Habeas Coca
Bolivia’s Community Coca Control
We know the war on drugs has failed, but we know far less about what to do about it, least of all how to responsibly craft drug policy in a way that reduces violence, shrinks the black market, and promotes security. Ceasing to arrest, prosecute, and jail small-time offenders, for example, has been enormously successful in many contexts. It has saved money and allowed law enforcement to direct their resources toward more serious crimes.

When it comes to Latin America, the world’s cocaine source, drug policy has experienced little innovation. Often cast as “the frontline” in the war on drugs, some of the worst excesses of drug control were outsourced to producer and transit countries in Latin America. Governments and major drug war donors led forced eradication campaigns that devastated local economies and, at their worst, spurred violent clashes between the rural poor and government agents, often driving peasant farmers into informal agreements with violent nonstate actors. Decades of alternative development assistance have proven largely ineffectual in reducing the coca crop.

While there is certainly an imperative to control the availability of cocaine, the international proscription on the cultivation of the coca leaf is one of international drug policy’s more controversial strategies. The plant is the subject of widespread confusion and misinformation. The leaf is a mild stimulant, more akin in potency to coffee than cocaine. Indigenous people have chewed the leaf or brewed it in tea for thousands of years with little evidence of harm. Its inclusion in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs—the treaty that serves as the foundation of international drug control—was the result of flawed science that certain actors have studiously avoided correcting.

In 2012, Bolivia withdrew from the 1961 Convention in order to re-access with a reservation on coca chewing. The following year, the UN General Assembly accepted Bolivia’s re-accession to the treaty with only a small minority of governments in opposition. For many,
this development was seen as a potential turning point in the intersection of drug control and human rights. While Bolivia’s reservation was very much reflective of local circumstances (i.e., the rights of indigenous people), considering the many ways that drug control clashes with other international human norms, the reservation may be instructive in how to moderate the worst excesses of drug control. For example, we know that a criminalized drug policy focusing on the arrest-and-prosecution of low-level offenders, will act as a barrier to life-saving services. With this in mind, the right to the highest attainable standard of health should factor importantly in negotiating drug control obligations in the future.

This is precisely why Bolivia’s alternative coca strategy is so important for the world to study.

The strategy enables farmers to grow coca leaf within a limited allotment. The plot is logged into a government database, cross-checked, and overseen by a local growers’ union to ensure it remains within the mandated limit. With a stable crop in place, the allotment has helped improve the financial wellbeing of farmers, which, in turn, has allowed them to experiment with growing noncoca crops. Rather than charging onto farms and pulling coca out by the roots, the government’s role has been to work with community leaders to maintain the quota rather than to recklessly eradicate the plant.

In many respects, the strategy is uniquely Bolivian. The entire project is specifically tailored to the country’s political structures and actors. And the policy has, of course, faced numerous challenges. Under-resourcing and bureaucratic weaknesses are both characteristic of the Bolivian policy, which has not been able to entirely prevent diversion of the coca leaf to the illicit market. Ultimately, however, the simple reality is that any country that wishes to pursue alternatives will operate in an extremely hostile environment rife with opposition.

That should not, nor cannot, preclude future pursuits of alternative strategies. The war on drugs has failed on multiple levels and harmed many people, including farmers who are merely cultivating a crop that they have grown for centuries. That the Bolivian government has been able to regulate the coca leaf—with some laudable results—proves that alternatives are not impossible.

This report outlines the successes of the policy as well the challenges it has faced. We hope that, despite the distinctiveness of the Bolivian approach, there are lessons for other governments.

But most of all, we hope Bolivia’s creative thinking inspires debate in other corners of the world. It is sorely needed.

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Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the assistance of the Andean Information Network (AIN), which has been working for a more humane, participatory, and inclusive drug policy in Bolivia and the Andes since 1991. Jessie Robinson and the AIN Board members all made this report a reality. Thanks also go to Thomas Grisaffi, an AIN collaborator and Open Society grantee, who provided interviews and perspectives on a regular basis. We are extremely grateful for all the time and help provided by the following people: journalist Sara Shahriari who conducted interviews in the Yungas; Godofredo Reinicke for his ongoing insight on coca issues; Christina Tellez for translating charts; and our transcribers Mauricio Ariles, Wilmer Machacha Leandro, Alba Rojas, and Cecibel Villca.

Our thanks go to everyone who spoke to us in Caranavi, the Chapare, Cochabamba, and La Paz. Of course, none of this would have been possible without the guidance and practical assistance of our current and former colleagues at the Open Society Foundations: Diego Garcia Devis, Adriana Sanchez, and Patrick Gallahue.

We dedicate this report to Linda’s late husband Ben Kohl, whose editing assistance, critical eye, insights, and sense of humor are all sorely missed.
Executive Summary

When Bolivian President Carlos Mesa challenged vocal U.S. opposition in 2004 and legalized the cultivation of small amounts of coca leaf by Bolivian farmers, it marked a sea change in supply-side drug policy in the Americas. Not only had one of South America’s poorest countries asserted national control after 20 years of U.S.-financed repression in its principal coca growing region, but the cato accord, as it was known, ended violent confrontations between police and small farmers. With the accord, coca farmers and their families achieved their longstanding demand to be permitted a subsistence plot of the coca leaf that plays such a central role in their economic survival and in Andean culture.

Just over a year later, the election of the leader of the coca growers’ union, Evo Morales, to Bolivia’s presidency consolidated the changes heralded with the cato. Under the slogan “Coca yes, cocaine no,” the new government committed to aggressive interdiction of cocaine paste and cocaine, and announced plans for “development with coca” to industrialize legal products made from the coca leaf. Bolivia also recognized traditional consumption of coca for the first time in its 2009 constitution and pressed for international recognition of the country’s right to consume leaf within its borders, which it won in 2013.1

1. Cocaine paste is called pasta de cocaína, pasta base de cocaína, paco, pasta base or basuco in South America. These are mostly crude intermediate stages of the cocaine manufacture process, but also include freebase forms such as crack cocaine, which is prepared from refined cocaine hydrochloride.

In 2009, an innovative program known as community coca control was launched. Drawing on high levels of coca grower organization paired with sophisticated technological monitoring, land titling, and economic development, the community control program builds on deeply entrenched cultural values that emphasize the importance of community participation through peasant unions. As shown in Figure 1, Bolivian community coca control mechanisms are multidimensional, with various government entities responsible for implementation.

Figure 1: Elements of cooperative coca reduction

Source: Jessica Robinson, AIN. (Acronyms available in Appendix 2)

Habeas Coca argues that Bolivia’s community coca control program is a cost-efficient and less violent alternative to the forced eradication of coca, which remains in place in Colombia and Peru.3 Over two decades of eradication policies have proven to be demonstrable failures in all three Andean countries, generating poverty and gross human rights

3. The bulk of the interviews and research for this report occurred in 2014, with follow-up conducted in early 2015. The report draws on both authors’ extensive research and writing on coca/cocaine in Bolivia over the past 25 years. While drawing on secondary sources, we sought to confirm our findings through interviews with a wide variety of actors. See the Appendix for the list of interviewees.
violations. In addition, these failed strategies strengthened insurgent groups in Colombia and Peru—all without meeting their objectives of controlling the coca crop and diminishing the illegal cocaine trade. While Bolivia’s policy effectively shrunk coca cultivation by 26 percent from 2010 to 2013, it is crucial to comprehending the policy’s reach to recognize that it is not designed, nor is it able, to limit drug trafficking. As leaf prices have risen, due in part to the current program, cheaper Peruvian coca and its derivatives have flooded through Bolivia to cocaine consuming and transit countries, such as Brazil. Demand, not supply, drives the drug trade, and originates almost completely outside Bolivia’s borders.

Bolivia’s initiative seeks primarily to reduce harm to coca growers by substituting the police- and military-driven forced eradication model with one that actively engages growers as citizens and increases the participation of farmers in determining their communities’ futures. The model is most effective in areas where residents support the current government, and needs further consolidation in areas without strong government influence, and where coca grower union organizations are in conflict with each other.

In President Evo Morales’s region, the Chapare, the combination of the new approach with other government policies, has dramatically cut the number of coca farmer deaths and injuries related to forced eradication efforts, and has facilitated coca growers diversifying their sources of income. The initiative is structured around negotiation and the recognition of local organizations as partners, guaranteeing farmers a subsistence wage. This is combined with establishing their legal identities as registered coca growers, which in turn generates a newfound sense of citizenship rights that engages growers themselves in limiting coca cultivation and aids in producing transparent, verifiable results.

The result is a program that the Organization of American States calls a “best practice... (worthy of) replication.” European Union (EU) Ambassador to Bolivia, Timothy Torlot, described the program as “...a success; you can see the impact in the effective and sustained reduction of coca production... the European Union’s experience has been very positive.” While Bolivia has developed the world’s first relatively promising supply-side program that broadly reflects the harm reduction principles in place in some countries on the

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6. A 2007 study found that the monthly prevalence of cocaine use in Bolivia is only 0.4 percent. A follow-up study in 2013 calculated an annual prevalence of 0.38. CICAD, 2007. p.13; CONATLID, 2014.
demand side, its very success illustrates clearly the minimal effect that supply-side efforts have on curtailing the demand for illicit drugs.

Effective, pragmatic drug policy reform must move beyond the traditional yardsticks of eradication, seizures, and arrests, to more genuine, valid indicators such as respect for human rights, social welfare of affected populations, economic stability, citizenship, rule of law, demilitarization, positive engagement with the civilian state, transparency, and the ability to effectively monitor and measure impact and sustainability.

I. Introduction

Coca leaf is any one of four varieties of Erythroxylaceae, a shrub native to western South America, whose psychoactive effects are analogous to coffee or tea. One of its 14 alkaloids is essential in the production of the drug cocaine. Bolivia ranks third in world coca leaf and cocaine production behind Peru and Colombia, but given the country’s small economy, income from coca/cocaine is more significant than for the other two countries.

The leaf has flourished on the eastern slopes of the Andes for at least four thousand years, serving both as an essential trade good and a key facet of Andean life. Coca’s mild stimulants dull hunger and fatigue, aid digestion, combat altitude sickness, and offer vitamins and minerals often lacking in local staples. It is present in every Andean ritual from birth to death. (See Figure A3.1: Coca cultivation in the Andean region, 2007, in Appendix 3.)

While Spanish colonization almost entirely eliminated leaf consumption in Ecuador and Colombia, chewing remains common in Peru and Bolivia. For miners, it is an article of first necessity to survive often brutal work conditions, and agricultural workers laboring in the hot and humid eastern lowlands consume large quantities as well. Coca is ubiquitous in highland and valley rural social interactions, as people perceive it to encourage wisdom, reflection, and introspection. The leaf is widespread in cities, and every restaurant in both Peru and Bolivia serve mate de coca (coca leaf tea).

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10. This section draws from Farthing and Kohl, 2014: Chapter 8.
13. Ibid.
Subsistence farmers grow coca leaf on the highly terraced Yungas mountainsides east of La Paz; in the Chapare (also known as the Cochabamba tropics), a semitropical lowland east of Cochabamba comparable in size to Wales or New Hampshire; and more recently, and to a far lesser extent, in the frontier zone called the North of La Paz. Both on the steep, verdant Yungas slopes and in the scrubby, predominantly flat Chapare, families manually cultivate fields that yield up to four harvests a year. Coca has often served as the main cash crop in both regions, complemented with products such as rice, bananas, coffee, cassava, and citrus fruits. A varying amount of the leaf is diverted into the illicit market to be processed into cocaine.14

Settlement in both of these areas, but particularly the Chapare, mushroomed beginning in the 1960s, and successive governments encouraged lowland migration to alleviate highland population pressure and poverty. In the absence of local state institutions, strong peasant unions, which combine indigenous cultural forms and peasant labor union traditions, arose to handle everything from granting land and resolving boundary disputes to building schools and disciplining antisocial behavior.15 They now number close to 1,000, and are organized into six federations that together form a coordinating body of all Chapare growers.

Like peasant unions throughout Bolivia, coca-growing unions tend to be male-dominated with power concentrated in the leadership. Nonetheless, they remain broadly participatory and, like unions elsewhere in the country, they have pushed leadership out of the way if they felt they were ineffective or unresponsive to their demands.16 During the U.S.-financed “War on Drugs” in the 1990s, these unions spearheaded cyclical, and often national, protests under the leadership of Evo Morales.17

In the Yungas, 30,000 largely Aymara-speaking families are organized into local unions that combine into six agrarian federations united into a Confederation (COFECAY) with a powerful marketing arm (ADEPCOCA). Fierce rivalries often erupt within and between the Yungas federations and their affiliated coca marketing associations. Cleavages

15. These unions were heavily affected by forced eradication policies in the late 1990s, at the same time that they played an important role in Evo Morales’s rise to political power. To this day, the unions are responsible for the allocation of land in parcels of 10 to 20 hectares (25 to 49.4 acres), collecting taxes from the coca trade, organizing collective work parties, resolving disputes, setting transport fares, and investing in public works. For coca growers, full membership in their community is dependent upon the exercise of political rights that far exceed the right to vote. The culture of their union assemblies prioritizes personal relationships, consensus building, and the direct accountability of leaders to their community (Grisaffi, 2013: 61).
run particularly deep between “traditional” zone farmers from areas where coca has been grown for centuries, who are anxious to avoid any limits on cultivation, and a group steadily expanding into frontier areas. Union leader Franz Caravedo explained in 2009, “Young people are forced to migrate because plots are too small in traditional areas. They can’t grow in catos controlled zones because that would result in excess production. So they set up their own coca farms in expansion zones.”

Differences between growers exist in the Chapare as well. Those who suffered through the worst of the years of repression resent newcomers who they feel are receiving development-related benefits that they spilt blood for. But at the same time, long-term Chapare residents are likely to have higher incomes, as they have catos, and their land tends to be closer to roads and other infrastructure. Overall, incomes in the union-dominated zones of both the Yungas and the Chapare compare favorably with earnings in the highlands and valleys, and are about average for the lowland parts of the country.

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**The International Prohibition of the Coca Leaf**

International drug laws are enshrined in three treaties that apply varying levels of control on substances depending on their risk of “abuse”—a term that was left undefined in the original documents. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the cornerstone of the drug control system. Prior to its drafting, coca was the subject of a pair of woefully flawed reports by international bodies, which greatly overstated the risks of coca leaf chewing. Subsequent efforts to update the scientific evidence were unsuccessful. For example, in 1995 the World Health Organization (WHO) finished a major study that concluded, “the use of coca leaves appears to have no negative health effects and has positive therapeutic, sacred and social functions for indigenous Andean populations.” The study, however, was blocked and never published.

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18. Bolivia’s 1988 drug control law delineated (albeit poorly) the areas dedicated to coca production for the first time and designates 12,000 hectares (29,653 acres) as “traditional” where coca production is considered legal.
20. CEDIB, n/d.
21. See: Transnational Institute, n/d.
22. Ibid.
Coca leaf became subject to the strictest controls in the 1961 Convention and was one of its principal targets, along with opium and marijuana. Article 49(2) (e) states, “Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming into force of this Convention.” This was followed by the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which also proscribed, “the possession, purchase or cultivation” of certain substances such as coca leaf—though subject to what the treaty terms “constitutional principles.” The 1988 Convention further notes that, “measures to prevent illicit cultivation of and to eradicate plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances, such as opium poppy, coca bush and cannabis plants,” must, “respect fundamental human rights and shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there is historic evidence of such use.”

1. U.S. Pressure, Forced Eradication, and Alternative Development Programs

Between the mid-1980s and the 2004 cato accord, the United States dictated drug control policy, prioritizing forced eradication and interdiction in the Chapare by U.S.-trained and funded police and military units. Despite Bolivian apprehension, given its history of repeated military coups d’état, the United States threatened to pull badly needed aid. Anti-drug legislation (Law 1008), imposed in 1988 by the United States, authorized 12,000 ha (about 46 square miles) of unregulated coca to be grown “legally” for domestic consumption in the Yungas’ higher altitude “traditional zone,” although its borders with surrounding “nontraditional” areas were poorly defined. The law designated the Chapare and frontier, lower elevation Yungas areas as “illegal” or “transition,” where coca had to be destroyed or substituted with other crops. The law required Bolivia to eradicate a minimum of 5,000 hectares (12,355 acres) a year. This figure guides Morales’s government policy to date.

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23. Ibid.
25. Law 1008 also considered the Vandiola Yungas in Cochabamba and the Franz Tamayo Province in La Paz as “traditional zones,” but did not stipulate how much coca could be grown there.
Chapare growers suffered most between 1997 and 2002 when former dictator Hugo Banzer and his successor Jorge Quiroga adopted Plan Dignidad (Dignity Plan) in an effort to curry U.S. favor. The strategy of forced military eradication, in violation of the nation’s constitution, promised to eliminate all Chapare coca by 2002. The plan’s application provoked a severe economic crisis among growers, who were only eligible for development assistance after losing their main source of income. Coca growers immediately and vehemently resisted the initiative. During escalating cycles of protest and repression, security forces killed 33 Chapare growers and injured 570 during forced eradication and road blockades. When no members of the security forces faced legal consequences for the deaths, retaliatory attacks by growers resulted in 27 military and police deaths. At the urging of the United States, Banzer announced a militarized eradication program in the Yungas in 2001, but retreated almost immediately after meeting fierce resistance from farmers.

Like forced eradication programs elsewhere, Plan Dignidad fomented instability and poverty, and de-legitimized the state. The clashes between security officials and growers provoked stinging criticism from human rights monitors such as Human Rights Watch, which reported mass arrests, violations of due process, excessive force, and unlawful violence against activists. In 1997, the United Nations Human Rights Committee voiced its concerns over impunity and crackdowns, specifically citing Plan Dignidad.

Beyond the human rights violations, Plan Dignidad never met its stated goals of destroying the coca crop or restricting the cocaine trade. Without any significant source of cash income, Chapare growers either fled the region or quickly replanted the leaf in spite of ongoing repression. As the security forces forcibly destroyed the hardy bush in the Chapare, production intensified in the Yungas, both within and outside of the traditional zone. By 2006, two thirds of Bolivia’s coca came from the Yungas. Cultivation had also been displaced to Peru and Colombia.

Largely ineffective alternative development programs accompanied the emphasis on coca eradication. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spent an estimated $300 million between 1982 and 2008 on programs that refused to work with

grower unions and conditioned assistance on eradication. For many years, the program, one of USAID’s largest in Latin America, focused on increasing the exports of legal crops and therefore participant farmers’ licit income. The program also emphasized non-coca farmer private sector investment including tourism infrastructure, and was most successful in extending Chapare road infrastructure. Farmers consistently complained about a lack of transparency, markets, and inefficacy.

In the Yungas, a five-year UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) crop substitution program, known as AgroYungas, spent $21 million in the late 1980s and proved a resounding failure. The coffee varieties introduced were more susceptible to disease than local ones and market research was absent. Communities as a whole had to give up coca before participating, which generated inter-community conflict. Even though most participants already grew more coffee than coca, farmers tended to view the program as a threat to their livelihoods. Beginning in 2001, USAID had greater success in expanding specialty coffee production, in part because of improved coffee processing, growing international demand for high-end coffee, and sophisticated marketing, although the project remained susceptible to dramatic price fluctuations.

Law 1008 set disproportionately high sentences for drug related crimes and many poor Bolivians at the lowest levels of the drug trade were imprisoned. The dysfunctional judicial system, which has the longest periods of pretrial detention in the region, meant that most detained Bolivians languished in prison for years before going to trial. “Someone approached my husband and me about taking a backpack to Santa Cruz for $20, which is about what we could make in a week if we were lucky,” explained Julia Choque in Cocha-bamba’s San Sebastian prison. She received a 13-year sentence for transporting drugs.

In 2013, the government implemented the first of three consecutive pardon initiatives, which allowed the release of approximately 1,500 low level offenders. In 2015, it is expected that an additional 500 will be released. Bolivian officials plan to adjust drug sentences during the reform of Law 1008 that is planned for 2015.

38. Author interview of Caranavi coffee farmer, August 2014.
40. Author interview, January 27, 2015.
Figure 2: Coca Control in Bolivia, 1988 to Present

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<tr>
<td><strong>Production ceiling</strong></td>
<td>12,000 hectares(^1) in traditional zones</td>
<td>15,200 hectares (12,000 ha for traditional zones and 3,200 in the Chapare)</td>
<td>20,000 hectares (12,000 in traditional zones plus 8,000 in cato plots in approved regions)</td>
<td>14,700 hectares (districts to be determined)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Permitted coca plot</strong></td>
<td>12,000 hectares (no plot size stipulated)</td>
<td>Traditional zones: no plot size stipulated</td>
<td>Traditional zones: no plot size stipulated Chapare: 1,600m(^2) Caranavi, La Asunta: 2,500m(^2) for registered farmers</td>
<td>Traditional zones: no plot size stipulated Chapare: 1,600m(^2) Caranavi, La Asunta: 2,500m(^2) for registered farmers</td>
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<td><strong>Agencies in charge of coca monitoring</strong></td>
<td>United States Government (USG)-funded DIRECO UMOPAR</td>
<td>USG-funded DIRECO UNODC F-57</td>
<td>• DIGPROCOCA (Bolivian government) • UNODC F-57 • European Union–PACS(^*) • U.S.-Brazil-Bolivia Trilateral Agreement (2011–2013) • Coca growers’ unions</td>
<td>• DIGPROCOCA • UNODC F-57 • Coca growers’ unions • Control Social Unit-Vice Ministry of Social Defense (Syscoca)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Funding for coca monitoring</strong></td>
<td>USG</td>
<td>USG UNODC (primarily U.S. funding)</td>
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Notes: * Acronym definitions are available in Appendix 2.  
** Program to Support Community Coca Control (PACS) http://www.controlsocial.bo/  
\(^*\) United States Office of National Drug Control Policy http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp
2. The Morales Administration’s Plan

When Evo Morales assumed the presidency at the beginning of 2006, the government quickly moved to assert its independence from the United States. Beginning in 2008, the bulk of U.S. funding was cut, and by 2012 the government spoke of the importance of “nationalizing” its drugs policy. After the expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador in 2008 for ostensibly meddling in Bolivian affairs, the United States revoked the country’s trade preferences through the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. The move provoked losses for some textile and leather exporters, most of it in the urban, small-scale, and family workshop manufacturing sector.

Subsequent U.S. withdrawal—the Drug Enforcement Agency left in 2009 and by 2013 USAID had been expelled, too—has, in part, been replaced by increased involvement of the European Union, with future EU funding now slated at €60 million between 2014 and 2017. The latest round of EU support incorporates interdiction and border control activities for the first time, while continuing existing financing for community coca control and integrated development with coca. Overall, the European Union has characterized Bolivian policy under Morales as a success.

The Morales administration’s Integral Development Plan with Coca, 2011-2015, continues the program put in place from 2006 to 2010 and is organized under the following guiding principles:

- Coca eradication is no longer a prerequisite for development assistance;
- Investment is made first in public works and social services and then in economic/agricultural development under the assumption that if growers have sufficient income, it will be easier for them to reduce their dependence on coca;
- Development initiatives are designed to meet unique regional needs, incorporating local knowledge, gender issues, and generational differences;
- Human rights are respected;
- Institutional, regional, and municipal economic development is promoted;

41. A hectare is 2.47 acres.
42. Calestani, 2012.
43. Ledebr and Walsh, 2009.
44. Medrano, 2014.
45. ERBOL, 2014.
46. Estado de Bolivia, 2010.
Coordination with representative local organizations is deemed essential; and

Environmental sustainability is encouraged, through initiatives such as increasing organic coca and coffee production, forest species diversification, and reforestation. 47

The sustainable livelihood approach utilizes innovative mechanisms to foster active community participation in defining local development plans.

47. Ibid.
II. Community Coca Control Implementation

1. Introduction

The original terms of the 2004 *cato* accord required Chapare farmers in established cultivation zones to submit their land for measurement in order to be entitled to a 1,600-square-meter plot of coca destined for legal markets.

After assuming office, the Morales government almost immediately boosted the Chapare region’s production ceiling from 3,200 to 7,000 hectares (7,907 to 17,297 acres). The new government obligated growers to title and register their coca fields, a process completed in the Chapare by 2008. Not only did individuals have *catos*, but also community-level unions often grew their own plot, providing them an important source of organizational funding, and increasing grassroots support for the accord.

Coca’s reliable income and ease of transportation—compared to bulky and perishable fruits such as bananas or pineapples—led many growers to initially petition for another *cato* by registering part of their land as belonging to a family member. While this practice has declined, it persists, particularly in the Chapare, despite government efforts to discourage it.

As conflict between the growers and national authorities decreased, the newfound peace transformed the economy in the Chapare, opening the market for new products such as fruit cultivation and the growth of other small businesses.48

Morales introduced the cato system to the Yungas in 2006, and subsequent registration concluded in the nontraditional zones in 2011 after successful negotiations with growers. Former vice minister of coca, Dionisio Nuñez argued, “Community control has always existed in the Yungas."

However, conflicts remain between traditional coca zones, where growers refuse to limit or regulate production, and expansion zones that have agreed to the cato. These tensions make it very difficult for Yungas unions to present a united front.49

Tensions also exist between Chapare and Yungas growers whose legal, cultural, and economic situations have differed significantly since the beginning of foreign-funded drug policy in the 1980s. Both sides argue that the other is getting the better deal from the Morales government and both are wary of any changes that seemingly benefit one region over the other. “There is a strong sense in the Yungas that the Chapare gets more funding and projects,” says Nuñez. “These differences in perspectives have never been fully and openly discussed.” However, in late April 2015, both regions announced a conference to develop a unified proposal for the new coca law.50

The participatory cato program is the cornerstone of government policy. By encouraging growers to exercise informal and internal controls through unions—in order to keep cultivation limited to permitted amounts—the control program prioritizes collective over individual rights and moderates potential tension between communities and the government. An accompanying complex, cross-referenced, online database of coca plots, existing crops, land titles, and growers’ licenses has become a valuable monitoring and coca reduction tool for union representatives, international monitors, and government officials.

The unprecedented and participatory Community Control Support Program (PACS),51 headed by growers themselves, began in January 2009. The European Union, like the coca growers’ unions and the Morales government, believes illegal coca cultivation stems from poverty, and, as such, contributed $13 million in funding (€9.5 million) over five years to the PACS. According to Marcelo Terrazas, PACS’ first director, “community control is about self-control. . . . We want to develop a deep conscience among coca producers by strengthening community organizations. Community control cannot be imposed; it has to come from growers themselves.” The current director, Pedro Ferrano, acknowledges that the program

49. A Yungas cato is 2,500 square meters (1.2 acres). In 2008, growers in the traditional Yungas zone signed an agreement with the Morales government that exempted them from any coca reductions. In 2012, 4,900 hectares (12,108 acres) of coca beyond the 12,000-hectare (29,653 acre) limit were grown in the traditional zone, while the UNODC reported a 7 percent cultivation drop in Yungas expansion areas in 2012.

50. EFE, 2015.

51. Literally translated as social control. We feel that community control is a more accurate translation of the concept behind the program.
exists, “thanks to the commitment of the European Union to take a risk on an innovative idea that had never been tried anywhere else before.”

The program places an emphasis on the coca leaf’s cultural importance and considerable history in the region. It has prioritized controlling the amount of coca grown without resorting to police- and military-driven repression, which has ensured a subsistence income for growers, maintained a high price for the leaf, created mechanisms to facilitate grower participation, and reasserted national sovereignty. “We bought our lot and built our little house thanks to the cato,” says Alieta Ortiz, who has worked in Chapare community radio.

Community coca control strives to accentuate the basic needs and fundamental rights of grower communities and the protection of the most vulnerable. It seeks to be non-judgmental, and perceives coca farmers as active agents in the policies that impact them. It further recognizes that any nation, including Bolivia, may be able to limit or alter drug production, but not completely abolish it.

The secondary goals of the program incorporate compliance with Bolivia’s international commitments, indirectly limiting the amount of coca that ends up as cocaine. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) data recognizes that cooperative reduction has been the driving force behind Bolivia’s declining coca cultivation figures. This trend was evident although the PACS program, which is well known in coca growing regions, had only effectively reached 30-40 percent of Chapare unions (although half of them have a Secretary of Community Control) along with Yungas farmers in Apolo, Caranavi, Circuata, and Irupana by the time its five-year funding ended in March 2013.

Since the Morales government’s election, 88 percent of eradicated coca has been removed through cooperative reduction with growers. “The ideal scenario is when producers pull up their own excess coca,” says EU Development Cooperation attaché Nicolaus Hansmann. This has occurred in the Yungas zone of Irupana and in some areas of the Chapare when local unions are advised that the Economic and Social Development Unit of the Tropics of Cochabamba (UDESTRO) or the Economic and Social Development Unit of the Yungas (UDESY) is coming to inspect their plots.

Of course, no system is foolproof and coca growers unions, like any other organization, are not immune to noncompliance or corruption. As a result, violation of community coca control policy can bring concrete, harsh penalties. Since 2011, Chapare unions decided that farmers who exceed the cato limit will lose their cato. Repeat offenders risk losing their right to grow any coca and even loss of their land. For example, in July 2014, over 800 growers in the Chapare lost their catos for producing more coca than permitted or for associating with drug trafficking.\(^{52}\) Morales officials affirm that these sanctions will be included in the new national coca law, slated for approval by August 2015.\(^{53}\)

\(^{52}\) ERBOL, 2014b.

\(^{53}\) El Diario. 2015.
Although, as Figure 3 demonstrates, forced eradication has been drastically reduced since the cato accord, as with any coca supply reduction program, crops are moved to remote areas, often expanding the agricultural frontier. “Eradication is just not very effective,” said Gonzalo Quezada, former director of Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (FELCN). “Planting just gets underway somewhere else.” Illegal and sizeable coca plantings have been discovered in areas where coca has rarely been found before: in far north and remote Pando and in Cochabamba provinces bordering the department of La Paz.54

In 2012, 8.5 percent of total coca production was found in 6 of Bolivia’s 22 national parks and protected areas. The parks closest to the Chapare (Carrasco and Isiboro Sécure) were affected most.55 President Morales has repeatedly exhorted growers to refrain from planting in national parks and offered plots elsewhere to the landless peasants who farm there so they can switch to alternative and unrestricted crops. The government announced

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54. Each citizen is permitted up to 15 plants for personal use.
55. UNODC/Plurinational Government of Bolivia, 2013. p. 35.
at the beginning of 2015 plans to install a radar system to improve detection of these illicit coca crops.\textsuperscript{56} 

Expansion of the coca frontier, driven by the relatively high price of the leaf, is often described as exacerbating environmental problems such as mono-cropping, deforestation, and increasing soil erosion. There is little doubt that transforming leaf into cocaine paste has contaminated local streams because of the dumping of chemical residues.\textsuperscript{57} However, the UNODC notes that current coca control policy has reduced the expansion of coca planting into these remote regions. The last figures reported (2013) note that only 4 percent of Bolivia’s coca crop is in protected areas (1,011 hectares or 2,498 acres), a 53 percent reduction from 2012.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that families are able to support themselves on smaller coca crops because of coca’s comparatively high price. As a result, deforestation has been lower than it would be otherwise. Some researchers have predicted that coca eradication and crop substitution actually exacerbate deforestation (and therefore soil erosion). They argue that eradication forces farmers to cultivate more land in order to survive because alternative crops have a lower yield and are not as valuable as coca.\textsuperscript{59}

2. **Implementation**

Community coca control incorporates the active, voluntary participation and engagement of farmers with state institutions, as well as information sharing and engagement with international entities and agencies, including the European Union and the United Nations, and the governments of Brazil and the United States. Growers themselves run the associated programs, whether as agricultural extension agents or inspections supervisors. They are well placed in government, currently holding key positions as vice ministers and the presidency. This has greatly enhanced coca growers’ sense of ownership and confidence in the efficacy of the program. Often, without being prompted, growers describe the community control of coca as “theirs.”

Men hold almost all the program’s leadership positions. This reality led PACS to encourage greater female participation by funding the participation of a woman delegate in each union federation. However, the frequent assignment of other duties to these female

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Página Siete, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{57} See for example, Dávalos et al. 2011 and Salm and Liberman, 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{58} UNODC, 2014, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{59} UNODC, 2006. pp. 28–30.
\end{itemize}
delegates, such as union secretarial tasks, has impeded the full implementation of roles for women in community control and oversight.  

To support union coca control efforts, PACS implemented five project pillars in close coordination with grower federations:

- studies to strengthen grower unions’ relations with the state;
- consciousness-raising, particularly of union leadership, on the importance of community control, leadership, and organizational training;
- investment in union infrastructure and equipment;
- incorporation of secretaries of community control into union leadership; and
- construction of four regional offices in the Yungas, and one in each of the six federations in the Chapare.

As community control over coca can often collide directly with individual grower economic self-interest, particularly if leaf prices do not remain elevated (which is key to ensuring a subsistence income), the approach requires considerable trust and cooperation within and between local unions and the umbrella federations they comprise. This is then tied to the government through growers’ deep-seated political loyalty to Morales—particularly in the Chapare—closely entwined with needs for subsistence income from coca and the profound indigenous respect for the “sacred” leaf. Growers in both the Yungas and the Chapare emphasized to us how critical the cato is for their family’s survival. “It’s very simple,” said grower Celestina Ticona, “The cato lets us feed ourselves.”

The program has been tailored to each region, which has been crucial to its acceptance. “Because of the different characteristics of each region and micro-region,” explained Pedro Ferrano, “we have adopted specific and distinct regulations for each zone.” Nonetheless, the PACS success in the Chapare has not been matched in the Yungas, due to less unified coca grower organizations, resistance from farmers in the traditional production zone, less loyalty to Evo Morales, and no legacy of forced eradication. Initially, given the distinct organizational, legal, and spatial configurations in the Yungas, most targeted farmers completely rejected the program.
From the perspective of EU attaché Nicolaus Hansmann, the viability of community control also stems from the successful implementation of three critical technical elements: the biometric registration (including fingerprinting and photographs) of growers (50,000 have been registered to date), land titling of just under 500,000 hectares (1,235,527 acres) to date, and satellite surveillance of coca plots. The 2013 Agrarian Census and initial efforts to bring coca merchant licensing into the electronic registry have also strengthened the initiative.

3. Complementary Policies

3.1 Farmer Registry and Identification Cards

Although growers’ organizations have registered their members for decades, lists were often outdated or inaccurate, and credentials could be easily duplicated or forged. As a result, the European Union funded a biometric registry—the extension of identification cards licensing coca producers—so as to facilitate monitoring through the database, SYSCOCA. This georeferenced system monitors how much coca each farmer grows as well as where the leaf is later sold or transported through market and road checkpoint controls. With the exception of the Yungas traditional zones, all producers have been registered, and ID cards have been distributed to program participants in La Asunta (Yungas) and Caranavi. Plans are underway to provide ID cards to growers in other regions.

3.2 Monitoring

By early 2012, Bolivia’s SYSCOCA database was the Andean region’s most sophisticated coca monitoring system, providing government officials with up-to-date information on the precise amount of coca planted, to whom it belongs, and whether it is grown by registered growers entitled to a cato. The system coordinates data from the UNODC’s satellite monitoring system (F-57) and the land-titling registry of the Institute of Land Reform (INRA) with the biometric registry. SYSCOCA can generate several years of details at the level of the individual producer about his or her cato, and whether there is any unauthorized coca on the plot. The data allows government officials to trace coca harvests and sale in the local market, permitting the tracking of diverted coca with greater precision.

Although the United States has reported significantly higher figures for Bolivian coca production under the Morales government than the UNODC has, a January 2012 monitoring agreement between Bolivia, Brazil, and the United States has led to more exact figures thanks in part to GPS and Brazilian monitoring software. As a consequence, in 2013, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) quietly downscaled their coca cultivation estimates as of 2005, as shown in Figure 4.
For the first time ever in the Andes region, coca monitoring data has created consensus on cultivation, permitting informed policy decisions and strategies with the support of domestic and international actors. U.S. and UNODC 2012 figures for Bolivian coca production vary by only 300 hectares (741 acres).\(^{63}\) In contrast, in Colombia, a 30,000-hectare (74,132 acre) discrepancy exists between the 78,000 hectares (192,742 acres) recorded in 2012 by the U.S. government and the 48,000 hectares (118,611 acres) registered by the UNODC.\(^{64}\)

### 3.3 Coca Merchant Licensing

The SYSCOCA database began to monitor coca transit, sale, and marketing in 2012. Since 2013, the database has been a valuable resource for DIGCOIN, the agency that licenses over 5,400 coca merchants, who together move 76 percent of all of the country’s legally traded coca (the remainder is sold directly by growers to consumers). These licenses and fees provide almost $600,000 a year to fund the agency’s operations,\(^{65}\) partially replacing the budgetary shortfall created by the suspension of U.S. funding in 2010. Improved monitoring

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63. See *Coca in the Andes*, United States Office on National Drug Control Policy, n/d.
has also increased seizures of coca leaf destined for the illegal market, with an average of 600 metric tons a month captured between July and November 2014.\footnote{Página Siete, 2014.}

The Bolivian government is in the process of installing internet connections at all DIGCOIN checkpoints in order to launch the SYSCOCA monitoring system. The next step is to include coca merchants in the biometric registry, which will allow close control of the movement of coca by registered intermediaries to the two authorized wholesale markets\footnote{Sacaba, just east of Cochabamba, and Villa Fatima on the eastern outskirts of La Paz.} as well as its distribution to individual vendors. When fully implemented, the system, which requires the technological equivalent of a smart phone, will bring a dramatic improvement in information sharing over the current paper records. However, several of our interviewees expressed concern that merchants may resist participating in the registry, although former vice minister of coca, Dionisio Nuñez, believes the coca marketing organization, Asociación Departamental de Productores de Coca de La Paz (ADEPCOCA), will most likely accept the measure. Nonetheless, success will largely depend on the implementation capacity and political will of the Bolivian government.

### 3.4 Depenalization of Coca Leaf

The government scored an important victory in January 2013 when Bolivia re-acceded to the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a reservation on coca chewing. “How can we forbid coca?” questioned Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, “It’s an integral part of our culture.” The Bolivian government had withdrawn from the 1961 Convention the year before in order to later re-accede with a reservation on coca chewing, which was accepted by the UN General Assembly with only a small minority of governments in opposition.

While in Bolivia and Peru the coca leaf has a unique cultural heritage, a number of experts saw the re-accession as an opportunity to consider how drug control obligations co-exist with other international norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People; the ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169); and UNESCO’s Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, among others\footnote{See: International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, 2011.} The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues had already recommended in 2009 that, “those portions of the [1961] Convention regarding coca leaf chewing that are inconsistent with the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional health and cultural practices, as recognized in articles 11, 24 and 31 of the [Indigenous Peoples] Declaration, be amended and/or repealed.”\footnote{UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2009. para 89. See also, ibid.}
In some respects, the UN’s decision to accept Bolivia’s reservation reflected its recognition that it needed to bring drug control treaties into harmony with other international standards. This is potentially instructive for future drug policy debates, especially as the treaties have so frequently come into conflict with international human rights norms.\textsuperscript{70}

Nevertheless, UN drug control treaties remain a barrier to establishing a fully functional licit coca industry. While the production of coca within Bolivia’s borders has international recognition, the Single Convention still classifies the leaf as a dangerous narcotic and bans its export to other nations.

In spite of this international prohibition, a Maywood, New Jersey, plant (managed since 1959 by the Stepan Chemical Company) has imported thousands of tons of coca leaf into the United States since 1903. The company extracts certain alkaloids for flavoring Coca-Cola. This special concession to Coca-Cola under the Single Convention is a direct result of U.S. government pressure. Stepan also sells the specific alkaloid used in cocaine manufacture for pharmaceutical use.\textsuperscript{71} Although Stepan and Coca-Cola currently buy the bulk of their coca leaf in Peru, during the peak of violent forced eradication there, the companies purchased leaf from the Chapare.\textsuperscript{72}

3.5 Production of Alternative Coca Products

Efforts to manufacture alternative coca products such as teas, flours, and toothpaste were initially slow to materialize, in part because international funders couldn’t fund merchandise deemed illegal in their own countries. A state-owned enterprise, Empresa Boliviana de Coca (EBOCOCA)\textsuperscript{73} opened in 2011, almost four years after it was funded. In the Yungas, two revitalized 1960s factories manufacture bagged coca tea and baking flour, but a new plant was postponed for several years because of inter-union disagreements over its location. All these difficulties have delayed the objective of an invigorated licit coca market and frustrated growers.\textsuperscript{74} These difficulties are compound by limits on funding availability for the research of alternative uses of coca, a problem shared by many of the ambitious plans undertaken by the Morales government.

Despite Bolivia’s successful modification of the Single Convention, there is no clear indication that international markets for coca products will open in the foreseeable future.


\textsuperscript{71} Cortés, 2013.

\textsuperscript{72} Associated Press, 2002.

\textsuperscript{73} Economía Bolivia, 2013.

\textsuperscript{74} Palacios, 2011.
Community control expert Karl Hoffman expressed concern: “There just isn’t the local demand, and without international legalization, there won’t be.” Despite the prohibitions, travelers have taken and sent coca from Bolivia for years. In early 2015, the government announced a project to remove the cocaine alkaloid from coca for pharmaceutical uses, in an effort to expand legal exports.

At the 2014 UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs—a meeting of the world’s primary drug policymaking body—Morales once again pressed for international support of alternative coca products. Ricardo Hégedus, manager of the country’s largest tea producer, Windsor Tea, explained, “Our longstanding dream is to grow the legal market. In its natural state, the leaf is a marvellous gift of nature, providing a moderate stimulant—like coffee without the jitters—that also packs a generous dose of vitamins and minerals.” Yungas grower Lucio Mendoza added, “We want to sell the leaf worldwide for the medicinal value we know it has. This would provide us legitimate income from coca and be good for the world, which will benefit from our sacred leaf.” To date, no international mandate exists to export the leaf other than as a flavoring agent.

3.6 Coca Consumption Study

After lengthy delays, the Morales administration released the EU-funded study on local coca consumption in November 2013. Comprised of eight separate investigations, the study identifies changes in consumption patterns, the quantity consumed locally, variations in coca productivity, and the functioning of local coca markets and transportation routes. A national survey on coca use was carried out in 12,000 homes, and the parallel production study examined 1,800 coca plots and conducted 2,700 interviews. The final results showed that 58 percent of Bolivian coca leaf is consumed locally and identified 14,700 hectares (36,324 acres) of coca as necessary to meet the local legal demand of just over 3 million consumers, considerably less than the 20,000 hectares (49,421 acres) the government had declared permissible in 2007.

76. However in 2013, Lufthansa, which handles all of the Bolivian National Post Office’s mail to Europe (except for Spain) announced that it would not accept any mail or packages containing coca leaf.
77. ERBOL, 2015.
78. Farthing and Kohl, 2014
79. Ibid.
80. UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, Article 27, clause 1. “The Parties may permit the use of coca leaves for the preparation of a flavouring agent, which shall not contain any alkaloids, and, to the extent necessary for such use, may permit the production, import, export, trade in and possession of such leaves.”
However, the 20,000-hectare (49,421 acres) amount reflected a political decision, consistent with government intentions to formally incorporate the cato system into state policy as a subsistence guarantee and conflict mitigation strategy. The government hoped that it could expand legal markets sufficiently to absorb this larger quantity of coca (8,000 hectares or 19,768 acres). However, in January 2014, Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Cáceres announced that the 10,600 hectares (26,193 acres) above the new production ceiling would be eliminated (the difference between the study’s determination of local demand and the 2013 UNODC coca monitoring findings).

The UNODC 2013 Coca Cultivation Study revealed that licit consumption is increasing; 30 percent of all Bolivians chew coca on a regular basis. It further recognizes an increase in licit coca transport and sales along the Bolivia-Argentina border, indicating the potential for an export market for non-narcotic uses in that neighboring country.

4. How Community Coca Control Works in the Chapare

The following is a detailed, step-by-step description of how, since 2012, the community coca control system has been carried out in the Chapare. A detailed list of the relevant acronyms is available in Appendix 2.

First, SYSCOCA shares its cross-referenced monitoring data with the farmer-run UDESTRO81 and with local-level union leaders through the Coca Control Modules offices. The local secretary of community control, or union leader, checks this monitoring data and organizes a commission to conduct onsite inspections of member plots. Commission members come from the union itself, as well as delegates from other local-level unions, and, if there is a problem, higher-ranking federation leaders. This control cruzada (cross-control) allows unions to exert compliance pressure on each other. In many cases, community members eliminate coca plants in excess of the cato limit before the commission arrives to avoid community disapproval or the total elimination of a family’s plot, which would place economic pressure on the community as a whole.82 “We don’t want the family to be left with nothing,” explained a young union leader named Maria. “If they have no income, they can become dependent on the rest of us.”

81. In the Yungas, the Economic and Social Development Unit for the Yungas (Unidad de Desarrollo Económico y Social de los Yungas–UDESY).
82. Anthropologist Thomas Grisaffi reports that both pride and shame play a powerful role in growers’ decisions to respect the cato.
In addition to educational orientation by PACS staff (until program funding concluded in March 2013), union members discuss how to enforce the cato at monthly federation meetings (attended by all grassroots union leaders) and local union gatherings. Community control over coca is always prominent on the agenda. Discussions of strategies for enforcement and individual cases can take up to three hours with active participation from rank and file members, leaders, and UDESTRO staff.83 Local unions that fail to limit excess planting can receive public reprimands via the Coca Federations’ radio station. “This can mean a real loss of face for your union,” explained a grower.

But noncompliance also brings serious material consequences. The same grower noted that exceeding the cato blocked community access to public works such as road improvements and school construction. “If you go to the town hall and your union has not respected the cato,” he said, “It’s like having a criminal record. No one will meet with you.” Unions also impose harsh punishments for abusing the system. For example, one farmer lost the right to grow coca after falsely denouncing neighbors from another community for unauthorized coca planting during a land dispute. The union banned the grower from future meetings or union participation.

Farmers often perceive the current control system as being more stringent than the previous U.S.-financed “zero coca” policy. One farmer recounted, “It is really tough, because now everyone knows how much coca their neighbors have—and they will turn in anyone who plants more than the permitted amount.”

The second level of compliance comes from UDESTRO. Its staff conducts routine visits to farms,84 and if they find more than a cato of coca, they schedule the removal of all of the family’s coca. The sanction forbids plantings for a year, which, because of maturation time, effectively means two years without any coca-related income. To replant, the farmers must ask permission from their union and reregister with UDESTRO.

The Joint Task Force, a combined military-police unit with 1,500 military and 400 police, are then called in to pull out any excess coca crops.85 They are organizationally linked to the Armed Forces command, but operationally dependent on the Vice Ministry of Social Defense. Based in 21 camps, 16 in the Chapare and 5 in the Yungas, they and 180 technical personnel from UDESTRO/UDESY have consistently surpassed government mandated coca reduction targets, particularly since 2010.

83. Many UDESTRO staff come from coca growing communities, which means that past and current employees provide insight on coca control at their own union meetings.

84. With limited staff, this is typically once every two years, although in some areas growers reported that it was once a year.

85. Ironically this is the same force that carried out repressive forced eradication from 1998 to 2004.
Forced eradication continues in the national parks and regions not subject to the
*cate* accord. The Chapare Federation of the Tropics has been aggressive in tackling this
issue, particularly in the parks where high-level delegations regularly carry out inspections
to identify clandestine crops. The federation reports success in ordering the local population
to uproot all unauthorized plants and burn rudimentary housing constructed in the fields.

Eight national and international agencies and organizations are committed to reduc-
ing the supply of cocaine; five Bolivian institutions and organizations as well as one from
Brazil, one from the United States, and one agency from the UN are dedicated to monitoring
coca/cocaine production and trafficking trends.

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86. UNODC/Plurinational Government of Bolivia, 2013. In 2012, cultivation declined 7 per-
cent in national parks over the previous year.

87. As reported to Thomas Grisaffi.
III. Community Coca Control Program Outcomes

Teasing out the effects of community coca control from other elements of drug control policy—whether economic development or interdiction—is close to impossible, as the program fits within a broader policy framework that relies on everything from land titling to improved law enforcement.

“It proves impractical to precisely measure the impact of community control on coca production,” said PACS director Pedro Ferrano. The integrated nature of the Morales government policy, we believe, plays a critical role in enabling each component of the program. While the following description seeks to focus on the results of community coca control, it inevitably draws on related policies.

An illegal drug market, by its very nature, precludes accurate measurement and data collection. Despite the Bolivian government’s 2014 allocation of $7.5 million\(^8\) to invest in the Chapare and the Yungas, information is sparse on the precise impact of economic diversification on local incomes, and of expanded government investment in education, health, and transportation on quality of life.\(^9\) However, enormous leaps in data collection have occurred—from satellite data to a 2013 Agrarian Census,\(^9\) to the biometric registry of over 50,000 coca growers. At the grassroots level, Caranavi union leader, Elías Cruz Aguilar,

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\(^8\) NotiBolivia Rural, 2014.
\(^9\) Ledebur and Youngers. 2012.
\(^9\) The country’s third. The first was in 1950, the second 1984.
emphasized that local growers’ organizations appreciate the data that the PACS program has made available, and PACS itself reports fielding repeated requests for information from its grassroots partners.91

1. Grower Engagement

For decades, coca grower unions were effectively the only governing force in the Chapare and much of the Yungas. While this began shifting with the 1994 Law of Popular Participation, which strengthened local governments by distributing state funds directly to them, grower union control of the municipalities means the unions remain critical in all aspects of local governance and the relationship with the state. The growers have a special relationship with Evo Morales that encourages compliance to government policies. “If we respect the cato, it is additional support for our president who is working so hard to make coca legal,” said Chapare union leader Eddie Godoy.

With significantly less funding than what was available during the period of forced eradication, the government has successfully and peacefully removed more excess coca production. “We have so much less money than was spent under the U.S.-driven policy,” said Pedro Ferrano, “and the results, particularly in 2011 and 2012, are far better than we ever expected.” The high levels of loyalty to the Morales government improved economic stability. The absence of violence combined with state investment in infrastructure and productive projects has stimulated a growing sense of citizenship amongst coca farmers. “Before we had no rights,” grassroots union leader Rosena Rodríguez said, “Now, with the cato and with our president, we do.” “The greatest benefit this government has brought the grower is the right to live well as a full member of our society,” added Ferrano.

Powerful local organizations provide the foundation for this engagement, and part of the program’s difficulties in the Yungas can be attributed to local organizational weaknesses and rivalries. EU attaché Nicolaus Hansmann has also emphasized the importance of leadership stability in the Chapare, forged initially in resistance to the government and then centered on the leadership of President Morales. Understanding how existing organizations are structured can be critical; the unions are hierarchical, from the local leader to the highest reaches of the federations, and the program’s recognition of this plays an important role in the success it has achieved.92

91. PACS, 2013. p. 146
92. PACS, 2013. p. 150.
2. Reduction in Violence

The violence provoked by forced eradication in the Chapare from 1996 to 2004 that led to the death of 60 farmers and security officers and hundreds of wounded has had a dramatic impact on an entire Chapare generation. Marco Erminio Fabricano’s experience is typical:

I began to work in 1984 when I was 12, but there was a lot of confrontation, death, and bloodshed everywhere. Everything was militarized, and every day more of our animals died because we couldn’t feed them... We depended on coca. We didn’t earn enough for a family to live on. It’s much better now because we have won the right to grow a cato of coca thanks to all the tears we shed. We are free, no longer downtrodden or kicked.

With the 2004 cato accord, violence plummeted in the Chapare. Since the cato’s adoption a decade ago, 2 coca growers and 4 eradication staffers have been killed. During the same time, coca production has steadily decreased to 2003 production levels. This dramatically illustrates how successful the adoption of the cato and the subsequent Morales administration coca control policy has been in both curtailing social conflict and enhancing compliance with both national and international policy goals.

Figure 5 plots the deaths and injuries provoked by coca reduction in relation to the amount of coca eradicated. It shows that since the adoption of the cato accord in October 2004, and especially since its formal incorporation into state policy in 2006, human rights violations have decreased dramatically.

During the Morales government’s tenure, two violent incidents have occurred during efforts to remove excess coca and another as a result of confrontation with the police in Caranavi over local demands for the construction of two citric plants.

In September 2006, a confrontation erupted between growers and the Joint Task Force in the Yungas de Vandiola, a traditional coca-growing region that shares a poorly delineated border with Carrasco National Park. The clash left two growers dead, and two soldiers and an additional grower with bullet wounds. Although the police involved in the incident have provided testimony, to date, no members of the armed forces have done so. In 2014, the government renewed an agreement with farmers, limiting them to 736 catos, which reflects the number of established union members living outside protected areas.

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93. Forced eradication was the undisputed source of most previous violence.
94. See Ledebur and Youngers, 2012 for details.
Seven years later, in October 2013, another confrontation took place in Apolo, a remote coca-farming area 90 miles north of La Paz. Four Joint Task Force members were killed after coca growers held some eight eradicators hostage. Ten more Joint Task Force members suffered gunshot wounds. The precise reasons for the deadly Apolo confrontation remain unclear, but several interviewees believed it reflected a struggle between different political parties in the area.

These clashes point to grower resistance in remote areas that lack the unified organization a local union provides. They indicate how critical careful planning, assessment, and monitoring can be.

3. Economic Stability and Diversification

Long-term success in containing coca cultivation hinges on agricultural diversification and economic growth. The EU decision, beginning in the mid-1990s, not to condition development funding on coca reduction (which had been a key element of USAID programs), and its recognition that coca farmers’ participation is indispensable, has strengthened grower trust in the government.96 From 2006 until 2014, the Morales administration implemented

more than one thousand infrastructure, institutional strengthening, and social development projects with an emphasis on consultation with participating families and food security.97

The secure income generated from the cato has permitted farmers to take risks with other income-generating activities.98 “The cato is a guarantee,” explained one grower, “it’s like a savings account which means you know you can survive.” This experimentation marks an identity shift as well, as one union leader remarked proudly: “Today, we are not only cocaleros, we are also bananeros (banana growers) and palmiteros (palm heart growers).”99 Marcela López, a former PACS communications officer and union liaison who comes from a grower family said, “We can’t always rely on coca. Now we have a real chance to improve our cultivation of other products with government assistance.”

Success with Fish Farming

“In the tropics, our original plan was to help 12 families, but within a year, 82 farmers had begun to raise fish, without any program in place for them. We were thrilled with this, as you can imagine. It turns out that there is a strong local demand for fish and they are disappearing from our rivers, so there was a good market opportunity. We are hoping that two years from now, the Chapare fish project will serve as a development focus for the region.

This made us realize that even without a large budget, we can meet peoples’ needs and expectations. What we did was identify farmers who really had the determination to do something good for their own family and wanted help in cultivating something else alongside coca. Once they saw that fish cultivation was feasible with their existing skills, and economically viable, they made a commitment to it. Their neighbors saw what they were doing and realized, ‘I can do this too,’ and so they began to excavate ponds and buy different species of baby fish.

97. Initiatives come from government entities such as the National Fund for Alternative Development or FONADAL, the Association of Municipalities, and the Special Projects Unit or UPRE administered by the president.

98. These can be seen as early adopters. Others will wait and see how they do before deciding whether or not to relinquish their coca.

99. Other more cautious or reluctant growers still proclaim an identity focused on coca leaf production.
We work to teach them how to build the pond, maintain it, care for the fish, and harvest them. It is going so well—they get a good price for the fish—that some growers earn twice as much from fish as from their catos of coca. And they can harvest the fish every three months, so it gives them the same regular income coca does.

We are having similar success with other crops as well—such as passion fruit near Ivirgarzama and bee-keeping in hilly areas in national parks. Not only are these income-generating projects growing, but they are becoming more mechanized. Such activities are waking people up to the realization that while the coca is a product integral to our culture and our history, and that it is something we should never lose, we must control it. We must respect the amount of coca the law allows us to grow, but we can also improve our standard of living by cultivating other products. What we want is, once and for all, to change the negative image that people have of the Chapare, that all we can produce is coca.”

—Giovanni Terrazas Camacho, Technical Coordinator of Productive Development Assistance, UDESTRO

Even the most casual observer can see that the Chapare, and to a lesser extent the Yungas, has been transformed since the adoption of the 2004 cato accord. Cars, motorcycles, fiestas (festivals), and home improvements are everywhere. The good economic times also reflect the upswing in the Bolivian economy since Morales took office in 2006, which the International Monetary Fund expects will show the region’s highest growth in 2015.

“The Chapare economy has become so dynamic,” said EU attaché Hansmann. “Aside from coca, 140,000 hectares (345,948 acres) of crops and cattle are being produced. I doubt that the next generation will be impoverished coca growers off some remote Chapare road.” Vice Minister of Social Defense Felipe Cáceres agreed: “Before, the children of growers didn’t think beyond coca. Three hundred students just graduated from high school in the 14 de Septiembre community. Ten years ago there were only seven or eight graduates.”

Agricultural diversification means that bananas now cover the largest cultivated area, making them a local economic mainstay, followed by citrus fruit and palm hearts, and then coca. Ninety-five percent of Chapare bananas are exported to Argentina.¹⁰⁰ Farmers are also experimenting with products such as honey, coffee, and chocolate. Others are starting small-scale businesses, particularly in marketing or transportation services.

¹⁰⁰. La Razón, 2013.
Land prices are spiraling upward, in part due to significant land titling efforts, but also due to an expansion of basic services through state-financed initiatives, private and public investment, and a corresponding growth in both the processing of agricultural goods and tourism. Improved access to inexpensive government loans and agricultural credit, and an influx of return migrants (mostly from Spain fleeing the economic crisis there), have combined with front-loaded, state-funded development assistance. While drug production and trafficking continue, these activities are primarily seen as a springboard to other economic activities.

Even though the price of coca has improved significantly (doubling over a six-year period), a cato still only generates between $200 and $300 dollars per month for most farmers whether the coca is sold in the licit or illicit market. Income is far less on hillsides fractured by steep ravines. This amount cannot generate enough income to support a family, but it does provide the financial stability necessary to encourage diversification into other economic activities.

In the Yungas, since 2006, the National Fund for Alternative Development (FONADAL) with EU and Bolivian state funding, has successfully worked with participating families and their unions in programs emphasizing food security. For the first time, other crops have provided significant income alongside coca. Built on the foundation of an earlier USAID program to develop specialty coffee markets, Yungeña coffee captured soaring prices in 2011 and 2012 encouraging a boost in production. In 2012, Yungas coffee outpaced coca in value and acreage, but by early 2013, international prices had tumbled (even though there was steady recovery in late 2014 and 2015), undermining coffee’s attractiveness as a substitute for coca.

The desire for alternatives is certainly there. Yungas grower Juan Mamani said, “We have tea now, the best production in the country. And we’re raising bees in places where only coca grew. These projects are great for us, and they give us a sense of pride that we can be coca growing families who don’t have to rely on coca.”

101. Thomas Grisaffi notes in some Chapare areas price has increased tenfold over a five-year period, which can create a problem for the next generation who are priced out—and do not have access to a cato. Although prices have risen sharply throughout Bolivia, increases in the Chapare have been proportionately higher.

102. Seventy four percent of the almost half a million hectares of land that has been titled are in the Chapare (PACS, p. 72 and p. 98)


104. Private lenders recognize the stability that a cato brings. Union leader Elías Cruz Aguilar reports that in his Yungas area, it is almost impossible to get a bank loan if you don’t have a legally recognized cato of coca.

105. Cocaine paste producers (the lowest rung of drugs production) repeatedly informed Thomas Grisaffi that they just wanted to make enough quick money to purchase a taxi or their own land.
4. Shifts in Coca Production

Better controls over production have led to sharp hikes in coca leaf prices, which are currently double or more what they are in Peru and Colombia. Many Chapare growers in particular are convinced that respecting the *cato* helps keep prices high, thereby boosting the income they can derive from the relatively small quantity they are permitted, an incentive that provides a positive feedback loop in encouraging compliance. It is important to note that according to the UNODC, higher leaf prices have not translated into hikes in value for Bolivian cocaine paste or refined cocaine, clearly demonstrating how little the price of coca leaf affects the cost of its illicit derivatives.

In 2011 in the Chapare, (excluding national parks) there was a 16 percent net drop in both licit and illicit coca cultivation in the Six Federation’s area of influence. In the Federation of the Tropics, the area where the community coca program has concentrated its resources and influence, the percentage fell even further, to 26 percent. According

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106. Although coca prices regularly show considerable volatility and fluctuation.
107. UNODC/Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2013 p. 3.
to Bolivia’s former UNODC director, César Guedes, “The progress is undeniable. In 2012, Bolivia was the only country with a decrease in coca cultivation.” In 2015, the Morales government intends to eradicate 10,000 hectares (24,711 acres).

Another shift is linked to government investment in development and infrastructure tied to coca, such as the organic leaf project in southern Yungas, where coca mono-cropping has caused significant ecological degradation. Bruno Terceros, who worked as monitoring and evaluation director for PACS, recounted, “In Irupana, we worked to certify 500 parcels as organic according to European criteria, which took us several years. There is a market for this kind of coca, and the 2,800 growers currently growing organically cannot meet the demand. We have a lot of international interest in this, because it is not just about coca, it is about protecting soils and the environment.” While a similar project in the Chapare has not gained the same traction, government funding is committed to further scientific studies into the benefits of organic coca leaf and leaf-based products.

5. Deviation of Coca to the Illicit Market

While, as Figure 7 demonstrates, overall coca production has declined steadily since 2009—the year the community control program was put in place—there remains a significant problem with the coca that detours into the illicit market.

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<td>1999</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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<td>27.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
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Source: UNODC/Government of Bolivia, 2013

109. See also http://www.controlsocial.bo/respaldos_2/Estudios/009_POTENCIALES_MER-CADOS_COCA_ECO.pdf. Irupana’s ready adoption of community control, even though it is a traditional zone, is attributed to its successful experience with organic coffee production (PACS, p. 136 and p. 142.)


111. Many factors play into production volumes, but we argue that community control has made a significant contribution to production declines. An overall 26 percent decline in Bolivia’s coca crop occurred between 2010 and 2013. However, the dynamism of the coca markets points to the importance of regional market analysis to take into account phenomena such as the balloon effect.

112. According to the UNODC 2013 survey, in 2012 8,100 hectares (20,016 acres) of coca were cultivated in the Chapare, roughly equivalent to 22,400 metric tons. Just 1,182 hectares (2,921 acres) were sold within the legal coca markets.
The 2013 total coca acreage figure is still 8,300 hectares (20,510 acres) above what the 2013 EU-financed coca study estimates is needed for local consumption of licit coca leaf or coca-leaf products. This suggests that 36 percent of total coca acreage is deviated to cocaine production and, in terms of metric tons produced, a little over half of coca in 2013 never entered the licit coca market (see Figure 8). The locus of the problem is in the Chapare, where as much as 90 percent does not pass through the legal market in Sacaba. Inadequate staffing at control points and police corruption has been identified as exacerbating the problem of controlling the leaf’s final destination. At first glance, this gives the impression that all of this uncontrolled coca ends up in the cocaine trade.

Figure 8: Coca leaf production and commercialization at the national level, 2004 to 2013

The reality, however, is more complex. César Guedes, former UNODC director in Bolivia, noted that consumers and merchants often purchase coca leaf directly for mining centers and for the Santa Cruz department. Santa Cruz is the country’s largest market for licit coca leaf (38 percent) as Figure 9 shows, and as the Chapare borders the Santa Cruz department, most of the coca consumed there comes east directly from the Chapare, rather

than going west to the Sacaba market just outside the city of Cochabamba and then east again to Santa Cruz.

Figure 9: Coca Leaf Commercialization by Department, 2004 to 2013 (tm)

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<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>4,480.7</td>
<td>4,480.7</td>
<td>4,629.0</td>
<td>4,773.6</td>
<td>4,705.0</td>
<td>7,213.0</td>
<td>7,153.6</td>
<td>6,871.5</td>
<td>6,988.0</td>
<td>7,325.8</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
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<td>La Paz</td>
<td>1,426.8</td>
<td>1,532.1</td>
<td>1,415.1</td>
<td>4,435.7</td>
<td>5,446.7</td>
<td>1,674.0</td>
<td>1,515.9</td>
<td>1,277.1</td>
<td>1,141.0</td>
<td>1,157.8</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>–18.9%</td>
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<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>1,402.0</td>
<td>1,352.3</td>
<td>1,640.8</td>
<td>2,266.6</td>
<td>3,505.3</td>
<td>3,298.0</td>
<td>3,016.8</td>
<td>2,695.2</td>
<td>2,361.0</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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<td>Beni</td>
<td>236.2</td>
<td>217.6</td>
<td>245.8</td>
<td>277.9</td>
<td>279.3</td>
<td>658.0</td>
<td>577.3</td>
<td>518.2</td>
<td>534.0</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>144.0%</td>
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<td>Oruro</td>
<td>590.6</td>
<td>691.1</td>
<td>775.4</td>
<td>781.2</td>
<td>793.0</td>
<td>1,154.0</td>
<td>1,235.9</td>
<td>1,195.6</td>
<td>1,364.0</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>143.3%</td>
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<td>Pando</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>84.0</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
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<td>Tarija</td>
<td>1,737.6</td>
<td>2,084.2</td>
<td>2,204.4</td>
<td>2,230.5</td>
<td>2,254.3</td>
<td>2,726.0</td>
<td>2,802.9</td>
<td>2,934.9</td>
<td>3,087.0</td>
<td>3,186.5</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
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<td>Potosi</td>
<td>1,422.0</td>
<td>1,459.7</td>
<td>1,588.4</td>
<td>1,623.8</td>
<td>1,622.6</td>
<td>1,933.0</td>
<td>2,050.3</td>
<td>2,075.1</td>
<td>2,098.0</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>–1.2%</td>
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<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>602.9</td>
<td>671.8</td>
<td>685.4</td>
<td>680.5</td>
<td>688.6</td>
<td>744.0</td>
<td>753.3</td>
<td>751.5</td>
<td>779.0</td>
<td>795.6</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,916</td>
<td>12,536</td>
<td>13,229</td>
<td>17,106</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>19,468</td>
<td>19,177</td>
<td>18,396</td>
<td>18,436</td>
<td>19,149</td>
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<td>Change from 2012–2013</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
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Considerable progress has been made to reduce coca deviated to the illicit market, as well. In fact, comparing the production declines against the amount authorized by the government coca-marketing agency, DIGCOIN, reveals that 60 percent more coca leaf entered official legal wholesale markets between 2004 (the year the cato accord began) and 2013.\(^{115}\) The government has also announced that it will focus more antidrug resources on controlling leaf sales. President Morales regularly exhorts coca growers to sell their coca through legal markets.

According to Humberto Fuentes, administrative director of the Vice Ministry of Social Defense, another state initiative, “will buy the difference between the identified local consumption quantity and the 20,000 hectares (49.4 acres) it recognized in 2007 as necessary to keep social peace.” He explained, “We plan to use these 5,300 hectares (12 acres) in alternative coca products. The remainder will be subject to eradication.”\(^{116}\)

115. Ibid. p.39.
6. Impact on the Cocaine Market

While community control and the *cato* accord have been effective in lowering violence and protecting vulnerable populations, forces beyond Bolivia’s borders shape the price, demand, and availability of cocaine. Even if coca cultivation could be limited to only domestic consumption, continued demand and cocaine profits would compel intermediaries to divert legal coca to cocaine, or cultivation would inevitably expand to meet demand. The creation of a, “huge criminal black market ... in which hundred fold increases in price from production to retail,” is an intrinsic characteristic of the current international drug control regime, according to the UNODC.\(^\text{117}\) This is a cautionary note to any government considering how it might apply the lessons from Bolivia’s *cato* experience. Internal controls will always have to wrestle with external demand for an internationally proscribed substance (in Bolivia’s case, coca leaf) and the elevated prices driven by such prohibitions.

Coca farmers regularly express concern about the trade’s harmful impact on their communities and families, even though local consumption of illicit drugs remains very low. “Paste production, it’s just so ugly,” said one woman. “I want my son to go to university. I worry about him being tempted by the cash and *pitillo* (*cocaine paste*).” This sentiment, coupled with the sharp distinction the current government makes between coca and cocaine and the greater social inclusion of farmers, has generated an unprecedented change in attitude toward the long-hated antidrug police (the FELCN and its rural unit, UMOPAR), as well as the JTF.

“Now the military, UMOPAR, and the government are on the side of the unions, and we have good coordination. The massacres and torture have come to an end,” explained Marcela López. “We are committed to community control, and to zero drug trafficking.” As one cocaine paste producer put it, “Before, coca farmers would tell you when UMOPAR was coming, now they just turn you in.” As a result, it is harder to find places to produce cocaine paste, and paste is often produced without the farmer’s knowledge (in places far from fields and growers) or on rented land, which does not have *cato* rights.

“The growers themselves have assumed a degree of responsibility to prevent trafficking,” said Gonzalo Quezada, FELCN director from 2010 to 2013. “They will denounce traffickers, something they never did before. We appreciate working with community control, because it provides important support from the population.” Similar statements from other FECLN commanders since 2006 reinforce how drug police perceive the policy as facilitating their efforts.\(^\text{118}\) Friction in the Chapare has flared up sporadically, for example in 2014.

\(^{117}\) UNODC, 2010, p. 10.
\(^{118}\) Ledebr and Youngers, 2008b; Farthing, 2010; Interview by Farthing and Ledebr of Gonzalo Quezada, 2014.
in response to the shooting of a resident by an UMOPAR officer,\textsuperscript{119} and in January 2015 for perceived police impropriety. Both incidents were unrelated to coca control.

No one denies that Bolivia’s novel policy is no match for the mercurial and immensely profitable drug trade. President Morales acknowledges that traffickers have “more modern” technology, “more sophisticated” weapons, and “better communications” than the police and the army combined.\textsuperscript{120} Limited budgets and technical capacity slow government efforts. However, despite the obstacles, from 2006 to 2012, accelerated enforcement led to a steady hike in seizures of coca pasta and refined cocaine, as well as the destruction of mostly small-scale paste production sites.

But with European cocaine demand spiking in the past 10 years and mushrooming consumption in Bolivia’s neighbors Brazil and Argentina, the country’s strategic location has made it a major transit country as well as producer. Approximately half of the cocaine paste and cocaine seized originates in Peru, and, as a kilogram of paste can cost half as much in Peru as it does in Bolivia, growing quantities are smuggled in and transported to Bolivia’s neighbors for consumption there or for export to Europe.\textsuperscript{121}

Brazil, now the world’s second-largest paste and cocaine consumer, buys almost 80 percent of Bolivia’s production. The 2,000-mile-long border with Brazil, largely through remote wilderness, makes control close to impossible.

Until the 1990s, elite families in remote, lowland, cattle producing areas dominated Bolivia’s drug trafficking. Since the mid-1990s, paste production and trafficking has spread throughout the country, carried out by small family clans. None of them control a significant share of the market, and they are quickly replaced if arrested and disbanded.\textsuperscript{122}

“We broke up more laboratories in 2014 than ever before,” said current FELCN head of Operations and Planning, Marco Antonio Ballón Terrazas. “Most labs produce 100–500 kilograms a week and are located northwest of the city of Santa Cruz.” In 2014, police arrested 3,455 people in Bolivia on drug trafficking charges.\textsuperscript{123}

Paste manufacture has dispersed throughout the country because of the adoption of the “Colombian method,” which uses ground coca to facilitate processing and can be carried out indoors. Press accounts suggest violence and other drug-related criminal activity have increased throughout cities where the bulk of Bolivians now live. However, the percentage of drug-related prisoners in the judicial system has fallen since President Morales has been in power, from over 70 percent to about 45 percent currently.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, according to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Los Tiempos, 2014; Estrella del Oriente, 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} ANF-Agencia, 2011.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} BBC, 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid, 2014. p. 131.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Opinión, 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Giocaman Aramayo, 2010.
\end{itemize}
Public Safety Observatory, only 5 percent of all crime is related to drug trafficking. Instead, 65 percent of illegal activities are some form of robbery or petty theft.\textsuperscript{125} A recent survey also found that only 4 percent of Bolivians stated that drug trafficking, combined with contraband and corruption were the most serious problems facing the nation. In contrast, 44 percent identified common crime and safety issues as their primary concern. Social conflicts, unemployment, poverty and inequality, poor government management, and economic instability all ranked higher than drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{126}

Interdiction funding from the United States has plummeted since the 2008 expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador and the DEA—from some $41 million in 2006 to zero in 2013. Even with curtailed financing, to some degree alleviated by increased Bolivian funding, seizures have risen almost every year since the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) left.\textsuperscript{127}

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\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure10.png}
\caption{Cocaine factory and maceration pit destruction in Bolivia, 2000 to 2013\textsuperscript{128}}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Figure 10:} Cocaine factory and maceration pit destruction in Bolivia, 2000 to 2013\textsuperscript{128}

Source: Vice-Ministry of Social Defense and Controlled Substances of Bolivia

\textsuperscript{125} Reinicke, 2015.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. p. 7.

\textsuperscript{127} Calestani, 2013. Critics contend that increased seizures merely reflect an increased volume of cocaine production in the country rather than improved interdiction.

\textsuperscript{128} Cocaine paste can be made by soaking coca leaves in precursor chemicals in a maceration pit. The paste can then be processed in a rudimentary ‘factory’ to be crystalized into cocaine.
In November 2012, the Bolivian, Brazilian, and Peruvian governments formed a permanent working group to systematize control efforts and to address drug transit flights between their countries. The Brazilian military signed a $420 million contract to develop the Integrated Border Surveillance System, including radar, drones, and sensors slated for installation along the border between Bolivia and Paraguay. The plan includes the placement of radar on the nations’ borders in order to shoot down flights that ignore orders to land or that are identified as transporting illicit drugs. The Bolivian congress ratified this provision in April 2014. Unfortunately, a previous regional shoot-down policy, coordinated by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), was easily evaded by traffickers and resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians.\textsuperscript{129}

7. International Response

Between 2007 and 2013, the European Union emerged as the major player in coca/cocaine control related financing in Bolivia as it significantly increased its funding. Its antinarcotic work, with an emphasis on social inclusion and strengthening of state institutions, consumed 36 percent of its in-country budget.

The United States has remained a vocal opponent of the Bolivian government’s strategy. For the past six years, the United States has issued a “determination” that Bolivia has, “failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to [its] obligations under international narcotics agreements.” Nevertheless, in 2011, the two countries signed a new framework agreement to guide bilateral relations and announced an exchange of ambassadors, although by April 2015, this had not yet occurred. The U.S. government claims that the expulsion of the DEA in January 2009 permanently impeded Bolivia’s ability to deal with trafficking. Bolivian officials expressed an interest in exchanging intelligence with the DEA in January 2015, but have not yet pursued the issue.

Bolivia has begun to coordinate closely with its neighbors on drug control initiatives and signed bilateral agreements with regional neighbors Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, as well as Mexico and Great Britain. Bolivia has provided evidence that, since 2009, cocaine interdiction has increased by 234 percent, the number of illicit drug laboratories destroyed has grown three-fold, and drug control operations have expanded significantly.

\textsuperscript{129} For more information see: Kruse, Ledebur and Roncken, 1999. The “Air Bridge Denial” Program led to violations of national sovereignty and unfortunate accidents, without significantly affecting drug trafficking. See also Patrick Gallahue, 2011.
8. Impact on Corruption

Bolivia’s extraction-based economy is based, in part, on illicit activities from contraband to drug trafficking, and pervasive corruption persists. However, from 2006 to 2013, Bolivia ranked significantly better, on average, in international corruption measurements than it had during the previous eight years. Governments, since 2000, have continuously reiterated their commitment to fighting corruption, and these efforts only accelerated when Evo Morales became president and strict anticorruption legislation was enacted.

The Morales administration inherited a dysfunctional and often corrupt Bolivian court system, which affects drug control and all other cases. Morales made reforming the judicial system a priority in his October 2014 presidential campaign.

Drug control efforts have not been identified as a central contributor to the corruption problem. In 2013, the U.S. State Department observed, “As a matter of policy, Bolivia does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. There were arrests and investigations of corrupt officials in 2012, but most were not related to corruption associated with drug trafficking. In 2012, all FELCN members took a polygraph test and those who did not pass were transferred out of the program.”

The highest profile drug-related case during the MAS (Morales’s party, the Movement Towards Socialism) tenure was the 2011 extradition to the United States of René Sanabria, head of the antidrug police (FELCN) from 2007 to 2008, for drug trafficking. In late 2013, the courts dropped charges for lack of evidence against the head of the directorate for industrializing coca (DIGCOIN) and the vice minister of Coca and Integrated Development for corruption related to coca licensing. In March 2015, prosecutors accused former national police commander, Oscar Nina, and his family of money laundering, placing him in preventative detention.

Community control of coca, with its crosscutting system of controls between unions, has arguably helped limit corruption. The Chapare municipalities run by coca growers unions have been widely recognized as the least corrupt and most functional in the country. Heightened trust in the state and in the police, since President Morales’s election, has strengthened citizen expectations that corruption is not to be tolerated.

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132. Kohl, Benjamin. 2003. The 1995 elections in newly formed municipalities led coca grower unions to be elected to lead of all Chapare municipalities. This grower control over Chapare municipalities has continued ever since.
IV. Current and Future Policy Landscape

Bolivia’s coca control policy confronts considerable internal and external pressures. To a certain extent, the effort’s viability depends on perceptions of equity between different coca growing regions in terms of “rationing” coca production. A May 2011 evaluation highlighted the need for a more solid communication strategy to address precisely this problem, not just between regions, but within them as well. Thomas Grisaffi reported: “Everyone talks about how much sacrifice they are making to control coca, but they don’t have any idea how the policy is applied elsewhere.” Repeated delays in training coca control secretaries are another element that has slowed compliance at the community level.

Unfortunately, the outdated legal framework of Law 1008 impedes maximizing community control’s potential. It creates a legal limbo and many of the human rights concerns and due process problems it provoked continue, in spite of partial reforms. The main impediment to sorely-needed reform is the law’s authorization of 12,000 hectares (29,653 acres) of legal production in the Yungas that has consolidated a staunch constituency there who have rejected any legal modification that would prevent them from continuing unrestrained coca production.

133. PACS, 2013. pp. 120–123. Communication about the program was primarily realized through meetings and secondarily through community radio. A soap opera about community control, Cocaj Causainin, was particularly effective in the Chapare. In the Yungas, where community radio is much less developed, meetings and events were the principal means that participants learned about the program.
Bolivian opposition parties criticized current government policy mostly in general terms that were not focused on the community control program. Parties on the right have accused the government of being a puppet of coca growers, and insist the unions exercise too much control over their members. Former president Jorge Quiroga of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristiano) has argued that permitting the cato legitimizes drug trafficking.\footnote{Página Siete, 2014.} The country’s principal opposition force, the Democratic Unity (Unidad Demócrata,) headed by wealthy businessman Samuel Doria Medina, has issued vague statements about replacing the coca economy with licit crops and increasing technological investments in the Chapare. The social democratic opposition, headed by Juan del Granado, has accused the government of ties to drug trafficking.\footnote{El Sol. 2014; El Diario, 2014.}

By late 2013, government authorities announced that two separate laws, one governing coca and the other drug trafficking, were in the process of formulation. The laws, slated for approval in late 2015, would formally codify the cato system into law where it currently operates, and ratify the 12,000-hectare (29,653 acre) limit in the “traditional” Yungas region. Vice minister of social defense, Felipe Caceres, explained that, “under the new law, the idea of the traditional zone disappears. There will be a legal and an illegal zone.” Such new legislation is crucial for the governments’ coca control policy to be institutionalized. But there remains resistance to it in the Yungas. “As a man who worked for the government, I want the new law,” said Dionisio Nuñez, former vice minister for coca, “but as a Yungas grower where traditional areas will lose out, I’m opposed to it. I think it’s going to have to be very vague to get through.”

Another overwhelming constraint to Bolivia’s drug control efforts is the lower cost of production of both coca and cocaine paste in neighboring Peru. Limited control over 1,047 km (654 miles) of border with Peru, much through inaccessible wilderness, means that Peruvian coca, paste, and refined cocaine can seep into Bolivia despite government efforts. With one of the lowest cocaine consumption rates in the continent, Bolivia has almost no control over sustained external demand from Argentina, Brazil, and Europe, and its own public has little comprehension of the dimensions of the problem.

Rivalries and overlapping competencies have also hampered Bolivian efforts as two ministries, two vice ministries, and almost a dozen agencies vie for resources and, on occasion, undermine each other.\footnote{See the list of agencies and organizations in the Acronyms section.} Protracted negotiations between PACS and the Land Reform Institute (INRA) to coordinate land titling temporarily impeded grower confidence in both
agencies. In other instances, government agencies failed to complete their commitments to one another in a timely fashion, which caused other policy components to fail.\textsuperscript{137}

Inadequate staffing has further restricted effective implementation. According to Humberto Fuentes, administrative director of the Vice Ministry of Social Defense, “There are just enough resources to identify the limitations of community control, but not to regulate the coca market. If we want to make this program sustainable, we need to find more financing.” With the current shortfall, at present only three staff members work to ensure the continuity of PACS and SYSCOCA. “Just to run SYSCOCA, we need 18 trained technicians,” continued Fuentes. Market monitoring has improved substantially through SYSCOCA, but DIGCOIN has only 50 inspectors to enforce controls over coca merchants nationwide. Although demarcation of borders between traditional and expansion zones (in the Yungas) and between legal and illegal zones (like national parks) has improved, ambiguity remains in some areas and, as such, is a potential source of conflict.

The inability to generate a larger market for processed licit coca products in order to expand legal demand is a significant constraint, as the government was initially optimistic that an international market could be developed rapidly. It is still committed to this goal, but has come to realize that it is likely that much time and effort will be required before Bolivia’s leaf is sold as tea or toothpaste on North American or European supermarket shelves.

Given the Bolivian government’s history of bureaucratic inefficiency and incapacity, its success in achieving concrete results is impressive.\textsuperscript{138} Faced with a significant funding gap in 2013 and 2014, the persistence of community control reflects growers’ organizational strength, trust, and loyalty. Caranavi union leader Elias Cruz insisted that “until now, community control remains in force, not in force as an institution, but in the conscience of the producers.”

\textsuperscript{137} PACS, 2013. p. 138, p. 150, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{138} Bolivia, similar to many countries like it, is also constrained by government incapacity to spend already budgeted amounts, especially at subnational levels such as municipalities.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Coca Control Achieves Development Goals

Bolivia’s community control initiative has effectively integrated evidence, such as satellite and census data into its social investment and development policy decisions and implementation. More reliable and agreed-upon statistics have enabled better, negotiated joint strategies between producers, the Bolivian state, and international agencies. The initiative has curtailed negative consequences for farmers as well as their punishment and criminalization through a limitation on violence and repression. In separating coca from cocaine, it has developed an integrated and coordinated policy that engages growers in assisting the state in controlling trafficking.

It has improved citizens’ access to information; it has enhanced legal identity through biometric registry; it has promoted rights to land and property through significant boosts in land titling; and it has advanced legal participation through citizen input into governance and through increased provision of services such as health care and education in marginalized communities.
2. Applicability to Other Regions and Countries

The most obvious application of the community control model is in countries where both a legal and illegal market exists or can be developed. This most directly applies to Peru where the same quantity of coca is legally permitted as in Bolivia under current law, and to a lesser extent Colombia where indigenous people are permitted to consume the leaf and small amounts of cocaine (and marijuana) are permitted for personal use, although sales of any quantity are illegal.

Bolivia’s experiment with community control of coca relies on a strong foundation of technological monitoring. It has been most successful where local organizations are strongest. Respect for grassroots organizations as legitimate interlocutors of local people is indispensable, which means that strengthening weak organizations and their ability to represent local populations is an essential element for sustained production controls. This approach has gained international recognition. The secretary general of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, has called community control, “a unique model... Bolivia has taken the lead for many years towards what should be a more sovereign and regional struggle against drug trafficking.”

Even in locations where the product in question (such as coca or opium poppy) is clearly destined for an illicit market, much of the community control model has relevance if it is adapted to local conditions and realities. By permitting farmers to grow a small amount of the product they rely on for economic survival, mixed with participatory monitoring, improved government services, positive engagement with the state, economic development initiatives, and a reduction in violent repression, growers are in a better position to diversify their production base and limit their dependence on an illicit crop.

3. Conclusions

Bolivia’s community coca control policy, even with its inevitable constraints and challenges, provides a policy initiative worthy of further consideration. It has proven more effective and cost-efficient than forced eradication in controlling coca production, and represents a local proposal appropriate to its context. Compared to continued confrontation in both Peru and Colombia, the Bolivian government’s approach offers a non-violent alternative that empow-

139. Peru’s coca law was written at the same time as Bolivia’s.
ers citizens and improves relations between growers and the state. It ensures subsistence for farm families and offers the hope of an integrated development that both incorporates the Andes’ relationship with coca and assists growers in finding livelihoods beyond it. With significantly fewer resources than its neighbors, Bolivia has consistently managed to assert greater control over coca production.

In exchange for increased citizenship rights, participating farmers opt to pursue a risky economic path—life beyond reliance on coca. Trust is critical in this shift, built on government respect for grower participation, combined with practical components such as land titling, educational, health, and road infrastructure, and improved, diversified crop production and marketing. “Things are better now thanks to this project through our president and the contract with our European brothers,” said Yungas leader Elías Cruz Aguilar:

Three key principles underpin the Bolivian coca and cocaine policy model and are essential for improved international cooperation with low-income countries on crops that can be destined for illegal drug production. These concepts are sovereignty, shared responsibility, and respect for human rights. Chapare union leader Rolando Vargas and Yungas grower Juan Mamani expressed these concepts forcefully:

As growers, we need to show the international community our commitment to eliminate drug trafficking. The UN conventions put us in the same category as traffickers, and we have never been drug dealers. So, we need to raise our awareness and understanding of our responsibilities to limit coca, but we need to do the same with the international community as well.

—Rolando Vargas

This government helped raise our awareness that we couldn’t grow more coca in Caranavi, not just because it is illegal, but also because it would give our country a bad image in the international community.

—Juan Mamani

Though no system is foolproof and multiple obstacles still bog down implementation, Bolivia’s community control program represents a pragmatic and ambitious effort to improve livelihoods and exert greater state control over the diversion of coca to illicit markets.

141 Titling is incomplete in the traditional Yungas growing zones and about 30 percent of the Chapare. PACS, 2013. p. 72.
The Bolivian model features close coordination between strong local organizations and programs that are adapted to local, even micro-level, conditions. These are key to implementing any participatory development policy as community participation and dialogue are principles that lie at the heart of the best of development practice no matter where or what the crop.

4. Recommendations:

- Programs must be constructed on a thorough knowledge of the area, as well as the differences within the area.

- Efforts to limit, complement, or substitute coca and other crops used in drug production must prioritize families’ economic sustenance and sustainability as a vital prerequisite to crop reduction.

- Direct engagement with growers is essential as negotiated reduction with community involvement is more sustainable and cost-effective than forced eradication.

- Economic development policies should not be subsumed by a counter-narcotics agenda, as even strong sustainable supply-side programs cannot stop or impede the cocaine trade.

- The bulk of efforts to shrink the market for cocaine must focus on demand-side policy and reducing the high profits associated with the illegal drug trade.

- International funders should be willing to support grassroots and host countries’ efforts to innovate and “think outside of the box” when it comes to drug control, as the European Union did in supporting community coca control. Governments and funders must provide greater support to control and monitor the illicit market, specifically by strengthening the efforts of institutions like Bolivia’s DIGCOIN to control coca leaf sales and transport.

- Development efforts and funding organizations should ensure social inclusion, citizenship, and a central role for local community organizations by strengthening legitimate representative civil society groups as valid interlocutors.

- The Bolivian government and international community should provide continued long-term funding to further institutionalize community coca control.


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66 REFERENCES


Appendix 1.
List of Interviewees

- Marco Antonio Ballon Terrazas, National Director of the Department of Planning and Operations, FELCN. January 30, 2015.
- Bruno Terceros, Monitoring and Evaluation Director for PACs, La Paz, February 28, 2013.
Yungas


Chapare

Appendix 2. Acronyms

International bodies

OAS    Organization of American States
UNODC United Nations Office on Drug and Crime
NAS    United States Narcotics Affairs Section
EU     European Union

Government entities

VDS    Vice Ministry of Social Defense and Controlled Substances (Vice Ministerio de Defensa Social y Sustancia Controladas)
VCDI   Vice Ministry of Coca and Integrated Development (Vice Ministerio de Coca y Desarrollo Integral)
FTC    Joint Task Force (Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta)
FECLN  Special Force in the Fight against Drug Trafficking (Fuerza Especial en la Lucha contra el Narcotráfico)
UMOPAR Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural) part of the National Police
UECLIN Executing Unit in the Integrated Struggle against Drug Trafficking (Unidad Ejecutora de Lucha Integral contra el Narcotráfico)
CONATLID National Council for the Struggle against Illegal Drug Trafficking (Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra Trafico Ilícito de Drogas)
FONADAL  National Fund for Alternative Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo)

UDESTRO  Economic and Social Development Unit of the Tropics of Cochabamba (Unidad de Desarrollo Económica y Social del Trópico de Cochabamba)

UDESY  Economic and Social Development Unit of the Yungas (Unidad de Desarrollo Económica y Social de los Yungas)

PACS  Support for Social Control (Programa de Apoyo al Control Social de la Producción de la Hoja de Coca)

DIGPROCOCA  General Direction of integrated development of coca producer regions (Dirección General de desarrollo integral de las regiones productores de coca)

DIGCOIN  General Direction of Coca Leaf and Industrialization (Dirección General de la Hoja de Coca e Industrialización)

CONCOCA  National Council of Revalorization of Coca Leaf (Consejo Nacional de Revalorización de la Hoja de Coca)

INRA  National Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria)

SYSCOCA  Georeferenced system on coca cultivation (Sistema geo referenciado de cultivos de coca)

Organizations

Chapare

- FTCTC Federación de Trabajadores Campesino del Trópico de Cochabamba
- Federación de Zonas Tradicionales de Yungas del Chapare
- Federación Única Centrales Unidas
- Federación de Comunidades Interculturales de Chimoré
- Federación Sindical de Comunidades de Carrasco Tropical
- Federación Sindical Agropecuaria Mamore Bulo

Yungas

- ADEPCOCA Asociación Departamental de productores de coca de La Paz
- COFECAY Confederación de Federaciones Campesinas de Yungas de La Paz
- APPROCOCA (Caranavi) Asociación Provincial de Productores de Coca de la provincia de Caranavi
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Black Devils Bolivian Military Air Drug Control Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Brazil Software and training for DIGPROCOCA to interpret and analyze imagery. Provided through the Trilateral Agreement. Data shared with Vice Ministry of Social Defense, UNODC, and DIGPROCOCA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGU</td>
<td>Coca Growers’ Unions Six Federations of the Cochabamba Tropics, COFECAY and ADEPCOCA in the Yungas, and other areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIG</td>
<td>General Coca Production Directorate (DIGPROCOCA) Economic and Social Development Units (Chapare’s UDESTRO and Yungas’s UDESY) register, measure, and monitor coca plots with GPS, laser distance-meters, etc. Data shared with UNODC and PACS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Bolivian Joint Task Force Bolivian military/police coca reduction force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>United States Narcotics Affairs Section Purchased GPS and Laser Distance Meters through now-expired Trilateral Agreement (United States is no longer an active partner).</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACS</td>
<td>Community Control Support Program Promotes and manages cooperatively limited coca production and strengthens state/union and inter-union coordination. The system will include coca marketing and transport in future years. Officially part of the Vice Ministry of Social Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCEU</td>
<td>Social Control Support Program Funded by the EU, the project includes the Coca Crop Monitoring System (SYSCOCA), a sophisticated database that cross-references monitoring data, land titles, satellite imagery, and coca crop locations. The system will include coca marketing and transport in future years. Officially part of the Vice Ministry of Social Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Crop Monitoring Program includes analysis of satellite imagery, aerial photography, and ground verification. Publishes annual report. Shares data with the Vice Ministry of Social Defense, DIGPROCOCA, and Program to Support Community Control.</td>
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Appendix 3.
Map and Photos
Figure A3.1: Coca cultivation density in the Andean Region, 2007
Figure A3.2: Coca chew-in to demand that the coca leaf be removed from Schedule 1 of the Single Convention

Figure A3.3: A member of Bolivian combined forces from the police and army uproots an illegal coca plant near Chimore
Figure A3.4: Farmers in the Chapare dry coca leaves in the sun, no longer fearing military patrols

© Noah Friedman-Rudovsky l 2014

Figure A3.5: Coca farmers gather at the coca market in the Villa 14 de Septiembre village to sell coca

© Carlos Cazalis l Corbis l 2006
About the Authors

Linda Farthing is a writer and editor with 25 years of experience in Latin America, much of it on coca leaf and its derivative, cocaine. Most recently she contributed to and edited, “Reimagining Drug Policy in the Americas” for the July 2014 issue of North American Congress on Latin America magazine. Farthing field produced the film Cocaine Unwrapped in Bolivia and has written a curriculum on drug policy for high school students. She is co-author of Impasse in Bolivia (Zed 2006), From the Mines to the Streets: A Bolivian Activist’s Life (Texas 2011), and Evo’s Bolivia: Continuity and Change (Texas, 2014).

Kathryn Ledebur is a researcher, activist, and analyst of alternative livelihoods, coca and drug control strategies, Bolivian politics, United States foreign policy, and human rights issues, with over two decades of experience in Bolivia. She also served as a consultant for the Washington Office on Latin America in Bolivia, and is a member of the International Drug Policy Consortium. Ledebur has published numerous articles, memos, and reports that have provided insight on drugs and development policy.

Linda Farthing is a founder and Kathryn Ledebur is the director of the Cochabamba-based policy think-tank, the Andean Information Network. The network promotes human rights and socioeconomic justice in Bolivia and more humane and effective illicit drug control policies. The network also provides information and analysis to NGO colleagues, the media, and international policymakers on developments in Bolivia and the impact of U.S. government and European policies. Working closely with civil society organizations in Latin America and in the United States, The Andean Information Network promotes policy dialogue and the development of pragmatic alternatives that address the underlying economic, social, political, and cultural needs of Bolivia.
Global Drug Policy Program

Launched in 2008, the Global Drug Policy Program aims to shift the paradigm away from today’s punitive approach to international drug policy, to one which is rooted in public health and human rights. The program strives to broaden, diversify, and consolidate the network of like-minded organizations that are actively challenging the current state of international drug policy. The program’s two main activities consist of grant-giving and, to a lesser extent, direct advocacy work.

At present, global drug policy is characterized by heavy-handed law enforcement strategies which not only fail to attain their targets of reducing drug use, production, and trafficking, but also result in a documented escalation of drug-related violence, public health crises, and human rights abuses.

Open Society Foundations

Active in more than 100 countries, the Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.
Drug policies that are based on human rights and promote public health are a priority for the Open Society Foundations. Our efforts focus on promoting collaboration and expanding the range of stakeholders committed to drug policy reform, empowering drug users to advocate for their rights at the national and international level, and supporting research into the economic and social costs of current drug policies.

_Habeas Coca: Bolivia’s Community Coca Control_ is the sixth in a series of publications by the Open Society Foundations’ Global Drug Policy Program that documents positive examples of drug policy reform around the world. We hope these case studies will inspire policymakers and advocates in consultation with people affected by drug policy to design rights-centered policies that are scientifically sound and humane.

_Habeas Coca: Bolivia’s Community Coca Control_ is the first of the Lessons For Drug Policy Series to explore supply-side policy reform. It documents Bolivia’s transition from two decades of forced eradication of coca, a tactic criticized for its violence and gross human rights violations, to the community coca control program, lauded internationally for its effectiveness. With its emphasis on sovereignty, shared responsibility, and respect for human rights, Bolivia’s community control program represents a pragmatic and ambitious effort to improve livelihoods and exert greater state control over the diversion of coca to illicit markets. Not only is it a local program appropriate to its cultural context, Bolivia’s community coca control initiative has also proven to be more effective and cost-efficient than forced eradication in controlling coca production.

In addition to drug policy reform, the Open Society Foundations work around the world to advance health, rights and equality, education and youth, governance and accountability, and media and arts. We seek to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens.