Globalization, educational trends and the open society

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1. Introduction

Historic changes are transforming the lives of people in the developed countries and most developing ones. National economies and even national cultures are globalizing. Globalization means more competition, not just with other companies in the same city or the same region. Globalization also means that national borders do not limit a nation’s investment, production, and innovation. Everything, including relations among family and friends, is rapidly becoming organized around a much more compressed view of space and time. Companies in Europe, the United States, and Japan can produce chips in Singapore, keypunch data in India or the Peoples’ Republic of China, out source clerical work to Ireland or Mexico, and sell worldwide, barely concerned about the long distances or the variety of cultures involved. Swatch now sells a watch that tells “Internet time,” a continuous time that is the same everywhere in the world. Even children watching television or listening to radio are re-conceptualizing their “world,” in terms of the meanings that they attach to music, the environment, sports, or race and ethnicity.

A global economy is not a world economy. That has existed since at least the sixteenth century (Braudel, 1979). Rather, a global economy is one where strategic, core activities, including innovation, finance and corporate management, function on a planetary scale on real time (Carnoy, Castells, Cohen, and Cardoso, 1993; Castells, 1996). And this globality became possible only recently because of the technological infrastructure provided by improved telecommunication networks, information systems, including the Internet, microelectronics machinery, and computerized transportation
systems. Today, as distinct from even a generation ago, capital, technology, management, information, and core markets are globalized.

Globalization together with new information technology and the innovative processes they foment are driving a revolution in the organization of work, the production of goods and services, relations among nations, and even local culture. No community is immune from the effects of this revolution. It is changing the very fundamentals of human relations and social life.

Two of the main bases of globalization are information and innovation, and they, in turn, are highly knowledge intensive. Internationalized and fast-growing information industries produce knowledge goods and services. Today’s massive movements of capital depend on information, communication, and knowledge in global markets. And because knowledge is highly portable, it lends itself easily to globalization.

If knowledge is fundamental to globalization, globalization should also have a profound impact on the transmission of knowledge. In this essay, I suggest that it does, and that its effects are felt throughout the educational system. The effects are of two kinds. The first is that globalization increases the demand for education, especially university education, and this increases pressure on the whole system for higher quality schooling, often producing perverse educational consequences, particularly from the standpoint of equity. An important question for democratic societies and societies transitioning to democracy is whether higher quality education for all is necessarily consistent with individual-centric democracy, particularly in societies marked by deeply-rooted ethnic conflicts and weak states.

1. Real time is, in entertainment parlance, “live,” meaning that information is
The second effect is that globalization produces a reaction. This reaction takes many forms, but it seems in the current historical conjuncture to be increasingly focused on ethnic-religious nationalism/regionalism. The implications of the reaction for the transmission of knowledge are also important. Ethnic-religious nationalism represents a search for an identity that is often the antithesis of globalism/internationalism and even individualism. In some cases (religious-based nationalism) it confronts the concept of globalized knowledge as interpreted by the West with a different form of globalized (universal) knowledge, namely religious fundamentalism. In other cases, it confronts globalized knowledge with localized notions of knowledge/identity.

In this paper, I outline the complexities of these issues systematically, beginning with the first type of effect and its contradictions within the framework of democratic or “becoming democratic” societies. Then I turn to a discussion of the conflicting “search for identity” notion of knowledge transmission.

2. Globalization and the Increased Demand for Education

Why does globalization increase the demand for education and for educational quality? The answer lies in two parts. The first is economic: rising payoffs to higher education in a global, science based, knowledge intensive economy make university training more of a “necessity” to get “good” jobs. This, in turn, changes the stakes at lower levels of schooling, and drastically changes the function of secondary school. The second part is socio-political: demographics (the changing family) and democratic ideals exchanged or communicated as it is produced.
increase pressure on universities to provide access to groups that traditionally have not attended university.

2.1 Globalized Markets and the Globalization of Skills

Governments in a global economy need to stimulate investment, including, in most countries, foreign capital and increasingly knowledge intensive capital, which means providing a ready supply of skilled labor. This translates into pressure to increase the average level of education in the labor force. The payoff to higher levels of education is rising worldwide as a result of the shifts of economic production to knowledge-intensive products and processes, as well as because governments implement policies that increase income inequality. Rising relative incomes for higher educated labor increases the demand for university education, pushing governments to expand their higher education systems, and, correspondingly, to increase the number of secondary school graduates ready to attend post-secondary. In countries, such as those in North Africa and the Middle East, that were previously resistant to providing equal access to education for young women, increased competition in product markets and the need for more highly educated labor (including the expansion of the education system itself) tends to expand women’s educational opportunities.

In the past fifty years, most countries have undergone rapid expansion of their primary and secondary education systems. This is not universally true. But thanks to a generalized ideology that basic education should be available to children as a right, even financial constraints in many debt-ridden countries, such as those in Latin America, did not prevent them from increasing access to basic and even secondary education (Castro and Carnoy, 1997).
The Soviet Union and the nations it controlled, as well as China, Cuba, and Vietnam, all organized economically and politically under Communist regimes, made especially large investments in education and produced highly schooled populations even in previously illiterate regions, such as Central Asia. The Communists not only expanded educational systems, but also increased the quality of the education in terms of teaching math and language skills. Whatever the reasons for this educational expansion, when these societies opened up to establish market economies and, in some cases, became politically democratic, they entered the new era with relatively highly skilled labor forces and highly literate populations.

University education has also expanded in most of the world’s societies but, given the bias of global demand for the higher educated, the tendency is to push up rates of return to investment in higher education relative to the payoffs to investing in primary and secondary schooling. Rates of return to higher levels of education are also pushed up by structural adjustment policies. These tend to favor those with higher skill levels hooked into the export sector and the multinational companies. Estimated rates of return in countries such as Hong Kong (Chung, 1990), the Republic of Korea (Ryoo, Carnoy, and Nam, 1993), and Argentina (Razquin, 1999), as well as in a number of the OECD countries (OECD, 1998), show that rates of return to university education are often as high or higher than to either secondary or primary. Furthermore, some of these same studies were able to measure rates of return for several different years in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. They suggest that rates of return to university have risen relative to primary and secondary rates. This is certainly the case in the former Communist countries, where university education was not highly rewarded before the 1990s, and now
increasingly unequal incomes favor university graduates. Rising rates of return to higher education relative to lower levels of schooling also characterize many countries where measured rates to investment in university remain lower than to investment in primary and secondary.

Rates of return to higher levels of schooling increase not necessarily because the real incomes of university graduates are rising in *absolute* terms. Real incomes of university graduates could stay constant or even fall but, if the incomes of secondary and primary graduates fall more than those of workers with higher education, the rate of return to higher education rises and pressure on the higher education system increases. Many years ago, Mark Blaug, Richard Layard and Maureen Woodhall studied the paradox of Indian universities. Graduates seemed to suffer high rates of unemployment, yet the demand for university education continued unabated (Blaug, Layard, and Woodhall, 1969). They found that although the rate of unemployment was, indeed, high among university graduates, it was even higher among secondary school graduates. This helped push secondary school graduates to go on to university. In the past 25 years in the United States, the real incomes of male college graduates have risen very slowly, but the real incomes of male high school graduates have fallen sharply, again raising the college income premium and increasing enrollment in higher education.

Globalization may therefore benefit university graduates only in *relative* terms, but the implications for general educational investment strategies are the same as if university graduates’ incomes were rising more rapidly than incomes of those young people with less schooling. By increasing the *relative* demand for university graduates
more rapidly than universities can expand their supply, globalization puts continuous pressure on the educational system to expand.

Yet, there is another side to this coin. Many analysts focus on the fact that globalization is reducing demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labor, that the new technology may be reducing demand for labor as a whole, and that countries have to compete for this shrinking demand by keeping wages low. These analysts claim that this is the reason that real wages are falling (or growing very slowly) in most countries (see, for example, Rifkin, 1994).

I have argued elsewhere that this is an incorrect analysis of both the effects of globalization and of the new technology (Carnoy, 2000). New information technology displaces many workers, just as all new technologies have done in the past, and this may influence short-term education and training investments. But this aspect of labor markets does not negate the more important issue for educational strategies: globalization and the new technology are knowledge intensive, and the new labor markets are increasingly information-intensive, flexible, and disaggregative, or individualizing, of labor, separating workers from traditional communities. The increasing individualization of workers and the increasing importance of education in defining individuals’ social roles tends to make institutions that transmit and create knowledge, such as schools and universities, new centers of knowledge communities. Individualized families organize their activities around their children’s and their own knowledge acquisition.

2.2. The Globalization of Skills and Increased Income and Educational Inequality

Higher rates of return (both private and social) to higher education have important effects on the rest of the educational system and on income inequality. Rising rates to
higher levels of schooling mean that those who get that education are benefited relatively more for their investment in education than those who stop at lower levels of schooling. In most countries, those who get to higher levels of schooling are also those from higher social class backgrounds. So not only do those families with higher social class background have more capital to start with, under these circumstances, they get a higher return to their investments. This is a sure formula for increased inequality in already highly unequal societies. It is also a sure formula for increased inequality in previously Communist societies, which were characterized by very equal incomes.

In addition, higher socio-economic status (SES) students are those who get access to “better” schools in regions that are more likely to spend more per pupil for education, particularly in those schools attended by higher socio-economic class pupils. Competition for such higher-payoff education also increases as the payoff to higher education increases, because the stakes get higher. Higher SES parents become increasingly conscious of where their children attend school, what those schools are like, and whether they provide access to higher levels of education. The total result is therefore that schooling becomes more stratified at lower levels rather than less stratified, especially under conditions of scarce public resources. National economic competition on a global scale gets translated into sub-national competition in social class access to educational resources.

If rates of return to university are pushed up by globalization, intensifying the competition for access to higher education, higher-educated, higher income parents tend to step up the amount they spend on primary and secondary school to assure their children’s university enrollment. This means that if promoting private education at the
primary and secondary levels through vouchers is part of the strategy to expand access, parents who can afford it are likely to send their children to selective private schools. Even in the public system, wherever possible, parents with more motivation and resources will seek “selective” public schools that serve higher social class clientele. These same parents, willing to spend on the “best” (often private) primary and secondary schools for their children, then end up fighting for high quality, essentially free, public universities.

Similarly, the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, now democratic or transitioning to democracy, are also transitioning from purely state schooling and university systems that focused heavily on vocational education to a system with increasing numbers of private schools and a shift to general education. Further, under Communism, teachers and students were distributed among schools by a centralized state bureaucracy. Since the Soviet economic system was self-contained, the educational systems were insulated from the influence of international competition and increasingly unequal distribution of earning in the rest of the world. In the new democracies, the educational system is no longer insulated, and “quality” teachers and students are increasingly distributed among schools according to the social class of students (the ability of families to pay).

At the same time, globally rising rates of return to university pressure on universities to accommodate more students. But financial constraints on increased public spending for education have pushed countries throughout the world to generate such higher education expansions by allowing for the rapid growth of private universities, often financed at least partly by Ministry subsidies to students. These private universities
compete for students but, in fact, the number of students wanting a degree is so great that competition hardly has to be fierce to attract students. Even so, private universities in some countries, such as Malaysia, “twin” with European and Australian universities to draw students. Most of these students are not “good enough” to get into the top public universities, so a private one, high fees and all, is their best hope for a professional career.

In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, and many other countries, commercial, private universities tend to be “diploma mills,” serving students from lower rather than higher-income families. The payoff to private university students is generally lower than the return to those who attend the more prestigious public universities.

2.3 Globalization and the Increased Payoff to Women’s Education

In addition to raising the payoff to higher levels of education, globalization appears to have raised the rate of return to women’s education. In many countries rates of return to education for women are higher than for men (Ryoo et al., 1993; Psacharopoulos, 1989). The reasons for the increased participation of women in labor markets are complex, but two main factors have been the spread of feminist ideas and values and the increased demand for low-cost semi-skilled labor in developing countries’ electronics manufacturing and other assembly industries. The world-wide movement for women’s rights has had the effect of legitimizing equal education for women, women’s control over their fertility rates, women’s increased participation in wage labor markets, and women’s right to vote (Castells, 1997; Ramirez, Saysal, and Shanahan, 1997). The increased demand for low-cost labor and greater sense by women that they have the same rights as men has brought enormous numbers of married women into wage employment world-wide. This, in turn has created increased demand for education by women at higher
and higher education levels. So globalization is accentuating an already growing trend by
women to take as much or more education than men.

This does not mean that women receive wages equal to men’s. That is hardly the
case. Nor does it mean that women are taking higher education in fields that are most
lucrative, such as engineering, business, or computer science. That is also far from true.
Women are still vastly under-represented in the most lucrative professions even in the
most “feminized” countries, such as Sweden or the United States. But globalization
seems gradually to be changing that, for both positive and negative reasons. The positive
reasons are that flexible organization in business enterprise requires flexible labor, and
women are as or more flexible than men, and that information technology and
telecommunications are spreading democratic ideas worldwide. The negative reason is
that women are paid much less than men almost everywhere in the world, and it is
profitable for firms to hire women and pay them lower wages than men. Yet, both sets of
reasons gradually seem to be driving both the education and the price of women’s labor
up relative to men’s. For example, the percent of women in science and engineering
university faculties is increasing worldwide. Although such increased
“professionalization” of women may contribute to the transformation of family life, it
does serve to democratize societies and raise greatly the average level of schooling.

3. Changing Demographics and the Impact on Education

Except in a few places such as Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where
fertility rates rose on the effect of postponed bearing of a third child among older women,
stimulated by a generous paid parental leave system, and extensive, high quality,
subsidized child care, and the United States, with a bulge in the female population of
child-bearing age and a large immigrant population, women in OECD countries are averaging far fewer children than a generation ago. This trend is also spreading to developing countries. It has long been the norm in the Communist bloc and characterizes the transition democracies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. One of the many reasons for the drop in fertility may be that women’s average education is much higher now than ever and, at least in the OECD countries and former Communist countries, higher-educated women are more likely to engage in “career” work and to postpone marriage and having children. Since they start bearing children when they are older, they end up having fewer children than less-educated women who marry at a younger age. In the developed countries, this appears to be the dominant pattern. In the developing countries, the pattern may be more complicated, especially because infant mortality rates may be considerably higher in low-income families.

Added to the low fertility rates among higher educated women in Western Europe, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, these countries/regions are hosts to increasing less-educated immigrants from “South” countries. The Latin American and African immigrants to Europe and the U.S. are especially likely to have high fertility rates.

Greater fertility among less-educated, lower-income families affects societies, especially in the current global environment. It means that most children may be growing up in families that cannot prepare them adequately for the ever-higher educational requirements needed to succeed in labor markets. This is not to say that higher educated men and women make better parents than those with less education. But being a parent in the global economy requires much more information than in the past, and the stakes in
children’s educational success are much higher. *On average*, less-educated parents are increasingly at a disadvantage in supplying what it takes for young children to be prepared to do well in school. Children living in families with less-educated parents are significantly behind middle-class children when they enter school, and there is no evidence that they catch up as they move through the grades.

This potential problem is accentuated by three other factors. First, income distribution in many countries has become more unequal in the past generation, with the real incomes of less-educated families stagnating or even declining. The second is that a high fraction of females heading households are not only poor because they are women, but are doubly poor because they have low levels of schooling. The third factor is public investment in the early care and education of children worldwide is low. Under these three conditions, the ability of children of less-educated families to escape poverty is the exception rather than the rule. Even in a rich country such as the United States, in the mid-1980s, an unusually high 37 percent of children were growing up in poverty or near poverty. Although that proportion declined in the 1990s, it remains the highest in the OECD. At the other end of the spectrum, less than 10 percent of children in Sweden fell into this category, thanks to a well-developed system of social welfare, including generous unemployment compensation, subsidized childcare and other forms of family support. Since the family is still the entity responsible for child rearing, differences in access to information and networks extant among social groups are likely to be reproduced from this generation into the next. The State can and should play an important role in offsetting differences in access to resources and information. This may be the only way to raise achievement for lower income children.
Changing labor markets and demographics combine to create major changes in universities as well. In the past twenty years, “new” demand for higher education in both developed and developing countries has come mainly from two groups that traditionally did not attend universities: a “rising” lower-middle social class and women. These sources will continue to fuel higher educational expansion and will be fighting for more places in elite institutions. But a major source of growth in population in developed and developing countries is now and will continue to be very low-educated families, many of them disadvantaged majorities in the developing countries and disadvantaged minorities in the developed countries. The increasing proportion of such children in secondary school is already posing a serious dilemma for educational policy. As secondary education becomes increasingly less valuable in labor markets, this growing part of the school population becomes the next “wave” of potential college graduates, yet in the traditional sense, they may not be “prepared” for college education.\(^2\)

Poverty rates in developing countries are much higher, and this means that universities will face similar or even greater problems as they expand than those in developed countries. Even though most of the children raised in poor families today, especially in developing countries, are unlikely to get access to universities, as universities in developing countries expand more rapidly than incomes rise, they will take increasing numbers of young people from such “disadvantaged” backgrounds. The

\(^2\) In many parts of Africa, including South Africa, the AIDS virus could drastically reduce the number of children from lower income families who reach college age, as well as drastically reducing population growth over the next generation. In these countries, population growth rates may approach developed country levels not because of lower fertility rates, but higher death rates. Even so, the pressure for university expansion will be great and the students entering university will increasingly come from low-income, low-education families.
paradox is explained by the relatively low fraction of young people in developing countries who live in high or even middle-income families. If the university system expands from admitting 10 percent of the age cohort to 25 percent, and 80 percent of young people live in low-income, less-educated families, at least 5 percent of university entrants (assuming that not all middle-class young people end up at university) would have to come from “disadvantaged” families. This would represent 20 percent of university students. In addition, the “disadvantaged” would not be distributed evenly through the university system. Most would be concentrated in less endowed institutions known for their poor quality or in night courses at major universities, or in specialties that are “easier” and are not defined as full-time programs. These are usually associated with low completion rates and low economic returns.

4. Increased Income Inequality and Declining Educational Quality

I have argued that one of the major impacts of globalization on education is increased pressure to improve the quality of schooling. This is the result of the increased pressure on economies to be more productive in the face of greater competition. Part of the formula for increasing educational quality pushed by international organizations has been the decentralization of educational administration, including promoting competition in the educational sector from private education and through parent choice of schooling for their children. The notion of dismantling centralized educational bureaucracies in favor of school autonomy and school competition is based on the notion of greater efficiency associated with markets and local control. There are important political reasons for local control of educational decision-making, as we shall discuss below, but unless there exists an even distribution of capacity to manage and deliver education at the
local level or among schools, there is a high probability that decentralization would contribute to greater inequality in the quality of schooling. Parent choice and increased competition among schools is supposed to increase educational quality, but this also assumes that the management and teaching capacity exists across schools to respond to increased competition. Again, it is likely that in lower-income areas, there is less capacity to increase quality in response to competition, hence schools in those areas will tend to lose better students to schools with higher social class student bodies, and quality might decrease further.

There are other factors associated with democratization of centralized, authoritarian societies that may also reduce the quality of schooling during this process. Centralized, authoritarian societies tend to be more economically equal and more socially ordered societies. Democratization and marketization is associated with increased income and social inequality, greater choice, and less order. This often means greater violence, more child labor, and greater spatial mobility, all factors that have a negative impact on student achievement, especially among lower-income students. Unless there is a strong civil society (community) to replace central authoritarian institutions, state-driven social capital is not replaced by family and community social capital, and schools become less effective because it becomes more costly to produce student achievement than before the democratic transition.

When school decentralization is added to these other factors, we would expect not only a decline of student achievement, but much greater disparity of student achievement among social classes than under centralized authoritarianism.
This is one of the great contradictions of the transition to democracy in the formerly Communist societies. It is also one of the great contradictions of globalization. On the one hand, globalization represents the next stage of democratization—this time on a world scale; on the other hand, globalization threatens democratization with increased social inequality and increased inequality in access to the high quality of education needed to develop democracy to that next level. Globalization may also weaken the power of the national state or regional governments to control economic development and the demand for education to the degree that they could in the past. As we have argued here, globalization may even pose a threat to decreasing the quality of education in many societies, or at least posing major barriers to increasing educational quality.

5. Globalization and the Struggle for Community

Education does much more than to impart skills needed for work. Schools are transmitters of modern culture. The meaning of modern culture as interpreted by the state is a crucial issue for educators and is contested in every society. Globalization redefines culture because it stretches boundaries of time and space and individuals’ relationship to them. It reduces the legitimacy of national political institutions’ to define modernity.

So globalization necessarily changes the conditions of identity formation. Individuals in any society have multiple identities. Today, their globalized identity is defined in terms of the way that global markets value individuals traits and behavior. It is knowledge-centered, but global markets value certain kinds of knowledge much more than others. As noted in the discussion of the changing market for skills, one major feature of global markets is that they place high value on scientific and technical knowledge and less on the kinds of local, artisan skills which serve more basic needs.
The global market does not work well as a source of identity for everyone. Markets also increase material differences among individuals. So that even if the market creates a sense of community among those who share the same professional networks, it also continuously destroys communities, isolating individuals until they are able to find new networks and new sources of social worth. With the individualization of workers and their separation from “permanent” jobs, even the identity individuals have with work places becomes more tenuous and subject to more frequent change (Carnoy, 1999). Today’s co-workers are not necessarily tomorrow’s friends.

Globalization is not the only force changing modern culture. Important social movements have challenged globalization in favor of cultural singularity and local control over people’s lives and their environment. Caught in between are the traditional mainstays of culture: religion, nationalism, gender relations, and the power relations that have developed historically in local regions, for example because of landowning pattern. In Manuel Castells’ words,

They include pro-active movements, aiming at transforming human relationships at their most fundamental level, such as feminism and environmentalism. But they also include a whole array of reactive movements that build trenches of resistance on behalf of God, nation, ethnicity, family, locality, that is, the fundamental categories of millennial existence now threatened under the combined, contradictory forces assault of techno-economic forces and transformative social movements (Castells, 1997: 2).

For those less successful in the global marketplace, the search for identity turns in other directions, and does so more intensely than in the past. When the search for other identities does not coincide with existing national territories, they also seek to redefine nationality. Ethnic identity is certainly one option. In sociologist Göran Therborn’s words,
“Affirming an ethnic identity amounts to discounting the present and the future for the past, to thinking and saying that the past is more important than the present... Who your parents were is more important than what you do, think, or might become...So, the less value the present appears to provide, the more important ethnicity, other things being equal” (Therborn, 1995: 210).

Religious identity is another direction to which the less globally successful turn. Religious fundamentalism is on the rise worldwide. It rejects the market as authority, and although fundamentalist groups have targeted the nation-state as a power base, there is an inherent contradiction between religious fundamentalism and a territorially defined nation. The same contradiction does not exist when it comes to local communities or to globalized movements for religious identity. But religious localism necessarily means communities based on exclusion. Even ethnic movements move away from their inclusionary focus. Rather than centering on nation-state legislative and financial intervention that includes the particular ethnic or race group in the national project, they now focus on cultural identities independent from the national project or seek recognition in global terms, above nationality. The fastest growing self-identity group among the world’s economically marginalized peoples is Muslim fundamentalists. Christian fundamentalism is an increasingly important movement, not only in the United States, where it appeals to working class whites, but also in Latin America, particularly among the rural poor. Hindu fundamentalism is also mobilizing similar groups in South Asia. Such fundamentalism provides a new “self-knowledge” that stands above market success. All the information you need to lead a fulfilling life is in the Koran or the Bible or the Torah. Fundamentalist beliefs do not exclude being successful in the market. But the appeal to fundamentalism is strongest for those who feel simultaneously threatened by the “inclusiveness” of a multiculturalist version of welfare democracy (or even the
authoritarianism of a single party state) that offers a bureaucratic vision of nationality, and the “inclusiveness” of the global market that serves the power of money and complex information systems.

Cultural identity, whether religious, ethnic, racial, or gender, and whether local, regional or more global, is an antidote to the complexity and harshness of the global market as the judge of a person’s worth. For nationalists, cultural identity is also an antidote to the globalized bureaucratic state. But such a trend could mean increased social conflict. If some localities/ethnicities/religious groupings feel increasingly excluded from the high end of the market, a weakened nation-state incapable of reincorporating them socially could mean less stability. Even though the political positions of various nationalist movements may differ considerably, they all tend to play to the sense for many of exclusion from participating in the fruits of globalizing national economies.

The market in itself has never been sufficiently inclusive. Strong undemocratic, non-egalitarian nation-states existed before the free market dominated economic systems, so many believe that states are no guarantee of inclusion. But the modern capitalist state developed into a successful market “softener.” The decline of that role in the face of powerful global marketization of national economies pushes the “dispossessed” to seek refuge in new and more exclusive collectives. These collectives generally do not have the power or the funds to help the dispossessed financially nor to develop the skills and knowledge valued by global markets. They can help develop self-knowledge and therefore self-confidence. They can provide community and therefore a sense of belonging. They often do so by defining others as “outsiders” without the “true” self-knowledge or the “right” ancestors. At the extreme end, the communities are often highly
undemocratic. If the nation-state does not have the financial capability or the political legitimacy to dissipate such movements by incorporating its members into much broader notions of community and values, societies unable to maintain market success may face serious, irresolvable divisions.

The conflicts in identity formation necessarily affect education. The distribution of access to schools and universities, as well as educational reforms aimed at improving its quality, are all headed toward forming labor for a market conditioned by globalization. But education can become more inequitable rather than more inclusive. Thus, in any strategy, central governments must still assume responsibility for leveling the playing field for all groups. This is particularly true because left-out groups see the educational system as both crucial to knowledge acquisition yet not serving the needs of their “community.” Schools and the educational system become primary targets for social movements organized around “self-knowledge,” such as religious or ethnic identity. The educational system has enormous resources devoted to knowledge formation for dominant groups. Why should not education in a democratic society serve all groups, even those that differ markedly from the ideal of the new, competitive, globally sensitive worker? It is no accident that much of the struggle, for example, between religious fundamentalists and the secular, rational state, is over state education. The public sector has the funds to place children in an educational institution, but not the commitment to create a moral community. Instead, the state has succumbed to crass materialism on a global scale. Fundamentalists want to attract those who are not happy with their value in a world economy, and to educate them and their children in a way that will strengthen religious affiliation, not economic productivity. The more they succeed, the less the
educational system will be able to develop global economy workers. Yet, at the same time that schools and universities are the site of intense struggles over the definition of culture, they represent to those who are not included in the global economy the single most important route to access global culture. Minority groups may try to control the cultural norms purveyed by schools and universities, but they often engage in such battles believing that their children should have a chance to learn skills valued by the global economy.

Decentralization of educational management to meet the goal of empowering regional and local social movements makes eminent sense when it is these movements that seek to gain control of the educational institutions that affect their children. Educational democratization movements have pushed for more power for parents and teachers at the educational site. Again, decentralization of control could promote greater educational productivity and greater sense of community when it is communities themselves that want that control. It might also effectively assuage groups seeking greater self-identity through influencing the production of knowledge in schools. Whether or not this contributes to a multicultural alternative to globalized individualism remains to be seen.

In addition, pro-active movements, such as feminism and environmentalism, post-modern in their outlook and in direct conflict with globalization, are attempting to redefine the conception of “global” in the education system. For example, feminism is gradually shaping global culture to include gender equality and equity, first in education, then in labor markets. Environmentalism has had an enormous impact on global culture through environmental programs in schools worldwide. These pro-active movements are
having a major impact on how schools define new global culture, and in that sense, are most closely associated with challenges to the techno-economic definition of globalized culture. Education plays and will continue to play a fundamental role in this struggle.

The women’s movement has made significant inroads into the educational system even in traditional Muslim countries. This reflects the movement’s power over the past generation to shape knowledge institutions at the heart of the globalization process. Even so, as the continued subordination of women in societies such as Pakistan and Afghanistan suggest, other anti-global movements rooted in male-dominated traditional culture see women’s equality as a global notion, and oppose it as part of their resistance to globalization.

6. Implications for Educational Policy in the Newly Opened Societies

Globalization is having significant impact on knowledge formation because it revalues different types of knowledge, particularly the knowledge associated with higher levels of education. As it does so, it increases the pressure to expand higher education and it increases the competition at lower levels of schooling among families trying to “game” the education system for their children’s social mobility. This increases the potential for greater inequality of access to quality education, even as globalization brings new kinds of people into universities and other types of post-secondary schooling.

For societies in the transition to democracy from state socialism—those in Eastern Europe to those in Central Asia—the transition in the context of this economic globalization poses great challenges for educational policies. The transition societies have generally inherited well-developed, high quality educational systems, in which teachers used to be paid wages little different from wages paid to other professionals.
With the disintegration of their command economies and their insertion into global markets, these societies’ social services, including education, have suffered severe budget constraints. Teaching has become a relatively low-paid profession, and private funding of schooling has increasingly supplemented public funding, with predictable increases in inequality of access to quality education and ensuing declines in average student academic performance. Correspondingly, increasing institutional diversity has also marked universities.

6.1 Ethnic and Class Competition. The former Soviet Union was built on the Russian Empire, which included many regions that were, strictly speaking, Russian colonies. Eastern European and Baltic countries also fell under Soviet control after World War II. Russian emigration to regions that were ethnically and culturally very different and the “colonial” relation between Russia and local ethnic groups has created another level of issues for education in post-Soviet democracy. Namely, in some countries local ethnic groups are making access to higher education for Russian-origin young people more difficult. The opening of these societies has therefore not been able to overcome the prejudices and conflicts inherent in nineteenth and twentieth century history. Rather than being a path to resolving such prejudices and conflicts, the educational system in the new democracies is often at the forefront of the conflict.

The difficulty of maintaining relatively high levels of K-12 schooling quality for young people in the opening societies is part of the overall problems created by increasing economic and social inequality. The increase in inequality poses a potential threat to the deepening of democratic institutions. Thus, educational privatization, while an important source of new funding for resource-starved schools, simultaneously
threatens conceptions of fairness and equity that are key to the deepening of civil society and democratic institutions.

Put another way, families cannot be faulted for trying to use private resources to give their children the best chance possible at social mobility in the new market economy. As a stopgap measure to assure that at least some fraction of the school-age population gets high quality schooling, greater inequality of access to quality education may a necessary, if not entirely satisfactory, way to provide social services. Similarly, in higher education, students and their families want to do what is necessary for the university to make them valuable in the global economic system.

At the same time, educational institutions, as the main sites of knowledge transmission in a knowledge economy, are the new loci of community formation. Higher education institutions are not only sites of community formation but, as in the past, also continue to act as centers of cultural leadership. Schools and universities are therefore under new kinds of pressures because global market culture is highly exclusive and destructive of local culture and, furthermore, also stresses individuality, competition, and unequal outcomes—factors that are not very consistent with building democratic institutions, particularly in societies that have long been accustomed to considerable emphasis on equity, at least in education, income, and employment. The new and contradictory pressures from greater competition and inequality will be played out in expanding educational systems over the next generation.

6.2 Multicultural Education in a Global Environment. Schools and universities do not just serve to add market worth to students hoping for a place in the globalized economy. Universities are definers of culture for national and diverse regional and local
communities. In many ways schools and universities are also cultural centers as such. For example, the school or university may represent for a community a center of particular culture in a multicultural society, or, may represent a new definitions of multiculturalism. Thus, the school or university becomes an important site of conflict between global culture *qua* preparing students to be economically successful in a global economic environment (scientific, global, economically-valued knowledge) and local cultural forms that build self-identity (self-knowledge). Often, this self-identity is an antidote to a global identity that fails to include even many university graduates in the developing countries. It may be also be consistent with a new kind of globalism that creates incorporative multicultural forms. The newly open societies face additional problems of ethnic conflicts and increasing social class inequality. If states in the opening societies contribute to the cultural conflict by using education to exacerbate cultural divisions, new social identities consistent with democracy on a global environment will be impossible to achieve. All this complicates further the incorporation of all these groups equitably into the global knowledge society.

Today’s more globalized notion of national identity in a period of declining state power makes it less logical to impose a narrow sense of national, regional or local culture. Since markets are increasingly global, an individual’s economic value is determined by broader criteria than his or her local “acceptability.” Further, declining state capacity to impose norms creates political space for counter-dominant concepts of self-knowledge. In practice, groups that do not do assimilate well into the global market knowledge culture have greater political options today than even a generation ago of forming relatively autonomous cultural groups with their own knowledge institutions.
This is true for fundamentalist religious groups as well as particular immigrant groups wanting to preserve language and native culture.

In terms of how school systems and universities may react to globalization, this suggests approaches to a self-knowledge community very different from those of the past. Two models come to mind. The first is one where the state allows any community group to create a knowledge institution with public funds as long as it met minimum legal criteria. Each community in a society could therefore socialize its children and transmit knowledge in the way it chose. This implies a vision of society where groups with widely different beliefs are held together by market relations but not necessarily other common bonds. Those who support educational vouchers, charter schools, and ethnic or religious schools and universities catering toward very different groups tend toward this approach. The second model is one where the state uses a multi-cultural self-knowledge approach to socialize all young people in the public system. This multi-cultural approach differs from totally autonomous definitions of self-knowledge by each group. It also abandons the imposition of a single dominant culture, but does make all children attending publicly funded institutions learn about the variety of cultures in the community (and their points

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27. Critiques of multi-cultural approaches to self-knowledge focus on their flight from the classics of Western civilization and the new “fascism” of political correctness. It is ironic that neo-conservatives critique multi-culturalism in the form that could certainly occur under a voucher system or charter schools, educational alternatives pushed by neo-conservatives. I agree that there is some validity in these criticisms. They are primarily aimed at minorities’ and women’s attempt to define culture in new ways, but to be consistent, would also have to critique Christian or Muslim fundamentalists who want to use public funds to socialize their children into values and norms inconsistent with the tolerance and enlightenment. It is also ironic that in their fear of the multi-cultural future, neo-conservatives push for the alternative implicit in these critiques—namely using the state to impose an assimilationist view of language, history and culture on groups that seek their own interpretation of history and culture—at the same time that they want
of view). In that sense, the state (national, regional, or local community) continues to impose an ideological perspective, but one that reflects the diversity of today’s post-industrial societies.

The first model assumes that market relations (the profit motive) are enough to keep increasingly diverse societies working together successfully. I have my doubts. To build social capital, diverse communities need to share common social experiences. In knowledge-based society, a common school and university experience with young people having at least some diversity in background and values serves this function. A multicultural approach to socialization does more: it allows children of various groups to gain an understanding of their own history and culture but also allows them to think critically about it. This makes it consistent with the higher-order problem-solving skills needed for an innovative, democratic society. It is also consistent with a positive, constructive vision of what post-industrial societies are becoming—a vision distinctly opposed to the parochial, defensive, anti-globalism of the nationalist Right (and Left).
REFERENCES


