foreigners Platform (Platform Buitenlanders Rijnmond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAR</td>
<td>Rotterdam Antidiscrimination Action Council (Rotterdamse Antidiscriminatie Actie Raad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Regional Training Centre (Regionaal Opleidingscentrum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RORAVOLERE</td>
<td>Rotterdam Council for Philosophy of Life and Religion (Rotterdamse Raad voor Levensbeschouwing en Religie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMOR</td>
<td>Rotterdam Moroccan Organisations Foundation (Samenwerkende Marokkaanse Organisaties Rotterdam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIOR</td>
<td>Rijnmond Islamic Organisations Foundation Platform (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPR</td>
<td>Rotterdam Social Platform (Sociaal Platform Rotterdam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVIZ</td>
<td>Foundation for Islamic Broadcasting Provision (Stichting Verzorging Islamitische Zendtijd)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAVO</td>
<td>Higher General Secondary Education (Hoger Algemeen Vormend Onderwijs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>Higher Vocational Education (Hoger Beroeps Onderwijs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVO</td>
<td>Humanist Education (Humanistisch Vormingsonderwijs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKOS</td>
<td>Inter-ecclesiastic Consultation in School Affairs (Interkerkerlijk Overleg in Schoolzaken)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBO</td>
<td>Middle Vocational Education (Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT2</td>
<td>Dutch as Second Language (Nederlands als Tweede Taal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMBO</td>
<td>Preparatory Middle Vocational Education (Voorbereidend Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVE</td>
<td>Pre- and Early School (Voor- en Vroegschoolse Educatie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VWO</td>
<td>Pre-university Education (Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBPs</td>
<td>Common Basic Principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Allochtoon (plural Allochtonen): Semantically, the word derives from the classical Greek words *allos* (“other”) and *chthonos* (“land”). Originally, the term was only used in geology and only entered the Dutch dictionary in 1961. Referring to immigrants, the term was first used in 1971 by the sociologist Hilde Verweij Jonker to offer a neutral alternative to the terms “guest worker”, “foreigners” or “immigrants”. The Central Statistical Agency’s (CBS) definition of “allochtoon” is “a person of whom at least one of the parents was born abroad”. A distinction is made between persons who are born abroad (first generation) and persons who were born in the Netherlands (second generation) of people who are first-generation immigrants. This definition is very broad and many people in the Netherlands fit into this category. Therefore, a further distinction is made between “western” and “non-western”.

Autochtoon (plural Autochtonen): This term is the opposite of *allochtoon*. Over time, this term has become most commonly used to refer to the indigenous population of a country or area.

Discrimination: The term “discrimination” is used throughout this report; it includes harassment and direct and indirect discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 of the EU Race Directive expressly prohibit both “direct” and “indirect” discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs “where one person has been treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin”. According to the Directive, indirect discrimination occurs “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”.

Ethnic or racial profiling: Describes the use by law enforcement officers of race, ethnicity, religion or national origin rather than individual behaviour as the basis for making decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.

Ethnicity: Membership of a group which may share language, cultural practices, religion or common identity based on a shared history. In the Netherlands, ethnicity is strongly related to societal and cultural contexts. Data on the size of ethnic groups are usually unavailable in the Netherlands. Therefore, the CBS uses data on *allochtonen* instead.

Harassment is conduct which creates “an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.

Integration: The definition used in this report is “a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” as stated in the Common Basic Principles. The Explanation to the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration 2004 states: “Integration is a dynamic long-term and
continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities.

**Islamophobia:** Irrational hostility, fear and hatred of Islam, Muslims and Islamic culture, and active discrimination toward this group as individuals or collectively.

**Marginalised:** Marginalised groups can be part of an ethnic or racial minority and a sub-category of minority groups. They can also be characterised and distinguished from other groups by suffering socio-economic disadvantage and a powerless position in society or in a group. This report defines marginalised groups as those who experience social exclusion, be they part of a minority or majority group in society.

**Migrant:** The United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) definition refers to a “person who has moved temporarily or permanently to a country where he or she was not born and has acquired significant social ties to this country”. This includes students, children and family dependants. A distinction is made in which this term does not include asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons.

**Minority:** Under international law, there is no agreed definition of this term. Some countries define a minority as that which is recognised as such by national laws. In this report, the term refers to ethnic and religious groups which are not the dominant group in society.

**Muslim:** Muslims as a group are diverse, although they share common belief systems and possibly experiences that qualify them as Muslims. This report relies on its Muslim respondents’ identification of themselves as Muslims. It therefore includes individuals who view themselves as Muslims in a cultural as well as a religious context.

**Nationality:** Country of citizenship.

**Native Dutch:** In this report, the term “native Dutch” is used as the English translation of the Dutch term *autochtoon*, meaning a person born from Dutch parents.

**Non-Muslim:** For the purpose of this report, a non-Muslim is anyone who does not define himself or herself as belonging to the Islamic faith.

**Race:** The term “race” is used in the context of discrimination in which people are treated differently and negatively because of their presumed membership in groups identified by physical features such as skin colour, hair or physical appearance.
References to race in this report should not be taken to suggest that there are distinct human races.

**Racism:** Where used in this report, “racism” will be defined as “racial discrimination” which according to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social or cultural or any other field of public life”. Racial discrimination can also be based on markers of visible difference due to membership of a cultural group.

**Social inclusion:** The provision and promotion of equal rights and access in the field of education, employment and decision-making. Overcoming discrimination is implicit throughout policies and practices to realise inclusion.

**Third-country national:** An individual who is not a national of an EU member state.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Islam is currently one of the “hottest” topics in the public arena in the Netherlands. The debates about Islam in the Netherlands are interwoven with the discussion on integration and acculturation of immigrants, since the majority of the non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are Muslim. However, many issues concerning the integration of minorities into Dutch society have little to do with religion. In the same vein, discussions about Islam in the Netherlands are often reduced to matters of integration and living habits of Muslims.

There are approximately 1 million Muslims in the Netherlands, representing 5.8 per cent of the total population of the country. Official Dutch statistics do not collect information based on religious affiliation, but data are available on allochtonen (a term referring to immigrants, see Definitions and Terminology), who are defined as individuals with at least one parent born abroad even though they may hold Dutch citizenship. Immigrants of a non-Western background largely reside in the four major cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague.

Rotterdam is the second-largest city in the Netherlands with a population of almost 600,000 inhabitants. It is home to many ethnic-minority groups, which make up almost half the population of the city. After extrapolating data from the country of origin where the dominant religion is Islam, the presumption was made that 13 per cent of the population in Rotterdam is Muslim (80,000 persons). The largest of these communities are predominantly from Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds (75 per cent) and approximately two-thirds of these groups are Dutch citizens. There are also Surinamese, Pakistani, Bosnian and Indonesian Muslim communities in Rotterdam. Almost 50 per cent of the Muslims in Rotterdam were born in the Netherlands and are second-generation.

---


2 M. Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam? Stedelijk beleid, voorzieningen, organisaties (Room for Islam? Municipal policy, services, organisations), Apeldoorn/Antwerpen, Spinhuis, 2006, p. 9 (hereafter Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam?).
Identity and belonging are important elements of integration. For many people, the key barometers of inclusion are their neighbourhood and city. This study examines the situation and experiences of Muslims in Rotterdam and looks, in particular, at the district of Feijenoord. Where possible, it explores the experiences at the neighbourhood level of Afrikaanderwijk, one of the eight neighbourhoods of Feijenoord. Alongside monitoring the socio-economic concerns of this diverse group with regard to selected topics which are considered to be of key importance to integration, the report examines a number of public policies and initiatives in Rotterdam that aim to improve integration and how they address the specific needs of Muslims as a group.

The 2006 municipal elections in Rotterdam were strongly polarised between the left-wing Labour Party and the right-wing party Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam). Partly due to this polarisation, the elections witnessed higher immigrant electoral participation than ever before. After four years in opposition, the Labour Party won a majority and became the largest party in power in Rotterdam. This can in part be explained by the large voter turnout among immigrants, which, if further broken down, saw a high Turkish compared with Moroccan participation. Of the 45 members of the city council, 12 have an immigrant background. Immigrants are represented at all levels of the municipality, including aldermen, city council members, district council members and high-placed civil servants. Since January 2009, Rotterdam has a mayor with a Moroccan and Muslim background.

There has been an effort from the Rotterdam administration to foster meaningful interaction between its diverse groups. During the electoral period 2002–06, when the Liveable Rotterdam party was the largest party, emphasis was placed on Islam and the integration of Muslims in Rotterdam, starting with the Islam Debates in 2003. From 2006, with the return of the Labour Party as the main party in the city council, there was less emphasis on Islam and a greater a focus on the active citizenship of all inhabitants of Rotterdam.

---

3 The research does not provide a definition of “Muslim” in terms of religious practice or belief, but accepts respondents’ and participants’ self-definition as Muslims.

4 The first stage of the At Home in Europe project produced a literature review providing a comprehensive review of available research and literature on Muslims in the Netherlands. Following the review’s recommendations, researchers included the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam as part of the Muslims in EU Cities monitoring project by the Open Society Foundations. See M. Maussen, J. Rath and F. Demant, The Netherlands, Muslims in EU Cities: Cities Report, Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey, Open Society Institute, European Union Monitoring and Advocacy Programme, Budapest, 2007 (hereafter Maussen et al., Netherlands Literature Survey).

5 Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (Centre for Research and Statistics, COS) “Sociale integratie… en de islam in Rotterdam. Feiten, teksten en publicaties over de islam en moslims in Rotterdam” (Social integration… in Rotterdam’s Islam (Circumstances, texts and publications about Muslims in Rotterdam) (Islam in Rotterdam series), by K. Canatan and D. Linders, June 2004 (hereafter COS, “Feiten, teksten en publicaties”).
In 2006, the council introduced the “Rotterdam Civil Code” as a tool to stimulate citizenship and inclusion. Rights-based organisations have warned of the discriminatory effect of this code, which mainly targets immigrants and Muslims.

Rotterdam municipal and city district policies on inclusion centre on participation and active citizenship, with the overall aim of creating a common city-led identity among its inhabitants. Findings from the Open Society Foundations survey indicate that Muslims in Feijenoord have a strong sense of belonging to the local area/neighbourhood and the city, which is stronger than their identification with the Netherlands. Many Muslim respondents feel that the standards they need to meet to be perceived as well-integrated citizens are constantly raised, and that they will never be perceived as Dutch regardless of the level of integration.

While the multi-ethnic environment of Rotterdam is viewed as a positive aspect, both the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents are concerned with ethnic segregation in areas such as Feijenoord, where there are few native Dutch residents.

The sense of belonging at the national level was lower among Muslim than among non-Muslim respondents.

Immigrant children constitute a significant proportion of the pupils in many schools in Rotterdam. The Dutch constitution allows schools to be based on specific religious affiliations or philosophies of life. There are seven Islamic schools in the city of Rotterdam. However, the overwhelming majority of Muslims attend (or have attended) or have children who attend state public schools or (Christian) parochial schools. While an increasing number of Muslim children enter the higher levels of secondary education, they are to be found in the lower academic strands of the system and a large number are likely to drop out before obtaining a qualification. There are also indications of discrimination against pupils of immigrant background. There are reports of instances where pupils are poorly advised or discouraged from entering the higher academic streams compared with native Dutch peers with similar test scores.

The unemployment rate among Muslims is high. Despite a positive trend in the labour-market opportunities of the second generation, there is still a significant difference between the employment levels of Muslims and that of native Dutch. Many respondents reported experiencing discrimination based on either their ethnicity or their religion when seeking employment opportunities.

The district of Feijenoord has a high concentration of immigrants with very little native Dutch presence. Upward mobility is one of the main factors for this movement, which also affects affluent immigrants. This in turn has led to fewer opportunities for inter-ethnic interaction and has an impact on labour market opportunities and education standards in the area and city. Since 1972, there have been several attempts to introduce a housing distribution policy that would counter the concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. However, the implementation of most of these
policies has been halted because of its discriminatory nature. In practice, distribution policies have had little effect.

A political priority of the Rotterdam City Council is to create an attractive living environment for the different groups in the neighbourhoods of Feijenoord district. Between 2005 and 2015, over €1 billion will be invested to improve the current housing stock, generating economic and recreational opportunities and creating an attractive and safe public area.

The health status of Muslims in Rotterdam shows differences between ethnic groups. Of growing concern to the city and, in particular, to Feijenoord municipality is the growing rate of obesity among children in all groups. A number of local initiatives have been created to address this and other issues, including investing in building playgrounds in the neighbourhoods and hiring health specialists from different ethnic backgrounds offering cultural sensitivity and skills to combat language barriers.

Anti-Muslim sentiments and anti-Muslim violence have increased in the Netherlands, and the right-wing parties are attracting a growing following in Rotterdam. Rotterdam was among the first cities to develop an action programme against radicalisation, and although this programme is directed mainly at extremism in Muslim communities, statistics show that the following for extreme right-wing movements among native Dutch youths is also increasing.

Statistics on Muslims in the criminal justice system are largely based on their status as criminal suspects. Very little is available on these groups as victims of crime. Levels of satisfaction with police performance in Feijenoord, although lower among Muslims than non-Muslims, were reported as improving. There have been efforts to build confidence and strong working relationships between Muslim communities and the police and this has led to success in signalling and reducing tensions between groups. In 2008, the Dutch government awarded Rotterdam police force the Diversity Prize for its engagement with minority communities and its initiatives in countering prejudice and discrimination among police officers. At the same time, in a city where almost half of the population is of immigrant descent, which includes Muslims, only 12.6 per cent of the police force has a migrant background. While efforts are made to counteract prejudice and discrimination within the police force, officers with an immigrant background have reported discrimination from colleagues.

Reporting on Muslims and Islam by the media has had an undeniably negative effect on the sense of belonging and feelings of exclusion, particularly among young Muslims in Rotterdam. Television is the most widely viewed medium but journalists and media workers with an immigrant background are under-represented in both broadcasting and the ranks of print media editorial staff.

This report makes a number of recommendations on consultation and participation, social protection, employment, and safety and security. At the neighbourhood and city level, Muslims in Rotterdam have a fairly strong sense of belonging and are confident
that they can influence local decision-making processes. While recognising that the Rotterdam City Council has devised a number of initiatives seeking the greater inclusion of its Muslim and minority groups, further challenges remain, especially in education and employment. There is also the challenge of growing extremism among segments of the native Dutch population.
1. **Introduction**

Islam is currently one of the most contested topics in the public arena in the Netherlands. The debates about Islam in the Netherlands are interwoven with the debates about the integration and acculturation of immigrants, since the majority of the non-Western immigrants are Muslim. In the same vein, discussions about Islam in the Netherlands are often reduced to matters of integration and habits of Muslims. However, many issues surrounding the integration of minorities into Dutch society have little to do with religion.

While public and political debates about immigrants in the Netherlands have taken place since the early 1980s, since 1991 the debate has shifted toward Islam and Muslims. The debate reached a critical point in 2000 after the publication of Paul Scheffer’s article “The Multicultural Tragedy” in the national newspaper *NRC Handelsblad*. Scheffer, a politician, academic and writer, argued that government integration policies had been unsuccessful in integrating immigrants into mainstream society, and failed to be clear about what was expected from immigrants. His argument concerned the four large immigrant groups: Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans. In addition, Scheffer described the position of orthodox Islam in Dutch society as problematic because of its rejection of Western values and the constitutional state. He emphasised the need to encourage these immigrant groups to identify with the Netherlands and Dutch values. The debate sparked by Scheffer’s article allowed the discontent of many native Dutch, who until then had felt that their concerns were not heard by the government, to come to the surface.

---

6 WRR, *Dynamiek in islamitisch activisme*.
7 Maussen, *Ruimte voor de islam?*.
8 The Centrum Partij (Centre Party), later called CP 86, was an extreme-right political party, founded in 1980 as a division of the Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU, Dutch People’s Union). The party no longer exists.
10 The term “Antillean” refers to persons from the island Aruba, located in the Caribbean Sea, which together with the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands form the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Aruban citizens hold Dutch passports. The term also refers to persons originating in the Netherlands Antilles, consisting of two groups of islands that form part of the Lesser Antilles in the Caribbean Sea. The islands are Curacao and Bonaire, which are just off the Venezuelan coast and belong to the Leeward Antilles; and Sint Eustatius, Saba and Sint Maarten, which are located south-east of the Virgin Islands and are part of the Leeward Islands. These Dutch islands form an autonomous part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Netherlands Antilles were scheduled to be dissolved as a unified political entity on 10 October 2010, so that the five constituent islands will each attain a new constitutional status within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
International developments and international politics have also influenced the debate in the Netherlands. Closer to home, the 2001–2002 rise and later murder of the politician Pim Fortuyn, the murder of the film-maker Theo van Gogh and the publicity surrounding the Somali former MP, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, left their mark. All three of these public figures were outspoken in their views of Islam and strongly criticised the multicultural political approach of the “Purple” coalition of the two electoral periods 1994–1998 and 1998–2002. Dutch society and the majority group, preferring assimilation, have become rejecting in their orientation toward ethnic and cultural diversity and the public and political debates have since shifted from “soft” multiculturalism to “hard” assimilation.

As one study has noted, the development and success of the integration process depends in part on how integration is understood. There have been different understandings of what it means to be integrated over time, across ethnic groups and between Muslims and non-Muslims. While the integration process advances, the expectations of what levels of integration should be reached by immigrants have changed, especially on the side of the native Dutch. This can increase feelings of...

---


12 Theo van Gogh (1957–2004) was a Dutch film-maker, columnist and public figure. On 2 November 2004, he was killed by a Dutch-born radicalised Muslim of Moroccan descent. Following the assassination, there was a series of violent attacks on Muslim schools, mosques and churches.

13 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, born in Somalia, came as a refugee to the Netherlands in 1992. Hirsi Ali strongly criticises Islam, in particular as a religion that is oppressive to women. After political controversies surrounding her Dutch citizenship, she moved to the United States in 2006 where she was offered a position at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank.


15 “Purple” was a coalition of the Labour Party (PvdA), the Democrat Party (Democrats ’66) and the Liberal Party (VVD). The coalition was named after the blend of the traditional colours of Social Democrat red and Liberal blue.


insecurity and lead to a withdrawal by individuals to their own ethnic or religious group. However, many second-generation Muslims are responding to the changing expectations of integration by seeking to meet the challenge and succeed.18

This report focuses on the city district of Feijenoord in the southern part of Rotterdam. It explores the daily experiences of inhabitants of Feijenoord at the neighbourhood level, concerning the selected areas that are of importance to integration. Furthermore, it describes a number of important policy measures and initiatives taking place in Rotterdam.

1.1 Methodology

The analysis presented in this report is based on a representative – although small-scale – survey that comprised 99 Muslims and a comparison group of 101 non-Muslims, as well as six focus groups with Muslims. It also includes interviews with 22 individuals from local government institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), members of Muslim communities and other related fields. These interviews were conducted in order to obtain contextual insight and information on local policies and practices, initiatives to address inequality and discrimination, and challenges facing communities in Rotterdam. The questionnaire included sections on identity and belonging, education, employment, housing, health, policing and security, and the media. The questionnaires were conducted by a number of locally based interviewers between February 2008 and June 2008 in face-to-face interviews lasting approximately two hours.

The 200 respondents were a non-random cross-section of individuals chosen from specified subgroups of the population in the neighbourhood of Feijenoord, one of the poorest areas in the city. The characteristics (age, ethnicity and gender) of the selected respondents were extrapolated from the available national population figures for the city. The categorisations of “Muslim” or “non-Muslim” relied on the interviewees’ self-identification. The non-Muslim comparison group was a mixed group of different ethnicities and different religions. Ethnic origin was not asked about directly and can only be guessed from the answers to the questions about nationality and place of birth and a third question which asked for the ethnic and/or cultural background the respondents felt that they belonged to. The majority of the non-Muslim comparison group were native Dutch nationals. While recognising the diversity and differing socio-economic status within the Muslim communities, the survey is not broken down into further categories due to the small scale of the study.

In addition to the questionnaire, six focus groups with around eight participants each were held with Muslim inhabitants from Feijenoord in order to obtain deeper insight

INTRODUCTION

into their perceptions and experiences regarding these subjects. The focus group participants were selected on the basis of gender, age, profession and expertise. Each group focused on particular subjects that are discussed in this report. Since the largest Muslim group in the area consists of people of Turkish background, some of the focus groups were conducted in Turkish with all-Turkish members. Each interview was fully transcribed and translated into English and Dutch.

The focus groups included individuals from various socio-economic backgrounds including the unemployed, low income and the skilled and unskilled. They were arranged as follows.

Focus group 1: “Education and employment; participation and citizenship” – Professionals, male and female, mixed age group.

Focus group 2: “Health, housing and social services” – Mixed male and female group, professionals and students, mixed age group.

Focus group 3: “Participation and politics” – Mixed male and female group, mixed age group.

Focus group 4: “Identity and belonging; education; employment” – Young women only, under age 35.

Focus group 5: “Identity and belonging” – Turkish women over age 45.

Focus group 6: “Identity and belonging; health; education” – Turkish men age over 45.

Part of the contextual and background information is based on a review of existing academic literature and research and policy publications, as well as media news reports, in order to position the findings within the context of the national and local political situation. The data collection of these sources ends at 1 May 2009. Developments that occurred after that date are not included in the analysis.

This report also includes feedback from a variety of participants from a roundtable held on 18 May 2009 with professionals in integration and inclusion, academics, representatives of municipal bodies and organisations and Muslim and immigrant organisations. This report reflects the opinions and information that were proffered during this meeting as far as possible within the scope and objectives of the research.
The majority of the non-Muslim comparison group were Dutch nationals.
### Table 1c. Foundations questionnaire respondents, non-Muslim men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Serbia and Montenegro</th>
<th>Suriname</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

### Table 1d. Foundations questionnaire respondents, non-Muslim women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Aruba</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Suriname</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
1.2 Terminology

This report has been written as part of an international comparative study, designed and commissioned by the At Home in Europe project of the Open Society Foundations. As a part of the ongoing work of the Foundations to protect and improve the lives of people in marginalised communities, this report was designed to monitor the position and concerns of the largest religious minority group in Western Europe: Muslims.

Because of this selection, it is unavoidable that a conflation of categories occurs. Many data that are available in the Netherlands and in other European countries do not take religious affiliation into account but rely on information on ethnicity and/or country of origin. As this report partly draws on secondary literature and research to contextualise the findings of the survey and to provide the necessary background information relevant to the Netherlands, it should be noted that most secondary literature on Muslims concerns Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their descendants. In addition, due to the selection of topics that are of key importance to social and economic integration, the behaviour, experiences and concerns of the interviewees are not determined by their religious identity, as Muslims did not first arrive in Europe as “Muslims”, but as guest workers, immigrants or refugees. Some questions concerning the issue of the self-identification or allocated identification of Muslims as “Muslims” thus remain.

Due to the small scale of this study, the findings do not claim to be general for all Muslims in all areas of Rotterdam. It is recognised that the findings from this report are not exclusive to Muslims and that other minority groups in the selected countries may face similar problems. However, the report does offer an insight into the daily experiences of Muslims and offers tools or directions for policy and for further study and research. The recommendations are derived from the findings in this report and are based on first-hand accounts of Muslims in Feijenoord.

1.3 Guide to Reading this Report

Each city report in this series looks at policies and social initiatives as well as the experience of local Muslim inhabitants in order to enable the inhabitants of cities to learn from each other. It should be stressed that this report does not claim to provide an exhaustive overview of all policy activity and initiatives in civil society.

Chapter 2 of this report offers background information on the demography and statistics in Rotterdam and the city district of Feijenoord. It describes the patterns of immigration and settlement of Muslims in the Netherlands and in Rotterdam and offers information on how citizenship and voting rights are organised in the Netherlands.

Chapter 3 goes into the administrative structure and the policy priorities in Rotterdam and Feijenoord, and the way Muslims are perceived in political and public discourse.
Chapters 4 to 11 elaborate on the findings for the selected subjects: identity, belonging and interaction; education; employment; housing; health and social services; policing and security; participation and citizenship; and the media.

The report’s first chapters describe the ways in which national and municipal authorities address the challenges relating to the integration of Muslims into society. Policies, practices and initiatives that contribute to the integration and inclusion of Muslims (both political and social), or the lack thereof, are highlighted. Where needed, the particular Dutch systems (such as the educational system) are outlined. Then, the findings from the Foundations questionnaires focus groups and stakeholder interviews are presented. Key findings from recent research are summarised when relevant.

The media section, Chapter 11, has a different structure. Some questions about media use were included in the questionnaire, but information about media involvement or media effects were not included. Therefore, the chapter provides an overview of recent existing literature and research on these subjects. It also examines the way the municipality communicates information to its immigrant inhabitants.

The conclusions from the preceding chapters are drawn together in Chapter 12.

In Chapter 13, the recommendations are presented, addressing policymakers and civil organisations at the local and national level.
2. **Population and Demographics**

2.1 Demography

**General Statistics**

This report describes the situation of Muslims in the Netherlands and its second-largest city, Rotterdam. Census data have not been collected in the Netherlands since 1971, so that in existing statistics and literature, the country of origin where Islam is the dominant religion is therefore taken as a proxy to estimate the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. As a result, most information on Muslims in the Netherlands concerns Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their offspring, as these are the largest ethnic minorities from countries with majority Muslim populations. It should thus be emphasised that statistics based on ethnicity, which are also used in this report as estimates of the situation of “Muslims”, do not reflect the level of religiosity or religious practice, or the different kind and degree of self-identification as “Muslim” of immigrants and their children.

The Dutch population registers collect information on country of birth and citizenship, as well as on the country of birth of both parents. In research and statistics, immigrants and their descendants are often referred to as *allochtonen*, which can be translated as “non-native born” or “immigrants”. Within this category, a further distinction is made between Western and non-Western. People are considered non-Western when they or at least one of their parents were born in Turkey, Morocco, other countries in Africa, Suriname, Aruba, other countries in Latin America and Asia (with the exception of Indonesia and Japan, which are considered Western). To enhance the readability of this report, when using general information and data on immigrants that are not based on specific ethnic or religious groups, the term “immigrants” will be used. Immigrants who were born abroad are referred to as first-generation immigrants, those born in the Netherlands second-generation. The third generation, with two Netherlands-born parents, are harder to track in statistics.

---

19. Between 1795 and 1971, Dutch census data were collected every ten years. In 1981, the census data collection was postponed and later cancelled. Because of a strong call for the protection of privacy, the collection of census data was legally abolished in 1991. Statistical data are now collected by representative surveys at the local and national levels. For more information (in Dutch), see www.volkstellingen.nl. National statistical data are collected by the Netherlands Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) and the Central Statistical Agency (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS) by statistical agencies at the regional level and by commercial research bureaus.


---
The Netherlands has a population of 16.5 million people.\(^{21}\) On 1 January 2008, there were 3.2 million immigrant residents in the Netherlands, which is 19.4 per cent of the total population. Of all immigrants, 1.8 million are non-Western, which is 10.9 per cent of the total population. Of the non-Western immigrants, two-thirds have their roots in Turkey, Morocco, Suriname and Aruba; the two first of which are predominantly Muslim (95 per cent and 97 per cent respectively).\(^{22}\) The largest groups of Western immigrants have their roots in Indonesia and Germany.

Of the non-Western immigrants, 40–50 per cent is second-generation. The numbers of first-generation immigrants in the Netherlands are decreasing: between 2004 and 2007, more non-Western immigrants left the country than entered it.\(^{23}\)

The average age of the non-Western immigrants is lower than that of the native Dutch. This is due to the general trend for younger people to immigrate, and the fertility rates and ageing of the native population. Of the native population, about one out of six is over 65 years, while only one out of 30 non-Western immigrants fall into this age group.\(^{24}\) The third generation of non-native immigrants is still small, consisting of around 50,000 children, half of whom are of Surinamese descent. The youngest among the third generation are Turks and Moroccans, of which about 90 per cent are below the age of ten.

Most of the non-Western immigrants live in the four main cities and the medium-sized cities in the Randstad (a region comprising a number of cities and towns otherwise known as a conurbation).

It is estimated that around 5.8 per cent of the Dutch population (some 885,000 persons) are Muslim.\(^{25}\) They too are concentrated in urban areas.

**Muslims in Rotterdam**

Rotterdam is the second-largest city of the Netherlands, after the capital, Amsterdam. On 1 January 2008, Rotterdam had 582,949 inhabitants.\(^{26}\)

---


Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly since the mid-1970s, Rotterdam has developed into a multi-ethnic urban society. By 2009 around 46 per cent of its residents were of immigrant background.\footnote{Gemeente Rotterdam, “Feitenkaart Participatie 2007” (Factsheet on participation 2007), Rotterdam, 2007.}

The number of Muslims in Rotterdam is estimated at around 80,000, which is about 13 per cent of its population. Half of the Muslim population in Rotterdam has Turkish roots, while a quarter is of Moroccan descent and the rest are from a variety of backgrounds, including Surinamese, Bosnian, Indonesian and Pakistani.\footnote{COS, “Feiten, teksten en publicaties”.}

Rotterdam has, with 45,699 Turkish inhabitants,\footnote{1 January 2008.} the largest Turkish minority in the Netherlands. With 37,476 Moroccans,\footnote{1 January 2008.} it has the second-largest Moroccan minority of the country (the largest Moroccan minority lives in Amsterdam). Only the Surinamese ethnic group, 51,885 people in total, outnumbers the Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Rotterdam. The native Dutch population in Rotterdam is 313,765. Of this, 68,884 are over 65 years of age. Among the native Dutch there are 20,000 more in the over-65 age group than any other age group. Among the Turkish and Moroccan minorities, the majority are of the second generation, and therefore relatively young (see Table 2.).
Table 2. Turkish and Moroccan populations in Rotterdam according to age group, 1 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Turkish 1st generation</th>
<th>Turkish 2nd generation</th>
<th>Moroccan 1st generation</th>
<th>Moroccan 2nd generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–14</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>11,672</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>12,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–24</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>4,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–34</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>4,869</td>
<td>1,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44</td>
<td>7,694</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>5,537</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,991</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–64</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,438</td>
<td>22,261</td>
<td>18,718</td>
<td>18,764</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centre for Research and Statistics (COS)31

As is apparent in Table 3, between 2000 and 2008 the Turkish and Moroccan populations increased compared with the other categories, with the exception of the combined category of “Other non-Western”, while the number of native Dutch inhabitants fell. Also, the Surinamese and Antillean population increased between 2000 and 2004 and decreased slightly between 2004 and 2008.

Table 3. Population of Rotterdam according to national background, 2000, 2004 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>50,053</td>
<td>52,291</td>
<td>51,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td>15,593</td>
<td>20,348</td>
<td>19,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>14,377</td>
<td>15,015</td>
<td>14,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40,277</td>
<td>44,637</td>
<td>45,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>30,238</td>
<td>35,355</td>
<td>37,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Western</td>
<td>30,184</td>
<td>40,125</td>
<td>40,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>355,438</td>
<td>332,327</td>
<td>313,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU(^{32})</td>
<td>30,937</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>32,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Western</td>
<td>25,563</td>
<td>27,546</td>
<td>27,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>592,660</td>
<td>599,544</td>
<td>582,949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COS

Feijenoord

The city of Rotterdam is divided in two by the river Maas. As of 2010, the number of city districts has risen from 13 to 14.\(^{33}\)

This research focuses on the southern district Feijenoord (Figure 1), which is predominantly a residential area. With 68,914 inhabitants on 1 January 2008, Feijenoord is one of the largest districts of Rotterdam, and one of the most ethnically diverse. Feijenoord is divided into eight neighbourhoods: Afrikaanderwijk, Bloemhof, Feijenoord, Hillesluis, Katendrecht, Kop van Zuid/Entrepot, Noordereiland and Vreewijk. The division between men and women in Feijenoord is 49.8 per cent male to 50.2 per cent female.\(^{34}\) One-third of the population is native Dutch and two-thirds are immigrants, 19 per cent of which are Turkish, 11 per cent Surinamese, 10 per cent

\(^{32}\) Includes EU countries that were members on 1 January 2007.

\(^{33}\) For an overview see [http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite1144.dws?Menu=267325&goto=259660&channel=182&substyle=251100](http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite1144.dws?Menu=267325&goto=259660&channel=182&substyle=251100) (accessed August 2010). A 14th district, Rozenburg, was added before the 2010 election.

\(^{34}\) This makes it one of the most equally divided districts in term of gender division. The city as a whole has 48.9 per cent male inhabitants to 51.1 per cent female. For information on all city districts see [http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite229.dws?goto=226732&s=2033&substyle=](http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite229.dws?goto=226732&s=2033&substyle=) (accessed August 2010).
Moroccan and 9 per cent “Other non-Western”.\textsuperscript{35} The percentages vary greatly between the different neighbourhoods. For example, in Kop van Zuid (a newly developed residential area with luxury apartments) the proportion of Dutch natives is 50 per cent, 3 per cent is Turkish, 5 per cent Surinamese, 2 per cent Moroccan and 17 per cent “Other non-Western”. The only neighbourhood with a majority of native Dutch inhabitants, at 69 per cent, is Vreewijk, which is the largest neighbourhood in Feijenoord.

\textbf{Figure 1. Feijenoord in the curve of the river Maas}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{feijenoord_map.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{Source:}
http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite229.dws?goto=351124&style=2128&substyle=251
(accessed August 2010)

\textsuperscript{35} The category “Other non-Western” is problematic when studying Muslims or other specific immigrant and/or ethnic groups. As this category includes persons from, among others, African countries as well as Asian countries, all information about the socio-economic situation and integration paths of the specific groups within this category disappears. Furthermore, the proportion of persons with a Muslim background in this category cannot be estimated. Interview with Rotterdam municipal administration representative, 8 April 2008.
2.2 Patterns of Immigration and Settlement

As noted above, the Muslim population in Rotterdam consists primarily of immigrants and their descendants. The largest immigrant groups in Rotterdam are of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan origin.

In the first few years after the Second World War, Rotterdam attracted only a relatively small number of immigrants. Although 300,000 Dutch-Indonesians from the former Dutch East Indies migrated or were “repatriated” to the Netherlands in the 1950s and arrived at the port of Rotterdam, most of them moved to other cities, especially The Hague and Leiden.

The postwar economic boom led to an increasing demand for low-skilled workers. From the late 1960s onward, the Dutch government concluded recruitment agreements with several southern European countries and later also with Turkey and Morocco to attract labourers to come to the Netherlands on temporary contracts. The largest numbers of these so-called “guest workers” came from these two countries. Also, a large number of men from what at that time was Yugoslavia were recruited to work in the metal industry in Rotterdam and its surrounding area. In the years before the independence of the Dutch colony of Suriname, large groups of Surinamese came to the Netherlands. The numbers of people of Moroccan and Turkish origin increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s due to family reunification and family formation (marriages with partners from Turkey or Morocco).

At first, the guest workers lived in special units and barracks outside the residential area. From the late 1960s to early 1970s, the number of boarding houses for immigrants rapidly increased, to almost 800 in 1972. The concentration of these houses in Afrikaanderwijk, one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the city, caused tensions there which culminated in riots in August 1972, when the Turkish boarding houses where attacked by Dutch residents of the neighbourhood.

The rapid growth of immigrant populations in Rotterdam – both in absolute and relative numbers – had an effect on the policy toward immigrants. Rotterdam was among the first cities in the Netherlands to acknowledge that the immigrants would not return and replaced its municipal policies concerning guest workers with policies focusing on immigration and settlement. This was partly because of the dramatic events of 1972, but also because an increasing number of guest workers in the early

---

37 Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam?, p. 110.
38 Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam?, p. 110.
1970s brought their families to Rotterdam. In 1978, the first policy note on immigrants in Rotterdam was presented.\textsuperscript{39}

Citizenship

The Netherlands has followed the principle of \textit{ius sanguinis}, according to which citizenship is determined by the birth parents. The general rule of the Netherlands Nationality Act\textsuperscript{40} states that a person has Dutch citizenship when at the moment of birth at least one of the parents has Dutch citizenship. There are important exceptions in favour of the principle of \textit{ius soli}, where nationality is determined by place of birth. This principle was strengthened in 1984 with the Netherlands Nationality Act, which gives an opportunity to children who are born in the Netherlands to immigrant parents and are now over 18 years of age to acquire Dutch nationality.\textsuperscript{41} Another way to obtain Dutch citizenship is through naturalisation. Persons who have resided in the Netherlands for more than five years without interruption, or have cohabited with a native Dutch person for at least three years (married or as a registered partner) can apply for naturalisation on the condition that they successfully complete the civic integration exam or can prove they have mastered the language with a "Dutch as Second Language" diploma (Nederlands als Tweede Taal, NT2).

Between 1992 and 1997, immigrants applying for Dutch citizenship could retain their original nationality alongside the Dutch. As a consequence, the number of dual nationals in the Netherlands increased in the 1990s. This policy changed in 1997 to a more restrictive naturalisation policy practice, in which dual citizenship is explicitly discouraged.

In principle, foreigners who wish to receive Dutch citizenship are expected to give up their foreign nationality. In many cases, this happens automatically when accepting Dutch nationality. In some cases, an explicit renunciation of foreign nationality is required. However, when it is impossible to give up the foreign nationality, as is the case for Moroccans because Moroccan law does not allow it, dual nationality remains feasible. Dual nationality is also allowed when surrendering the foreign nationality would create particular disadvantages such as loss of some benefits, including inheritances and property rights. This applies particularly to Turkish nationals. In Rotterdam, over two-thirds of the people originating from Turkey and Morocco hold Dutch citizenship, in most cases alongside Turkish or Moroccan nationality.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} Gemeente Rotterdam, “Nota Migranten in Rotterdam” (Note on Migrants in Rotterdam), Rotterdam, 1978.


\textsuperscript{41} Netherlands Nationality Act, 1984.

\textsuperscript{42} COS, information available at \url{http://www.cos.rotterdam.nl/smartsite2125603.dws?th.name=Bevolkingsgroepen&th.nr=6025&style=2033&substyle=} (accessed August 2010).
Voting Rights

According to the Dutch constitution, voting rights, in contrast to many other fundamental rights, are connected to citizenship. All Dutch citizens over age 18 are entitled to vote and to be elected (unless otherwise ruled by a judge). Dutch citizens who reside outside the Netherlands are entitled to vote in the national and European elections, but not the municipal elections.

Persons without Dutch citizenship, but who originate in EU countries, have voting rights for municipal and city district council elections under the same conditions as Dutch citizens. When registered in the municipality where they reside, they can also take part in the European elections, but not the national elections.

Persons without Dutch citizenship who originate in non-EU countries can vote in and be elected to municipal council and city district council elections under the same conditions as citizens, on the condition that they have resided legally (by means of a resident permit) in the Netherlands for five years continuously prior to the day when the information on the candidates is made public.43

43 See the Parlement and Politiek website, http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g3rhq0j (accessed August 2010).
3. CITY POLICY

3.1 Religious Diversity and Relations between Church and State

The Netherlands has been accustomed to religious diversity for centuries. The history of the Netherlands resulted in a society divided according to religious and ideological affiliations or pillars, which lasted until the 1960s. Catholics, Protestants and Socialists each organised themselves into more or less closed communities, within which all social life took place.44 The specifically Dutch model of state – church relations can be described as one of “principled pluralism” – is based first and foremost on the principle of equal treatment by law of the different religions and life philosophies.

While freedom of religion is a fundamental right, the separation of church and state is a theoretical principle, and thus always subject to interpretation. In the Netherlands, religious organisations are assigned an important civil function. This means that the (local) government can, and sometimes has to, create the conditions which allow people to profess their faith together.45 Consequently, religions can be part of public life, for example in media, unions or other organisations, such as schools, based on principled equality. All religious groups have to be treated equally, meaning that if a church can receive funding to run a shelter for the homeless, a mosque that wants to organise similar activities should be granted funding too.

At the city level, the municipality of Rotterdam does not grant subsidies to specific groups for activities that are only for followers of that group. At the district level, Feijenoord does provide subsidies that can be used as a tool to support activities by organisations that serve a particular group, where the activities are considered to have a social function, for example for the integration and/or emancipation of particular minority groups.46

When it became clear in the late 1970s that Muslims were no longer temporary guest workers but immigrants who were settling permanently in Dutch society, a number of legal and institutional provisions were made to guarantee the equal treatment of Islam as a minority religion in the Netherlands.47

At first, Muslims were encouraged to organise themselves along religious lines as the Dutch had done before them. The idea was that a strong degree of organisation would benefit the group’s emancipation, as it had done for Catholics in a predominantly Protestant setting. However, because the Islamic organisations established themselves

---

44 Maussen et al., Netherlands Literature Survey, p. 42.
45 Kennisnet Integratiebeleid en Etnische Minderheden (KIEM), Religie binnen het stedelijk beleid (Religion in municipal policy), Veenman Drukkers, Rotterdam, 2005.
46 Interview with a representative of the city district of Feijenoord, 8 April 2008.
47 Maussen et al., Netherlands Literature Survey, p. 43.
in the 1980s, when the Dutch were already highly secularised and the pillar system had lost its significance, Muslims were, in a way, too late to benefit from it.48

The first Islamic organisations in Rotterdam were mosque organisations that tried to meet the needs of Muslim immigrants for prayer rooms, religious education and contact.49 At the end of the 1980s, an initiative arose to found a platform for Muslim organisations. This led to the formation of the Rijnmond Islamic Organisations Foundation Platform (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond, SPIOR) in 1988. One of the reasons for the formation of the umbrella organisation was to have a more effective response to the problem of finding space for mosques. SPIOR gained political acknowledgement, equal to the Rijnmond Foreigners Platform (Platform Buitenlanders Rijnmond, PBR), an important umbrella organisation founded in 1981 for immigrant organisations. Both umbrella organisations remain active today.

Since 2000, political support for funding Muslim organisations has declined. Rather than seeking emancipation and integration as a group while keeping distinct cultural and religious characteristics, Muslims are now expected to integrate and emancipate as individuals. Still, whenever politicians wish to reach immigrant groups, they address the religious organisations and ask for help and advice or call on the responsibilities of the organisations.50

3.2 Municipal Relations with Muslim Communities

Municipalities have a degree of independence in the ways in which they implement the separation of church and state in their local policies, within the boundaries of the freedom of religion.

In 2006, a study was published in which the relationship between the municipal administrations, policy and Islam and cultural diversity were studied in four major cities, including Rotterdam.51 Four theoretical policy visions were distinguished. In the marginalising policy view, policymakers aim to push the visibility of Islam in society as much to the corners as possible, for example by banning the building of clearly visible mosques or the wearing of headscarves. In a pluralist vision, emphasis is on the right to a different collective identity, for example by allowing Muslim schools and recognisable mosques. Third, in a dialogic vision, emphasis is on individual emancipation from

---

51 Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam.
institutionalised Muslim organisations. Last, an assimilationist view requires that immigrants and Muslims adapt to the Dutch social context and Dutch culture.

Although voices were raised in the national and political debate supporting a radical change of policy toward Islam, the study concludes that in these cities policymakers generally continue to follow a combination of pluralist and dialogic policies. The pluralist policy view on religious facilities is strongly rooted in local policy and in the Dutch historical context of religious pluralism. At the same time, based on the dialogic view, the development of facilities and initiatives that fit into the Dutch context and a meaningful interaction between different religious and ethnic communities are encouraged.

Rotterdam currently has 30 official mosques and Islamic prayer houses. In Rotterdam Islamic prayer spaces were first established in the early 1970s by the first-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, then still referred to as guest workers. As this first generation brought their spouses and children to Rotterdam, these facilities came to play a central role in Muslim communities’ efforts to provide for their particular socio-cultural, educational and religious needs. A special policy for the housing of mosques was developed between 1988 and 1991. It was then assumed that facilitating an Islamic pillar would foster the emancipation of this group, as it had done with other religious groups before them. Ten years later, these same buildings were subject to strongly polemical debates.

Muslim organisations as discussion partners are of great importance to local governments. In Rotterdam, SPIOR is, with over 20 years of experience, a solid organisation that functions as a partner of the municipality. As a partner of the municipality rather than a representative of the entire Muslim community, SPIOR’s role is to identify shared goals and interest of Muslim organisations and bring these to the attention of the municipality, to ensure that policy initiatives have the support of a range of Muslim organisations. Through this process they have helped develop initiatives on issues such as forced marriages, the emancipation of women and caring for the elderly.

In Rotterdam, the instrument of municipal funding is used to encourage civic activities in the city. Funding is not granted to specifically religious initiatives, but to civic initiatives in which different groups can take part. At the district level, however, funding is sometimes granted to specific groups if the activities are thought to improve the integration of this group into the larger society.

52 Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam?, p. 228.
53 Information provided by SPIOR, stakeholder interview, 8 April 2008.
55 Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam?, p. 96.
3.3 Administrative Structure of Rotterdam

The municipality of Rotterdam consists of a commission of the mayor, aldermen and city council. The mayor and aldermen are the administrative authorities, while the city council holds legislative authority. Based on suggestions by the city council, the Minister of the Interior recommends a candidate to be the mayor of a given city. After approval from the States General Chamber, the Queen appoints the mayor. The aldermen are accountable to the mayor.

Every four years, municipal elections are held in which the inhabitants elect local representatives of national parties to govern their city (Labour, Green, Christian Democrats and so on). The city council is formed according to the election’s outcome, and the council then selects the aldermen from among them. The aldermen are in office for the four years of the electoral term, but can be selected again after new elections. The position of the mayor is not connected to the elections, as the mayor is not elected but appointed. The mayor can thus remain in office for a longer period and fulfill a structural role in the city.56

On 5 January 2009, Ahmed Aboutaleb, a member of the Labour Party and former Secretary of State of Social Affairs, was inaugurated as Rotterdam’s new mayor. Aboutaleb arrived in the Netherlands from Morocco at age 14 and his background was frequently mentioned in debates preceding his appointment as the new mayor. The right-wing MP Geert Wilders and his followers, as well as people involved in other right-wing parties, have often questioned his loyalty because of his dual citizenship. Some council members belonging to the local level of the right-wing Fortuynist party Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam) disagreed at first with the council’s decision to recommend Aboutaleb for the same reason. They later withdrew their objections and expressed their confidence in Aboutaleb.

Aboutaleb presents himself as an observant Muslim, and strongly supports secularism. He has emphasized that Islam is compatible with Dutch society, and has spoken out against extremism.57 According to him, integration is about participation in society, which includes learning the language and adapting to the most important values of the host country. For example, when he was Secretary of State of Social Affairs, he stated that women who choose to wear a burqa should not be allowed to receive social

56 The last mayor, Ivo Opstelten of the Liberal Party (VVD), was in office 1999–2006.
57 On 25 April 2006, Aboutaleb held the closing lecture of the annual Amsterdam Lectures, “The secular city”. He emphasized the importance of religion to immigrants worldwide (Christian and Muslims alike) and described how Islam evolves in Dutch society. However, he also stressed, directed at young Muslims: “Do not allow your faith to be taken hostage by some fanatic idiots.” The lecture is available (in Dutch) at http://amsterdam.nl/nieuws?ActItmIdt=11384 (accessed August 2010).
welfare, because their personal choice made access to the Dutch labour market impossible.\textsuperscript{58}

In addition to the mayor, the city council has several members of immigrant background,\textsuperscript{59} some of whom were born in the Netherlands. Immigrants are also represented on the district councils and the (district) council advisory boards. In some districts, such as Feijenoord, district council members with an immigrant background are even a majority.

In Rotterdam, as in Amsterdam, the city is divided into districts with a similar administrative structure to the municipality. The city council is responsible for the overall policies of Rotterdam. Each city district has a district council, a board of city district aldermen, and is presided over by an elected city district president. The district councils’ domains are established at the level of city districts and neighbourhoods. While the city council reflects the electoral outcome of the entire city, each district council reflects the electoral outcome of the district. Since the municipal elections of 2006 the city district of Feijenoord has had a predominantly Labour district council.

Depending on the number of inhabitants in a given municipality, there are a number of representatives on the city council. Each political party presents a list of candidates that can be elected by the inhabitants. The aldermen are not part of the city council. The city councils thus resemble the national council, where the ministers cannot be part of the parliament. In the largest cities, including Rotterdam, there are 45 seats in the city council. Rotterdam (like Amsterdam) has city district council elections which take place at the same time as city council elections. The district council has 13–25 members, depending on the district’s size. The district council selects the council board, as the city council selects the aldermen. Feijenoord, one of the largest city districts in Rotterdam, has 25 members on the district council.

The whole city is divided into districts each with its own district councils, except for the harbour, some industrial areas and the city centre, which are governed by the city council. District councils have responsibilities in the areas of the local economy, employment, safety, environmental improvement and general liveability of the area. In addition, they provide all kinds of services to the district residents, such as the renewal of Dutch passports. An apparatus of services and agencies supports the city council with projects and structural services, including health services. The city districts have some degree of autonomy, and formulate local policy matching the specific situation of the district. However, their policies are tuned with the city council. The city council

\textsuperscript{58} Aboutaleb made this statement in the feminist monthly magazine \textit{Opzij} in April 2006.

\textsuperscript{59} It is difficult to give an exact number as occasionally some council members resign due to political conflicts or for other reasons. On average, between one-quarter and one-third of the city council members (a total of 45) are of immigrant background. In the district councils, this percentage may be higher.
and the councils of the city districts negotiate agreements after the municipal elections to work on common goals and issues considered most important to the city as a whole.

For the electoral period 2006–2010 the main points on the political agenda of Rotterdam have been security, socio-economical participation, housing and the economy. Security includes policing, maintenance and supervision of public areas and financial investment in the physical and social structure of the city. The emphasis of the socio-economic policy is on increasing the number of immigrant inhabitants who master the Dutch language, generally increasing civic participation, improving higher education, counteracting poverty and improving employment rates.

Labour is the biggest party in Feijenoord city district. This is reflected in the composition of the district council and in its policy programme. The policy programme of the city district Feijenoord for 2006–2010 is called “For a Strong and Social Feijenoord”. After the security and cleanliness of the city district, emphasis is placed on the socio-economic and socio-cultural empowerment of the inhabitants. Reducing unemployment rates, improving the educational achievement levels of young people and stimulating integration of first and subsequent generation Dutch of immigrant background are also high on the political agenda. The district council aims to involve the inhabitants in local politics by inviting them to public meetings and neighbourhood activities that are directed at improving social cohesion and social participation.

In February 2008, Feijenoord adopted a new organisational structure in which focus is placed not on the whole district but on specific local areas. Aided by three “area teams” (Gebiedsteams) and an expert team, the city districts focus on specific problems, which differ between neighbourhoods. This approach aims to encourage the involvement of the residents of the neighbourhoods, local organisations and municipal services. One of the most important cooperative initiatives is the Southern Pact (Pact op Zuid), in which the districts in South Rotterdam cooperate with housing corporations to improve the quality of housing, public space and infrastructure across the southern part of the city.

3.4 Perception of Muslims in Political and Public Discourse

The debate on Muslims and Islam in Rotterdam has been influenced to a large degree by the developments of 2001–2002 when the populist politician Pim Fortuyn and the

---

60 More information about the agenda of the council is available at the website of the city of Rotterdam (in Dutch) at http://www.rotterdam.nl/smartsite2117044.dws (accessed August 2010).


political party Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam, the local division of Leefbaar Nederland) rose to great popularity. Fortuyn, a former member of the Labour Party, spoke out strongly against “the Islamisation of our culture.” In this period dissatisfaction with the integration of immigrants into Dutch society was the topic of intense political and public debate. This discontent came to the surface much more powerfully in Rotterdam than it did in Amsterdam, where the Liveable Party did not reach anything like the popularity it did in Rotterdam. It channelled many of the discontents of the inhabitants of Rotterdam, especially the native Dutch population’s concerns about security and the integration of immigrants. A possible reason might have been the differences in the economic structures of both cities. Liveable Rotterdam became the biggest group in the municipal elections of March 2002. The Labour Party, traditionally the largest party of the working-class majority in Rotterdam (in 1974 it held an absolute majority), saw its support decline by half. They had to concede power to the opposition for the next four years.

After the municipal elections of 2002, a commission of the mayor and aldermen was established in Rotterdam with Liveable Rotterdam as the biggest party. They formed a municipal coalition with the Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) and the Christian Democrats (Christen Democratisch Appel, CDA). High priority was given to security and the integration of immigrants.

With the so-called “Fortuynist revolt” of Liveable Netherlands and Liveable Rotterdam, and later in 2002 with Fortuyn’s own party, Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF), the broad discussion and problematisation of Islam intensified. In Rotterdam, this was expressed in a major project carried out in the city, named “Islam and Integration between 2003 and 2005”. With a series of debates, expert meetings, public debates and publications, the municipality sought to stimulate discussion among Muslims on issues

---

63 Liveable Rotterdam is a local party, connected to the national party Liveable Netherlands. While the national Liveable Party no longer has a large following after Pim Fortuyn started his own national party, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Liveable Rotterdam became the biggest party in Rotterdam in 2002, and the second-biggest party in 2006.


65 Entzinger and Dourleijn, *De laat steeds hoger*, p. 16.


67 Fortuyn started his own political party after he was dismissed from his presidency of Liveable Rotterdam after an interview in a widely read national newspaper, in which he stated that the first amendment should be abolished as it forbids discrimination and therewith, according to Fortuyn, limits the freedom of speech. In the same interview, he called Islam a “backward culture”.

68 Maussen, *Ruimte voor de islam?*, p. 121.
such as the emancipation of women, domestic violence, divorce, homosexuality, Islam itself and the Dutch construction of church–state relations. Furthermore, the municipality strived to reach a better understanding between the different ethnic and religious groups in the city and to stimulate active citizenship among Muslims. Although the municipality and many critics evaluated the results of the debates positively, many Muslims felt offended because general concerns such as domestic violence were discussed as if they were particular to Islam. Furthermore, Muslims felt that the debates were more of a platform to speak out negatively about Islam and Muslims, so that they in fact enforced the existing prejudices and stereotypes.

In 2006, new municipal elections were held. The elections were strongly polarised; because Liveable Rotterdam would not take part in a new coalition if it did not gain a majority of votes, Labour targeted left-wing voters and in particular immigrants in their campaign. Both on the right and on the left side of the political spectrum, people were encouraged to vote strategically, and the elections became a “clash of the Titans” between Liveable and Labour. Labour won the elections with 37.4 per cent of all votes. The victory can partly be explained by the mobilisation of immigrants who had not participated in the municipal elections during the previous elections, the polarised character of the elections and the lower number of total voters in comparison with the elections of 2002. Liveable Rotterdam won 29.7 per cent of all votes and had to concede power to a Labour council.

The current (Labour) city council seems to be far less concerned with Islam. Instead, politicians stress the needs to improve social cohesion, which is perceived as too weak, and to increase active citizenship in the Netherlands and among the inhabitants of Rotterdam. Integration issues such as increasing the Dutch-language skills of immigrants and the economic participation of these groups is included under the umbrella term “participation”.

---

70 Foundations Roundtable, Rotterdam, May 2009. Explanatory note: The Open Society Foundations held a roundtable meeting in Rotterdam in May 2009 to invite critique of the present report in draft form. Experts present included representatives of the municipality, local groups and non-governmental organisations. Representatives of the SPIOR as representatives of Muslim organisations, individual (Muslim) professionals and (non-Muslim) representatives of the municipal administration agreed that there was no such thing as a true “debate” between Muslims and non-Muslims.
71 Interview with RADAR, 8 May 2008.
4. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: IDENTITY, BELONGING AND INTERACTION

Identity and belonging are important elements of integration. While an individual may be integrated into the labour market and social networks he or she may not identify with the area, city or country in which he/she lives. At the same time, the failure of public and social policy to acknowledge and respect important aspects of a person’s identity and sense of self can hinder integration. A greater sense of inclusion for both majority and minority communities is offered through the creation of a common public sphere and there is growing recognition of the importance for cohesion of meaningful contact and interaction between people of different ethnic and cultural groups, as this helps overcome prejudice and challenge stereotypes.

The concern about parallel lives and segregation and the emphasis placed by social cohesion policy on expanding interaction and communication between people from different ethnic or religious groups are underpinned by increasing evidence from conflict resolution studies of the positive effect of more personal contact on reducing people’s prejudices toward members of different social groups. In order to do this contact must be meaningful and not superficial or casual (like passing a person on the street), because in the absence of meaningful contact casual contact may be worse than none. Having friends from other social groups would be a strong indication of meaningful contact.

Muslims in Rotterdam are part of a multi-ethnic, multicultural society. The second generation of Muslims in Rotterdam have not known anything other than a multi-ethnic environment. This section describes some key policy views and practices concerning identity and belonging. It explores how Muslims in Feijenoord feel about their neighbourhood, neighbours and city, and looks at the contexts where interactions take place.

4.1 The Debate on Dutch Identity

Identification with the Netherlands and what actually comprises Dutch identity have been a topic of vigorous political debates over the past few years, triggered by the concern about the lack of identification of immigrants with the Netherlands as their

78 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De lat steeds hoger, p. 90.
home country, as well as other issues such as globalisation and the European Union.79 The Scientific Council for Government Policy published a report in September 2007 called *Identification with the Netherlands*.80 One of its most important conclusions was that aiming to establish one particular Dutch identity can be counterproductive. According to the council, identity (including “Dutch” identity) is always changing and thus cannot be determined. Moreover, the way people give meaning to their Dutch identity is very diverse and very personal. Moreover, the council stressed that Dutch history is defined by the diversity and even rivalry of cultures. Identity always involves what connects an individual to others, and also what separates “us” from “them”.

The current Dutch government,81 composed of a Christian-Labour coalition, stresses the importance of overcoming the ethnic, cultural and religious barriers between different groups in Dutch society.82 It aims to improve social cohesion between groups in terms of respect for diversity, and to decrease discrimination as well as possible extremism. Moreover, it explicitly strives for the social and cultural integration of ethnic minorities, which includes inter-ethnic contact, a strong identification with the Netherlands rather than with the countries of origin, and acquiring cultural and social skills specific to the Dutch context (such as communication skills, assertiveness, individual self-development and individual responsibility), in order to increase the participation of citizens of migrant background in Dutch society.

4.2 Municipal Initiatives and Policy in Rotterdam

Between 2003 and 2005, a major project was carried out in Rotterdam, named “Islam and Integration”. This project consisted of a number of publications on the situation of Muslims in Rotterdam, expert meetings and a series of public debates at the city district and municipal level. The project resulted in a kind of code of conduct for the citizens of Rotterdam, constructed by a commission composed of the mayor and aldermen.83 The code was subject to strong criticism from many council members.84 For instance, one of its points was that Dutch should be used as the common language
in the streets of Rotterdam. Critics thought that it was unrealistic to expect all inhabitants of Rotterdam to speak Dutch in the streets, not only because of the ethnic composition of certain areas, but also because Rotterdam has many international companies with English-speaking staff.

In 2006, the Rotterdam code of conduct was renamed the “Rotterdam Citizens’ Code”. The greater part addresses radicalisation and extremism, the equal treatment of boys and girls, men and women, homosexuals, persons with different religions and non-religious people. Because of this emphasis, the code is perceived to be directed at immigrants, and more specifically, at Muslims. Consequently, it gives the impression that immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular, are responsible for the tensions and conflicts in Rotterdam. This, in turn, can lead to discrimination.

Since April 2007, the city council’s policy programme has emphasised civic citizenship and participation. In its general policy note of 2007, the council expressed its ambition to create a strong sense of belonging to the city among all inhabitants of Rotterdam. In addition to concrete programmes on integration, education and employment, the council aims to increase the involvement and commitment of the inhabitants. Referring to the challenges that are a consequence of the city’s demographic characteristics – where half of the population is of immigrant descent and the population is also relatively young – the council describes the citizens of Rotterdam as people “directed at a common future, not a differentiated past”.

As part of the policy programme, the council developed a programme called “Building Bridges through Dialogue” (Dialoog Bruggen Bouwen). There are four pillars in the programme. The first pillar, the broad civic citizenship dialogues, is directed at integration and cooperation between the municipality, welfare support and cultural policy. The main aims are to integrate the different initiatives in the area of participation and sharing knowledge. The second pillar is citizenship and identity dialogues. The emphasis is on creating a shared identity and strong solidarity among the inhabitants of Rotterdam. The Muslim academic Tariq Ramadan, who was first

88 Gemeente Rotterdam, “Kadernota stadsburgerschap: het motto is meedoen” (Policy note: urban citizenship: the slogan is participation), April 2007.
89 Gemeente Rotterdam, “Uitvoeringsprogramma dialoog bruggen bouwen” (Implementation programme for building bridges through dialogue), 23 June 2008.
invited to Rotterdam to take part in the Islam debates, has a special role here. During these debates it became clear that Ramadan’s message on citizenship\(^\text{90}\) appealed to many ethnic groups and in particular to young Muslims. By attracting Ramadan to Rotterdam, the council aimed to guarantee attention to the specific needs of Muslims in Rotterdam.\(^\text{91}\) Between March and June 2007, Ramadan held a city tour through Rotterdam where he spoke to representatives of several organisations.\(^\text{92}\) The tour resulted in three main points of concern, which will be followed up in future policy decisions. These were education, the labour market and the media. The third pillar is neighbourhood dialogues. The initiative here is placed on the inhabitants, organisations and other parties to create a dialogue customised to their needs. The municipality provides funding. Finally there are street dialogues, about stimulating involvement with the immediate environment through meetings where the inhabitants can share ideas and concerns.

### 4.3 Civil Organisations

Civil organisations play an important role in the continuing dialogue between different religions in Rotterdam. SPIOR, with over 20 years of experience and links with 60 Muslim organisations, is an important discussion partner for the municipality and municipal services. Muslim communities in Rotterdam benefit from having such an organisation that can offer advice, training and practical support.

In 2001, the Rotterdam Council for Philosophy of Life and Religion (Rotterdamse Raad voor Levensbeschouwing en Religie, RORAVOLERE\(^\text{93}\)) was founded. This is an organisation in which a wide range of religious organisations, including SPIOR, the Foundation for Islam and Dialogue,\(^\text{94}\) Sufi movements, Christian churches (of different denominations), Jewish communities, Hindu, Buddhist, Baha’i, and humanist and esoteric (theosophist, anthroposophist) communities are represented. RORAVOLERE organises inter-religious debates, dialogues and lectures. Its activities aim to emphasise the role of religion and the philosophy of life in a multicultural society. It keeps up contact with and offers advice to civil organisations, NGOs and municipal bodies. RORAVOLERE and the Foundation for Islam and Dialogue fill a gap in the inter-religious dialogue in Rotterdam and emphasise the importance of religion and life philosophies in the city.

---

\(^\text{90}\) For a list of publications by Ramadan on this subject, see www.tariqramadan.nl

\(^\text{91}\) Due to Ramadan’s activities for an Iranian-funded broadcasting channel, he was forced to resign from his duties for both the municipality and the university in August 2009. Many scholars at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, where Ramadan worked, offered him their support and remain critical of the political decision to dismiss him.

\(^\text{92}\) “Verslag stadtour Tariq Ramadan” (Report on city tour of Tariq Ramadan), available (in Dutch) at www.tariqramadan.nl (accessed August 2010).

\(^\text{93}\) See the organisation’s website (in Dutch) at www.roravolere.nl (accessed August 2010).

\(^\text{94}\) See the organisation’s website (in Dutch) at http://www.islamendialoog.nl/_/index.php?p=home (accessed August 2010).
Every year, since 2001, Rotterdam holds a Day of Dialogue (Dag van de Dialoog), which is partly funded by the municipality. After the events in the United States on 11 September 2001, several organisations in Rotterdam, including the antidiscrimination agency Art.1, came up with a concept to enhance social cohesion. During the Day of Dialogue people of different backgrounds are given the opportunity to sit around tables, spread over the city, in mixed groups of religions and cultures to share thoughts and concerns. Also, workshops and network meetings are organised. This initiative to stimulate contact between different people has proved very successful, and the Day of Dialogue currently takes place in 50 municipalities in the Netherlands.

4.4 Belonging

The respondents to the Foundations questionnaire were asked several questions about their sense of belonging to their local area, the city and the country. They were asked to mention the positive as well as the negative aspects of their neighbourhood and local area. Neighbourhood in this context is taken as the streets immediately surrounding their home, whereas the local area is defined as the area 15–20 minutes’ walk from where they live.

Overall, most interviewees responded positively when asked whether they enjoyed living in their neighbourhood. The Muslim respondents were slightly more positive than the non-Muslim respondents when the two positive categories are combined, but the non-Muslims were more outspoken about enjoying living in their neighbourhood (Table 4.).

Most respondents in both groups also expressed a sense of belonging to their local area. Both Muslims and non-Muslims felt a similar level of attachment and sense of belonging. Almost a quarter of the Muslim (23 per cent) and non-Muslim (24 per cent) respondents indicated that they identified very strongly with their local area, and an additional 54.5 per cent of Muslims and 61 per cent of non-Muslims identified fairly strongly with their local area. None of the Muslim and only 2 per cent of the non-Muslim respondents reported having no sense of belonging to their local area. However, a larger proportion of Muslim than non-Muslim respondents (20 per cent and 7 per cent) said their sense of belonging was not very strong.

The interviewees mentioned the area’s facilities, such as shops and public transport, as positive factors. In the focus groups, younger Muslim women complained that some of the shops in a particular shopping street now conformed to Dutch standards for opening hours, whereas they used to be open much later.

The overall cleanliness of the area was a topic of concern mentioned in both the questionnaires and the focus group interviews. Muslims and non-Muslims alike complained that there should be stricter requirements for people cleaning up after their pets, and that there should be higher fines to punish those who do not comply.
A similar proportion of Muslim (67.3 per cent) and non-Muslim respondents (63.1 per cent) indicated that there were no areas of the city in which they felt uncomfortable.

Table 4. Would you say that this is a neighbourhood you enjoy living in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

While a large majority of all respondents felt a strong sense of belonging to the city, non-Muslim respondents were more likely than Muslims to have a very strong sense of belonging. However, a quarter of Muslim respondents said that they had no, or not a very strong, sense of belonging to the city, compared with 9 per cent of non-Muslims (Table 5.).

Table 5. How strongly do you feel you belong to this city?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strongly</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very strongly</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strongly</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Among the majority of Muslim respondents there is a positive sense of belonging (that is either fairly strong or very strong) to both the city of Rotterdam and the Netherlands. Almost three-quarters (73.7 per cent) of Muslim respondents reported either a fairly strong (49.5 per cent) or very strong (24.2 per cent) sense of belonging to
the city. A smaller proportion, two-thirds (65.6 per cent), reported a fairly strong (54.5 per cent) or very strong (11.1 per cent) sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In fact, among Muslim respondents the sense of belonging to the city was significantly stronger or more intense than belonging to the country; 24.3 per cent of Muslim respondents felt a very strong sense of belonging to Rotterdam, compared with 11 per cent who felt a very strong sense of belonging to the Netherlands. Although the non-Muslim comparison group answered more positively on both questions of identification, it should be noted that their identification with the Netherlands is weaker than their identification with their city.

Table 6. How strongly do you feel you belong to this country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strongly</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very strongly</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strongly</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

4.5 Identity

Among the respondents who categorised themselves as Muslim, 26 per cent stated they did not actively practise their religion. One-third of the Muslim respondents wore visible signs of their religion: all but one were women who wore a headscarf. The one man with visible signs of religion wore a beard and Islamic clothing.

Identity develops in a dynamic socio-psychological process that is influenced both internally and externally. This means that people feel they belong to some defined social category such as an ethnic group, while this feeling is confirmed or contradicted from the outside. There is an interaction between internal and external processes: the
feeling of belonging to a certain group can be strengthened by the opinion of others, and vice versa.95

Respondents were asked what ethnicity they felt they belonged to. Among the Muslim respondents, 1 per cent (1 person) stated feeling “fully” Dutch and 18 per cent stated that they felt they belonged to several ethnicities, including Dutch and another national/ethnic group. Most respondents who gave a mixed ethnic identity as an answer were under 30 years old (7 per cent). Also in the older age groups, Muslims felt they belonged to several ethnic groups, including Dutch: 4 per cent among the group aged 30–39, 1 per cent in the age group 40–49, 3 per cent among the age group 50–59 and 2 per cent among the oldest group of over 60 years old. Twelve per cent of all respondents mentioned they felt “Muslim” first: 5 per cent among the age group 20–29, 3 per cent in the age group 30–39 and 4 per cent in the age group 40–49. The other Muslim respondents mentioned their national background (Turkish, Moroccan, Indonesian, etc) as their ethnic group.

Although during the focus group sessions Turkish interviewees used the terms “Turk” and “Muslim” almost indiscriminately when referring to their ethnic group, they did differentiate between their own ethnic group and other Muslim groups, especially Moroccan. Thus, while the Turkish interviewees spoke about Muslims as a category, this did not (necessarily) include Muslims of other ethnic groups. Moreover, some Turkish interviewees said that they felt that they were held responsible for the problems caused by Moroccans.96

In 2006 researchers at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam conducted a survey among a representative sample of Turkish, Moroccan and native Dutch people aged between 18 and 30 years of age living in Rotterdam.97 The survey was a follow-up to an earlier survey held in 1999.98 The second report provides an insight into the changes in the daily experiences of this age group between the period before and after 11 September 2001, the rise of Pim Fortuyn, the period in which Leefbaar Rotterdam was the largest political party in Rotterdam, and the murder of Theo van Gogh. The findings of the survey show that the identification with Rotterdam and the feeling of being “Dutch” increases over time, over generations and with educational levels. The sense of

96 In public and political discourse in the Netherlands, Moroccan youths—particularly boys—are depicted as troublemakers.
97 See Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger.
belonging to the city and being a Rotterdamer becomes particularly strong in youngsters growing up in the city.\textsuperscript{99}

On the Foundations questionnaire, over half of the Muslim respondents, 56.4 per cent, stated that they did not feel Dutch. Of the non-Muslim respondents, which of course include a number of ethnic Dutch people, 23.3 per cent felt the same way. The results of the question “Do most other people in this country see you as Dutch?” are even more striking: only 17.8 per cent of the Muslim respondents felt that they were seen as Dutch, compared with 67 per cent of the non-Muslim respondents. Corresponding with policy concerns about the social and cultural integration of immigrants, not speaking the language was mentioned by most respondents of both groups as the main barrier to being Dutch. Of the Muslim respondents, 28.7 per cent stated that language was the main barrier, while another 19.8 per cent reported the main barrier was the fact that they were born abroad. Being a non-Christian was mentioned by 7 per cent. Another 6 per cent indicated that there were no barriers. Only a few respondents specified their answer when they selected the categories “none of these” or “other”. When they did specify, their answer indicated that being an immigrant (allochtoon, non-native) is the barrier to being Dutch. Quite a large percentage stated that they did not have an answer to the question (13 per cent of the Muslim and 12 per cent of the non-Muslim group).

Well over half of the Muslims compared with almost one-quarter of the non-Muslims, including those with an immigrant background, stated that they did not want to be seen by others as Dutch.

\textsuperscript{99} Entzinger and Dourleijn, \textit{De lat steeds hoger}, p. 93.
Figure 2. Do you want to be seen by others as Dutch?

This outcome needs to be studied further. The interviewees were given the chance to clarify their statements, though few did so. Among the clarifications that were given, there were very diverse answers for “not wanting to be seen as Dutch”. While some mentioned that they felt proud of their ethnic background, others mentioned that they did not wish to be part of a dominant group that discriminates against them. Still others stated that they did not feel the need to belong to any particular nationality: they felt cosmopolitan. Therefore, at this stage, no strong conclusions can be drawn from this finding.

4.6 Trust and Social Cohesion

Attempts have been made to develop questions that can be used to measure levels of social cohesion in an area. Three possible indicators to measure levels of social cohesion are levels of trust of people in the neighbourhood, whether people believe that people in their neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbours and whether they think people in their area share the same values. The levels of trust in their neighbours are only moderately high in both groups: 26 per cent of the Muslim and 25 per cent of the non-Muslim respondents indicated that many people in their neighbourhood could be trusted.

A little over half of each group, 52 per cent and 57 per cent respectively, agreed that their neighbourhood was close-knit. When asked whether the people of their
neighbourhood were willing to help their neighbours, most respondents agreed. Of the Muslim respondents, 14 per cent agreed strongly with this statement and 57.5 per cent agreed fairly strongly. The non-Muslims were slightly more positive, with 16.5 per cent agreeing strongly with the statement and 58.5 per cent agreeing fairly strongly.

A total of 40 per cent of Muslims stated that the people in the neighbourhood shared the same values, and 36 per cent of non-Muslims agreed with this statement.

### Table 7. Would you agree that in this local area people from different backgrounds get on well together?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too few people in this local area</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

A majority of both groups stated that the atmosphere among people from different backgrounds in the area was positive.

### 4.7 Interaction

Research has shown that a large proportion of second-generation Turkish, Moroccan\(^{100}\) and native Dutch youngsters in Rotterdam and Amsterdam had friends from different ethnic groups among their close circle of friends in secondary school. However, after youngsters leave school or finish their studies when they are in their twenties, the...

---

\(^{100}\) As mentioned, these are the ethnic groups that are often used as a proxy for Muslims, as specific data are unavailable.
number of inter-ethnic friendships decreases in favour of friendships within their own ethnic group.\textsuperscript{101}

Corresponding with the national data, Turks have the fewest inter-ethnic friendships. However, there are large differences within the group in education. Turks and Moroccans with a higher level of education are more likely to have inter-ethnic friendships, specifically with native Dutch.\textsuperscript{102} This can be explained by the fact that there are still substantial differences in educational achievement levels between natives and immigrants, and Turks and Moroccans are still minorities in higher education. In addition, higher educational levels tend to correspond with a stronger orientation toward Dutch society and more participation in volunteer work, civil society and political activities, areas in which immigrants are still under-represented.\textsuperscript{103}

Many interactions between people of different backgrounds take place at the level of the neighbourhood, where people share the same facilities, talk to their neighbours, practise sport or other leisure activities and take their children to school. Living in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods therefore enforces ethnically homogeneous contacts. A study by the SCP concluded that the social distance observed between different groups in several cities in the Netherlands correlates with the residential segregation of different social and ethnic groups. The study also pointed out that contacts between different ethnic groups, and between ethnic minorities and the native majority population, are important for mutual acceptance.\textsuperscript{104}

A majority of the Muslim respondents to the Foundations questionnaire mentioned that while ethnic and cultural diversity is perceived as enriching the liveability and specific quality of the area, the high level of ethnic segregation is at the same time a topic of concern, especially in the schools, which are almost completely “black”\textsuperscript{105}. The term “black” refers to schools that have very large numbers of pupils from immigrant and non native backgrounds. A Muslim interviewee stated: “Sometimes I overhear the Dutch in the shops complain that they feel submerged by the foreigners. It’s not nice to hear them say that, but they do have a point.”


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Jaarrapport integratie 2007}, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{104} SCP, \textit{Uit elkaars buurt. De invloed van etnische concentratie op integratie en beeldvorming} (Out of each other’s sight. The influence of ethnic concentration on integration), SCP, The Hague, 2005 (hereafter SCP, \textit{Uit elkaars buurt}).

\textsuperscript{105} Schools that have either a very high or a very low percentage of non-native pupils are called “black” or “white” schools. That these terms have become commonly used illustrates the level of ethnic segregation in the schools in Dutch cities.
Given the ethnic composition of Feijenoord, the immigrant inhabitants are unlikely to have many interactions with the native Dutch population. One Turkish woman exclaimed in a focus group interview: “They want us to speak Dutch, but who should we speak Dutch with?” This remark refers to the obligatory civic integration and language courses that immigrants have been required to take since 2007.

Meaningful interactions between the inhabitants are of great importance to stimulate social cohesion in neighbourhoods. In the Foundations questionnaire, respondents were asked how often, and in what situations, they interact with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Most of the meaningful inter-ethnic contacts that take place on a daily basis are at school, work or college (22 per cent for Muslims, 24 per cent for non-Muslims). Muslims, more often than non-Muslims, stated they interacted socially on a daily basis with people from different ethnic backgrounds outside work and school (11 per cent of Muslim respondents and 6 per cent of non-Muslim respondents). Also, Muslims interacted more often with people from different ethnic groups at community centres and neighbourhood groups than non-Muslims on a daily basis (6 per cent and 8 per cent compared with 3 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively).

Most weekly social interactions take place through sport or leisure activities (Muslims 13 per cent, non-Muslims 14 per cent), the street market (both 9 per cent), the park or outdoor spaces (both 7 per cent) and also at home (7 per cent for Muslims, 9 per cent for non-Muslims).

A Dutch (non-Muslim) woman stated:

I just adapted to the neighbours, and vice versa. We try to understand and get to know each other. I have a good contact with them. We have “Opzoomeren”, local activities, and we get together three or four times a year.

“Opzoomeren” is a term that derives from Opzoomerstreet (named after the lawyer and philosopher C.W. Opzoomer) in one of the poorest areas in western Rotterdam, whose residents decided in 1989 that their neighbourhood needed a boost and set up initiatives to enhance the safety, atmosphere and cleanliness of their streets. The action gained much media attention. The municipality started to fund the Opzoomer activities, which have since been adopted all over the city. It consists of initiatives of ordinary residents carried out at street level. Most are directed at meeting the neighbours and getting to know each other better. Usually, they are combined with

---

106 The Opzoomer campaign maintains a website at http://www.opzoomermee.nl (accessed August 2010).
practical activities such as repairing or cleaning the area. In 2006, over 1,800 streets in Rotterdam participated.107

4.8 Perceptions of Prejudice and Exclusion

The polemical discourse on Muslims in the Netherlands has had a negative effect on the feelings of inclusion among Muslims. In a 2007 survey conducted by the COS108 among a representative sample at the municipal level, some questions about religion, society and the debate about Islam were included. Based on information from this survey, COS researchers have written a publication about integration and polarisation in Rotterdam, which remains unpublished.109 The survey shows that 84 per cent of the Muslim population in Rotterdam followed the general debate about Islam.110 Two-thirds of the Muslim respondents felt that the debate was held in a negative manner, whereas only one quarter of the non-Muslims following the debate thought so. Of the Muslims in this survey, 77 per cent stated feeling personally hurt by negative comments and discussions about Islam.

Many respondents to the COS Omnibus Survey – both ethnic Dutch and immigrants – felt that ethnic groups were polarised in Dutch society. Moreover, Muslims felt that action rather than debate was needed to bring about change. Over a quarter (27 per cent) of Muslims disagreed with the tone of the debate and stated they were willing to do something to change it (but did not specify what that would be). Only 10 per cent of non-Muslims agreed with them and felt the same way. As these questions were posed to residents of Rotterdam, the COS construed their answers as influenced by the local Islam debates described above rather than by national debates.111

Although there were fewer reports of discrimination in Rotterdam in 2007 compared with 2006,112 the Rotterdam Antidiscrimination Action Council (Rotterdamse Anti


108 COS, OMNIBUS survey, 2007. The OMNIBUS survey is a yearly survey conducted in Rotterdam by the COS. Different municipal services can include questions, the answers to which can be used for policymaking.

109 COS (2007), unpublished document. When asked why the report was kept internal, the researcher explained that many of these small reports remain unpublished. The researcher was not sure whether the climate at the time was a factor in not publishing the report, but did think it was likely (information based on interview with COS researcher, 28 May 2008).


Discriminatie Actie Raad, RADAR\textsuperscript{113} research indicates that there is a high level of under-reporting of discrimination based on ethnicity or religion in Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{114} While respondents to the Foundations survey considered that respect for all religions is a key value of Dutch society, many nevertheless feel that there is religious prejudice in the Netherlands. The vast majority of both groups, 90 per cent, indicated that this religious prejudice is mainly directed against Muslims.

### Table 8. How much religious prejudice do you feel there is in this country today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

A majority of Muslim respondents (65.5 per cent) and 46.5 per cent of non-Muslim respondents felt that the level of religious prejudice has increased over the past five years.

\textsuperscript{113} RADAR is the antidiscrimination bureau for Rotterdam. It was the first antidiscrimination bureau in the Netherlands.

Figure 3. Over the past 12 months, how often have you experienced prejudice or unequal treatment based on your religion?

When asked about their personal experiences of prejudice and unequal treatment, almost half of the Muslim respondents stated that they never experienced prejudice or unequal treatment based on their religion. However, almost a quarter experienced such treatment “sometimes” and 14 per cent said they experienced such treatment a lot of the time.

Source: Open Society Foundations
5. **EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: EDUCATION**

The educational system provides individuals with the skills and qualifications for participation in the labour market and is a key driver of social mobility. It also plays a formative role in the socialisation of young people in the rules and values of society and is the first public institution that young people have contact with. The ways in which schools respond to and respect the needs of Muslims are therefore likely to shape their feelings of acceptance in and belonging to the wider society. Schools also contribute to integration by providing opportunities for interaction between pupils, parents and teachers of different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

This section looks at the key issues that have emerged in education. It begins with an outline of the role of religious schools, including Muslim schools, in the Dutch educational system. It then looks at the educational system from pre-school and early-years education through primary and secondary education and including higher education, followed by a consideration of the data on the educational achievement of Moroccans and Turks in Rotterdam. It moves on to examine the views and experiences of the educational system among Muslim participants in the Foundations survey and focus groups. The final section highlights examples of initiatives being taken to improve the educational attainment of minorities and other marginalised groups in the city.

5.1 The Dutch Educational System

In the Netherlands school attendance is compulsory for all children from five to 16 years of age. Compulsory education begins on the first day of the month after a child’s fifth birthday, and ends at the end of the school year in which the child turns 16. Directly after that, there is the qualification-duty (*kwalificatieplicht*), which ends when the child has received what is considered a starting qualification (explained below), or turns 18.

Children between two and five years old can join the Pre- and Early School Education programmes (*Voor- en Vroegschoolse Educatie, VVE*), which take place in pre-school and in the two earliest years of primary school. Most children, however, start their education at four.

Children leave primary school at the age of 12. The decision about the type and level of secondary education a child will follow depends on a test that all children take at the end of primary school, the CITO (Central Institute for Test Constructions, Centraal Instituut voor Toetsontwikkeling) test, and the advice of the teacher. Teachers give preliminary or provisional advice to students before the test and follow up with final recommendations after students take the test.

There are several pathways in secondary education. The lowest level is the apprenticeship (*praktijkscholen*), where pupils learn certain skills while working. They usually enter state-funded jobs, and are not likely ever to reach a starting qualification,
due to lower skills levels. Then there is the Preparatory Middle Vocational Education programme (Voorbereidend Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs, VMBO), the vocational preparatory educational programme, of which there are four levels, leading from basic (less academic, more practical) to academic. The highest level of VMBO, or sometimes the third level if the grades are high enough, gives access to the Higher General Secondary Education programme (Hoger Algemeen Vormend Onderwijs, HAVO), or to Middle Vocational Education (Middelbaar Beroeps Onderwijs, MBO). The highest level of secondary education is the Pre-university Education programme (Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs, VWO). The MBO is also divided into four levels. Only the highest level gives access to the Higher Vocational Education programme, the HBO (Hoger Beroeps Onderwijs). Access to university can be direct, with a VWO diploma, or indirectly through an HBO diploma, in which case a short track can be taken at university.

Starting qualifications, which imply a diploma relevant to the labour market, are an MBO 2 level, HAVO, VWO or higher. The number of youngsters dropping out of school before obtaining such a qualification, thereby severely reducing their chances in the labour market and of a decent income, is high in Rotterdam. Immigrants are over-represented in these percentages. The municipality of Rotterdam continues to try to persuade youngsters without qualifications who have turned 18 and are no longer obliged to be in school to continue studying until they obtain a starting qualification. People below the age of 23 who do not have a starting qualification must be studying for a starting qualification if they want to apply for social welfare, by either working for welfare in jobs appointed by the municipality, or going back to school.

5.2 Faith Schools in the Netherlands

Article 23 of the Dutch constitution grants the freedom to set up schools according to denomination or educational vision. Schools receive governmental funding according to equality norms. Non-public schools can be divided into two categories: parochial special schools, which include all schools with a religious orientation, and general special schools like Montessori or Steiner schools. At 60 percent, the Netherlands is marked by a high level of non-public schools. Every school must provide a core curriculum, specified by the Ministry of Education, and meet general educational objectives. However, in their weekly programme, schools have the freedom to include additional time for religious education, and to start and end the day with prayer. Although it is unlikely that article 23 will be altered any time soon, or that confessional special schools, especially Islamic schools, are a topic of continuing political and public debate.

---

115 See the Parlement and Politiek website at http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g3dmc0ye (accessed August 2010).
In 2009, there were 44 Muslim primary schools (out of a total of over 7,500) and two Muslim secondary schools nationwide (out of approximately 650). One of the two first Muslim primary schools in the Netherlands, Al Ghazali, was founded in Rotterdam in 1988 in the Delfshaven city district in the western region of the city. In 2000, the first Islamic secondary school, Ibn Ghaldoun, was founded in Rotterdam. Currently, Rotterdam has seven Muslim schools, six of which are primary schools. In 2003, the Islamic branch of the Rotterdam Schools Community, “The Unity” (De Eenheid), was founded. In Feijenoord there is one Islamic primary school: IBS The Dialogue (De Dialoog). Although based on shared religious beliefs, Muslim schools usually attract pupils from particular ethnic groups.

There is also an Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR). This privately funded institute was founded in Rotterdam in 1997. Until November 2008, there was a second Islamic university, the Islamic University of Europe (IUE), which was founded in Schiedam in 2001 but closed due to financial problems. The IUR aspires to offer training in Islamic theology, in religious assistance (with a spiritual adviser) and in the Arabic language and culture. The IUR has approximately 60 regular students enrolled in its bachelor’s programmes and 30 in its master’s programmes. Besides these, there are larger numbers of part-time students who take several short courses. The degrees that the IUR offers are not officially recognised, as the IUR is not an accredited university. At the time of the writing of this report, the IUR was in the process of applying for accreditation and was awaiting the results.

5.3 Educational Achievements of Muslims

Transition from Primary to Secondary School

As mentioned above, the CITO test plays a crucial role in determining the school and educational path that pupils pursue at secondary level. Research shows that speaking Dutch at home has a positive effect on the CITO test scores of Turkish and Moroccan children. The difference in achievements of native and non-native children is still large: 20 per cent of native Dutch children enter the highest level of secondary education directly from primary school, compared with only 9 per cent of non-

---

118 Interview with Professor Akunduz, director of the Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR), 10 February 2009.
Western immigrant children. However, the number of non-native children entering the higher levels of secondary education is increasing each year.

Entry into secondary school is not based on the CITO test alone but supplemented by the teachers’ provisional and final recommendations. The CITO is an objective measurement instrument taken at one specific moment, and the teacher’s recommendation is subjective and relies on knowledge of the child. Comparing the CITO scores and the provisional recommendations of the teachers shows that in general non-native children more often than natives are suggested for a lower track than their test scores imply.

On a national level, there has been a steady increase in the CITO scores of Turkish and Moroccan children. Turkish and Moroccan girls tend to score slightly lower than the boys do on the test. However, throughout their educational career, in all ethnic groups, girls do better than boys. In all types of education they reach higher levels, finish without delay more often, have lower drop-out rates and have a higher output from their achievements in terms of active citizenship and the labour market. Muslim girls, whose mothers often only had primary education or none at all, have made the greatest progress in one generation.

Several factors influence the CITO test results and more generally, the educational career of children, such as the parents’ socio-economic status and educational levels.

Moroccan and Turkish children are more likely than native Dutch children to enter the two lowest levels of the vocational pathways of the VMBO. Many immigrant children enter primary school with lower language and cognitive skills than their native peers, a disadvantage which is difficult to overcome. The pre and early school programmes described above aim to reduce this imbalance.

---

120 L. Stroucken, D. Takkenberg and A. Béguin, “Citotoets en de overgang van basisonderwijs naar voortgezet onderwijs” (Citotest and the transition from primary education to secondary education), Sociaaleconomische Trends, 2e kwartaal (Socio-economic trends, 2nd trimester), 2008, pp. 7–16 (hereafter Stroucken et al., “Citotoets”).


123 In March 2009, a Moroccan girl received a lot of media and political attention because she had achieved the maximum score of 550 points on her CITO. A large photo of this veiled Muslim girl was placed on the cover of the widely read national newspaper, with a story on the emancipation of young immigrants. The 11-year-old girl stated she was determined to become a dentist and that she was a feminist. She was invited to be a special guest at a Labour Party conference about integration as a role model and an example of successful integration.


126 Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 57.
In the secondary school system, if a pupil fails more than two subjects with a score of less than 55 per cent, they have to take the year again. After a second fail in the same year, they are obliged to follow the rest of their education at a different school. Of the Muslim pupils in Rotterdam, over 20 per cent have been put back due to failing too many classes at least once during their educational career; in contrast, just 10 per cent of the native Dutch pupils are in this situation.\textsuperscript{127}

Secondary Vocational Education and Tertiary Education

After finishing secondary education, Muslim youngsters more often than their native peers choose the highest level of education that their diploma allows them to enter. Many of the second-generation Turks and Moroccans in HBO and university, however, do not enrol directly from secondary education. As explained above, they often need to reach the highest educational levels through a long process of “stacking” diplomas.\textsuperscript{128} The question remains whether these youngsters benefit from the system in which they can continue up to the highest levels, or whether their talents should have been recognised at a much earlier stage of their education.\textsuperscript{129}

As the educational levels of young Muslims increase, attitudes and behaviour also change. These include their integration and participation in Dutch society, attitudes concerning relations between males and females, religion and politics.\textsuperscript{130} At the higher educational levels, students are much better prepared for active citizenship through social studies, volunteer activities and political participation than at the lower levels (up to MBO), which focus mainly on preparation for the labour market and jobs.\textsuperscript{131}

The educational level and the socio-economic position of a majority of the residents in Feijenoord is lower than the average in Rotterdam. The percentage of inhabitants with an MBO 2 diploma or higher in Feijenoord is 39 per cent and in Rotterdam as a whole 56 per cent.\textsuperscript{132}


\textsuperscript{128} COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{129} M. Crul, A. Pasztor and F. Lelie, \textit{De tweede generatie. Uitdagingen en kansen voor de stad} (The second generation. Challenges and Opportunities for the City), Nicis Institute, The Hague, 2008 (hereafter Crul et al., \textit{De tweede generatie}).

\textsuperscript{130} Crul et al., \textit{De tweede generatie}.

\textsuperscript{131} Entzinger and Dourleijn, \textit{De lat steeds hoger}, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{132} H. Van der Werfhorst, “Leren of ontberen” (Learning or lacking), inaugural lecture, Amsterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2008.

\textsuperscript{133} COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 29.
Choices and Labour Market Opportunities

Recent research shows that a majority of the Turkish and Moroccan pupils in the Netherlands studying for the VMBO choose programmes that prepare them for employment in economics or law. Turkish and Moroccan students are also likely to take courses on these subjects. At the higher levels, economics and law offer good labour market prospects. At the lowest levels, however, the labour market prospects following these programmes are less favourable. Also, the drop-out rates in these are high at the lower educational levels. Boys in particular, who may prefer manual working but choose a course that they believe has higher status, could benefit from vocational training that prepares them to have skilled labour jobs.

5.4 At-risk Youth and the Division in the Second Generation

National data show that almost twice as many native Dutch (77 per cent) adults below the age of 34 leave the educational system with a starting qualification, compared with those of Turkish (37 per cent) or Moroccan (44 per cent) background. However, there are indicators of significant improvement in the educational achievements of second-generation people of Turkish (46 per cent) and Moroccan descent (68 per cent).

Young people who fail to obtain a starting qualification are considered “at-risk youth”. They are over-represented in crime rates, their chances in the labour market are low, as are their chances of becoming and remaining financially independent. The numbers of youngsters leaving school without a starting qualification has been a problem in the Netherlands for many years. National statistics show that the drop-out numbers for Turkish and Moroccan youth are twice as high as for native Dutch youth. In Rotterdam, one in three Antillean, Moroccan and Turkish youngsters drop out of school. Feijenoord has a large number of young people dropping out of school. Among 17–22-year-olds, 32 per cent drop out, while for Rotterdam as a whole the percentage is 26 per cent.

---

137 Interview with coach of MBO drop-outs, 27 May 2008. The coach mentioned that parents influence the children’s educational choices. As many Muslim fathers have done hard labour as guest workers, they prefer to see their children in jobs in which they are behind a desk. The parents lack the information that the technical vocational training prepares people for well-paid jobs and thus differs greatly from their own experiences.
138 SCP, Uit elkaars buurt: Jaarrapport integratie 2005, p. 50.
140 COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 43.
A study found that girls are over-represented in the group that leaves school without a diploma or after finishing only one of the levels of VMBO. In many cases, they leave school to marry and start a family.

One of the most striking conclusions of recent research on second-generation Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam and Amsterdam was the difference in educational achievement levels among the second-generation Turks and Moroccans. While one-quarter of the second generation of these groups has not achieved a starting qualification, an equal number are highly educated (HBO or university). This effect becomes stronger because people without a starting qualification mostly marry someone who also has no starting qualification; those with high levels of education marry spouses with a similar level of education. While the less educated, with fewer prospects for a steady job, a good income or financial independence may start a family at a younger age and have more children, highly educated couples are older on average when they start a family and have fewer children. Thus, on the one side there are the families in extra-vulnerable situations, while on the other there are highly economically and socially successful families.

5.5 Parental Involvement in Children’s Education

Ethnic Segregation in Schools

In the larger cities of the Netherlands, Amsterdam and Rotterdam being the largest, there is a great deal of de facto ethnic segregation in educational institutions. As a consequence of this reality native children and immigrant children often attend different schools, resulting in so-called “white” and “black” schools (see footnote 105 and section 4.7). The Rotterdam municipality is concerned by this development, as school is an important place where children of differing backgrounds can meet.

To a large extent, this segregation in schools is a logical result of settlement patterns that tended toward segregation. Distribution policies were initiated but not implemented, in part because of their discriminatory effect, but also because of

---

141 M. Crul, *De sleutel tot succes. Over hulp, keuzes en kansen in de schoolloopbaan van Turkse en Marokkaanse jongeren van de tweede generatie* (On help, choices and opportunities in the educational career of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan youth), Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 2000, p. 18.
142 Crul et al., *De tweede generatie*, p. 18.
143 Crul et al., *De tweede generatie*, p. 17.
144 Crul et al., *De tweede generatie*, p. 17.
145 *Jaarrapport integratie 2007*, p. 121.
practical concerns, such as travelling distances. Besides the demographics of the area, segregation in schools is also strengthened by the choices of parents, who are free to choose a school for their children outside the immediate neighbourhood. Native parents prefer not to send their child to a school with a high number of immigrants (so-called “white flight”). Also, Muslim parents choosing a Muslim school, for example, may influence segregation.

Rotterdam has more “black” schools than Amsterdam. In the school year 2007–2008, 50 per cent of the primary schools in Rotterdam had 0–50 per cent non-native pupils, 23 per cent of the primary schools had 50–80 per cent non-native pupils, and 27 per cent of the primary schools consisted of more than 80 per cent non-native pupils.

High levels of segregation are also found in secondary education. Of the secondary schools in Rotterdam 39 per cent had less than 50 per cent non-native pupils, 23 per cent had 50–80 per cent non-native pupils and 38 per cent had more than 80 per cent non-native pupils.

When choosing a school for their children, Muslim parents choose schools nearby. For secondary schools, the distance from home to school is considered less important than with primary schools. The second most important motivation when choosing a school is the school’s reputation. Among the native Dutch population, both reasons weigh equally. While children usually enrol in a primary school in their neighbourhood, this is not always the case for secondary schools.

There is a large difference between native Dutch children and children of Turkish or Moroccan descent over switching secondary schools in Feijenoord. Of the Turkish and Moroccan pupils, about 30 per cent switch schools at some point during secondary education, compared with 18 per cent of the native pupils. More often than natives, they fall under the category of “overburdened”, described below.

---

153 Crul and Heering, TIES Research Report, p. 53.
5.6 Experiences of Muslim Pupils, Parents and Teachers

Satisfaction with Local Schools

A majority of Muslims and non-Muslims were either very or fairly satisfied with their local primary and secondary schools. A greater proportion of Muslims (21.2 per cent) was dissatisfied with the local primary and secondary schools compared with 6 per cent of non-Muslims. (See Table 9.)

Table 9. How satisfied would you say you are with the local primary schools?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total % 100.00 100.00 100.0

Source: Open Society Foundations

The Muslim interviewees were also less satisfied with the local secondary schools than the non-Muslim comparison group. However, a large percentage responded “Don’t know” to both questions on schools. (See Table 10.)
Table 10. How satisfied would you say you are with the local secondary schools?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Some of the interviewees felt that the quality of the primary schools in Feijenoord had decreased in the past ten years because of the increased ethnic segregation of schools. A Moroccan teacher argued that children’s achievements improve in a more ethnically diverse group. In recent debates about segregation in schools, focus was not on the ethnic background of the students, but on the segregation between underprivileged and privileged children in schools. As noted earlier, the opportunities and chances for a successful educational career increase significantly with a higher social economic background and with higher parental educational achievement. As many immigrant children are raised in poorer families by less educated parents, they are more likely to fall into the underprivileged category than native children.

The ideal mix is thought to be 30 per cent of underprivileged and 70 per cent of privileged children in a classroom, but critics say that the division 40:60 is more feasible. In order to achieve this, active distribution policies would need to be implemented; this would also require a review of the legislation on freedom of education.

---

154 Trouw, “Kansrijk neemt kansarm op sleeptouw” (Privileged take underprivileged along), 29 February 2009.


157 Trouw, “Kinderen trekken zich aan elkaar op. Rotterdamse school herbergt 30 procent kansarme en 70 procent kansrijke leerlingen” (Children level up to one another. School in Rotterdam has 30 per cent underprivileged children and 70 per cent privileged children), 9 March 2009.
Interviewees with children in primary or secondary school suggested that their generation is more willing to challenge the school when their children are given lower options than the CITO score implies. A woman gave an example:

My nephew wanted to go to a good high school (a HAVO). His teacher would say that he couldn’t do that. My nephew was stubborn. He said he was capable of it […] The teacher kept saying he couldn’t make it. Then, he was accepted to a very good high school (a VWO). And now he’s studying at a university.

Although teacher training colleges offer courses on inter-ethnic communication skills and on teaching an ethnically diverse class, Muslim parents have experienced that teachers have little knowledge of cultural differences:

We bring up our children at home according to our own culture. And in our culture showing respect to your elders is very important. Then, our children do the same thing to the teacher. Other students, the Dutch students, are more assertive and have something to say for everything. Then, when the teacher sees that the Turkish students don’t talk much, he thinks that they must be either retarded or stupid. The teachers are very judgemental against our children.

Focus group participants emphasised the importance of increasing the number of teachers from minority groups, so that they better reflected the local population.

Feelings of Discrimination

Few children and parents actually report discrimination in school. However, research conducted by RADAR confirms that pupils from minority groups do experience exclusion, racist or discriminating remarks and aggression in schools in multi-ethnic cities, including Rotterdam. Later, when Muslim students in secondary vocational or HBO education need to find an internship matching their education, they experience discrimination.

A school social worker of Moroccan descent, who also offers training in assertiveness and social skills, reported that Turkish and Moroccan students often feel discriminated against. However, she nuanced this perceived discrimination, stating:

Students come to me and complain that their teachers discriminate against them. However, if I ask deeper, in all of the cases I encountered it was not as much discrimination, as inconsistent behaviour of the teacher. That is something that needs to be worked on.

---

159 RADAR, “Discriminatie op school; een beleveningsonderzoek” (Discrimination in school; research on experiences), RADAR, Amsterdam, 2005.
160 Schriemer and Kasmi, Gevallen en Gevoelens.
Several of the Foundations survey interviewees reported incidents where they felt there was discrimination in the admission policies of some schools. An experience of a Muslim mother illustrates this: “My daughter had to change schools four times because of her scarf. Wherever we went, the teachers said, ‘We accept it, but the principal doesn’t want it.’”

5.7 Religious Education

In 2007, an official syllabus for teaching Islam was made available to all primary schools in the Netherlands for the first time. Teachers of religion in all primary schools can request this teaching programme for their school. The material is adapted to be suitable for all primary school years. Attention is paid to several topics, including the life of the Prophet Mohammad and the rules and customs in Islamic religion.

Due to the parochial character of many Dutch schools, there are no compulsory teaching programmes or learning goals for the subject of religion and philosophies of life, and not all schools have this subject in their teaching programme. However, public schools are obliged to facilitate religious education for pupils if parents request it. All schools are also obliged to include subjects about different religions, philosophies of life and cultures.

Since 1955, the Rotterdam municipality has been unique in the Netherlands in funding religious education at primary schools. Whilst the state funds parochial and faith based schools, it does not usually fund faith based initiatives. Initially, Rotterdam municipality only funded biblical religious education. In 1972, it was extended to humanist beliefs, and since 1989, Islamic religious education. This is organised by SPIOR. In 2004, the organisations working on religious education in public schools (SPIOR, IKOS (Interkerkelijk Overleg in Schoolzaken), the foundation for Inter-ecclesiastic Consultation in School Affairs and the Humanist Education HVO (Humanistisch Vormingsonderwijs)) started a pilot project called the Religious Education Platform which aimed to acquaint children with different cultures and religions in order to facilitate understanding and better knowledge. Muslim pupils would receive Christian religious education and vice versa. Other municipalities are taking on this platform and regard the cooperation between the organisations offering religious education in Rotterdam as an example.

162 In 2006, there was discussion among politicians about making religion a compulsory teaching subject in all schools, see http://www.kerknieuws.nl/nieuws.asp?old=9915 (accessed August 2010).
163 Wet op Primair Onderwijs (Act on Primary Education), art. 50 and 51.
5.8 Municipal Initiatives

Improving early childhood education is seen as crucial to supporting the education of children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Although the pre- and early school programmes are accessible to all children, they target children from certain groups, including children who, due to socio-economic or cultural circumstances, may start primary school at a disadvantage compared with other children. In order to help children from disadvantaged backgrounds enter primary school with an equal level of language development the programmes in pre- and early school education focus on the development of Dutch language skills and cognitive abilities. The VVE programmes also aim to engage and involve the parents of the children. The programmes offer language courses in Dutch and home-oriented courses (training in parenting strategies) to the parents, usually the mothers.

Nationally, the percentages of Turkish and Moroccan children entering the pre-school programmes are higher than those of other immigrant groups. Approximately one-third of Turkish and Moroccan children participate in the pre-school programme.165

In Rotterdam, the number of two- or three-year-old children from the target groups, which includes a majority of immigrants, who joined the pre-school programme increased from 33 per cent to 40 per cent between 2004 and 2006.166 The number of four- or five-year-old children who joined increased from 64 per cent to 76 per cent in the same period.167

A recent evaluation of the VVE programmes in Rotterdam concludes that the results of the programmes are best in the schools where they were first introduced in 2000. In the schools that introduced the programmes later, the skills that the children have acquired during the programme do not exceed the skills of children with similar backgrounds in regular playgroups for toddlers or nursery schools.168 This indicates that the programmes need some time before they become successful.

During the stakeholder interviews and the roundtable stakeholder meeting, it was frequently mentioned that Muslim parents need to be more involved in the education of their children. An initiative in Rotterdam that aims to involve the parents, while at the same time working on the improvement of school results, is called the Centre (Het Centrum).169 This organisation, which has received important funding from local authorities, offers after-school homework support and a mentoring programme. While the Centre states that it is not a particularly Turkish organisation, 90 per cent of the pupils are of Turkish background. In small groups, children receive support with their

---

165 Jaarrapport integratie 2007, p. 103.
166 COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 44.
167 COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 44.
168 A. Veen, Voor- en vroegschoolse educatie.
homework, their Dutch-language skills and general cognitive abilities. They are taught by HBO students who are training to become educators and by trained teachers. The children are introduced to older students, who serve as role models and are successful in higher educational programmes such as HBO or university. The relationship with the role models is meant to be informal, spending time together and developing a “brotherly/sisterly” bond. To involve the parents, the organisers visit them at home in an informal manner and invite the parents to parents’ breakfasts at the Centre. The director stressed that it takes considerable patience and perseverance to convince the parents that their involvement is very important, that they should join parental boards at their children’s schools, attend school meetings and participate in the schools’ activities and initiatives. However, results from the project show that children involved in the programme get better CITO scores, and in most cases, the parents become more involved. Other ethnic groups could benefit from well-structured organisations like the Centre that have professional employees and volunteers who have the necessary cultural expertise.

Rotterdam is taking steps to reduce its drop-out rates. As explained above, many young people make a poor choice after secondary school and drop out during their vocational training. A first step to combat the high drop-out rates is to offer better advice and information about educational choices and labour market opportunities in the final year of secondary school to both the pupils and their parents.

A new approach to the high drop-out rates in Rotterdam has been developed, which is directed at creating a better balance between education and professional care. Of the 9,000 young people who drop out of school in Rotterdam and the surrounding area each year, 20 per cent have multiple problems, including (mental) health problems, problems in their upbringing, personal development and their socio-economic background. These young people are referred to as “overburdened.”

Following this line of approach, new types of schools are being introduced in Rotterdam for the lower and middle levels of secondary vocational education (MBO), each addressing the specific needs of certain groups. First, there will be neighbourhood schools specifically for youngsters under 23 years of age, with a diploma for the lowest

170 Interview with Fatih Ozbasi at Het Centrum, 8 April 2008.
171 Ibid.
172 “Het Rotterdams Offensief VMBO–MBO” (The Rotterdam Raid VMBO – MBO), released 8 June 2008, Rotterdam. The Rotterdam Raid is an initiative by the Regional Educational Centre (Regionaal Opleidingscentrum, ROC) Albeda and Zadkine MBO College, with over 45,000 students in Rotterdam and the surrounding area.
level of VMBO and for VMBO drop-outs. The neighbourhood schools are designed to have the lowest possible barriers for participation by youngsters. At this level, there will be extensive care and support as well as a focus on developing social skills and work experience. The highest level they can obtain is MBO level 1 (not a starting qualification). After that, the youngsters can continue at the vocational school. The Dutch parliament will spend €5.6 million for the school years 2009–2010 and 2010–2011. The project will be offered to 200 students for each of the two years. After this period, the project will be evaluated and, if positive, continued with funding from the Ministry of Youth, Family and Society.

The next step after neighbourhood schools will be new vocational schools. These schools have been developed on the understanding that many young people in the lower educational levels prefer working with their hands, and it is believed that the generally high emphasis on theory causes them to lose enthusiasm for learning and to drop out. These vocational schools offer specific programmes to train them for particular professions at MBO levels 1 and 2 (starting qualification).

The final set of schools is the Top Schools. These schools aim specifically at the youngsters who could, if given enough attention, make it to the highest levels of the MBO and then continue to HBO and become high-skilled professionals. The development of these schools is a response to recognition by the municipality that talent is wasted because youngsters with the potential to progress to higher education fail to receive appropriate guidance and support. Emphasis is on education, less on care, but there is broad assistance through the entire course. Preparations for setting up the Top Schools are under way.

The initiative is not designed specifically for non-native youngsters. However, looking at the educational attainments of Muslim youth and their drop-out rates in relation to the demography of Rotterdam, it is obvious that they are part of the target group. The experiences and expertise of the involved organisations in Rotterdam could aid other municipalities with similar challenges faced by youth living in urban settings.

---

6. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: EMPLOYMENT

Participation in the labour market remains at the core of economic integration, which requires not only opportunities for employment, but also employment in the mainstream labour market and in jobs that are commensurate with an individual’s skills and qualifications.

The chapter begins by looking at the economic context of employment in Rotterdam and Feijenoord before looking at evidence of the labour market position of Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam. The chapter then turns to the experiences highlighted by Muslim respondents to the Foundations survey and participants. The final section describes initiatives being taken to improve the labour market participation of minorities, including those addressing discrimination.

6.1 The Economic Structure of Rotterdam and Feijenoord

The labour market participation rate is lower in Rotterdam in all age groups than in Amsterdam. At 9 per cent, the unemployment rate in Rotterdam is almost three times the national average (3.6 per cent). In Feijenoord, unemployment (at 15 per cent) is even higher than the average in Rotterdam, and almost four times the national average.

Of all the households in Rotterdam, 16 per cent have a low income. As is the case in the whole country, non-Western immigrant households in Rotterdam are three times more likely than native ones to have a low income, and of these 58 per cent are dependent on the social welfare benefit called the bijstandsuitkering, which provides a minimum income.

---

176 The net labour market participation expresses which part of the labour force (persons 15–65 years old) has paid employment for at least 12 hours a week. This is the active labour force. People who do not have paid employment are not by definition unemployed. This is only the case if they are actively looking for work for more than 12 hours a week (meaning they are registered at an employment office). Many people who do unpaid labour in the home, (high-school) students and persons who are disabled for work are thus not included in the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is measured from the total labour force, i.e., the total of the employed and unemployed labour force. The denominator on which unemployment is based is thus lower than the denominator for net labour market participation (Jaarrapport integratie 2007, p. 131).

177 Crul and Heering, TIES Research Report, p. 66.

178 COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, p. 60.

179 For 2009, a low income level was set at a total income per household of less than €1,395 a month.

180 Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 16.

181 The bijstandsuitkering is a type of financial assistance to raise the income level to the minimum income level of €1,395 a month.
In Rotterdam and in Feijenoord, the proportion of households receiving social welfare benefits is 9 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively.\(^{182}\) The percentage of native Dutch in Feijenoord receiving this type of welfare is twice as high as on average in Rotterdam, and it is slightly higher for all ethnic groups than the Rotterdam average.\(^{183}\)

### Table 11. Work sectors in Rotterdam and Feijenoord\(^{184}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Rotterdam %</th>
<th>Feijenoord %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fishing, construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and utility</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and catering</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business service sector</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-service sector</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BRZ

As can be seen in Table 11, the division of employment per sector in Feijenoord differs from that of the city as a whole. The business service and transport sectors are particularly small in this area. There is more employment in industry and utility services. While the public-service sector is the largest employment sector in Rotterdam as a whole, it is particularly important in Feijenoord where it accounts for over half of all employment.\(^{185}\)

#### 6.2 Income Levels

The financial prosperity level of non-Western immigrants is lower than that of natives, although the second generation has higher incomes than their parents.\(^{186}\) In 2005, the total average income of immigrants in the Netherlands was 74 per cent of that of natives, which was an increase compared with ten years earlier when it was 71 per cent.\(^{187}\) Moroccans and Turks have the lowest incomes. Furthermore, compared with native Dutch, immigrants are less likely to see their income increase over time.

---

\(^{182}\) COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, p. 60.

\(^{183}\) COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, p. 61.

\(^{184}\) COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, p. 66.

\(^{185}\) COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, p. 61.

\(^{186}\) Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 17.

Immigrants from families with a low income often have a low income themselves. The second generation has better chances of increasing their income than the first, and is more often financially independent. The second generation is also less dependent on welfare benefits than the first. Although both generations depend on social welfare more than natives, their number is decreasing compared with the natives.

Data from 2005 show that the average income level in Rotterdam per person is 5 per cent lower than the national mean; per household, it is 15 per cent lower. This is partly because Rotterdam has a high number of small (single-person) households.

Feijenoord is the second-poorest city district in Rotterdam. The average annual income is €10,100 per year, after taxes and compulsory insurance premiums. Only in the city district of Delfshaven is the average income lower. However, whereas in Delfshaven income in all neighbourhoods is close to the mean, there is greater variation between incomes across different neighbourhoods in Feijenoord. The lowest incomes in Feijenoord are found in Afrikaanderwijk, with €8,400 per year per person. The highest are in Kop van Zuid-Entrepot, with €15,800. Afrikaanderwijk is the second poorest neighbourhood in Rotterdam. Spangen, a neighbourhood in the western region of the city (Delfshaven), is the poorest.189 (See Table 12.)

Table 12. Income levels (after taxes and compulsory insurance) in the neighbourhoods of Feijenoord, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Average income per person, €</th>
<th>Average income per household, €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kop van Zuid-Entrepot</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>33,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noordereiland</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>23,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vreewijk</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>23,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katendrecht</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>21,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemhof</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>21,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillesluis</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>21,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feijenoord</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>20,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaanderwijk</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>21,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COS 2008

188 COS, “Feitenkaart inkomensgegevens Rotterdam op deelgemeente- en buurtniveau 2005” (Factsheet of income information for Rotterdam at the city district and neighbourhood level 2005), Rotterdam, August 2008, p. 3 (hereafter COS, “Feitenkaart inkomensgegevens”).
189 COS, “Feitenkaart inkomengegevens”, p. 3.
6.3 Turks and Moroccans in the Labour Market

The socio-economic position of immigrants in the Netherlands in 2007 had improved compared with a decade ago. In 1997, the unemployment of non-Western immigrants (in which Turks and Moroccans are included) was 20 per cent, compared with 5 per cent among the native Dutch. In 2007, these numbers had decreased to 10 per cent unemployment among non-Western immigrants and 4 per cent among natives. This led to an improvement in the general income of immigrants. The main reason behind this was the expanding economy from 2005 to 2007. Non-Western immigrants tend to work in sectors more affected by general economic trends, which places them in a more vulnerable position. In the period of economic slowdown between 2001 and 2005, the labour participation of non-Western immigrants decreased compared with the native Dutch and their unemployment rate increased more rapidly. In 2001, the majority of immigrants received income through work; by 2005 the majority received income through social benefits. The economic downturn that started in 2008 has of course had a severe impact on immigrants, as well as native Dutch.

The vulnerability of non-Western immigrants to fluctuations in the economy is related to the large number of immigrants in the labour force with flexible contracts rather than fixed contracts. For those on flexible contracts there is no fixed number of working hours a week (a “zero-hour contract”). Employees with this type of contract are dependent on the work schedules that are offered to them. Immigrants are twice as likely to be employed on a flexible contract as the native Dutch. The national percentage was 21 per cent for 2007. The over-representation of non-Western immigrants in flexible contracts is found across all age groups.

The first generation of Turks and Moroccans that arrived in the Netherlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s were unskilled labourers, who came to work in manufacturing and heavy industry. After the oil crisis of 1973, a period of large-scale unemployment and economic crisis followed. The sectors in which most guest workers were employed were among the sectors that were most affected by the economic crisis, and massive lay-offs of low-skilled Turkish and Moroccan workers followed.

Second-generation Turks and Moroccans have a better position in the labour market than the first generation. Although the net participation of the second generation of immigrants is lower than that of the first generation, the difference disappears when the average age of the second generation is considered; their chance of paid work is in fact higher than that of the first generation. The second generation, as noted above, is also better educated than their parents. The level of employment among highly

---

190 Jaarrapport integratie 2008. At the time of the writing of this report, no data were available on the consequences of the recent financial crisis on the labour market position of immigrants in the Netherlands.


192 Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 3.
educated Turks and Moroccans is almost equal to their Dutch peers. At the national level, the labour market participation rate of highly educated Turks and Moroccans is 80–85 per cent of the rate of their native peers. Overall, there is still a large difference between these ethnic minorities and native Dutch in salaried labour. Demography also plays a part in the differences in type of work and labour participation between the native Dutch and the second-generation Turks and Moroccans. Natives, being older on average, often have a job (or jobs) while Moroccans, being the youngest group, more often are full-time students who combine jobs and study or follow an apprenticeship.

Recent research on second-generation Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam and Amsterdam gives a nuanced insight into the employment position of youngsters who enter the labour market without a starting qualification (see section 5.2). On the one hand, the data show that there is an increasing division within the groups between those who are highly educated and occupy favourable labour market positions, and those who drop out of the educational system. On the other hand, the data also show that among the latter group, the majority of the young people without a starting qualification in fact do not become structurally unemployed. In general, the women do not enter the labour market, but instead stay home and provide full-time care for their families, while the men tend to find employment. In fact, when educational achievement levels are taken into account, one in five men can be considered as having done exceptionally well. They either develop a career while in employment through work-specific courses and training, or they start a business. Turkish men are more likely to become self-employed. Nevertheless, the data also show that the labour market position of the second generation without qualifications remains vulnerable. They often switch jobs, and even after years of employment they remain on flexible contracts. Corresponding with the data on the labour market position of immigrants nationally, a flexible contract economy correlates with (temporary) unemployment for second-generation Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam.

Recent research conducted by RADAR and the Rotterdam Moroccan Organisations Foundation (Samenwerkende Marokkaanse Organisaties Rotterdam, SMOR) among Moroccan inhabitants of Rotterdam reports that compared with natives, but also with other ethnic-minority groups, Moroccans in Rotterdam have the least favourable position on the labour market. In 2006, 31 per cent of the Moroccan working-age

193 Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 3.
194 Crul and Heering, TIES Research Report, p. 68.
195 Crul et al., De tweede generatie, pp. 13–16.
196 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 30; SCP, Jaarrapport integratie 2008, p. 69.
197 Jaarrapport integratie 2007, p. 131.
199 Schriemer and Kasmi, Gevallen en Gewelens.
population in Rotterdam were employed. In the same year, 8 per cent were unemployed, and 61 per cent were neither employed nor searching for work. In the same year, a little over half of the other immigrants were employed and 40 per cent were not searching for a job (i.e., not registered at the unemployment offices and not employed). Of the native working age population, almost two-thirds were employed, a little less than 5 per cent were unemployed and 30 per cent were economically inactive.

**Table 13. Employment of Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam (x 1000), 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Total non-native</th>
<th>Of which: Turks and Moroccans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour force</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-labour force</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (including unknown)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COS²⁰⁰

The Moran population in Rotterdam is on average less educated than other non-native inhabitants of Rotterdam, and even less compared with the native population. Because of this they are dependent on elementary jobs for work. Both unemployment and competition for jobs in the low-skilled labour segments are high.²⁰¹

The research also found that women and youngsters specifically have experienced discrimination in work- and education-related fields like internships for vocational programmes of the MBO and jobs. Many Muslim women experience discrimination because they wear headscarves. Discrimination is more often reported by young Muslims of the second generation. Many Muslims of the first generation are less aware of their rights and the laws. The second generation, in contrast, is more aware of their rights and is more likely to assert them. The report also mentions the integration paradox: those who are best integrated in terms of schooling, language and culture are more likely to interpret rejection for jobs as a case of discrimination than others.²⁰²


6.4 Experiences of Muslims in Feijenoord in the Labour Market

The participants of the focus groups stated that employment is not easily found in Feijenoord and that they commute to other districts in the city for work. The commuting is not perceived as a problem because it is not far to the city and public transport is well organised in Rotterdam, with metros, trams and buses. The largest bus station serving the surrounding areas of Rotterdam is close to the neighbourhood.

Findings from the Foundations questionnaires and focus group interviews show that Muslims believe that they must prove themselves more than other employees; they feel they come under greater scrutiny and that they must show that they do not answer to the negative image of their group. These findings correspond with those at the national level.203

Male Employment

Among the male Muslim respondents to the Foundations questionnaire, unemployment is higher than among non-Muslim males.

Several participants in the focus group of older Turkish men were employed in heavy labour or manufacturing. Most of those who were unemployed suffered from poor health and back injuries. This is also reflected in the percentage of Muslim male respondents to the questionnaire who were unemployed due to disability or permanent sickness (Table 14.).

The elderly Muslim men felt discriminated against by their (former) employers. One man said:

I used to work at the state railways. But I had a problem with my back and I had difficulties to move. Finally, they said they’d retire me due to health reasons. I said to the head of personnel, “I don’t want to stay home. Don’t retire me. Give me a lighter job and I’ll work,” but the man said, “Mister, we are going to give this job to a Dutch [employee].” If that isn’t discrimination, what is it?

The men also told stories about other Turks they know who were discriminated against by their employers. They gave examples of unequal treatment when on sick leave and

### Table 14. Employment of Muslim and non-Muslim men, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim males</th>
<th>Non-Muslim males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employee</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employee</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working unpaid in family business</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and looking for work</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after home or family</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently sick or disabled</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations
indicated that the situation is now worse for Turkish employees than in the past. Some of the elderly unemployed men said that they in fact do want to work again, and they feel that the municipality should help them to find low skilled jobs:

They call me every week and tell me to find a job. And I want them to give me a job. They say you should find it yourself. But I can’t find a job.

Female Employment

Among the female respondents, Muslim women were more often full-time caregivers for family or relatives than non-Muslim women. At the same time, however, there was a higher percentage of female students with a Muslim background than non-Muslim, while in the age group figures, Muslim women under the age of 29 were slightly outnumbered by the non-Muslim female comparison group (see Table 15).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim females</th>
<th>Non-Muslim females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employee</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employee</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working unpaid in family business</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and looking for work</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after home or family</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently sick or disabled</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>% 100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
Many women interviewed by the Foundations felt that they, as Muslims, are expected to correct the stereotypical images of the entire group and need to work extra hard to prove that these negative stereotypes do not apply to them. This finding corresponds with those of RADAR and SMOR on discrimination against Moroccans in Rotterdam. 204

About half of the female participants of the Foundations focus groups reported having had experiences of discrimination in the labour market. One woman said that she was asked during a job interview about her plans to start a family. She felt that the employer asked this because of the stereotype that Muslim women quit their jobs as soon as they have children. She wondered whether the same question would be asked of a native Dutch woman.

Apart from experiences of discrimination, the women belonging to the second generation of Muslims also mentioned challenges and opportunities. They took pride in being equal discussion partners with native Dutch employers and colleagues, while their parents were not. They did feel that it is more difficult for them to reach the positions they wanted, not only because of their headscarves, but also because of cultural differences. They felt as though they were the bridging generation. Their expectations were that the situation would improve over time and that the younger generation, the third generation, would not encounter the same obstacles.

Among the women in the focus group, the overall tone was positive. One woman explained:

If company A does not employ you, then company B will. We should not let ourselves become frustrated and should continue looking for a job.

Cultural expectations of traditional family roles are significant in shaping the opportunities for women for employment in the labour market. During the focus group with older Turkish men (over 45 years old), participants emphasised the importance of family and the role of women in maintaining family life. They noted that their wives had never participated in the labour market. One man said:

Our family is all we have, it is impossible for us to be like the Dutch who live like friends with separate houses and separate incomes.

There are, however, indications of generational changes in the attitudes toward female employment. While the older generation of men associated women staying out of paid employment with their ethnic or religious tradition (the two adjectives are used interchangeably), the younger generation of Turkish men seemed more in favour of women’s employment. Still, the young men argued that if they earn enough, their (future) wives will not have to work, but they can work if they want. Views of female labour market participation were closely related to expectations and preferences over child care.

204 Schriemer and Kasmi, *Gevallen en Geweelens*, p. 68.
Among both men and women there was a preference for women to care for young children at home. Female focus group participants did, however, stress the advantages of having a salaried job. They mentioned the financial benefits, but more importantly they expressed a desire to have something that was their own, to have stories to tell their spouses when they came home but still have enough time for the children. They did, however, also confirm that educated Muslim women do often choose to be the primary caregivers for children when the husband starts earning more. They defended this point of view by stating: “More and more educated Dutch women are staying at home, too. Child care is really expensive.”

6.5 Labour Market Initiatives in Rotterdam

There are a number of projects in Rotterdam that aim to improve the labour market position of people who are at a disadvantage in finding employment.

In March 2008, the city council announced a new project of funded jobs for unemployed persons over the age of 45. The project is specifically designed for employees who lack the language skills, social skills or modern technical knowledge to find work. Unlike previous types of funded jobs, where the job itself was funded and which lost the political (and financial) support of the government, the council will pay for the costs to employers in training these employees and supporting them in their work.

One of these projects, called “Decisiveness” (Daadkracht), offers the opportunity of receiving a vocational degree to immigrant men and women who have not been able to earn a diploma for reasons such as lack of finance, education, Dutch-language skills or child care, or who have a foreign diploma that is not recognised in the Netherlands. During their education they follow apprenticeships, and at the end of the course, according to the Southern Pact (a project aimed at encouraging employers in south Rotterdam to employ staff of migrant descent), it is almost certain that they will find a job. Between April and September 2008, 60 people participated in the programme preparing them for retail and catering. The majority found paid work after completing the course. In September 2008, 15 women (mostly Turkish and Moroccan) started training to be professional child caregivers. The course takes one and a half years, and the women start working six months into the course. This programme was initiated by the social service, and is executed by a commercial organisation.

This type of customised training and cooperation with employers could be effective in other municipalities both in the Netherlands and Europe.

6.6 Discrimination in Employment

The national government is more concerned with the influence of discrimination on
the labour market position and the chances of ethnic minorities than some years ago.208
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice have made agreements with
the Public Prosecutor and the police force, municipalities and NGOs (including Art.
1) to counteract discrimination. Police recording of instances of discrimination is being
improved; at the same time there is increased awareness and understanding of different
manifestations of discrimination among the police and the Public Prosecutor. In
addition, the Act on Municipal Antidiscrimination Facilities was enacted in spring
2009 by the government (Wet Gemeentelijke Antidiscriminatie voorzieningen).209 As a
result of this legislation all municipalities have to offer a facility where inhabitants can
go to obtain advice or make a complaint about discrimination. They also have to
ensure that discrimination complaints are properly recorded. Municipalities remain
free to decide how to shape these facilities.210

As a first step against discrimination in the labour market, in 2007 the government
commissioned a research report based on quantitative data to examine the level of
discrimination in the labour market experienced by the four largest non-Western
immigrant groups. The data analysis suggests that ethnic minorities do experience an
“ethnic penalty” in the labour market, that is, up to 30 per cent of the unemployment
of Turks and Moroccans cannot be explained by personal characteristics and factors
which are relevant to the labour market, and this could indicate discrimination.211

The prevention of discrimination is now included in labour legislation. From July
2009, employers are required to monitor the risk of discrimination in their workplace
and, if proved necessary, to take action to prevent discrimination. The responsibility
for ensuring compliance with these legal duties lies with the Labour Inspectorate.

In December 2006, Rotterdam joined the European Coalition of Cities against
Racism.212 It is the first municipality in the Netherlands to implement a programme to
counteract discrimination and exclusion, called “Discrimination? So long!”
(“Discriminatie? De groeten!”).213 The policies behind the programme are inclusion

208 K. Andriessen, Discriminatiemonitor niet-westerse allochtonen op de arbeidsmarkt (Discrimination
monitor of non-Western immigrants on the labour market), SCP, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 9
(hereafter Andriessen, Discriminatiemonitor).
209 Wet Gemeentelijke Antidiscriminatie voorzieningen (Act on municipal anti-discrimination
facilities, more information available at
210 See http://www.radar.nl/read/7/gemeenten_verplicht_tot_instellen_antidi (accessed August
2010).
212 See the UNESCO website for a description at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=10629&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed August 2010).
213 Gemeente Rotterdam, “Discriminatie? De groeten!”.
and stimulating active citizenship among all inhabitants of Rotterdam and RADAR is closely involved in the project. In its official publication the municipality encourages minorities always to report discrimination and assert their right to equal treatment. The municipality furthermore states that exclusion and discrimination in some cases may be the result of factual situations such as not mastering the Dutch language and low educational achievement, which reduce people’s chances of participating in society. Investment is therefore needed in a wide range of areas including language acquisition programmes and the educational system. In order to reduce discrimination in the labour market, the vocational secondary education (MBO) programmes must provide young people with more training in writing job application letters and job interviews. Small and medium-sized employers are also targeted in order to increase diversity among their personnel. The results of the programme have not yet been evaluated.

7. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: HOUSING

Housing and the characteristics of one’s neighbourhood have an effect on opportunities for interaction with other people from different backgrounds. Living in poor housing can also exacerbate factors that undermine social inclusion; in particular, unfit housing conditions can increase ill health. Overcrowded housing contributes to disadvantage in other ways because there is less space for young children to study, complete homework or revise for exams, affecting educational achievement and subsequent employability. Furthermore, the lack of privacy and space in overcrowded housing can increase stress and have an impact on mental health and family relationships.

This chapter begins by looking at how housing policy over time has contributed to the spatial distribution of different minority and Muslim communities in Rotterdam. It examines the initiatives to regenerate disadvantaged areas through housing policies, and then explores the experiences of the Foundations survey respondents and focus group participants in housing and regeneration in Feijenoord.

The municipality of Feijenoord is located on the river Maas, on the south side of the city. The area has historically been an area that has experienced immigration, high poverty and crime rates, and low educational attainment levels. In the last decades of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, the area attracted Dutch farmers from southern regions who settled in southern Rotterdam hoping to find work in the city. Because of this, the area has long been called “the peasants’ side” of the city. Much of Rotterdam’s housing stock was destroyed during World War Two. While around a third of the city’s housing stock is from the prewar period, 60 per cent of Feijenoord’s housing stock is prewar vintage.

7.1 Spatial Segregation of Turks and Moroccans

Ethnic minorities are concentrated in the four largest cities of the Netherlands. While just 13 per cent of the native Dutch population lives in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, more than half the Surinamese, almost half the Moroccans and over a third of the Turks and Antilleans live in these four cities. Within the cities, ethnic minorities are concentrated in particular neighbourhoods. However, there are differences across ethnic groups. Turks and Moroccans are more likely to live in

---


neighbourhoods with concentrations of people from their ethnic group than Surinamese and Antilleans.

Recent research by the SCP concludes that home ownership among immigrants increased rapidly across the nation between 1998 and 2006. In 2006, 26 per cent of Turks lived in property they owned, compared with 15 per cent in 1998. Among Moroccans, 3 per cent lived in owner-occupied property in 1998, compared with 16 per cent in 2006. The total home-ownership level among immigrants was almost 25 per cent in 2006. There is still a large difference between immigrants and natives, of whom 60 per cent lived in owner-occupied property in 2006.218

An analysis of housing tenure shows that rates of social housing and private rental are higher, and owner occupation lower in Feijenoord than in Rotterdam as a whole. Just over half of the houses in Rotterdam (52 per cent) are owned by social housing corporations. The proportion is higher in Feijenoord, where the figure is 71 per cent, and Afrikaanderwijk, where it is 85 per cent. The proportion of owner occupation in Rotterdam as a whole (27 per cent) is twice that of Feijenoord (14 per cent). In Rotterdam as a whole, 21 per cent of housing tenure is private rental; in Feijenoord it is 15 per cent.219

In Rotterdam, although ethnic segregation is still high, it has declined in recent years, and ethnic minorities have become more evenly distributed in the city. The decline can be explained by the suburbanisation of ethnic minorities who have moved to areas outside Rotterdam.220

Since 1972, Rotterdam’s municipal authorities have developed many policies aimed at reducing concentrations of ethnic-minority groups. In 1972 Afrikaanderwijk in Feijenoord was one of the worst slum neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. The newly arrived guest workers had no access to social housing and lived in overcrowded boarding houses. The landlords of the boarding houses owned most of the cheap properties in the area, and turned them into boarding houses to gain maximum profit. As a consequence, the native Dutch inhabitants in Afrikaanderwijk found it difficult to access affordable housing. Tensions over housing led to an attack by native Dutch inhabitants on Turkish boarding houses in the summer of 1972, which sparked ethnic riots that lasted for several days.221

The municipality responded to the riots by starting large-scale urban renewal of the old city districts. The city council tried to achieve a more even distribution of people from ethnic-minority groups in the different neighbourhoods. The municipality proposed a

---

218 SCP, “Goede buren kun je niet kopen” (You can’t buy good neighbours), The Hague, 2009.
219 COS, Feijenoord in Beeld 2006, 47.
law that sought to keep the percentage of immigrants in a particular neighbourhood below 5 per cent (at the time this was the percentage of immigrants in the Netherlands). However, the bill never became law as it was dismissed by the national government in 1974 for being unconstitutional. A second attempt to actively distribute immigrants was initiated in 1979. The council placed new immigrants in neighbourhoods where less than 16 per cent of the residents were immigrants. Civil protests and dialogue ended this policy. However, for the municipality of Rotterdam, an active distribution policy remained an important tool to limit the tensions in the old city districts and to stimulate the integration of immigrants.

Active distribution policies are not specifically directed at ethnic minorities, but at a more even distribution of income groups. The most recent and controversial antisegregation measure passed in the Netherlands in 2005 was initiated in Rotterdam, and can be attributed to the electoral triumph of Leefbaar Rotterdam in 2002. The law allows city authorities to prohibit the settlement of people with low incomes, students and retired persons excluded. Since ethnic-minority groups are over-represented among the unemployed and low-income groups, the law has a disproportionate impact on them. In practice, the law applies to a number of streets or blocks in neighbourhoods with high poverty rates. Although the law has in practice had a limited impact, it has been the focus of criticism. It has been noted that the law implies that the unemployed (of whom many are of immigrant background) are responsible for the social problems that exist in neighbourhoods with a concentration of ethnic-minority and low-income groups. The policy aims to exclude people in socio-economically disadvantaged positions rather than create opportunities for social mobility. Furthermore, the reputation of the designated neighbourhoods may have an adverse effect on them.

222 This is known as the 5 law. See F.J.J. van Hoorn, *Onder anderen, Effecten van vestiging van Mediterranen in naoorlogse wijken* (The Netherlands others – effects of settlement of Mediterranean people), KNAG, Amsterdam, 1987.
224 Bolt, “Over spreidingsbeleid en drijfzand”.
225 See for example “Raamnota: De buitenlandse werknemer en hun gezinnen” (Note on foreign employees and their families), Amsterdam City Council, 1979.
226 Wet bijzondere maatregelen groot stedelijke problematiek (Act on special measures for urban problems), better known as the Rotterdamwet (Rotterdam Act).
228 Bolt, “Over spreidingsbeleid en drijfzand”.

AT HOME IN EUROPE PROJECT 95
7.2 City Renewal Initiatives in Old South

In 2007, the Programme Minister of Housing, Communities and Integration presented a list of 40 neighbourhoods nationwide, for which the municipalities were given extra funding in order to improve their overall status. These neighbourhoods were not only selected because of economic or physical reasons, but also because social cohesion was perceived to be particularly vulnerable. Many but not all of them had a majority of non-native residents. The local authorities were expected to improve the physical structure (housing and public spaces), the economic structure (employment), security (reducing crime levels and domestic violence) and the social structure (social cohesion, civil society, leisure and active citizenship). With seven of these so-called “powerful neighbourhoods” (Krachtwijken, referring to the policy’s aim to empower the inhabitants), Rotterdam has the largest number of these designated neighbourhoods. In southern Rotterdam, several neighbourhoods are clustered under one name, “Old South” (Oud Zuid), forming one of these target areas. The designated neighbourhoods in southern Rotterdam are partly in Feijenoord and partly in the neighbouring city district of Charlois. The objectives of the ministry are included in the city renewal programme of the Southern Pact partnership between the municipality, housing corporations and municipal services. In total, over €1 billion is available to be spent in the period 2005–2015. The five key points in the programme are housing (improving the existing housing stock as well as building new houses), work, education, integration and safety.

Overall, in the larger cities of the Netherlands, the most important measure to counter the concentration of ethnic-minority groups with low socio-economic status is to create more differentiated housing stock, which in turn should draw in people of diverse socio-economic positions. The underlying premise is that ethnic-minority concentrations are in fact a reflection of socio-economic segregation. As a representative of the city district explained:

The problems here (in Feijenoord) are not so much immigrant problems, but poverty problems. However, the situation is that many poor people are also immigrants. So when addressing problems in areas like these, it may be unclear whether you are dealing with an immigrant problem or a poverty problem. […] However, it should also be noted that this is a Socialist230 vision.

Economic segregation, in turn, is a consequence of the spatial dispersion of housing.231 As there are many low-cost houses in neighbourhoods such as in Feijenoord, they also

---

229 For more information on the krachtwijken and the policy programme (in Dutch) see http://www.nicis.nl/nicis/kcgs/krachtwijken/index.html (accessed August 2010).
230 The Labour Party is the biggest party in Rotterdam, and has a vast majority in Feijenoord. The party has its roots in Marxism and Socialism.
231 Bolt, “Over spreidingsbeleid en drijfzand”.
attract people with lower incomes, many of whom are of immigrant descent. In
neighbourhoods such as in Feijenoord, people cannot move up the property ladder;
when they become better off, they often cannot find larger or better housing in the
local area. Creating a more diverse housing stock should change this situation.
However, people with lower incomes are still bound to remain in certain areas, even if
they wish to move to a different area. During the focus group discussions, Muslims
also expressed this view. A man described it as follows:

If you go to the municipality and say that you want to live in that area, they
say your income isn’t sufficient enough to do that. The Dutch have twice
your wages. But I earn only €1,300. I want to live somewhere close to my
work place, but they don’t let me do it, because my income isn’t sufficient.

Since 2006, Rotterdam has had a new tool to draw in more prosperous inhabitants to
these neighbourhoods. The municipality has offered a total of 169232 houses and
apartments for sale for substantially reduced prices, which need to be extensively
renovated by the new owners, so-called *klushuizen* (which means something like “fixer-
up”). To make it more attractive for middle-class buyers to move to the
neighbourhood, the municipality simultaneously renovates the streets in which the
houses are located. By obliging the new owners to do up the house within a year and to
live there for at least two years, the municipality aims to connect middle-class residents
more strongly to their neighbourhood.

### 7.3 Experiences of Muslims in Feijenoord

When asked about their motivation to move to this area, almost 8 per cent of the
Muslim respondents, compared with 2 per cent of the non-Muslims, said that the
social housing corporation offered them a house in the neighbourhood.

For both groups, living close to family is one of the main reasons for moving to the
area (18 per cent Muslims, 16 per cent non-Muslims). Ten per cent of the non-
Muslim respondents stated they were born in the local area, similar to 9 per cent of the
Muslim respondents.

Most residents have lived in the local area for more than ten years. While more non-
Muslims have resided in the local area for a shorter period, a larger proportion of non-
Muslims had also lived in the area for over 30 years (Figure 4.).

---

Of the respondents to the Foundations questionnaire, 7 per cent of both groups rented from a private landlord. Muslim respondents lived with their parents in twice as many cases as the non-Muslims – 17 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. None of the Muslim respondents stated that they moved to the area because of its reputation, but 3 per cent of the non-Muslims provided this as a reason.

The majority of the respondents to the Foundations questionnaire were dependent on social housing. The houses offered by the social housing corporations are mostly located in the old city districts. This fact in itself limits the chances for many Muslims to move to less ethnically concentrated areas.

The distribution policies of the social housing corporations have changed from an allocation model, in which the corporations determined who qualified for which house through a web of diffuse qualification decisions, to a model where distribution is determined by the supply. In the allocation model, letters could determine which groups – specifically Turks and Moroccans – were allocated a house in which street or neighbourhood. Turks and Moroccans were allocated worse houses than others, and were placed in areas with a concentration of the same ethnic group. The supply model is more transparent, and leaves less room for discrimination. However, it does impose some criteria, like age, the amount of years lived in the current house, and the number of years that a person has to be registered in the corporation’s system. Because Muslims
are younger in general or have lived in the Netherlands for a shorter period, they still have fewer choices and less of a chance of placement in newer and larger houses than other groups.233

Figure 5. Do you own or rent your home, or have some other arrangement?

Source: Open Society Foundations

Ethnic segregation was mentioned several times among the concerns that Muslims have about their housing situation. They also expressed concern about their children growing up in an almost all-minority neighbourhood and going to almost all-minority schools. They said they wish more natives would move to the area.

Results from the Foundations questionnaire show that a majority of the Muslim respondents, as well as the non-Muslim control group, who wanted to move to a house more suitable to their situation (for example, Muslims who had a large family or physical disability) did not want to move out of the area. Familiarity with the local shops, services and the people were mentioned among the reasons they wanted to stay. However, the interviewees stated that it was difficult for them to find affordable housing in the area. The city renewal projects, though partly perceived as positive, are a point of concern here. Interviewees believed that the renewal projects made it increasingly difficult for them to find rental apartments.

233 See the Artikel 1 website, http://www.art1.nl
Now when people leave rental flats the housing office sells them instead of renting them once again, despite the fact that they claim they do not have enough flats.

**Figure 6. How satisfied would you say you are with the local social housing services?**

![Graph showing satisfaction levels](image)

In general, the majority of Muslim and non-Muslims were satisfied with local social housing. However, a greater proportion of Muslims (25.3 per cent) than non-Muslims (12 per cent) were dissatisfied.

During the focus group interviews, a number of interviewees stated that the social housing services do not repair shared facilities when called about broken doorbells, doors or broken mailboxes. They reported that they were addressed discourteously when they called to report the problem. A woman gave an example:

In my building, the doorbells have been broken for three months. When my guests come to my house, they can’t get in. We called the housing office many times. They just play with us saying that they’d come. We wait for them for two weeks and then we call again. They say they’d come on such and such day. We wait and wait. Nobody comes. (...) It’s been three months now. We have to leave the main door open. Then, everybody comes in. Then, they put a camera there. But it’s useless.
An equal number of interviewees, particularly elderly women, however, said that their housing situation had improved significantly from when they first moved into the area in the 1970s and 1980s, due to the urban renewal projects.

At the beginning, we would live in the dilapidated houses without bathrooms. [...] We used to live in houses without central heating. It’s completely changed now. Those old houses were pulled down and the new ones were constructed.
8. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Health and Social Services

Access to adequate health care is important to social inclusion. Long-term illness affects people’s opportunities for economic and social participation, reducing employment opportunities and income, which in turn have an influence on people’s opportunities for social and leisure activities.

This chapter begins with an overview of the data on the health status of Turks and Moroccans. Using data from the Rotterdam Health Survey it examines differences of perceived health status across different groups as well as differences in the types of physical and mental illnesses that affect Turks and Moroccans. It examines the experiences of health care reported by Muslim respondents to the Foundations survey and participants in the focus groups and highlights some of the initiatives for improving health and access to health care.

8.1 Health Status of Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam and Feijenoord

In general, immigrants in the Netherlands face greater health risks than natives. As a consequence of the poorer health of many immigrants, the mortality rates for immigrants are higher than for natives. However, the difference is diminishing. For all age groups, the risk of death from health problems came down between 2002 and 2006. During this period, infant mortality rates fell by 15 per cent, and mortality rates for those aged 15–30 fell by 25 per cent. Furthermore, data suggest that the risk for Moroccan men in their 40s dying from poor health is in fact lower than that of native men in the same age group.

The Rotterdam Health Survey is a monitoring report based on a survey conducted by the municipal health service (Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst, GGD) on the health status of the inhabitants of Rotterdam. The survey is conducted every four years. Data from the 2005 survey were published in 2007. In addition to this, in 2003 and 2004, a health survey was conducted specifically among Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam. Data for this survey were collected by both postal surveys (in Turkish

and Dutch) and face-to-face interviews in people’s homes. For some questions, the different methodological approaches led to differing results. Some of the key findings of these reports are summarised below.

Perceived Health

Corresponding with the numbers in other large cities in the Netherlands, one out of five (19.5 per cent) respondents to the 2005 Rotterdam Health Survey perceived their personal health as moderate or bad.238 In the city district of Feijenoord, residents perceived their health as at a significantly lower quality than that of residents in other city districts (25.9 per cent), with the exception of Rotterdam North (25.5 per cent).239 There were differences in perceived health levels between men and women, educational levels, age and ethnicity. Women, those with lower education levels, the elderly and immigrants were more likely to perceive their health negatively compared with men, the better educated, younger people and native Dutch.240

In the 2003/2004 Health Survey of Turks and Moroccans, one-third of the Moroccan respondents perceived their health as moderate to bad, as did almost half of the Turkish respondents.241 Among the Moroccans, there were no significant differences between men and women and educational levels, whereas among the Turkish participants, men and the better educated perceived their health to be better than women and the less well educated. Among the Moroccans, people with full-time jobs (over 32 hours’ paid work per week) perceived their health to be better than non-working people (including students and housewives) and people who worked part-time. There was no difference between working, non-working or part-time groups among the Turks.

Illnesses

Nationally, there are significantly fewer deaths from cancer among immigrants than there are among natives. In addition, compared with all other groups, Moroccans suffer less often from heart and vascular diseases.242 This is related to their lifestyle, as they drink significantly less alcohol than other ethnic groups because of their religion. The percentage of smokers among Muslim women is much lower than in other groups, also reducing the risks of cancer.

Of the respondents to the 2005 Rotterdam Health Survey, 42.2 per cent reported having a disease or ailment determined by a doctor in the 12 months preceding the survey. In Feijenoord, this percentage was 46 per cent. If diseases and ailments that

242 *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*, p. 42.
were not confirmed by a doctor are also taken into account, this number rises to 60 per cent for Feijenoord and 56 per cent for the city as a whole. Complaints about neck, shoulder and back pain were higher in Feijenoord than in any of the other city districts.

Almost two-thirds of the Moroccans (64 per cent) reported several diseases or ailments. Moroccan women (58 per cent) reported suffering from diseases or ailments less often than Moroccan men (68 per cent). There were no differences shown between age groups, educational levels and working situation (employed, unemployed, part-time employed). Among the elderly, diabetes and high blood pressure were often mentioned. Of the Turks, 80 per cent reported suffering from one or several diseases or ailments. Turkish women reported this more often than men (84 per cent compared with 75 per cent).

**Mental Health**

Results from the 2005 survey showed that about one-quarter of the population of Rotterdam (24.8 per cent) suffered from slight or severe psychological problems. Looking in more detail at the city, the survey shows that in Feijenoord and two other city districts more people perceived their mental health as poor compared with other districts. In Feijenoord, 31.5 per cent of the respondents to the 2005 survey reported poor mental health. The survey highlights other relevant factors: women and less well educated people reported experiencing psychological problems more often than men and the well educated, and immigrants more often than natives, with the exception of the Antillean population.

The survey found that the inhabitants of Feijenoord were more likely (46.2 per cent) to be suffering from depression than the average level for all residents in Rotterdam (35.3 per cent). In fact, 14 per cent of inhabitants in Feijenoord had a high risk of depression, compared with 9 per cent in Rotterdam as a whole.

The survey data for minority groups show that among the Moroccan respondents, a significantly lower number (9 per cent) of those personally interviewed reported poor mental health than those who responded to the survey by post (23 per cent).

Turkish respondents showed a similar pattern. Respondents to the bilingual (Dutch-Turkish) survey sent by mail reported having poor psychological health in 39 per cent of cases, while 30 per cent of the respondents reported bad psychological health during

---

244 Van Buren and Zwanenburg, Gezondheidsonduke Turken en Marokkanen, p. 49.
245 Schouten and Kuilman, Gezondheidsonduke 2005, p. 16.
248 Van Buren and Zwanenburg, Gezondheidsonduke Turken en Marokkanen, p. 47.
Among the Moroccan respondents, there were significant differences between age groups, the percentage increasing with age. Differences between men and women, work situation and education were not significant. Of the Turkish respondents, the age group 35–44 years old suffered most from psychological problems. People living on welfare suffered more from psychological problems than people who worked more than 32 hours a week.

Better educated Moroccans reported depression more often than the less well educated. Of the Turkish respondents, people living on social welfare more often reported depression (22 per cent) than working people (12 per cent).

**Obesity**

The number of immigrants suffering from obesity or who were overweight is higher than that of natives. In Rotterdam, 47 per cent of the total population is overweight or obese. Over half of the Moroccans and Turks in Rotterdam are severely overweight (55 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively). Of the Moroccan population, women are more often obese than men (57 per cent and 54 per cent), while among Turks this is the other way around (52 per cent and 68 per cent). Turks and Moroccans also exercise much less than natives; according to the Dutch Guidelines for Health and Exercise, adults should have at least half an hour of moderately intensive physical exercise at least five days a week. The inhabitants of Rotterdam Feijenoord take significantly less exercise than the national average level and 50 per cent do not meet the recommended guideline amount of weekly exercise, which is again one of the highest percentages in Rotterdam.

### 8.2 Lifestyles, Health and Obesity among Muslim Children

In cooperation with infant welfare centres, parents and schools, GGD monitors the psychological and physical health of children and adolescents aged 0–19 years.

---

Two-thirds of the children in the city district of Feijenoord in their third year of secondary school define their personally perceived health as “good” or “very good.”

The percentage of overweight or obese children is higher in Rotterdam than on national average. One out of ten toddlers, one out of six pre-schoolers and one out of between four and five secondary-school children in Rotterdam are (severely) overweight.

Turkish children in all age groups suffer from obesity more than all other ethnic groups. Moroccan toddlers and pre-schoolers are also more often overweight than children of other ethnicities. In secondary school, students in the lower educational levels (VMBO) are more often overweight than students in the higher levels (HAVO/VWO). Many Turkish and Moroccan children and youth do not eat breakfast daily, watch television for more than two hours a day, drink a lot of sugary soft drinks and do not play outside or participate in sports outside of school, all of which can lead to weight problems. Among all ethnic groups, Turkish and Moroccan youth in the third year of secondary school are the least likely to be members of a sports association.

The number of young people in the third year of secondary school who report consuming alcohol is lower in Rotterdam than on average in the Netherlands. This could be because of the number of Muslim children in Rotterdam who do not drink because of their religion. Moroccan youngsters smoke the least of all ethnic groups, together with Cape Verde children (both 2 per cent), while Turkish youngsters (10 per cent) and native Dutch (9 per cent) most often report smoking daily.

8.3 Access to and Experiences with Local Health Services

Turkish and Moroccan women consult with health specialists more often than Turkish and Moroccan men. Both Turkish and Moroccan men and women consult their GP more often than the average for Rotterdam as a whole. Better educated Moroccans visit their GP more often than those who have less education, while for Turks it is the other way around. A high proportion of Turks and Moroccans also visit a dentist annually.

The Annual Integration Report 2008 comes to the “very preliminary” conclusion that at first glance there are no specific barriers for immigrants to health care, but it

---

258 COS, “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006”, p. 35.
259 “Jeugdmonitor Rotterdam”, p. 21.
260 Van Buren and Zwanenburg, Gezondheidsenquete Turken en Marokkanen, p. 46.
acknowledges the need for further research. In general, non-native parents of young children visit the infant welfare centres as often as natives, and immigrants use similar amounts of medication compared with natives. However, although there may not be formal barriers to health care, there may be informal barriers caused by cultural differences. As mentioned by one of the female Muslim respondents, the interactions between female Muslim patients and male doctors may be one of those barriers. Also, in 2007, a Dutch specialist magazine for medical professionals, *Medisch Contact* (Medical Contact), reported an increase of incidents where male doctors were hindered in their work or unable to perform surgery on Muslim women because the husband prevented a male doctor from touching his wife.

There are a number of initiatives aimed at overcoming the barriers to health care faced by immigrants. In Feijenoord, there is a centre for intercultural psychiatric and psychological healthcare, called i-psy. The centre has five locations in the Netherlands, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Leiden, which are cities with large immigrant populations. It offers specialised mental health care to immigrants who suffer from psychological problems often related to their migration history, changes of cultural and social environment and their personal situations. The psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists and social workers at i-psy take the cultural and religious background of the patients into account. The mental care offered is adjusted to the needs of the immigrant populations in each city.

That there is a need for this type of mental health care was confirmed by a GP working in Feijenoord. He described the mental problems of many Muslim women he encountered in his profession as problems relating to their migration as well as their socio-economic situation:

> When people come to a doctor, you do not address them by their religion […]

> Many problems are related to the migration history. However, the cultural situation does play a role. For Muslim women of the first generation, they arrived here without a specific wish, a specific goal, and now they find themselves in this situation that they feel they have no control over. They come to me with vague physical problems, and when you inquire further, it is often mental. Their complaints often relate to stress, to being “locked” in the house, so to speak, disconnected from their family and friends, in an environment they don’t understand and that they cannot be part of.

There are also municipal initiatives to reduce the language barriers between health specialists and non-native patients: the municipal health service employs several health

---

261 *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*, p. 17.
263 See the i-psy website at http://www.i-psy.nl (accessed August 2010).
consultants from different ethnic backgrounds to support communication between the patients and the health specialists.

The municipal health services also involve organisations, such as SPIOR, to target specific groups with awareness campaigns.

8.4 Experiences of Muslims in Feijenoord

In general, the Muslim inhabitants of the neighbourhoods in Feijenoord were fairly satisfied with the health services, but they were more often dissatisfied than the non-Muslim control group (see Figure 7.). The two groups had similar complaints, including long waiting lists for treatments and not enough attention from doctors.

**Figure 7. How satisfied would you say you are with the local health services?**

The majority of the Muslim respondents indicated that the hospitals and medical clinics respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions to a satisfactory extent (Figure 8.). Over 7 per cent of the Muslims, more than non-Muslims, even said that hospitals and medical clinics take religious customs into account too much, while 3 per cent of the non-Muslims replied that they in fact take religious customs into account too little.
Figure 8. To what extent do you think that hospitals and medical clinics respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?

Source: Open Society Foundations

Elderly Muslim women said that until a few years ago women and men had separate rooms in the hospital, but that this had changed.

Muslims aren’t satisfied with this situation. The Dutch don’t care at all. They even like it better. But for Muslim women, it’s really disturbing. We feel really uncomfortable because when we lie in bed, our hair or our arms could be seen. But they say, “This is our rule. If you want to stay here you have to live with it.”

In the focus group interview with women over 45, it appeared that this group was very unsatisfied with the health services. They had many complaints about the general health service including the diagnoses made by doctors. Several women said that their complaints were not taken seriously, and that they had to visit the GP several times. They had the feeling that the doctors did not believe them when they reported health problems: “Just because we are Turks and Muslims, are we liars?”

There is a level of distrust in the doctors:

[The doctor] starts with cheapest medications first. He uses us as testers. He says, “First try these pills, and then come next week.” I go to see him next week; he gives me a slightly more expensive medicine and tells me to come next week. They use us as guinea pigs.

In some cases, they mentioned that they went to the doctor in Turkey when on holiday, and got treatment from the doctors there.

The majority of the complaints during the focus group interviews among elderly men did not concern the health services as much as health insurance and paying for it. In
the Netherlands, the health insurance market has been liberalised since 2006.\textsuperscript{264} Many of the Muslim men indicated that their health insurance no longer covered the costs that it had in the past. Very few have additional insurance on top of the basic health insurance that is compulsory. A GP who worked in several neighbourhoods with a high concentration of disadvantaged people observed in an interview that the liberalisation of insurance had a greater effect on poorer people:

For example, if you only have basic insurance then you need to stop your physiotherapy after so many times. If you can afford it, you can just continue and pay for it. A sore shoulder will not kill you, but it does decrease the quality of life.\textsuperscript{265}

The interviewees were surprised to hear that native Dutch are provided with the same medicines as the immigrants, and that natives have to pay the same for insurance that they do. The group interview sessions suggested there is a great level of mistrust among the Turkish inhabitants of Feijenoord, who feel they receive unequal treatment from the Dutch institutions, based on ethnic and religious discrimination.

Second-generation participants in the focus groups illustrated how the language barrier that the first generation experiences influences their access to good health care.

When my mother goes to the doctor – she doesn’t speak Dutch well – it’s like they don’t listen. Then if I come along to interpret, they suddenly understand the problem. It seems to me that because she hasn’t mastered the language, they don’t want to make the effort. If she says she’s in pain, they’ll say, “Take an aspirin.” But if you further explain, they’ll listen. So the language is a problem.

8.5 Municipal Initiatives and Challenges

The municipality of Rotterdam has initiated the Action Programme for Nutrition and Exercise (Actieprogramma Voeding en Bewegen) to reduce obesity in young people and children in Rotterdam. The programme is a cooperative effort between the municipality, youth services and health services.\textsuperscript{266} One of the projects is the “Nice and

\textsuperscript{264} Everyone is obliged to have basic health insurance. The government decides what needs to be covered. Hospital costs are covered, as well as other forms of medical care (physiotherapy, psychological care, dentist, GP, post-partum care) up to a certain amount. The first €155 of the costs every year must be paid by the client, over and above monthly premiums. The basic insurance can be supplemented, so that more is covered, against higher premiums. As statistics show that poorer people have more health problems, this affects them most as they are also less likely to take the supplemented insurance. The supplement includes, for example, higher coverage for physiotherapy or dental care.

\textsuperscript{265} Interview with general practitioner in The Hague, 28 May 2008.

\textsuperscript{266} COS, “Factsheet Overgewicht en Leefstijl” (Factsheet on Overweight and Lifestyle), Rotterdam, November 2007.
Fit” (“Lekker Fit”) programme. The schools participating in this programme provide one additional hour of sport for the children besides the regular two hours a week.

The School Sports Association (Schoolsport Vereniging)\(^{267}\) was also set up to facilitate sports activities for children who live in neighbourhoods that have very few sports facilities or none at all. Rather than expecting children from these (often poor) neighbourhoods to travel long distances to a sports association, the associations come to them in an attempt to get the children to become members. Different types of sports are offered, including judo, football, basketball and gymnastics. Children who become members of the association can practise sports directly after school at the school or nearby and the associations ensure they can participate in regular competitions. The Southern Pact is one of the financial partners in this project.

In addition, since many of the parents of obese children belong to the lowest income groups, there is the Youth Sports Fund, a municipal initiative, which covers the contribution to the associations. An additional sum may be granted to buy the necessary equipment. The Youth Sports Fund is subsidised by the municipality.

Still, according to the teacher of a primary school that participates in the Lekker Fit programme, the school sports programme is much more successful in some of the Feijenoord neighbourhoods than in others. Muslim children are a particularly difficult target group, although the teacher stressed that the Muslim children do show an interest in sports. Many children, including a high number of Turkish and Moroccan children, especially boys, come to the introductory classes of all the different sports that are offered. Overall in Rotterdam, boys take up sports more than girls.\(^{268}\) However, after a few trial lessons, very few children sign up. It is not clear why there are such low sign-up rates. It could be a language barrier with the parents, which makes it difficult to inform parents that they can get financial support to help their children participate. Very few parents attend the meetings organised to inform them about the programme and the possibilities for their children to participate in sports.

\(^{267}\) See the organisation’s website at http://www.schoolsportvereniging.nl (accessed August 2010).

\(^{268}\) “Jeugdmonitor Rotterdam”, p. 17.
9. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: POLICING AND SECURITY

In the national discourse on radicalisation, emphasis is placed on counteracting polarisation in Dutch society. The polarisation between different groups in society may lead to tensions between these groups and to segregation according to ethnic and religious lineages and may stimulate radicalisation. Polarisation is therefore perceived as a threat to social cohesion.

9.1 Anti-radicalisation Policies

The National Context

In response to the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, the Dutch national government has been concerned with the demarcation between what is considered acceptable civic plurality and unacceptable and intolerant radicalism. Politicians stress the need to increase the orientation of immigrants, specifically Muslims, toward Dutch society.

The national Action Programme against Polarisation and Radicalisation 2007–2011 has three primary objectives. First of all, it stresses the need to prevent further processes of isolation, polarisation and radicalisation by actively including people who are at risk of becoming radicalised or turning away from society and the democratic constitutional state. The second objective is early signalling of radicalisation by administrators and professionals, and the development of an effective approach. The third objective is exclusion, which involves isolating people who have become radicalised, thereby reducing their influence on others.

Rotterdam

Municipal approaches to radicalisation aim mainly at prevention, signalling and intervention. For example, the municipality funds projects that enhance the tenability of groups and social cohesion and aims to increase the expertise of municipal board members and front-line professionals, such as youth workers, social workers and teachers by means of information and education.

Rotterdam was among the first municipalities of the Netherlands to develop an action programme against radicalisation. Following the terrorist attacks in Europe, the murder

---


of Theo van Gogh by a radical Dutch Muslim and the discovery of planned attacks against key targets, such as harbours and airports, in the Netherlands, the municipality of Rotterdam decided late in 2004 to take measures against extremism. In February 2005 the municipality, supported by the Institute for Security and Crisis Management, presented an action programme against radicalisation, named “Participate or Stay Behind” (Meedoen of Achterblijven).272

Corresponding with the national anti-radicalisation policies, the municipal action programme aims to find a balance between prevention and repression. It has three objectives: to prevent the radicalisation of Muslims; to monitor people who do become radicalised; and to suppress the actions of radical individuals in order to prevent violent or terrorist attacks. It combines measures of inclusion and exclusion in order to counter radicalisation. The municipality aims to offer opportunities and support to inhabitants of Rotterdam who experience difficulties participating in society as well as to exclude people who become radicalised by cutting them off from welfare services. The police and the municipality each have their own tasks and means to signal and counteract radicalisation.

After the publication of the municipal policy on radicalisation, there was strong criticism from the Moroccan community, which was mentioned in the action programme as specifically vulnerable to radicalisation.273 The tone of the report and the fact that Muslim organisations had not been included in its formation caused the Moroccan organisations concern, in that they perceived discrimination as a growing problem playing a part in the processes of exclusion and radicalisation. In response, Meedoen of Achterblijven financed a project called “The right not to be discriminated against” (Recht om niet gediscrimineerd te worden), directed specifically at the Moroccan communities. The PBR, RADAR, SMOR and SPIOR worked together to initiate meetings with Moroccan organisations, providing information on discrimination and legislation against discrimination, and to monitor actual and perceived discrimination among Moroccans in Rotterdam.274

In 2006, the municipality launched the antidiscrimination campaign called “Discrimination? So long!”. Employment and access to the labour market through internships for Muslim students in the vocations are key components of this campaign.

272 Gemeente Rotterdam, “Meedoen of achterblijven. Actieprogramma tegen radicalisering en voor kansen voor Rotterdammers” (Participate or stay behind. Action programme against radicalisation and for opportunities for the inhabitants of Rotterdam), Rotterdam, 4 February 2005.


274 Schriemer and Kasmi, Gevallen en Gevoelens.
9.2 The Extreme-right, Anti-Muslim Racism and Interethnic Racism

The Anne Frank Foundation\footnote{See the organisation’s website at http://www.annefrank.org (accessed August 2010).} has been monitoring racism and extremism in the Netherlands since 1997.\footnote{Information available at http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?pid=1&lid=1 (accessed August 2010).} As part of its monitoring, the foundation has noted an increase in Islamophobia in the Netherlands over the past few years. Apart from increased negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam, the level of violence against Muslims has also increased.\footnote{W. Wagenaar and J. Donselaar, “Rasistisch en extremistisch geweld”, in J. Donselaar and P. Rodriguez (eds), Monitor Racisme en Extremisme (Racism and Extremism Monitor), Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 17–39, p. 35. \nonumber W. Wagenaar and J. Donselaar, “Extreemrechtse formaties” (Extreme right formations), in J. Donselaar and P. Rodriguez (eds), Monitor Racisme en Extremisme (Racism and Extremism Monitor), Anne Frank Stichting/Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 43–63. \nonumber Schriemer and Kasmi, Gevallen en Gevoelens, p. 62. \nonumber Landelijk expertisecentrum diversiteit (National Centre for Expertise on Diversity), Politie voor EENIEDER, Een eigentijdse visie op diversiteit, Police for ALL. A contemporary vision of diversity), February 2009 (hereafter Politie voor EENIEDER).}

There has also been increasing radicalisation among native Dutch youths who are attracted to right-wing extremist groups.\footnote{Schriemer and Kasmi, Gevallen en Gevoelens, p. 62.} Following the murder of the film-maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004, a series of violent acts were directed at Islamic and Christian institutions, mostly Muslim schools, Christian churches and mosques. In total, 22 Muslim schools were targeted by what seemed to be mostly extreme right-wing Dutch youths. Some schools were entirely burnt down.

The political climate changed after the rise of Pim Fortuyn and new right-wing parties. One part of Fortuyn’s legacy was to legitimise the right to be able to say what one thinks, regardless of the offensive character of the statement to some (mostly Muslims). This contributed to a shift in the balance between equal treatment and freedom of speech away from protection against discrimination.\footnote{Landelijk expertisecentrum diversiteit (National Centre for Expertise on Diversity), Politie voor EENIEDER, Een eigentijdse visie op diversiteit, Police for ALL. A contemporary vision of diversity), February 2009 (hereafter Politie voor EENIEDER).}

9.3 Diversity Policy

As is usually the case, local policy in Rotterdam on policing and security is largely informed by national policy. The policy view on policing is called “The Police for ALL, a Contemporary Vision of Diversity” (Politie voor EENIEDER. Een eigentijdse visie op diversiteit).\footnote{Landelijk expertisecentrum diversiteit (National Centre for Expertise on Diversity), Politie voor EENIEDER, Een eigentijdse visie op diversiteit, Police for ALL. A contemporary vision of diversity), February 2009 (hereafter Politie voor EENIEDER).} This document explains that diversity has an internal and an external dimension:

Internally, it is about creating and maintaining an environment in which all staff members can develop in a natural and self-evident manner, which allows them to contribute optimally to the goals of the police […] Both
internally and externally, diversity is about integrity in attitudes and behaviour. As the police organisation, we need to be able to serve all groups in society. Here, diversity is about the genuine acceptance of other cultures and manifestations, and it is about working on legitimacy.\footnote{Politie voor EENIEDER, p. 9. (translated).}

The policy explains that diversity has shifted from a social issue to an efficiency issue. Diversity as a social issue implied that the police organisation attempted to reflect society in its staff members. This approach proved to have insufficient dynamics. By approaching diversity as an efficiency issue, the police acknowledged that the organisation needs diversity to function. The shift in the diversity approach is thus from political interest to self-interest. This implied, however, that diversity ceases to have social importance to the police organisation. The principle of equality remains of fundamental importance. The business case for diversity involves recognition that the organisation aims to be multicultural, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the organisation and increase its legitimacy for society. Specific recruitment policy remains necessary, as a variety of skills and backgrounds (ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation, physical condition) are needed to foster multicultural professional policing services.\footnote{Politie voor EENIEDER, p. 56.}

The diversity policy is of high priority to the police force in Rotterdam. In 2008, police officers in Rotterdam with an immigrant background formed 10.4 per cent of the force; the police force aims to have 14.5 per cent non-native officers in the coming years.\footnote{Data provided by the Personnel and Organisation Service (Human Resource Management) of the Police Force of Rotterdam–Rijnmond, during a stakeholder interview with a policy adviser at the Rotterdam Police Force, 26 June 2009.}

Counteracting discrimination is also one of the main functions of the Rotterdam police force. One of the measures is a compulsory course for all 6,000 employees of the police organisation, including secretaries and high-ranking officers. In this course, called PRROUD (Police Rotterdam Rijnmond Offers U Diversity) the staff members receive training in small groups revolving around behavioural dialogues,\footnote{Information about the PRROUD initiative and the behavioural dialogues was provided by a policy adviser of the Rotterdam Police Force during a stakeholder interview, 26 June 2009.} whose aim is to challenge people to confront the stereotypical images and prejudices they hold against people of other backgrounds (ethnicity, religion, gender, etc). The training aims to equip the police to improve the way they address the public, to reflect on how their feelings about others may unconsciously lead to undesired effects and to maintain the neutrality that is needed to successfully do their job.

The Rotterdam police force won the Diversity Prize of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in 2008 for its efforts to counter prejudice among its own staff and to recruit staff members of different backgrounds. This programme could serve as an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\footnote{Politie voor EENIEDER, p. 9. (translated).}
\item\footnote{Politie voor EENIEDER, p. 56.}
\item\footnote{Data provided by the Personnel and Organisation Service (Human Resource Management) of the Police Force of Rotterdam–Rijnmond, during a stakeholder interview with a policy adviser at the Rotterdam Police Force, 26 June 2009.}
\item\footnote{Information about the PRROUD initiative and the behavioural dialogues was provided by a policy adviser of the Rotterdam Police Force during a stakeholder interview, 26 June 2009.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
example for other municipalities, in the Netherlands as well as abroad, to help officers in their profession and effectively counter discrimination in and by the police force.

In Rotterdam, the diversity policy is also expressed in the establishment of force ambassadors. These officers are usually local police officers selected for their qualities to build and maintain networks with different cultural groups. They receive training so as to inform them about the work of the police force and policing policy. When communities hold meetings about matters involving policing or security matters, these ambassadors can be invited to provide information, answer people’s questions and address their concerns. The aim is to build and maintain networks between the communities and the police.285

The Rotterdam police force played an important part in the weeks before the anti-Islam film *Fitna*, produced by the right-wing MP Geert Wilders, was released on the Internet in March 2008. Through building networks and strengthening the connections with community centres, mosques and local civil servants, the police were prepared for violent outbursts.286 There were no violent incidents after the film was released.

Although building and maintaining networks in society between the police and communities is very important, the stakeholder interviews and the roundtable stakeholders’ meeting expressed the desire that these networks should be more structurally maintained, even when tensions are not high and there seems no immediate need to make use of them.

9.4 Experiences with Policing and Security

Non-native residents of the Netherlands have an ambiguous position in crime statistics. Immigrants are often suspects, but they are just as often victims of crime.287 According to researchers at the University of Utrecht, a prejudice exists in the Netherlands that Moroccans would not rob people from the same ethnic group. This proves not to be the case; Moroccans are just as likely to become the victims of a crime committed by another Moroccan as any other person.288 Research in several cities, including Rotterdam, indicates that immigrants report crimes to the police less frequently. Because of language barriers, older immigrants in particular do not report crime.289 Moreover, survey research on victimisation is usually based on respondents who are listed in the telephone book and who speak Dutch.

287 J. Korf and F. Bovenkerk, *Dubbel de klos. Slachtofferschap van criminaliteit onder etnische minderheden* (Double victimisation. Victims of crime among ethnic minorities), Boorn, Meppel, 2007 (hereafter Korf and Bovenkerk, *Dubbel de klos*).
288 Korf and Bovenkerk, *Dubbel de klos*, p. 11.
289 Korf and Bovenkerk, *Dubbel de klos*, p. 36.
Apart from the monitoring reports of antidiscrimination agencies and research centres (such as RADAR and the Anne Frank foundation) that are based on the reported crimes committed against Muslims, there is little information available on the experiences of Muslims as victims of crimes.

While most concerns of the Open Society Foundations focus group participants addressed local issues, the feeling of being stigmatised by the national government also came to the surface. One focus group participant stated that:

> Today, everybody knows that Wilders’ rightist party is the enemy of Muslims. The government seemed to be with Muslims against him for a while but stagnated. They didn’t try to get into a dialogue with Muslims. I mean, what did we do to you? All these Muslims have been working in this country for 30–40 years. Do these people have anything to do with terrorism? No.

The vast majority of Muslim respondents to the Foundations survey (97 per cent) stated that they had not been a victim of crime during the 12 months prior to the survey. For the non-Muslim group, the figure was 89 per cent. Of the three Muslim respondents who replied positively to the question, the locations where they were a victim of crime were the neighbourhood, the local area and the city. Among the non-Muslim victims of crime, the incidents occurred in the neighbourhood more often (65 per cent) than in other areas. None of the respondents stated that the crime was motivated by discrimination.

A few young Muslim men mentioned that they sometimes felt they had been victims of racial profiling by the police. The general security policies – specifically the law against gathering on the street in order to reduce gang activity – are said by them to affect them unjustly, and they feel they are treated as criminals when they are innocently talking to friends on the street. While perceived discrimination does not always mean that discrimination is indeed occurring, feelings of exclusion or unequal treatment can lead to feelings of alienation and accordingly should be taken seriously. Research has shown that racial profiling does occur in the Netherlands, in particular when it concerns measures to prevent crime, such as pre-emptive body searches and the ban on the gathering of groups on the street.290

Almost 25 per cent of the non-Muslims had had contact with the police in the 12 months before the survey, while among Muslims, it was less than 10 per cent. In most cases (80 per cent Muslims and 68 per cent non-Muslims) the interviewee initiated the contact.

---

290 See J. Goldschmidt and P. Rodriguez, “Het gebruik van etnische of religieuze profielen bij het voorkomen en opsporen van strafbare feiten die een bedreiging vormen voor de openbare orde en veiligheid” (The use of ethnic or religious profiles in preventing and tracing criminal acts that are a treat to public order and security), in J. Donselaar and P. Rodriguez (eds), Monitor Racisme en Extremisme, Zevende rapportage (Racism and Extremism Monitor, seventh report), Anne Frank Stichting, Amsterdam, 2006.
Levels of dissatisfaction with the local police are higher among the Muslim respondents to the Foundations questionnaire than among non-Muslim respondents. Many of the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents alike indicated that there is not enough policing in the neighbourhood, and that the police do not act efficiently against the youngsters who are loitering around on the playing fields, who deliberately destroy common facilities in the neighbourhood and cause a nuisance. One man illustrated his point:

We run a household. Don’t we know what our wife and children are up to? Likewise, the municipality also knows what these bad people are up to. They could intervene if they want to.

However, during the roundtable meeting, representatives of the police force stated that while people usually claim that they want a more visible police presence, doing so can also make people feel less safe, as it can give them the impression that crime levels are higher than they really are.

People say they want more police presence. But when they see the local officer passing their street for the second time they become concerned and they come up to the officer asking: “What is the matter?” They fear that something is going on.291

Police representatives said that the police force was constantly trying to find the balance between being visible but not overwhelming.

Figure 9. How satisfied would you say you are with local policing?

Source: Open Society Foundations

During the focus groups, the problem of drug dealing in the neighbourhood was raised by Muslim women.

As long as I can remember, there were young people loitering in the area. I don’t think much has changed [...] But now they are becoming criminal, they are dealing drugs.

Another Muslim woman of Turkish background linked the problem, which she ascribed to Moroccan inhabitants, to the increasing segregation of the neighbourhood:

The community centre is just across from my house. And there’s a big garden in front of it. When the weather is nice, all the Moroccans come together there and use heroin. They fight with each other. They broke the windows of the community centre several times. Because of this, all the Dutch people in our neighbourhood move away.

Harassment from young people loitering was also an important point of concern for respondents to the questionnaire. They linked the problems caused by the youths to the lack of facilities that could bring them together.

There is nothing for them to do here. Everything closes up at night, when it becomes dark. So they [the young people] hang out in the streets. They make noise and cause trouble because they are bored.

Creating more facilities for young people was also mentioned by almost half of the total respondents as one of the things they wished to see improved in their local area.
10. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: PARTICIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Civic and political participation can be a further measure of social inclusion. Participation in society and its institutions as well as the claiming of minority rights are, to a considerable extent, influenced by access to citizenship.

10.1 Citizenship and Access to Welfare Benefits

Inclusion of Immigrants

At the core of citizenship issues is the question of who is included and who is excluded from social benefits. This question first arose in the 1970s. An economic recession followed the first oil crisis of 1973, and unemployment increased rapidly. Industry and manufacturing were among the most severely affected sectors. While in the 1960s there was almost full employment, the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were a time of crisis. In 1973, labour migration was halted. It emerged that many labourers who came on temporary contracts had in fact remained in the Netherlands much longer than was originally intended. They were insufficiently registered, but this had gone unnoticed because they had always been employed. Now, the Turks and Moroccans were among the groups that suffered from massive lay-offs and were seeking to register for social welfare.

The halt on labour recruitment also created a large group of illegal residents, the guest workers who had come to the Netherlands outside of official channels. In 1975, these workers were given a one-off opportunity to register, and 15,000 did so, many of whom were from Morocco and Turkey.

When people in the Netherlands acquire legal status (by means of a resident permit, not to be confused with citizenship), they are entitled to the same rights to welfare state services as natives. As a consequence, policies to restrict immigration and increase the demands placed on immigrants were adopted in the 1990s in order to reduce the strain on social welfare benefits. What was called a civic integration policy (inburgeringsbeleid) was created. Newcomers had the obligation to learn Dutch by taking language courses and civic integration courses about Dutch society. Also, unemployed immigrants were obliged to attend labour market orientation sessions.

Expectations of Immigrants

From 1994 the active citizenship of immigrants was the leading principle in integration discussion. Active citizenship in 1994 meant learning the language and participating in

292 Interviews at Instituut voor Migratie- en Etnische Studies (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, IMES), 3 February 2009.
293 See Chapter 1.
294 Maussen et al., Netherlands Literature Survey, p. 15.
Since 2004, the demands have become stricter and have shifted toward an assimilation policy.

The most important legacy of Rita Verdonk, who was the Minister of Integration in 2003–07, is that all the costs of integration are now borne by the immigrants, whereas before they were partly paid for by the state. Since 1 January 2007, the compulsory language and civic integration courses that were previously offered by the regional educational institutions were privatised as a result of a government policy change. Also older immigrants, if unemployed, now have to take the course to improve their chances on the labour market, even if they have resided in the Netherlands for years. New immigrants are obliged to pass the civic integration exam, but they are not obliged to take the course and can study for it at home. If new immigrants do take an integration exam course, they can receive a refund of 70 per cent of the costs up to €650 after successfully passing the exam.

10.2 Muslim Participation in National and Municipal Elections

The changes in the outcome of the 2006 municipal elections compared with 2002 can largely be explained by the mobilisation of the non-native electorate. In the 2006 municipal election, Rotterdam was divided into neighbourhoods where either Labour or Leefbaar was the dominant party. The highly polarised character of these elections was a factor in the high turnout, particularly of immigrants.

After the municipal elections of 2006, Labour became the biggest party in Rotterdam, ending their four years in opposition. However, Leefbaar Rotterdam remained the second-largest party. Although the popularity of Leefbaar significantly decreased nationwide, in Rotterdam, many people remained loyal to the legacy and memory of the late Pim Fortuyn. Due to the rise of Fortuyn, who drew many people to the ballot box who otherwise would not vote, the electoral turnout was already higher in 2002 than before, but it was higher still in 2006.295

The 2006 elections also had record turnout rates among Turkish and Moroccan voters. The turnout among the Turkish electorate was higher than that of other non-native ethnic groups. They voted Labour in large numbers, and often for Labour candidates with a similar ethnic background to themselves.296 This was the case for at least 50 per cent of the Moroccan votes and over 55 per cent of the Turkish ballots.

In 2002, there were three candidates of Moroccan descent on the list for Labour who collected a total of 2,200 votes. In 2006, there were four Moroccan candidates who collected over 8,300 votes. In 2002, there were two candidates with a Turkish background on the list for Labour who won a total of 4,200 votes. In 2006 there were five Turkish candidates, who won 13,000 votes. Thus, the Turkish and Moroccan


296 COS, Analyse Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen 2006.
candidates alone brought Labour over 15,000 votes, half of which were votes from Turkish and Moroccan voters. The Turkish and Moroccan electorate thus had an important part in the victory of Labour in 2006 compared with 2002.

Of the Muslim and the non-Muslim respondents to the Foundations questionnaire, 80 per cent responded that they were eligible to vote in the municipal elections. Of this number, 65.7 per cent of the Muslim respondents stated that they voted in the last municipal elections, compared with 55.4 per cent of the non-Muslim control group. The percentage of Muslim voters was particularly high for Feijenoord, where the average turnout did not exceed 58 per cent. However, as noted above, Turks are more likely to vote than other ethnic groups, which could explain the high self-proclaimed political participation.

**Figure 10. Did you vote during the last local council elections?**

![Bar chart showing voting percentages for Muslims and Non-Muslims.](chart)

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

Muslims and non-Muslims responded similarly, with 71 per cent stating that they voted in national elections. Of the Muslim respondents, 17 per cent were not eligible to vote in national elections and are therefore included in the non-voters. Of the non-Muslim control group, 11 per cent were not eligible to vote.

### 10.3 Levels of Trust in Governmental Institutions

During the group interviews with Muslim inhabitants of Feijenoord, the interviewees were asked whether they felt they had any say in decisions at the municipal and district levels. The interviewees who were more involved and familiar with politics replied that they did feel they had an impact on local decision making.

Table 16. Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your city?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely agree</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely disagree</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

The Muslim respondents gave a strongly positive response to the statement less often than non-Muslims, and more often a strongly negative response.

There was very little trust in the local government and institutions among the elderly Turkish residents interviewed for this report. At one point during the group interview with older men, one man tried to discourage another from telling an anecdote about discrimination his uncle had experienced in a situation concerning the local government, saying the speaker could put his uncle in danger by telling this story. The focus group coordinator had to reassure him that the interviews would remain anonymous. The anecdote, however, remained untold.

The focus group participants of the first generation felt particularly disadvantaged by governmental institutions. They reported that their concerns were not taken seriously, and that they were being discriminated against.

We are fed up with it so much that we don’t even want to go to an official institution or to a hospital, to the police, and to the municipality any more.

We don’t want to have anything to do with them.

The elderly Muslim women and men expressed concern about the obligatory language courses. Currently, non-European immigrants aged 17–65, without a Dutch passport, who are foreign-born, have lived in the Netherlands less than eight years before turning 17 and who do not have a diploma to show that they have mastered the Dutch language, are obliged to take civil integration courses and pass the exam. During the focus group sessions, the women above the age of 45 expressed anxiety because of the language courses. They spoke of feeling discriminated against and humiliated by the
national government. Although they understood the importance of being able to speak the language, they felt they were now too old to learn. Moreover, many women suffer from bad health. One woman explained:

They called me the other day. I said, “I can hardly sit up because of the pains in every part of my body; how can I study something?” My head is full of problems of daily life; it’s not possible to put in something new now. Even if I did learn the language, what good can it do me at this age?

The elderly men and women interviewed for this report expressed feeling under great stress because of these compulsory courses. When they first arrived in the Netherlands, they were not expected to learn the language. Now required to do so, they felt that they were too old to be able to learn Dutch. Taking into account the general low educational levels of first-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, the possibility of successfully completing the course is very low for some who can hardly read and write in their native languages.

10.4 Civil Participation

Municipal Initiatives

The Swiss-born philosopher and Islamic theologian Tariq Ramadan has advised the city of Rotterdam on the “Citizenship, Identity and Feeling at Home” (Burgerschap, identiteit en je thuis voelen) project, which implements some of the urban citizenship policy and is part of the “Dialogues on Urban Citizenship” (Dialogen Stadsburgerschap) implementation programme (see Chapters 1 and 4). Ramadan was asked to lead the debate on identity and citizenship.

Muslim Organisations

The first Islamic organisations in Rotterdam were mosque associations, with which Muslim immigrants tried to meet people’s needs for prayer rooms, religious education and contacts. In the 1980s, the process of organisation formation accelerated, especially among Turkish Muslims. Several mutually connected movements and umbrella organisations started up.

At the end of the 1980s, there was an initiative to set up a platform for Muslim organisations. This led to the formation of the SPIOR in 1988. This gained political acknowledgement, equal to the PBR, an important umbrella organisation founded in 1981 for immigrant organisations. Both umbrella organisations remain active today.

The SPIOR maintains relations with the municipality of Rotterdam and the surrounding area of the city, functioning as an intermediary between the Muslim

298 Details are available (in Dutch) on the City of Rotterdam website at http://www.rotterdam.nl/smartsite2192275.dws (accessed August 2010).
299 Canatan, *Turks Islam*. 
organisations and the municipality. It keeps up relations with the councils of the city districts as well. Although it cannot be seen as speaking for the Muslim community, it does have a large number of organisations behind it who do, in certain cases, perceive the SPIOR as their spokesperson. This was, for example, the case after the film *Fitna* was released, when in a public statement the SPIOR expressed its disappointment at the negative portrayal of Muslims in the film, saying that the film would not lead to the unrest it wanted to bring. The SPIOR stated it would continue its work in playing an active role in Dutch society, without being distracted by Geert Wilders, who had made the film. Also, it sought to distance itself from violence and terrorism in the name of Islam.300

The SPIOR is invited to certain municipal meetings, but also approaches the municipality when it perceives a need for it. There is structural contact between the SPIOR and the municipality, but this is influenced by the political colour of the municipal council. The vision of the debate on integration held by the previous council of Liveable Rotterdam, differed greatly from that of the SPIOR and the current city council. Moreover, the perception that some members of Liveable Rotterdam held of Muslims and articulated in the public and political debate was not very positive.

The relation between the umbrella organisations and the municipality involves a constant search for balance between the interests of the different parties. The politics of the council always play an important role in the consultations between the SPIOR and the municipality. The SPIOR takes the position that being Muslim does not rule out being a Dutch citizen and a Rotterdammer. The emphasis is on active citizenship and participation; Islam and the cultural background of the organisations and their members are a starting point.

Around election time, SPIOR and other Muslim and immigrant groups organise information meetings about the elections and the candidates.

Muslim Participation in Civil Society

The national concern about the civic participation of ethnic minorities is mirrored by the municipal government of Rotterdam. Active citizenship is believed to improve the social cohesion and economics of the city.

A representative of the district council explained the tools the district council uses to involve the inhabitants in the area, in order to encourage people to participate and increase the feeling among inhabitants that they do have influence over their surroundings and control over important aspects of their own lives. At the time of the interview, the representative had been working to create networks between the chairmen of Muslim organisations in the area. The initiative was still in a very early stage.

Young guys, between 25 and 35 years. For example, they’ll get together four times a year. On two such occasions, they’ll just drink tea and chat. Then they’ll get media training and a later training in meeting skills, for example. The point is that they know where to find each other when they need each other, that they have a strong network.

Muslim organisations across Europe could benefit from this type of support by local, experienced and trained politicians to enable them to establish professional and effective organisations and networks.

A large majority of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents to the Foundations questionnaire were not involved in social activism. Almost 8 per cent of the Muslim respondents stated that they actively participated in activities at school in the last year that were based on mixed-background participants. None of the Muslim respondents indicated having taken part in school activities based on their own religion. Among the non-Muslim group, the proportion was 6 per cent, and 2 per cent reported having participated in a religious activity at the school. This can be explained by the fact that there are more Christian schools (with Christian celebrations such as Christmas in which the parents participate), while there are no Muslim schools in Feijenoord, and therefore no specific Muslim activities at the schools.

Of the Muslim respondents 7 per cent had been involved in ethnic and religious mixed youth activities, and 2 per cent were active in religiously oriented youth activities in their own group. Of the non-Muslims, 10 per cent were involved in mixed youth activities and 1 per cent in religiously oriented youth activities. Of the Muslim respondents, 8 per cent had played an active role in a religious activity based on their own religion or ethnicity. Of the non-Muslim respondents, 5 per cent were engaged in activities in their own religious group. None were involved in mixed religious activities. (See Figures 11a. and 11b.)
Figure 11a. In past 12 months, have you taken active part in running youth activities?

Source: Open Society Foundations

Figure 11b. In past 12 months, have you taken active part in running any religious activities?

Source: Open Society Foundations
Very few respondents were involved in political activism, like human rights activities, unions or signing petitions. Non-Muslims were more likely to be involved in voluntary activities connected with social welfare issues and community organisations.

**Figure 11c. In the past 12 months, have you played a role in a social welfare organisation or activity?**

![Bar chart showing participation in social welfare organisations or activities by Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents.]

Source: Open Society Foundations

During group interviews with young Muslim adults, women said that they did feel that they should be more involved in volunteer work in their local area. Specifically, they mentioned that they felt they should be more involved in caring for the elderly and in women’s organisations that help immigrant women with the Dutch language and finding their way through the Dutch bureaucracy. However, they stated that they were too busy with work and/or children to be able to spare the time.

**10.5 Participation of Women**

Since 2002 the emancipation of non-native women has featured prominently as a policy issue. An advisory board, the Commission on the Participation of Women of Ethnic Minorities (Participatie Vrouwen Etnische Minderheden, PAVEM) was

---

301 M. de Gruiter and N. Boonstra, *Allochtoone vrouwen doen mee! Eerste generatie vrouwen in Rotterdam en hun perspectief van activering* (Immigrant women join in! First-generation women in Rotterdam and their perspective on activation), SPR/Verweij Jonker Instituut, 2007 (hereafter De Gruiter and Boonstra, *Allochtoone vrouwen doen mee*).
established in 2003–2005, in which the Crown Princess Maxima (an Argentine immigrant) was strongly involved. Its policies were aimed at the participation of non-native women in a wide range of social fields in order to increase their self-reliance and their chances of becoming economically independent and to counter isolation as well as facilitate their access to the labour market.

One of the initiatives in Rotterdam and five other municipalities to stimulate the civic participation of immigrant women is called “1001 Force” (1001 Kracht), introduced in March 2007. The government set a target that the civic participation of women from ethnic minorities should be increased substantially within three years. The women are encouraged, with individual guidance, to take part in voluntary activities at schools or in community centres, or are helped to find paid employment.

In 2007, a survey was conducted by the Rotterdam Social Platform (Social Platform Rotterdam–SPR) among 460 first-generation immigrant women about their perceptions of participation and wishes to participate in their local area. The survey was conducted in four neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, including Afrikaanderwijk. Students with an immigrant background (second-generation) conducted the interviews. They found that the elderly Turkish and Moroccan women had a greater potential to remain isolated and inactive in neighbourhood activities than Surinamese women. The students also felt that the isolation of Turkish and Moroccan women was difficult to break through, as these women in many cases answered that they wanted to participate in activities with a small group of friends only.

Analysis of the data collected by the SPR shows that of all the ethnic groups, Turkish women had the least knowledge of the Dutch language. The Moroccan women had a moderate knowledge compared with the Turkish women on the one hand, and Surinamese and Antillean women, on the other, who had the best Dutch. This corresponds with national numbers. The results from the survey further showed that Turkish women had the highest level of reciprocity, meaning that they could rely on other women of the same ethnic background for help, for example to borrow an ingredient for a cooking recipe or to talk to someone about their problems, due to their local network. Of the Surinamese and Antillean women, 80 per cent reported being involved in neighbourhood activities, but only 33 per cent of the Moroccan women were engaged with their neighbourhoods. In Afrikaanderwijk, the total percentage of


303 See the description of the programme at http://www.kiemnet.nl/dossiers/socialecohesie/Arbeidsparticipatie/PaVEM-Pagina_1016.html (accessed August 2010).

women who stated that they wanted to participate more in neighbourhood activities was much higher, at 71 percent, than the average for all four neighbourhoods, which was 55 per cent.\(^{305}\)

The Turkish women appeared mostly oriented toward their own ethnic group, and had less contact with other ethnic groups than other immigrant groups. Although they do participate in neighbourhood activities, they are usually not involved in the organisation of these activities. Moroccan women most often stated that they wanted to be involved in school, sport or play activities for the children.

Three-quarters of the interviewed women mentioned several barriers to neighbourhood participation. Most often, obligations toward home and family were mentioned as causing a lack of time. However, health problems were also cited. Turkish women in particular stated that their bad health prevented them from participating. Limited knowledge of the Dutch language was also mentioned. In only a few cases was the fear of gossip about their outside activities, objections by spouses or religion mentioned as a barrier.

The better the knowledge of the Dutch language was among the interviewees, the greater the willingness to participate in neighbourhood activities. Also, many Turkish and Moroccan women feel very insecure, partly because of their lack of education and partly because of the cultural differences between them and the institutions that organise the activities.

There are several initiatives and organisations active in encouraging emancipation and civic participation of first-generation Muslim and other immigrant women. The SPIOR organises activities, lectures and courses on a regular basis. The civil initiative Learning and Meeting Project for Women (Leer- en Ontmoetingsproject voor Vrouwen, LOV) organises private language lessons at home and stimulates interaction between native and immigrant women. This project started as a voluntary initiative in 1991 when native Dutch women started to give private language lessons to immigrant women by going to their houses once a week for a full year. This one-to-one approach, where immigrant women not only learn the language but where women learn from each other’s cultures and history, has grown into a professional organisation, funded by the city districts and the Youth, Education and Society Service (Dienst, Jeugd, Onderwijs en Samenleving, JOS). Over 130 volunteers and immigrant women in Rotterdam commit to the weekly meetings.\(^{306}\)

\(^{305}\) De Gruiter and Boonstra, *Allochtone vrouwen doen mee!*, p. 69.

\(^{306}\) See the programme’s website at http://www.lovrotterdam.nl (accessed August 2010).
11. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

How Muslims and Islam are represented in the media reflects society’s attitudes toward them, and also shapes the space for their political, social and cultural participation. The debates in the media contribute to the discussion of social cohesion and integration.

This chapter begins by examining views and perceptions of reporting about Muslims and Islam by the media in the Netherlands. It also looks at the extent to which Muslims work in the media, highlighting some of the initiatives that are being taken to increase diversity. It explores the trends in media usage, including print, television and Internet media.

11.1 Islam in the Media

The report by the Scientific Bureau for Government Policy (WRR), *Identificatie met Nederland* (“Identification with the Netherlands”) (see also Chapter 4) pays special attention to the role the media play in supporting or undermining immigrants’ sense of identification and social connection with the Netherlands.\(^{307}\) It stresses the need for careful and precise use of language. A blunt division between “native” and “immigrant” is often counter-productive. It recommends that government and media should ensure that their language is relevant to the context and that reference to the status of immigrant or minority is only made when necessary. For example, a person’s spoken language is often more relevant than whether their parents were born in Morocco. The report also points out the lack of immigrant representation in the media. Immigrants are talked about but they are not invited to the media discussions or featured as experts in news items.\(^{308}\)

Research in the Netherlands also shows that native Dutch commentators and opinion makers dominate the debate on Islam, and that Dutch researchers and politicians are interviewed about issues concerning Islam or Muslims before Turkish or Moroccan specialists.\(^{309}\)

In 2006 a survey was conducted in Rotterdam among a representative sample of Turkish, Moroccan and native Dutch young people between 18 and 30 years of age. The survey included a question about the way young people experienced the media’s

---

\(^{307}\) WRR, *Identificatie met Nederland*, p. 143.


reporting on Turks, Moroccans and Muslims. A majority of the 650 young Muslims viewed the reporting on Islam and Muslims in the media as negative. Of the Turkish respondents, 57 per cent experienced the reporting on their ethnic group and on Muslims as negative and 40 per cent experienced the reporting as neutral. Among the Moroccan respondents, these percentages were 77 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. Of the Dutch comparison group, 47 per cent felt that the reporting on Turks, Moroccans and Muslims was negative, and 51 per cent felt it was neutral. Almost none of the respondents answered “positive”.

A 2009 report on the Netherlands by of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) states that:

> Since ECRI’s second report, most information on the presence of stigmatising or unbalanced reporting in the Netherlands in the areas covered by ECRI’s mandate has concerned the portrayal of the Muslim communities. These communities are widely reported to have been the subject of generalisations and frequent associations with terrorism in both print and broadcast media. Although, as noted in ECRI’s second report, codes of media self-regulation are in place, they are reported to be rarely applied in practice.

However, other research finds that a more nuanced view on media coverage of Islam and Muslims can also be found. An analysis of newspaper articles of the month after 9/11 found that as well as the articles dealing with terrorism and Afghanistan or the Taliban, there were also a large number that aimed to increase knowledge about Muslims and Islam among readers and the general population.

In 2006, a longitudinal research analysis was published with a focus on the reporting on Islam and Muslims in the widely read national newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad* (*AD*) for the period 1998–2005, up until two months after the murder of Theo van Gogh. The researchers conclude that the reporting on Islam was fairly balanced. However, in a time of crisis such as the period after this murder, journalists reported more negatively on Muslims. Polarisation prompted by particular events seems to be a

---

310 Entzinger and Dourleijn, *De lat steeds hoger*, p. 72.
311 Entzinger and Dourleijn, *De lat steeds hoger*, p. 73.
clear tendency. The bulk of the research, however, shows that journalists report more negatively on Islam abroad than on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. In reporting on Muslim or Islam-related stories within the Netherlands, Dutch journalists tend to allow several actors to speak from different points of view. For similar news stories from abroad, journalists rely more on information from press agencies and provide less contextual and background information. This reporting is also marked by more frequent use of stereotypes and less attention paid to different opinions, so that Muslims are represented as a homogeneous group. Reporting on Islam in the Netherlands in the *AD* seems more balanced in part because of a section where Muslim and native readers have a discussion through letters, based on topic statements posed by the paper’s editors. Moreover, a quiz brought to light that there was little knowledge among natives about Islam, so that in the following weeks a separate section of the newspaper was dedicated to Islam.

The research found that Muslim women were very poorly represented in the debates on Islam. Only 7 per cent of the participants were female, whereas apart from organisations, over half of the sources were male. Reporting on Islam is still often triggered by negative events, such as terrorism, violence and fundamentalism, which have a stigmatising effect. The identity of the actors in the media coverage is mostly in religious terms as “Muslims”. This term has become an ethnic as well as religious marker in the past years.

The difference between the ways in which the debate on issues associated with Islam takes place online on web forums and offline in a major newspaper has also been studied, with the case of the debates on honour-related violence in the Netherlands. Although the online debate is more accessible to ordinary citizens, the analysis shows that there was in fact less diversity of participants in the online debate than in the debate held in the newspaper. The participants were also predominantly natives on a non-native web forum like maroc.nl. The variety of perspectives was larger online than in the newspaper. At the same time, the online debate was more strongly polarised between “us” and “them” statements. The openness of the internet as a medium does not necessarily lead to a more inclusive debate.

### 11.2 Muslims’ Involvement in the Media

The editorial staff of the national newspapers in the Netherlands is predominantly native Dutch. Only 2 per cent of some 14,000 employed Dutch journalists are of

---

316 D’Haenens and Brink, “Islam in de Nederlandse media”, p. 357.
317 T. Witschge, “In- en uitsluiting in het online publieke debat. De discussie over eerwraak” (Inclusion and exclusion in the online public debate. The discussion about honour killings), *Migrantentudies* 1, 2008.
immigrant origin. The make-up of those working in the print media does not reflect the multicultural nature of Dutch society. Research suggests that little will change in the coming years. However, editors are well aware of the benefits of a more diverse staff in terms of reporting on ethnic minority groups, access to these groups and the possibility of drawing a new audience to the newspaper. They state that it is difficult to find journalists with an immigrant background.

Indeed, the study of journalism is not very popular among non-native students. Only 5.7 per cent of the students studying journalism at HBO level (see Chapter 5) are of non-native descent. The relative absence of Muslim journalists in Dutch media is often explained by reference to the alleged low social status of the profession among these groups. However, in the UK the BBC has succeeded in increasing the percentage of Muslim journalists to 9 per cent. Editors expect that diversity will come in time with the increasing numbers of non-native students at the higher educational levels.

While there is a slow increase in the number of immigrant students entering journalism school at the HBO level, they also remain significantly under-represented in journalism courses at universities. Moreover, the number of vacancies for journalists in daily newspapers is very low. Although editors state that a journalist of non-native descent would be preferred when compared to equally qualified Dutch competitors, the willingness to indeed create a more diverse journalistic environment can be questioned.

11.3 Initiatives to Increase Diversity in the Local Media

A report looking at Dutch media policy and cultural diversity between 1999 and 2008, based on research commissioned by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, found that the broadcasting networks have good intentions, but need to be pushed further to ensure that cultural and ethnic diversity are mainstreamed into their programmes.

319 W. Shadid, “Sensationalistic journalism”.
321 Deuze, *Journalists in the Netherlands*.
322 S. Bink, *Niet stigmatiseren maar stimuleren. In- en doorgroei van allochtone studenten in het hoger onderwijs* (Don’t stigmatise them but stimulate them. Immigrant students in higher education), Mira Media, Utrecht, 2005.
323 W. Shadid, “Sensationalistic journalism”.
The policy of the city council of Rotterdam is that all inhabitants of Rotterdam should take an active part in society. In January 2008, three media organisations for local television and radio signed a declaration at the city hall, in the presence of the Aldermen of Culture and Participation, in which they stated their willingness to cooperate with each other. In the memo “Local media and urban citizenship”, the city council takes urban citizenship as a starting point and stresses that regardless of the multiplicity of identities and loyalties, being a Rotterdamer should bind all inhabitants of the city together. Taking the heterogeneity of cultural and religious immigrant groups into account, the council wants to play a part in strengthening facilitating access to the forums where city inhabitants can interact, are given a voice, and can be heard. The municipal policy concerning local media relates to radio and television.

11.4 Media as Source of Information

The SCP has studied various aspects of the daily life of immigrants in the larger cities of the Netherlands. Their reports include non-Western immigrants’ media usage. The research finds that most immigrants are not exclusively oriented toward the country of heritage, but use the Dutch media frequently. They read Dutch newspapers, watch Dutch television channels and use the Internet. Of all non-native immigrant groups, Turks’ and Moroccans’ media usage differs the most from that of the native Dutch. They often rely on newspapers and television channels from the home country, and Turks in particular watch Turkish television via satellite.

National Newspapers

Nationally the proportion of those who read a newspaper on a daily basis or at least five times a week is lower among the Turkish and Moroccan population (30 per cent and 34 per cent respectively) than among the native Dutch (57 per cent) or Surinamese (52 per cent) and Antilleans (45 per cent). Often, Turks and Moroccans do not read newspapers at all. These differences can largely be explained by the differences between the five groups in age (immigrants being younger, especially Moroccans), gender, education and competence in reading Dutch.

Among the Turks in the Netherlands, some 20 per cent read Dutch and Turkish newspapers at least once a week, 39 per cent exclusively read Dutch newspapers and 8 per cent exclusively Turkish. Among Moroccans, the percentage that reads exclusively Moroccan newspapers or reads both Moroccan and Dutch newspapers is negligible. Of the Moroccans, 36 per cent read a newspaper less than once a week. Among the

328 Broek and Keuzenkamp, Het dagelijks leven van allochto ne stedelingen, p. 125.
Turkish this is 34 per cent and among the Dutch natives it is 20 per cent. The SCP concludes that, with the exception of first-generation Turks, immigrants with characteristics comparable with Dutch people in age, education and mastery of the language read Dutch newspapers as much as natives. The SCP reports do not distinguish which newspapers they read, and whether they read the free newspapers or the established daily papers.

**Newspaper Reading of Turkish and Moroccan Youths in Rotterdam**

The survey among Turkish, Moroccan and Dutch youths in Rotterdam shows that Turkish and Moroccan young people read more newspapers in 2006 than they did in 1999. This can be explained by the fact that there are now several free newspapers available (*Metro*, *Spits*, *De Dag*, *De Pers*) that are easily accessible at train stations, post offices and some shops. The 2006 survey found that among those aged 18–30 years, a higher proportion of Turkish (31 per cent) and Moroccan respondents (40 per cent) read Dutch newspapers on a daily basis compared with native Dutch (27 per cent).

As for reading non-Dutch newspapers, in the 1999 survey 27 per cent of the Turkish newspaper readers were found to read predominantly or exclusively Turkish newspapers. Among the Moroccans, this figure was only 8 per cent. The low percentage of Moroccans reading Moroccan newspapers can be explained by the fact that many do not read Arabic well. In 2006 the percentages of Turkish and Moroccan respondents reading predominantly Turkish or Moroccan newspapers had gone down to 14 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively. The majority stated that they exclusively read Dutch newspapers.

**National Television**

Television is the most used information source among all ethnic groups. Turks and Moroccans spend some two hours and 45 minutes in front of the television each day. Natives on average watch half an hour less per day. Because of the language barrier, Turks and Moroccans watch different channels. They spend slightly less time watching the public channels than natives and watch the commercial channels far less than natives. Viewing of local channels decreases with an increase in education. The choice often reflects language needs. The preference for local channels is greatest among those who are least fluent in the Dutch language.

The 2006 survey of Dutch, Moroccan and Turkish youths found access to satellite television channels was different: 83 per cent of Turkish respondents stated that they

---

331 Enrizinger and Dourleijn, *De lat steeds hoger*, p. 67.
owned (or had access to, family-owned) a satellite dish to watch Turkish television. In the Moroccan population this was 68 per cent. The research suggests that language could be a factor in the differences between the two groups, as many Moroccans speak Berber languages and have difficulties understanding Arabic.

National Internet Usage

All four large immigrant groups use the computer less often than natives do. The percentages are lowest among Turks and Moroccans, corresponding with a lower level of computer ownership. Online, few immigrants focus exclusively on their own ethnic group. Of the four large immigrant groups, the Turks are most oriented toward their own ethnic group when online.334

The 2006 survey in Rotterdam shows a different picture. Moroccan young people in Rotterdam focus more, but not exclusively, on websites catering for their own ethnic group (24 per cent) than Turks do (12 per cent). Websites with a focus on Islam were consulted by 14 per cent of the Turks and by 16 per cent of the Moroccans. Among the native respondents, 6 per cent occasionally visited Islamic websites. Among Turkish and Moroccan youth access to the Internet was less frequent than among natives in the same age group. One-quarter of the Moroccan respondents did not have access to the Internet, while 18 per cent of the Turkish respondents reported not having access to the Internet. Among the Dutch respondents, the percentage was negligible. About 20 per cent of the Turks and 35 per cent of the Moroccans who had access to the Internet were online once a week at most, while among the Dutch respondents, this figure was 8 per cent. All three groups used the internet predominantly for emailing and chatting, followed by reading the news and looking at work- or education-related websites. While both Turks and natives listed lifestyle, music and film as additional reasons to be online, the Moroccans rated lifestyle and Islamic websites below websites for Moroccans in the Netherlands.

11.5 Muslim Media and Other Media Sources Used by Muslims

In the early 1960s, the public broadcasting channels began broadcasting the first programmes for ethnic minorities. The first Islamic broadcasting station, the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation (Islamitische Omroepstichting), was founded in 1986, but it ceased broadcasting in 1993. In that year the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Organisation was founded (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep). Since 2005 this broadcasting network has shared its broadcasting time with the New Islamic Broadcasting Network (Nieuwe

334 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 68
335 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 68.
336 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 68.
337 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 71.
338 Entzinger and Dourleijn, De laat steeds hoger, p. 71.
Islamitische Omroep), which is the voice of the Consultative Structure for Muslims and Government (Overlegorgaan Moslims en Overheid). Conflicts between the two broadcasters regularly make the news. Both stations are part of the public broadcasting system, and are part of the group made up of church societies or societies based on a philosophy of life, the so-called 39f broadcasts.

In September 2007, the Commission for Media required the two to work together and create a partnership called the Foundation for Islamic Broadcasting Provision (SVIZ, Stichting Verzorging Islamitische Zendtijd), which was given the broadcasting slot for Islamic programming in the Netherlands until 1 September 2010. The two broadcasting networks divide the 52 hours of television and 200 hours of radio that are allocated to Islamic programming. They hold responsibility for their own programmes. As of August 2010, the Commission for Media decided not to renew the licence for this partnership.

Besides media based on religious affiliation, there are media based on shared identity, such as the Turkish online monthly magazine called The Time (Zaman), a Dutch edition of the widely read Turkish daily newspaper of the same name. The director of the Time Media Group producing this paper is a former Christian Democrat member of the City Council of Rotterdam, a Turkish Muslim himself. The Time Media Group targets Dutch Muslims and native Dutch. It aims to take a bridging position in order to stimulate dialogue, participation and cohesion.

Many young people in Rotterdam listen to the radio channel FunX, which specifically targets urban youth and has cultural diversity and urban identity as its trademark. Apart from playing music that appeals to urban youths, topics related to youth culture and its diversity are discussed in an informal manner that appeals to youth.340

340 See the radio station’s website at http://www.funx.nl (accessed August 2010).
12. Conclusion

Muslims in Rotterdam are part of a multi-ethnic, multicultural society. Indeed, the second generation of Muslims in Rotterdam has not known anything but a multi-ethnic environment. Still, there are some important challenges to integration and the inclusion of Muslims. Identity and belonging are important elements. Concerns of Muslims in Rotterdam revolve around issues of belonging and identity, and inclusion and equality, as well as challenges connected with participation and urban citizenship.

A sense of inclusion and a belief that society offers equal opportunities to success and wellbeing are preconditions for shaping a willingness to take an active part in society. In Rotterdam, as in other parts of the country, identification with the Netherlands and what actually defines Dutch identity have been topics of vigorous political debates over the past years.

The identification of immigrants with the Netherlands is considered to be of prime importance for social cohesion and active citizenship, which are both high on the political agenda. At the same time, it is important to understand the specific needs of groups and the relevance of religion as an important marker of identity. Building cohesion among minority and majority groups must include the key aim of fostering a sense of citizenship and belonging. Local politics and local politicians have had a great influence on the debate on Islam in Rotterdam and the Netherlands and on feelings of acceptance and inclusion. Rotterdam was the first municipality in the Netherlands to implement an immigration policy and has a long history of dialogue and cooperation with Muslim organisations, notably the SPIOR.

The creation of a common public sphere offers a greater sense of inclusion and there is growing recognition of the importance of building cohesion through contact and interaction between people of different ethnic, cultural, religious and social groups. In Rotterdam, organisations such as the RORAVOLERE, the Foundation for Islam and Dialogue, the SPIOR and others as well as annual events such as the Day of Dialogue and cultural festivals play an important role in stimulating open debate and mutual understanding.

While the municipal policies, together with established and new organisations, provide an infrastructure which allows Muslims to set up organisations, seek information and advice and apply for financial support for civil activities, the findings of this report indicate that the polemical nature of much of the discourse on Muslims in the Netherlands has had an adverse influence on feelings of inclusion among Muslims. The interviewees indicated that the level of religious prejudice has increased over the past five years.

At the local level, Muslims and non-Muslims share similar concerns. At the national level, however, there are feelings of exclusion and discrimination. Over half of the Muslim interviewees stated they did not want to be perceived as Dutch. Interviewees clarified this answer by saying that they did not feel a need to assimilate, that they felt
cosmopolitan or that the feelings of exclusion and not being accepted by the dominant society played a role.

At the levels of the neighbourhood and city, Muslims in Feijenoord have a fairly strong sense of belonging. The ethnic diversity of the area, the perceived social cohesion and the presence of local facilities contribute to a pleasant living environment for both Muslims and non-Muslims. While a number of Muslims who were interviewed experienced discrimination, it was not particular to the local area. More generally, Muslims felt that their religion and ethnic background made it more difficult for them to be included by the dominant culture than non-Muslims. In their view, they continued to be perceived as foreign no matter what level of integration they achieved. Moreover, more Muslims than non-Muslims expressed their wish not to be perceived as “native”. However, the extent to which the perceptions of being excluded count toward the feeling of not wanting to be included in the dominant culture needs to be studied in more depth.

The need to combat discrimination is recognised by political institutions and the police force, and efforts are made through public policies to convey a clear message of acceptance and responsibility to the wider society.

Discrimination has undesirable economic, social and political consequences. The city council of Rotterdam is aware of the short- and long-term costs and is committed to counteract discrimination and to create equal opportunities for all the different groups. Still, much remains to be done to achieve this goal. Feelings of exclusion and unequal treatment were most strongly felt in relation to education and employment. Muslims shared experiences of discrimination at schools, both in the behaviour of teachers and in the selection procedures. Muslims felt that their children were given unequal chances compared with other children at the end of primary school when children receive advice about their secondary education.

The renewal of the educational system of the VMBO and MBO in Rotterdam shapes educational opportunities for many disadvantaged youngsters, and could serve as an example for other municipalities that face similar challenges in terms of high drop-out rates from schools and low educational achievement. The data from empirical studies show that opportunities in education are strongly influenced by the socio-economic background of families, which determine a child’s chances for a successful education.

The socio-economic position of many Muslims in Rotterdam is reflected in their housing situation and their concentration in certain urban districts and neighbourhoods. Urban renewal projects in Rotterdam are directed at improving housing conditions and decreasing the concentration of poverty in such areas. A point of concern for both Muslims and other ethnic-minority groups in Feijenoord was the perception of unequal access to better housing. Muslims expressed dissatisfaction with and distrust of the local social housing services.
Feelings of deprivation, exclusion and a threatened identity can lead to tensions and conflict in the city. The police force in Rotterdam has taken positive steps toward creating links with communities in neighbourhoods such as those in Feijenoord. The district council of Feijenoord recognises that individuals need to feel control over their lives in order to be involved in their area and to be willing to take responsibility. Increasing social ties through networks is an important tool for encouraging this type of civic involvement and feelings of inclusion in the political and societal structure. There are important positive initiatives taking place in Rotterdam and in Feijenoord, where the district council invests in creating strong networks among Muslim organisations and offering training in organisational skills.

While the municipal services and local politicians still have mistrust to overcome, the findings of this report show that Muslims feel they can influence local decision-making. This was reflected in the higher voter turnout rates among immigrants in Rotterdam at the last municipal elections, which was a positive sign of greater civic participation among immigrants in Rotterdam.

Media use by Muslims in the Netherlands is increasing, including reading the Dutch daily newspapers. However, the participation of Muslims as well as other minority groups in the media as journalists and reporters is very low. When journalists report on issues surrounding Islam, they consult Muslims less frequently than non-Muslims. Muslims are also only consulted when the subject is related to Islam, and not as mainstream specialists on other subjects. This can add to stereotyping and feelings of exclusion.

The data presented in this research point to several concerns that are of prime importance to Muslim and non-Muslim groups in Rotterdam and offer a number of recommendations which may serve the process of the greater inclusion of Muslims in Rotterdam as citizens. In addition, some of the best practices in Rotterdam are outlined here to serve as an inspiration for policy and initiatives in other multicultural cities across Europe.
13. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are aimed at local and national policymakers, Muslim communities and civil-society organisations. They reflect key findings from the report and address the need for further engagement by the Rotterdam City Council with its myriad and growing communities. At the same time, responsibility lies with communities to initiate actions and efforts which bring about change in policy, practice and behaviour. While recognising that Rotterdam offers a number of very positive practices in inclusion of its diverse communities, the report calls for policies to tackle socio-economic disadvantage and minority inclusion, so as to ensure that all groups that make up the diverse population of the city are consulted and that their specific needs are understood and accommodated.

13.1 Identity, Belonging and Interaction

1. The Rotterdam City Council and Muslim and other minority organisations should develop targeted awareness campaigns, offering accessible information about antidiscrimination legislation in the Netherlands and providing information about the public bodies and citizens’ advice bureaus to which people can report discrimination.

2. In the Open Society Foundations survey, half the Muslims interviewed said that they did not want to be seen as Dutch. Further research should be commissioned by the Dutch government and the Rotterdam City Council, as well as think tanks and academics, to explore and expand upon the data presented in this report with a view to obtaining a better understanding of ethnic, socio-economic and cultural factors which may have an impact on the findings.

3. The perception of exclusion is strong among the Muslim respondents in this report. In addition to further research on the reasons for not feeling Dutch and on experiences of discrimination, a responsibility lies with the media and public figures on how they frame the discourse on national identity and belonging. Terms are not neutral, and language matters. Public figures and the press are urged to nurture diversity and belonging to the Netherlands through language that unites rather than divides.

13.2 Education

4. Muslim civil society, in co-operation with RADAR and municipality services directed at youth, education and society (Jeugd, Onderwijs en Samenleving – JOS), should continue to build partnerships with local education departments, schools, and teacher training colleges in a bid to strengthen diversity and intercultural communication training for teachers. Such training can be important in helping teachers to encourage higher aspirations and confidence among pupils and in addressing issues of prejudice and stereotyping.
5. Civil society organisations, such as SPIOR, are encouraged to continue collaboration with Muslim organisations to raise awareness about the importance of pre-school classes in order to ensure that children start school on an equal basis, linguistically and otherwise. Such organisations can be instrumental in explaining the education system, supporting the removal of barriers to greater participation of Muslim parents in their children’s schooling and encouraging better interaction between teachers, educational establishments and pupils.

13.3 Labour Market
6. In order to identify the most effective areas, the municipality of Rotterdam should evaluate its antidiscrimination programme. Large-scale surveys about perceived and actual experiences of discrimination in the workplace and among individuals seeking apprenticeships should be included in measuring the programme’s success with a view to adjusting it where necessary.

13.4 Housing
7. Feijenoord district authorities and representatives of the eight neighbourhoods in the district should work together to develop ways to improve the local environment, including cleaner streets, litter removal and tackling antisocial behaviour. Such partnerships should also be engaged in identifying areas of concern and recommendations for policy measures for municipal and city officials.

8. Muslim communities, local authorities and welfare organisations are encouraged to build partnerships which together seek to create and strengthen publicly available spaces for youth from all backgrounds in local neighbourhoods.

13.5 Health and Social Services
9. Municipal social services should work with civic and Muslim organisations to provide more accessible information about the insurance and health-care system in order to overcome feelings of distrust.

10. Muslim organisations should be involved in the campaigns to increase sports activities among Muslim children, a difficult group to target. The Muslim organisations should use their networks and the trust they hold to inform people about the possibility of financial aid for athletic activities and the importance of a healthy lifestyle.

11. In order to better address the health status of young children and the growing need to alleviate official concerns on obesity, the district authorities and immigrant organisations should develop a joint and concerted information campaign for Muslim and migrant parents about healthy lifestyle choices for their families. This campaign should involve schools and communicate the
economic support and physical facilities available to families that aim to
decease particular health concerns among immigrant children as well as adults.

12. Recruitment policies in local medical facilities should be proactive in
employing staff from diverse immigrant backgrounds, including doctors,
nurses and administrative staff. Improved training on patients’ specific
traditions and religious requirements would enhance the delivery of health
services.

13.6 Policing and Security

13. The Open Society Foundations survey found that reporting of crimes by
Muslims is very low. As a means to better understand how to improve
reporting of crimes and increase trust in the police, an independent statutory
body and/or a non-governmental organisation, based in Rotterdam, should
commission and/or increase its research into levels and type of crimes
experienced by Muslims and ethnic minorities including racially and
religiously aggravated assaults.

14. Local Muslim and non-Muslim organisations and educational establishments
can increase the level of community trust toward the police by investing in
building strong connections with local police officers. This can be undertaken
through increased and meaningful interaction at meetings and events in
neighbourhoods offering opportunities for communities and the police to
speak to each other and to familiarise themselves with each other’s work.

13.7 Participation and Citizenship

15. The SPR should follow up its research on the civil participation of immigrant
women. By carefully mapping and researching the barriers experienced by
different groups of immigrant women, a better understanding and more
nuanced, effective policies for approaching and engaging immigrant women at
the civic and political level can be determined.

16. The education departments of districts in Rotterdam should consider
developing a mentoring scheme which partners newly arrived immigrants with
senior students in collaboration with other partners in Rotterdam. This
scheme could offer support for an extended period in order for new
immigrants to better understand Dutch culture, for greater interaction
between immigrants and the native Dutch, and improvement of language
skills, thereby enabling success in integration courses. Such schemes are also
important for wider Dutch society to obtain a better understanding of the
culture and background of immigrant communities.
13.8 Media

17. Individuals and public figures with a Muslim background should not only be engaged or consulted on Islam-based news stories but should also be asked to express their views on all stories relating to Dutch society, both locally and nationally, which have an impact on their lives as Dutch citizens or residents.

18. Public broadcasting corporations and programme and policymakers should improve their diversity policies for recruiting and promoting ethnic-minority staff, especially locally.

19. The local media should reach out to young people from all ethnic backgrounds to better inform them about careers in the media and develop their interest through informal experiences in the world of journalism and the media, such as visits to local media companies (television, radio and print media). Greater involvement can be developed through competitions and awards for youths to be held by local broadcasting organisations, local newspapers and/or well-known national public broadcasting or news agencies.

20. In order to change the negative and stereotypical image of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands, Muslim communities should strengthen the position and capacity of their own media outlets. As well as enabling them to preserve religious and cultural practices that are important to their identity, proactive engagement through minority and with mainstream media can be a stride toward improving current portrayals of Muslims and directly challenging negative discourse on inclusion.
ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

In English


### In Dutch

**Books and articles**


Crul, M. *De sleutel tot succes. Over hulp, keuzes en kansen in de schoolloopbaan van Turkse en Marokkaanse jongeren van de tweede generatie* (On help, choices and opportunities in the educational career of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan youth). Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 2000.


RADAR. *Discriminatie op school; een belevingsonderzoek* (Discrimination in school; research on experiences). Rotterdam-Rijnmond: RADAR, 2005.


ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY


Witschge, T. “In- en uitsluiting in het online publieke debat. De discussie over eerwraak” (Inclusion and exclusion in the online public debate. The discussion about honour killings), Migrantenstudies 1 (2008), pp. 7–22.

Laws / Acts


Wet op Primair Onderwijs (Act on Primary Education), art. 50 and 51.

Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek (Act on Special measures for urban problems), better known as the Rotterdamwet (Rotterdam Act).

National Dutch Daily Newspapers


Trouw. “Kansrijk neemt kansarm op sleeptouw” (Privileged take underprivileged along). 28 February 2009.

Trouw. “Kinderen trekken zich aan elkaar op. Rotterdamse school herbergt 30 procent kansarme en 70 procent kansrijke leerlingen” (Children level up to one another. School in Rotterdam has 30 per cent underprivileged children and 70 per cent privileged children). 9 March 2009.

Government and municipal reports

National


Rotterdam

College van B & W Rotterdam (Council of Major and Aldermen). “Nota Migranten in Rotterdam” (Note on Migrants in Rotterdam). Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.


2003


2004

Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (Centre for Research and Statistics, COS) « Sociale Integratie… en de islam in Rotterdam. Feiten, teksten en publicaties over de islam en moslims in Rotterdam” (Social integration … in Rotterdam’s Islam. Circumstances, texts and publications about Muslims in Rotterdam) (Islam in Rotterdam series), by K. Canatan and D. Linders. June.


2005

College van B & W Rotterdam (Council of Major and Aldermen). “Meedoen of achterblijven. Actieprogramma tegen radicalisering en voor kansen voor Rotterdammers” (Participate or stay behind. Action programme against radicalisation and for opportunities for Rotterdammers). Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam, 4 February.

2006


College van B & W Rotterdam (Council of Major and Aldermen). “Kadernota Stadsburgerschap: het motto is meedoen” (General policy note on urban citizenship: the motto is participation). Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam, April.

COS. “Factsheet Overgewicht en Leefstijl” (Factsheet on Obesity and Lifestyle). November.

COS. “Feijenoord in Beeld 2006” (A picture of Feijenoord 2006).

Gemeente Rotterdam. «Feitenkaart Participatie 2007» (Factsheet on participation 2007).

2008


COS. “Feitenkaart Bevolkingsmonitor 1e kwartaal 2008” (Factsheet population monitor, first trimester 2008).


COS. “Feitenkaart inkomensgegevens Rotterdam op deelgemeente- en buurtniveau 2005” (Factsheet of income information for Rotterdam at the city district and neighbourhood level 2005”. August.

Gemeente Rotterdam. “Lokale Media en Stadsburgerschap” (Local media and urban citizenship). February.

JOS. “Jeugdmonitor Rotterdam, rapportage 2008” (Youth monitor for Rotterdam, report 2008).

ANNEX 2. LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

Academic

W. Achbari, PhD student, University of Amsterdam / University of Edinburgh
Prof. Dr A. Akgunduz, director of Islamic University Rotterdam (IUR)
Dr M. Maussen, University of Amsterdam / IMES
Prof. Dr R. Penninx, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES)
Prof. Dr J. Rath, University of Amsterdam / IMES
Prof. Dr W. Shadid, University of Tilburg

Policy / Council / District Council

Robbert Baruch, (former) member of district council board of Feijenoord, Labour Party, Rotterdam
Frank Lenferink, Policy Adviser at the Rotterdam Police Force
Ahmed Mokhtari, Policymaker, Rotterdam IJsselmonde
Willem Tuinman, Senior Policy Adviser for the Rotterdam Municipal Administration (Bestuursdienst Rotterdam)
Chris de Vries, Researcher at COS

NGOs / Organisations

Zorica Majic, senior adviser at the Centre for Civil Development – Stimulans, Rotterdam
Fatih Ozbazi, director of Het Centrum, after-school homework and mentorship programme, Rotterdam
Marion Schachtschabel, project director in Feijenoord for the Learning and Meeting project for Women (Leer- en Ontmoetingsproject voor Vrouwen, LOV), Rotterdam
Rita Schriemer, researcher at RADAR, Rotterdam
Cyriel Triesscheijn, director of RADAR, Rotterdam
Marianne Vorthoren, policy officer at SPIOR, Rotterdam

Interviewees preferring to remain anonymous

General practitioner (GP) in Feijenoord, Rotterdam
Primary schoolteacher physical education at a primary school in Feijenoord
School social worker and trainer at an MBO school in Rotterdam
Schoolteacher religious education and coach/trainer at an MBO school in Rotterdam
Youth drop-out coach at an MBO school in Rotterdam
ANNEX 3. LIST OF ORGANISATIONS IN ROTTERDAM

Antidiscrimination agencies
Rotterdam Anti-Discrimination Action Council (Rotterdamse Anti-Discriminatie Actie Raad – RADAR)
Mailing address: Postbus 1812, 3000 BV Rotterdam
Visitor address: Grotekerkplein 5, Rotterdam
Tel: +31 (0) 10 4113911
Email: info@radar.nl

Umbrella organisations and expert organisations
Centre for Civic Development, CMO Stimulans (Centrum voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, CMO, Stimulans)
Graaf Florisstraat 41-43
3021 CC Rotterdam
Tel: 010 433 19 11
Fax: 010 4331170
e-mail: info@cmo-stimulans.nl

Foundation Islam and Dialogue (Stichting Islam and Dialoog)
Rochussenstr. 221–223
3021 NT Rotterdam
Tel: +31 (0) 10 2400015
Fax: +31 (0) 10 2400018
Email: info@islamendialoog.nl

Foundation Platform for Islamic Organisations Rijnmond (Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond – SPIOR)
Teilingerstraat 122
3032 AW Rotterdam
Email: info@spior.nl
Tel: +31 (0) 10 4666989
Fax: +31 (0) 10 4666279

Platform for Rijnmond Immigrants (Platform Buitenlanders Rijnmond – PBR)
Grotekerkplein 5
3011GC Rotterdam
Tel: +31 (0) 10 4122057
Website: www.pbr.nu

Rotterdam Council for Philosophy of Life and Religion (Rotterdamse Raad voor Levensbeschouwing en Religie, RORAVOLERE)
Contact: J.G. Elshout
Prinses Margrietaal 19A
3051 AN Rotterdam
Tel: +31 (0) 10 4220471
Email: co.elshout@xs4all.nl

**Mosques and Muslim organisations in Rotterdam**

**Bosnian**

Isamitisch Cultureel Centrum Selam
Ebenhaëzerstraat 58 B
3083 RP Rotterdam

**Dutch**

Stichting Nederlandstalige Moslima’s ‘Dar al-Arqam”
Gerard Scholtenstraat 129
3035 SJ Rotterdam

**Indonesian**

YMAE
Merwedestraat 12
2987 CJ Ridderkerk

PPME
J. Duthilweg 154
3065 KA Rotterdam

**Moroccan**

Aboe Bakr moskee
Snellemanstraat 7
3035 WJ Rotterdam

Al Mohcinine moskee
Oranjeboomstraat 105
3071 SC Rotterdam

Al Wahda moskee
Van Eversdijkstraat 25
3083 MA Rotterdam

An Nasr moskee
Van Citterstraat 55
3022 LH Rotterdam

Essalaam Moskee
Polderlaan 84C
3074 MH Rotterdam

Marokkaanse Culturele Vereniging Oude Westen
Kogelvangerstraat 12
3014 ZP Rotterdam
Marokkaanse Islamitische Vereniging Schiedam  
Westfrankelandstraat 15–17  
3117 AJ Schiedam

Stichting voor Vernieuwing en Participatie  
Putseplein 28  
3073 HT Rotterdam

Marokkaanse Vereniging Centrum Noord  
Vijverhofstraat 86  
3032 BC Rotterdam

Stichting Islamitische Errahmane Moskee  
Middenmolensingel 14  
2912 PD Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel

Othman moskee  
Boezemdwarsstraat 1  
3034 EP Rotterdam

Vereniging Etaouhid  
Schietbaanlaan 100A  
3021 LN Rotterdam

**Pakistani**

Stichting Masjid Ghausia  
Boulevardstraat 57  
3073 ZA Rotterdam

Pakistan Islamic Centre  
's Gravendijkwal 46  
3014 ED Rotterdam

Pakistan Welfare Uitvaart Society  
Spanjaardstraat 144-A  
3025 TX Rotterdam

Stichting Ghausia Jongeren Welzijn  
Boulevardstraat 57  
3073 ZA Rotterdam

Stichting Minhajulquran Holland  
Polslandstraat 13  
3081 TK Rotterdam

Stichting Medina  
Heer Arnoldstraat 71  
3073 KC Rotterdam
Palestinian
Stichting Palestijnen Islamieten In Nederland
Willem Buytewechstraat 99A
3024 XB Rotterdam

Somali
SICUN
Riederare 15
2993 XH Barendrecht
Stichting Dar-al-Hijra
Putselaan 223 A
3072 CK Rotterdam

Surinamese
MA Shaan-E-Islam Ahli Sunnat
Aleidisstraat 31
3021 SB Rotterdam
Stichting Sjaane-Islaam
Friesestraat 41
3074 TD Rotterdam
Nederlandse Moslim Stichting
Shane Mustafa Ahle Soenna
Maastunnelplein 44
3083 EA Rotterdam

Tunisian
Stichting Het Tunesisch Forum in Nederland
Oceaan Business Centre, Unit 95
Heiman Dullaertplein 3
3024 CA Rotterdam
Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Nederland
Grote Visserijstraat 71 C
3026 CD Rotterdam

Turkish
An Nisa
Insulindestraat 236–238
3037 BK Rotterdam
Ayasofya Moskee
Mathenesseerdijk 367 B
3026 GD Rotterdam
Annex 3. List of organisations in Rotterdam

Ayasofya Jongeren
Mathenesserdijk 367 B
3026 GD Rotterdam

Vereniging Birlik
Pusteplein 25–26
3073 HT Rotterdam

Stichting Birlik
Pusteplein 24
3073 HT Rotterdam

Sportvereniging Birlik ’99
Buitendijk 110
3078 XC Rotterdam

Cemaat Un Nur
Willem Buytewechtstraat 101C
3024 XB Rotterdam

El Biruni
Insulindestraat 236
3037 BK Rotterdam

Fatih Moskee
Polderstraat 75
3074 XH Rotterdam

Jongerenvereniging Gonca
Wijkgebouw de Camelia
Putebocht 89
3073 HE Rotterdam

Merkez moskee
Duyststraat 26
3023 EE Rotterdam

Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Iskender Paşa
Insulindestraat 236
3037 BK Rotterdam

Sociaal Cultureel Islamitische Vereniging ‘Barbaros’
Dr. Schaepmanssingel 1
3118 XH Schiedam

Sultan Ahmet Moskee
Spoorsingel 31B
3033 GE Rotterdam

Stichting Anadolu
Putebocht 16A
3073 HK Rotterdam
Stichting Akyazili  
Diergaardesingel 56–58  
3014 AC Rotterdam

Stichting Furkan  
Insulindestraat 236  
3037 BK Rotterdam

Stichting Jongerencentrum Rotterdam-Zuid  
Polderstraat 75  
3074 XH Rotterdam

SAVIV  
Postbus 51025  
3007 GA Rotterdam

Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Rotterdam Noord  
Exercitiestraat 6  
3034 RA Rotterdam

Turks Cultureel Centrum Rotterdam  
Buitenhofstraat 15  
3022 PB Rotterdam

Turkse Vrouwen Vereniging Hoogvliet e.o.  
Traviataweg 51  
3194 JW Hoogvliet

Stichting Selimiye  
West Varkenoordseweg 115 a  
3074 HN Rotterdam

Vereniging ABI  
Passerelstraat 48  
3023 ZD Rotterdam

Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Geylani  
Oranjeboomstraat 95 A  
3071 HD Rotterdam

Stichting Onderwijs-Cultuur en Eenheid Nederland  
Kogelvangerstraat 59  
3014 ZN Rotterdam

Stichting Vahdet  
Mathenesserdijk 349  
3026 GD Rotterdam

Other  
Interculturele Studenten Unie (ISU)  
Vareseweg 123  
3047 AT Rotterdam
Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly-arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with challenges and opportunities. The crucial tests facing Europe’s commitment to open society will be how it treats minorities such as Muslims and ensures equal rights for all in a climate of rapidly expanding diversity.

The Open Society Foundations’ At Home in Europe project is working to address these issues through monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of Muslims and other minorities in Europe. One of the project’s key efforts is this series of reports on Muslim communities in the 11 EU cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Leicester, London, Marseille, Paris, Rotterdam, and Stockholm. The reports aim to increase understanding of the needs and aspirations of diverse Muslim communities by examining how public policies in selected cities have helped or hindered the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims.

By fostering new dialogue and policy initiatives between Muslim communities, local officials, and international policymakers, the At Home in Europe project seeks to improve the participation and inclusion of Muslims in the wider society while enabling them to preserve the cultural, linguistic, and religious practices that are important to their identities.