Muslims in the EU:
Cities Report

FRANCE

Preliminary research report and literature survey

2007
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<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANPE</td>
<td>National Employment Agency (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFPA</td>
<td>Association for the Training of Adults (Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCM</td>
<td>Permanent Assembly of Trade Rooms (l’Assemblée permanente des Chambres des Métiers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEVIPOF</td>
<td>The Political Research Centre of “Sciences Po” (Centres de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po) – a Paris-based research centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFDM</td>
<td>French Muslim Council (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRS</td>
<td>The National Scientific Research Centre (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODAC</td>
<td>(Commissions Départementales d’Accès à la Citoyenneté)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPEC</td>
<td>Committees for the Promotion of the Equality of Opportunities and Citizenship (Commissions pour la promotion de l’égalité des chances et de la citoyenneté)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORIF</td>
<td>The Council of Reflection on Islam (Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>The Directorate of Evaluation and Planning (Direction de l’Evaluation et de la Prospective) of the Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>The National Fund for Social Projects (Fonds d’Action Sociale)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNMF</td>
<td>The National Union of the Muslims of France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front (Front National) – a French political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>General Certificate of Education (baccalauréat)</td>
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<td>GELD</td>
<td>Group for the Study of, and Fight against, Discrimination (Groupe d’Etudes et de lutte contre les discriminations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HALDE</td>
<td>High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCMF</td>
<td>High Council of French Muslims (Haut Conseil des Musulmans de France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>Council houses (habitations à loyer modéré)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>Political Studies Institute of Paris (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris) – “Sciences Po”</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOP</td>
<td>The French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d’opinion publique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>The National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) – a French political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SONACOTRA</td>
<td>The National Construction Union for Algerian Workers (Société nationale de construction pour les travailleurs algériens)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire – a French political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UOIF</td>
<td>The Union of the Islamic Organisations of France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France)</td>
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Background

This research paper, focusing on the situation of Muslims in France, was commissioned by the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP)\(^1\), of the Open Society Institute (OSI)\(^2\). Similar reports have also been prepared for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

The overall aim of this series of research papers is to provide a comprehensive review of available research and literature on Muslims in each of these countries, including a bibliography covering the most relevant recent publications. Another aim is to facilitate the selection of a number of EU cities for inclusion in a proposed new OSI monitoring project to be initiated in 2007 — “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”. This project will address policy on Muslims at the city, or municipal, level, as opposed to the national level, which is the more usual level of analysis for cross-country monitoring. It follows on from previous EUMAP reports addressing the situation of Muslims in Europe, in particular the 2004 report, *Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens*\(^3\).

Each of the research reports follow the same methodology, to provide comparative information across the countries covered, according to a common methodology prepared by EUMAP\(^4\). Part I of the report evaluates the availability of data and other information on the situation of — specifically — Muslims in France, in the following areas: population, identity, education, employment, health and social protection, policing and security, and participation and citizenship. Part II addresses the policy context in France, in particular with regard to the perception of Muslims, integration policy and administrative structures. Part III looks more specifically at the potential suitability of four cities in France with significant Muslim populations — Marseille, Grenoble, Paris and Lille — for inclusion in the OSI “Muslims in the EU” city monitoring project.

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\(^{1}\) Full details on the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) can be found at www.eumap.org.

\(^{2}\) Full details on the Open Society Institute (OSI) can be found at www.soros.org.

\(^{3}\) The full report, as well as previous EUMAP reports on the situation of Muslims in France and Italy, can be found here: [http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/britishmuslims](http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/britishmuslims)

\(^{4}\) The methodology for the research papers is available on the EUMAP website (www.eumap.org)
Executive Summary

French law forbids distinguishing, or counting, citizens or residents according to their faith. However, estimates place the French Muslim population at between 3.5 and 5 million, representing 6.0-8.5 per cent of the total population (58.5 million). This total includes at least 2 million Muslims with French citizenship. The majority of Muslims in France have origins in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia — the Maghreb). There are also large populations with origins in Turkey, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Muslim migration to France began before World War I, but significantly expanded after World War II, when French companies, in need of immigrants to fill gaps in the labour market, recruited from the Maghreb, the countries of the Sahel area (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania), and later from Turkey. This first wave of economic immigration was suspended in 1974. In the 1970s, immigration occurred mainly through family reunification; although tight restrictions had been put in place, many women and children joined the male immigrants and settled in France. The next wave of immigration was the arrival of political refugees from Turkey, after the military coup d’état in 1980. In the second half of the 1980s, Kurds from Turkey also arrived in France as asylum-seekers.

French Muslim immigrants were mostly employed in industries such as car production, the building trade and the chemical and metallurgical industries. They settled in areas where industrial activities and cheap housing were concentrated, a pattern that has been retained to this day. The most significant Muslim populations are in the following régions (counties): Île-de-France (where Muslims comprise up to 35 per cent of the population), Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, PACA (20 per cent), Rhône-Alpes (15 per cent), Nord-Pas-de-Calais (10 per cent) and Alsace.

Initial post-war Muslim immigration occurred at a time of housing shortages in France. As a consequence, it was difficult for immigrants to find housing. They were forced to live in woefully inadequate housing in the big cities, and in some cases even in ‘shanty towns’. In the 1950s, the Government started to build specific housing residences for immigrant workers, while removing the ‘shanty towns’ and unsanitary housing. This resulted in a major improvement in the situation of Muslim immigrants. In the 1970s, they progressively gained access to social housing (HLMs). However, this came at a time when significant improvements in the living standards of working-class people of French origin, were enabling them to buy their own properties. This meant that, from the 1970s onwards, the HLMs came to be increasingly occupied by immigrants. Even today, the majority of immigrants rent social housing.

There is a strong geographical concentration of Muslims in socially disadvantaged parts of cities. However, for a long time the State referred to the housing problems of immigrants in terms of ‘social exclusion’, but refused to admit the existence of racial discrimination in this area. However, this position now seems to be changing. This is mainly thanks to recent reports and surveys providing evidence of discriminatory practices, including discrimination in access to housing, including discrimination on the part of the public bodies managing the HLMs. Access to private accommodation can be even more problematic for the foreign population and their children.
Young immigrants, or children of immigrants, are particularly exposed to discrimination when they look for accommodation. Council housing bodies see them as a risk to others. They therefore, systematically offer them accommodation in poor districts, or only in the districts where they were born and grew up. Families from Sub-Saharan Africa also face barriers in accessing social housing; as a consequence they often live in unsanitary homes in the private sector or in squats. In 2000, Government policies were introduced to reinforce social diversity in housing and a law was passed to make public housing institutions and municipal bodies ensure social heterogeneity in the HLMs. Although the aim of this law was to prevent the creation of poor and rich HLM, in practice, it has instead been used to control the ethnic composition of council houses.

The restructuring and lay-offs that the industrial sector underwent during the 1970s and 1980s has a disproportionate impact on French Muslims. Many currently find themselves unemployed, in early retirement or unable to work (because of illness or a permanent disability). French Muslims suffer disproportionately from unemployment, and also encounter more difficulties finding full-time long-term employment. They still occupy the least qualified professional positions and are underrepresented in executive positions. They are twice as likely to work in a factory, as compared to the general population, and are overrepresented in the construction and automobile sectors. This concentration of Muslim immigrants in the industrial sectors also impacts on their ability to build a strong social and professional network that would enable them to help their children find employment.

For French Muslims, citizenship is less of a barrier to employment than in other European countries, as many are in fact French citizens. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that even second generation French Muslims, who have lived in France all their lives, continue to be considered as migrant workers. In interviews and surveys, many young people of North African origin say they had been victims of racial discrimination. French legislation protecting employees against discrimination from employers has been strengthened over the last decades. The Law on Equal Opportunities, adopted in March 2006, details several new measures concerning employment and education. The French State has also developed several actions and programmes to combat discrimination in the labour market.

Discriminatory practices in the workplace persist, however. Interviews with people in charge of recruitment have revealed, for example, that, despite the legislation in place, subjective elements may be used to evaluate job applications from those with foreign origin; these are often particularly unfavourable to applicants of North African origin. This could include subjective evaluations of the applicant’s level of integration, or his or her capacity to fit into the company in spite of any cultural differences. In 2004, evidence from ‘situation testing’ revealed the existence of discriminatory practices in the recruitment process. By sending a CV to different companies, researchers found that a CV from someone with a foreign origin was more likely to be rejected than a similarly qualified individual with no obvious foreign origin.

The proportion of female immigrants in the workplace has increased. However, they are concentrated in precarious and part-time positions. In addition, Muslim women wearing the Islamic headscarf (hijab) encounter problems from employers.

It is difficult to analyse the educational attainment of the Muslim population due to the absence of official statistical data disaggregated according to faith. In fact, Ministry of Education statistics do not even reveal the number of pupils with a ‘foreign origin’. Available research reveals, however, that children with foreign origins under-perform in education. The
educational achievement level of the first generation of immigrants varies according to their country of origin, with those from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia much more likely to have no diploma or only a primary level of education. By contrast, first generation immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by a higher level of educational achievement; in many cases, they came to France to finish their university studies.

Studies on the educational achievement level of Muslims, specifically, have found that the proportion with a General Certificate of Education (baccalauréat general) is equivalent to that of the general population. However, compared to the general population, this group contains a higher proportion of people with a low level of education (primary level only), while people who have graduated with a university degree are less numerous. It seems, therefore, that Muslim students have difficulties in attaining a more advanced level or a diploma. Many select a university programme because they did not succeed in obtaining a place at a school preparing technical diplomas. They also choose fields of training that currently have significant rates of unemployment, such as the social and economic fields.

The ability of children with foreign origins to successfully integrate into the French school system is strongly linked to their migration experience. Factors such as spending several years abroad before experiencing the French schooling system, being born abroad, or the time spent by the parents in France are all important. The socio-economic background of children with foreign origins needs also to be taken into account. Pupils of foreign origin are mainly found in schools in working-class suburbs, where it is not unusual to find schools in which they comprise the majority of pupils. The French educational system distributes pupils according to their place of residence. However, parents from the middle or upper classes generally refuse to send their children to the assigned school if there is a strong concentration of foreigners and children of immigrants in that school. Many instead choose private institutions or try to obtain a place in another school.

In 2004, a new law was introduced that prohibits the wearing of religious symbols, including the hijab, in public schools. Subsequently, the majority of Muslim girls have complied with the law and have stopped the wearing of the hijab while in school. Some have chosen to join a private school or to be schooled at home, so that they can continue to wear the hijab.

The French social welfare system provides, under certain conditions, for the care and assistance of any sick person, whether a foreigner or an immigrant, even if that person remains illegally in the country. Those without health cover can still seek medical advice in free health centres. Nonetheless, there is evidence that immigrants and foreigners use the health system less than the rest of the French population. In general, little attention has been paid to the health condition of foreigners, immigrants or their children in France. There is no statistical data on the health of the Muslim population, specifically. This, despite the fact that this population faces great social and economic difficulties, including a poor integration into the labour market and an over-concentration in deprived districts — all elements that could impact on their physical and psychological state of health.

For Muslim immigrants, the question of addressing the needs of an aging population is now becoming an important issue. Many from the first wave of immigration have decided to live out their retirement in France, but in most cases do not have significant resources or savings. Their occupations, which often involved exhausting and tiring manual jobs, have contributed to the rapid deterioration in their health. In addition, the social crises meant that many were laid off by the age of 50, with little chance of subsequently finding work. Their precarious work status often meant that their employers did not register them with the French
employment authorities, so gathering a record of all their past jobs also poses a great difficulty.

The relationship between the police and the French Muslim population is sometimes tense. This is aggravated by the fact that the Muslim population is concentrated in deprived districts in the city suburbs, where crime is more prevalent. In addition, the Muslim population has come under particular police scrutiny since 2001.

There are complaints from Muslims about discriminatory practices and the conduct of certain police officers. These mainly focus on alleged acts of provocation committed by the police, verbal and physical violence, as well as insults and humiliation. They typically concern young Muslim men, who complain in particular of harassment during identity checks. Over the last decade, there have been moves to hold the police more to account and to prevent discrimination. However, the lack of diversity in the police force makes it more difficult to address claims of racial discrimination. One barrier to the recruitment of more young people of foreign origin has found to be their lack of sufficient proficiency in the French language to succeed in competitions for recruitment.

Since the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants, the situation of Islam in France has evolved considerably and the religion has become more visible within the public space. The constant growth in the number of followers of Islam is a strong indicator that religion remains important beyond the first generation of immigrants. From the 1980s, numerous religious organisations have been established, at the national and local levels, to represent the interests of French Muslims. These predominantly represent Muslims with North African origins and few Muslim organisations have been able to transcend national and ethnic divides. Only some associations of young Muslims have succeeded in bringing together people with diverse ethnic backgrounds.

The existence of various Muslim organisations in France compelled the political authorities to consider Islam as an element of the political debate. However, the ethnic and religious diversity of the Muslim population has made collaboration difficult. The French Muslim population has consistently lacked a central body able to represent their interests at the national level. A new representative organisation has recently been established — the French Muslim Council (CFCM), which has both regional councils and a national council. However, it is too early to assess how effective this new structure will be in representing the interests of Muslims.

Muslim participation in the political arena is more complicated to analyse in France, than in other European countries. The French universalistic model is often represented as the antithesis to the Anglo-Saxon models. Individuals are expected to keep their cultural or religious participations to themselves, and claims for multiculturalism are always excluded from the public arena. Political initiatives in favour of the integration process have concerned the immigrant population as a whole, rather than French Muslims specifically. The designation of the first préfet of North African origin, in January 2004, reignited debate about the role of religious identity in the political arena.

The image of Muslims, and public perceptions of and opinions regarding Muslims, has changed considerably over the last ten years. In the 1980s, an “anti-immigrant” atmosphere was reinforced as the economic and social situation in France deteriorated. Public debate questioned the right of Muslims and their children to stay in France, and young North Africans became the scapegoats of society’s frustrations and fears, and of xenophobic
attitudes in France. In the 1990s, however, public opinion and the media focused instead on the loyalty of the Muslim population towards France, and to its republican and secularist principles. The terrorist attacks in France in 1995, and later the attacks of 11 September in the USA, impacted sharply on French public opinion, which consistently links Islam with negative images.
Part I: Research and literature on Muslims

1. Population

1.1 Muslim population estimates

A statistical evaluation of the size of the Muslim population in France is difficult, because official surveys on population do not collect reliable data. Until 1872, the population census for France collected information on religious affiliation. However, the Third Republic considered religious attitudes to be a private matter and stopped gathering information on this in the census. Since this period, official statistics have not supplied this information. There are academic surveys published on the Muslim population that provide an estimate of the size of this community, but the estimates vary from one survey to another, and often underestimate the number of Muslims.

The most frequent estimations are of a Muslim population ranging between 3.5 and 5 million, including both French citizens and immigrants with foreign citizenship. In 1999, the last time that a complete general population census was conducted, the total population of France was 58,518,395, so Muslims would therefore represent around 6 to 8.5 per cent of the population.

In 1998, Gilles Couvreur presented data on the Muslim population disaggregated by their geographical origin (see Table 1). Using previous sociological surveys published on Islam and Muslims in France, Couvreur attempts to describe the status of Islam in France, and proposes data on Muslim immigrants and their descendants. His data on immigrants are based on the results of the 1990 population census (see Table 2), published by the national statistical body, l’Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE). The sources used to determine the proportion of French citizens who are descendants of Muslim immigrants are more imprecise. The Muslim population with French citizenship includes the children of immigrants, immigrants who have been naturalised, “Harkis” (individuals who were members of the French army during the Algerian War) and their children, and so on.

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7 Couvreur was also the author of the report L’Islam en Europe [Islam in Europe]. The report was prepared for the Secretariat for Relations with Islam of the French Christian Church (Sécrétariat pour les Relations avec l’Islam de l’Episcopat français), which works for a better understanding of Islam and aims to promote inter-religious dialogue with Muslim representatives: Dossier du Sécrétariat pour les Relations avec l’Islam de l’Episcopat français, L’Islam en Europe [Islam in Europe], 1996.

8 INSEE is a “General Directorate” of the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry. It is therefore a governmental agency. INSEE collects and produces information on the French economy and society. This information is made available to the entire national community (government, business, researchers, media, educators, private individuals) for study, forecasting, and decision-making purposes. Further details available on the INSEE website at http://www.insee.fr/en/home/home_page.asp (accessed 20 February 2007).
Table 1. The Muslim population in France (1998) (Source: Couvreur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>Approx. no. of foreigners</th>
<th>Approx. no. of French citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of North African origin</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Muslims of Algerian origin</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslims of Moroccan origin</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslims of Tunisian origin</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims of Turkish origin and Middle East</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims of Sub-Saharan origin</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Muslims of French citizenship</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National population (1999)</td>
<td>56,625,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gilles Couvreur

Table 2. Proportion of immigrants in the national population (1990 and 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Proportion of immigrants (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of immigrants</strong></td>
<td>4,165,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population</strong></td>
<td>56,615,155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE

The estimates produced by Alain Boyer (see Table 3 below) are very similar to the data proposed by Gilles Couvreur. Alain Boyer also uses data from the 1990 population census. However, he also suggests data for the population of Harkis, according to the information of the French Delegation of Repatriated People, and of converts to Islam.

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10 INSEE, Population censuses, 1990, 1999. The 1999 population census was the last one to cover the entire population simultaneously. Since 2004, the census of France’s resident population has become annual, replacing the former complete censuses conducted every eight or nine years. See the INSEE website at [http://www.recensement.insee.fr](http://www.recensement.insee.fr) (accessed 20 February 2007).


12 Harkis are individuals who were members of the French army during the Algerian War. Estimates of this population are approximate and problematic. In 1998, Alain Boyer spoke of about 450,000 individuals, according to the numbers published by the Delegation for the Repatriated People from the ex-French Colonies. Stéphanie Abrial, *Intégration socio-politique des Franco-maghériens: identités politiques des enfants de harkis* [*Socio-Political Integration of the Franco-Maghrebi: Political Identity of the Children of Harkis*], Thèse pour le Doctorat de Science politique, Université Pierre Mendès France, IEP, June 1999.
### Table 3. The Muslim Population in France (1998) (Source: Boyer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of Algerian origin</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of Moroccan origin</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of Tunisian origin</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Muslims from the Middle East (including Turkey)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Arab Muslims from the Middle East (including Turkey)</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkis and their children</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converts to Islam</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,590,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alain Boyer

The main difficulty with the estimates of both Alain Boyer and Gilles Couvreur is that they do not explain clearly how they produced their data on Muslim French citizens. By contrast, the number of Muslim immigrants with a foreign nationality is clearly identified in the national population census.

Any attempt at simple statistical enumeration should, however, be treated with caution, due to methodological problems and conflicting data. One important question is how relevant such estimations are, if they vary from one survey to another. First, it is difficult to define the Muslim population, as the criteria used by the various studies are not the same. Certain researchers, for example, use the degree of religious practice as the main criterion of their argument and ask their interviewees to describe their level of practice (such as performance of the five daily prayers or the Friday prayers in the mosque).

Michèle Tribalat, who in the 1990s published one of the first statistical studies about immigrants and their children in France, did not clearly define the Muslim population. Her study does not contain direct and precise questions on religious affiliation (such as “Are you a Muslim, a Catholic, etc.?”), but has estimated the relationship with Islam of the second generation (mainly children with Algerian and Moroccan origins) using questions concerning certain attributes of their religious practice. She collected information about how individuals perceive themselves as believers, details about religious education, their attendance at the mosque, and their respect of the Ramadan fast and of food restrictions.

A recent study (2005) by Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, researchers at the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po (The Political Research Centre of “Sciences Po”, CEVIPOF), Paris, provided a better definition of the Muslim population in France. Their study looked at French citizens with African and Turkish origins (their sample was composed of...

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17 The Political Studies Institute of Paris (Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) de Paris) is also referred to as “Sciences Po”.

13
of both immigrants who became French citizens by naturalisation and persons who were born in France). To the question about their religious affiliation, 59 per cent of respondents defined themselves as Muslim and 20 per cent declared themselves as being without religion.

Other researchers restrict the scope of their study to Muslims with French citizenship, or to people registered on the electoral rolls (for example, the electoral surveys published by CEVIPOF\textsuperscript{18}), even though a significant proportion of Muslims in France possess a foreign nationality, and so do not have French citizenship and political rights. This option was chosen by Bruno Etienne, in his chapter dedicated to Muslims in the book \textit{Dictionnaire du vote}.\textsuperscript{19} Here, he estimates the number of French Muslim citizens as being between 1.8 and 2 million.

1.2 Settlement patterns
The geographical distribution of Muslims in France shows that they live in regions where industrial activities and cheap housing are concentrated. Muslim immigrants have settled near their workplaces, and most have been employed in industries such as car production, the building trade and the chemical and metallurgical industries.

Claude Dargent\textsuperscript{20} noted in his work that the Muslim population is overrepresented in specific parts of the country, namely the following régions\textsuperscript{21} (counties): Alsace, Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur (PACA), and, to a lesser degree, also Franche-Comté, Languedoc-Roussillon and Nord-Pas de Calais. By contrast, few members of the Muslim community live in the western part of France. The most recent figures from the Ministry of the Interior, in a report published on Islam in France, suggest that Muslims make up 35 per cent of the population of Île-de-France, 20 per cent in PACA, 15 per cent in Rhône-Alpes, and 10 per cent in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.\textsuperscript{22}

1.3 The main waves of migration
The majority of French Muslims come from North Africa. Although most migration happened after World War II, Muslim migration to France began before World War I. At the end of the nineteenth century, hundreds of Berbers lived in France and 5,000 new immigrants arrived each year before 1911. In Marseille, the first Berber workers were recruited in 1910, during a period of strikes organised by Italian workers in the factories producing oil and sugar in the port. In opposition to these social movements and repeated strikes, their employer in Marseille sought manpower beyond the Mediterranean Sea, and the Berber immigrants, even if they did not have qualifications, were viewed as very docile and hard-working. The success of this first recruitment in Algeria encouraged the other companies to select other Algerian

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\textsuperscript{21} France is divided into 26 régions (counties). Of these, 21 are in mainland France, and each of these is further subdivided into between 1 and 8 départements.

\textsuperscript{22} Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Agence pour le développement des relations interculturelles [Ministry of Employment and Solidarity, Ministry of the Interior, Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations], \textit{L’islam en France}. 
workers: “In Marseille, there were already more than 2,000 Berber workers in 1912. In 1914, in certain companies they formed half of the working manpower.”

During World War I, the colonial authorities recruited manpower from the French colonies and protectorates, and migrants were used as military troops. North Africans were numerous in the French army as infantrymen – 86,000 men were engaged, and the same number was conscripted. After the end of the conflict, the fighters from the colonial empire settled in France, and during the inter-war period 78,000 Algerians, and 55,000 Moroccans and Tunisians joined the first waves of immigrants. The colonial authority organised the migration of the workers and intervened during all the stages of their transfer to France. They established the employment contracts (generally the duration was one year), selected the manpower directly in the country of origin, and sent the workers to the port of Marseille, before their subsequent transfer to factories in the département or to other parts of the country.

The authorities tried to send these workers back at the end of World War I. However, the reconstruction needs of the country and a shortage of workers instead led to a further wave of recruitment of migrants from North Africa. In 1924, the Société générale d’immigration was created. This was a public organisation, directed by employers from the industrial and agricultural sectors, which constituted the first stage of the public management of immigration to France. On arrival in France, the workers decided to settle down in cities where they found employment or where they had family connections. Many settled in Marseille, Nice, around the city of Saint Etienne, in the suburbs of Grenoble, in Lyon or Vénissieux, in the north, and in the eastern suburbs of Paris (Saint Denis, Aubervilliers and Boulogne-Billancourt). Former military towns (such as Clermont-Ferrand, Royan, Arcachon and Alès) also welcomed workers who arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century in order to fight beside French troops in World War I. In 1936, the census evaluated the number of North Africans in France, and found that 84,000 people (more or less all Muslims) lived in France during this period.

Following World War II, immigration from North Africa increased dramatically during the “Trente Glorieuses” (1945–1973). As the French companies lacked manpower, employers

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25 France is divided into 26 administrative regions (régions), each of which is further subdivided into 100 (départements).
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were driven to sign bilateral agreements with some countries – mainly in the Maghreb. In 1963, an agreement concluded with Morocco resulted in a significant increase in the number of immigrants, from 33,000 in 1962 to 260,000 by 1975.

French Muslims from Sub-Saharan Africa form the second largest group, after those from North Africa. Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa also arrived in several waves. The first wave arrived in France as troops from the African colonies, providing assistance to the French forces during World War I. While most of the survivors went back to their homelands at the end of the conflict, some stayed on in France.27

After World War II, there was economic migration, particularly from the countries of the Sahel area (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania).28 In 1945, Sub-Saharan Africans were excluded from the application of the law concerning the conditions of French nationality acquisition.29 However, according to the Constitution of 1946, members of this population were considered to be subjects and not as citizens of the French Union (gathering together the French Republic and overseas territories), and were allowed to travel all around the French territory.30

Before their independence, there were few work migrants from Sub-Saharan African states, and only the political or economic leaders circulated between the metropolis and the overseas territories. After independence, these states maintained their right of free circulation of their nationals. The French State accepted such conditions, with the aim of maintaining its influence in the region. The employers were favourable to this right, in order to select manpower in Sub-Saharan Africa and to diversify its countries of recruitment in the reconstruction period after World War II. But the crisis of the 1970s led successive Governments to modify this right and to apply the law of 194531 also to the populations of Sub-Saharan African countries.

The suspension of economic immigration in 1974 had specific consequences on immigrants coming from this part of the world. They had emigrated without their families and wives at the end of the 1960s, and the government decision to stop the waves of immigration did not allow their families to emigrate. The new law of immigration (circulaire 5 and 9 July 1974 stopping the immigration of non-EU workers) imposed a lot of conditions on those immigrants who wanted to bring their families to France.32 However, in spite of the difficulties of family entry and settlement, many immigrants’ families decided to settle in France.

According to C. Quiminal and M. Timera, the very frequent changes of the legislation on immigration in France encouraged Sub-Saharan Africans to stay on in France without a residency permit. Indeed, the permits were very difficult to obtain or to renew. All these legal obstacles explain why the proportion of people living in France without a residency permit is

28 According to the data proposed by the Encyclopaedia Encarta, in 2006 the Muslim population represents 90 per cent of the national population in Mali, 92 per cent in Senegal, 22 per cent in Cameroon, 2 per cent in the Republic of Congo and 2 per cent in Congo-Brazzaville.
29 Ordonnance no.45-2441 19 October 1945, Nationality Code.
31 Ordonnance no. 45-2658 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en France.
32 The African immigrants have to prove self-sufficient incomes and an accommodation adapted for their family.
so important for immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. And the lack of a residency permit does not allow these immigrants to obtain a work permit, so a lot of them decide to find an illegal, “black market” job (le travail au noir).

In the 1970s, immigration occurred through family reunification, as families were reunited and many women and children joined the male immigrants. The female population of African origin therefore increased significantly during this period. By 1999, women represented more than 47 per cent of African immigrants.

Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa also included a large population of young people. Indeed, the settlement of young people, and in particular young women, was important in France. Between 1990 and 1999, people under 19 years old represented 26 per cent of the arrivals. Among these young “applicants for emigration”, many took their chances through illegal networks of emigration, via Morocco and Tunisia. A diversification of the geographical origin can also be seen. While the Sahel countries supplied the most important population of African immigrants, there were increasing numbers of people from Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Cameroon and the former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC). However, the most numerous national groups remain the Senegalese and the Malian. Their settlement in France was for the most part in the Île-de-France région, where 65.4 per cent of immigrants come from Sub-Saharan Africa. In other regions, the ratio is not as high as it is in Île-de-France – only 4.9 per cent in PACA, 4.3 per cent in Rhône-Alpes and 3.7 per cent in Haute-Normandie.

Immigration from Turkey occurred in the 1960s, after France and Turkey signed the first agreement on manpower. The immigrants came mainly from the central and the eastern parts of Turkey, where families work mainly in the agricultural sector. When they arrived in France, the immigrants settled in regions such as Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes and Alsace (where the Turks represented the first immigrants). In the 1980s, they also arrived in Auvergne, Limousin, Bretagne and Bourgogne. The men worked in the construction sector, in the car factories (Peugeot and Citroën), or in the forestry sector. The immigrants from Turkey are very heterogeneous in terms of their various ethnic groups (such as Turks, Kurds and Kazakhs) and religious categories (such as Alevi Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians).

After this initial wave of economic migrants, the arrival of political refugees from Turkey gave a new dimension to this population in France. After the military coup d’état in 1980, these refugees came to France seeking asylum. In the second half of the 1980s, Kurds from

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38 The first agreement was signed in April 1965, between Hassan Isik, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bernard Hardion, the French Ambassador in Ankara. See the website of the French Embassy in Turkey: http://www.ambafrance-tr.org (accessed 20 February 2007).
Turkey also tried to settle in France as asylum-seekers. Some failed in obtaining residency permits, but decided to stay on in France despite their illegal status.\(^{40}\)

2. Identity and religious practices

2.1 Data collection

Unlike many other countries, France does not allow the collection or publication of statistics on religious groups. The law forbids distinguishing, or counting, citizens or residents according to their faith. Indeed, any counting indicating religious membership is forbidden, whether it be based on an individual statement or on an estimation of public authorities. The last census asking a question on religious membership was in 1872 in France, and in 1962 in the départements of Alsace-Moselle.41

The estimates produced by demographers, sociologists and historians meet with numerous methodological and ethical difficulties, and offer only approximate knowledge on questions relating to religious affiliation. In the case of Islam in France, population movements and immigrants’ acquisition of French nationality reinforce the difficulties. Moreover, religious identity is not fixed; it evolves according to the relationships created by individuals with their faith. It is thus necessary to analyse the extremely diverse realities that encompass religious feeling, attitudes and practices with caution. This is especially the case for Islam in France: a community that has to build its religious identity in a society dominated by secularism and where Muslims represent a minority of the French population.42

To study the Muslim population, it is first necessary to know who should be considered as a “Muslim”. Each researcher thinks or believes that he or she knows which rites, practices and faiths should be used as a basis for determining whether somebody should be considered as a Muslim. It is an essentialist point of view, one that never takes individuals and their own idiosyncrasies into account.

Certain surveys consider as Muslim every person born in a family coming from a predominantly Muslim country, without looking into the individual’s practices or convictions. Nancy Venel used the notion of a “sociological Muslim” to designate individuals of Muslim culture.43 Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj have tried to develop research less in thrall to essentialism and have claimed that only those individuals who declare themselves Muslim should be considered as such (in other words, making self-declaration the sole criterion).44

A direct question on religious affiliation is not included in the interviews carried out by Michèle Tribalat, in her survey on the immigrant population in France.45 Instead, she uses indirect questions to identify the Muslim population, such as prayer practice in the mosque, prayer in a mosque, membership in a Muslim association, and whether the person’s parents were Muslims.

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41 The région of Alsace-Moselle is managed by a specific legislation concerning religion and secularism. In July 1801, Pope Pius VII and Napoleon Bonaparte signed an agreement (concordat), which recognised the Catholic religion as the religion of the majority of the French citizens (while not as a State religion) and allowed the State to designate and employ them. In 1905, France adopted the secularism law (establishing separation between the Church and the State), but the départements of Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin were parts of German territory since the French defeat by Germany in 1870. When the région rejoined the French territory in 1918, they kept their specific legislation on religion. So in these départements, the Republic recognises religions such as Judaism, Catholicism and the Reformed and Lutheran Protestant Churches. The Jewish, Protestant and Catholic representatives are paid by the State, but are not considered to be State employees. They are also authorised to teach in public schools.


45 Michèle Tribalat, De l’immigration à l’assimilation, pp. 235–236.
and observance of food restrictions. Her questionnaire contained the following question: “Are there foods or drinks that you never consume, whether it is due to respect for the religious prohibitions or for the traditions of your culture?” Tribalat recognised that the lack of a question on religion in the questionnaire has limited the quality of the study.

2.2 Background on Islam in France
Since the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants, the situation of Islam in France has evolved considerably. As the religion has become more visible within the public space, it has developed more relations with the French State, and the Muslim population seems now to be more ethnically diverse. Surprisingly, the public recognition of Islam in France occurred after World War I, when the French Government of Edouard Herriot decided, in 1922, to build a large mosque in Paris as a sign of gratitude for the involvement of Muslims in the conflict. In reality, however, the needs and concerns of French Muslims have long been ignored and considered to be of secondary importance.

Initially, during the colonial period, the question of Islam was only discussed in relation to the political context of the Maghreb. The French authorities had given a specific personal status to all the Muslim citizens in North Africa. Algeria was integrated into the national territory in 1840, ten years after the French conquest. Its inhabitants became French, but without benefiting from citizenship rights; they were simply considered to be French subjects. This exclusion was justified by “the local civil status” applied to the Algerians and determined by Muslim law. This legal status was maintained until the next days of World War II. In 1947, the French State decided to recognise Algerians as citizens, but refused to give them political rights. Officially, this was in order to protect their religious identity, but the reason behind this action was in fact a public justification for discrimination against Muslims, who were considered as “indigènes”, while the minority of Europeans and Jews living in Algeria were defined as “Français d’Algérie”, with French citizenship and political rights.

It was in the name of the Islamic religion that those fighting for the independence of the Maghreb had asked for a modification of their status as a colonised people, and the freedom of their country. As heirs of this colonial history, Muslim immigrants from North Africa have since considered themselves to be excluded immigrants in France, and have lived their faith with a lot of discretion. Furthermore, as they arrived in France for economic reasons, initially on a temporary basis, the first generation of Muslim immigrants existed outside French society. They were less involved in the public space and practised their religion only in private. The respect of religious duties for these workers was not always simple, because of their work conditions and their social situation. This changed with the subsequent migration of spouses and families, and the birth of children and their schooling in France, which modified the attitudes of the Muslim workers and compelled them to adapt to their host

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46 Since the colonisation period, France has recognised a set of legal codes, and of courts of justice, which existed before the French settlement. This legislation was based on laws and Qu’ranic institutions, and is referred to as “local status”. According to the Senatus-Consulte of July 1865, it was also said that “the Muslim native is French; nevertheless he or she will continue to be governed by Muslim law”. The Senatus-Consulte is a law concerning the naturalisation process of people born in Algeria, which was adopted under the Second Empire.


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society. Muslim immigrants, intimidated by a Western context dominated by different values, reinforced their attachment to Islam in order to protect their families from what they perceive as the negative consequences of immigration.

The arrival of a second generation of Muslim immigrants will constitute a new stage in the existence of Islam in France. These young people have not had the same history as their parents and do not have the same relationship to their religion. Nevertheless, there are many who do not hesitate to define themselves as Muslims, even though not all of them are believers. Contrary to their parents, the children of Muslim immigrants are creating new religious attitudes and adapting their beliefs to the host society. Although Islam is the religion of the majority of this population, and a main referent of identity within their countries of origin, it is definitely evolving in the French context. At present, studies completed on this population show that their religious practices are more individual, and less regular. For example, many choose to respect some, but not all, Qur’anic obligations – they may fast during the month of Ramadan, but do not pray five times each day.

2.3 Muslim religious practice

According to Magali Morsy, an historian, Muslim immigrants initially maintained a “repressed faith” in their private space. However, they started to publicly rediscover their religion in the 1970s in the course of social struggles. At that time, the organisation of work was becoming increasingly automated, notably in the car factories, and this situation entailed the loss of many jobs held by Muslim immigrants. Most trade unions and political organisations that usually supported the rights of workers (such as the Communist Party, and the Confédération Générale du Travail, CGT) completely ignored the redundancies of immigrant workers. The immigrants were left to struggle by themselves to defend their interests. Their collective mobilisation was organised around religious demands and included the construction of prayer rooms in factories, as well as authorisation to respect their religious obligations during their work. The main objective of the mobilisation was to obtain an improvement of their way of life, both in the workplace and in the housing environment, and more respect for their religious behaviour.

At the beginning of the 1980s, a progressive integration of Islam in France was made possible thanks to a political environment dominated by the Socialist Party. After François Mitterrand became President in 1981, his Government and his Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, helped to create a political climate more favourable to immigration and the rights of immigrants in France. So, from 1981 to 1982, an exceptional regularisation of 130,000 foreigners (people illegally resident in France) was organised. At the same time, on 7 July 1984, the system of residency permits was reformed and just two kinds of permits were retained: the residency permit, which authorises people to live and work in France for ten years and which is automatically renewed, and the temporary residency permit, which was valid for one year only. Other modifications affected the civil society sector, within which foreigners could

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52 The residency permit could be renewed at the Préfectures (administrative authorities representing the central body in the région or the département).
henceforth create civil society organisations without authorisation from the Ministry of the Interior.\(^{53}\)

This period of institutional and political opening was, however, also marked by an increase of riots in the French suburbs, in particular in Lyon, during the summer of 1981. Young people of North African origin living in the cities of Vaux-en-Velin, Villeurbanne or Vénissieux stole cars, met in the evening, and organised “car races” before burning them. The intervention of police forces provoked confrontations between the young people and the policemen during July and August 1981. The violence of this summer was so important that the media described these incidents as the “revolt of ghettos”. In 1982, memories of this revolt were still present in the public opinion and a climate of tensions still existed and racist crimes were committed against young Maghrebis.\(^{54}\) This atmosphere of insecurity allowed the National Front (the main far right-wing party) to strengthen its support among French voters, by vilifying young Muslims and encouraging xenophobia against immigrants and foreign citizens living in France.\(^{55}\)

The Islamic religion, which became visible within the public space from the 1970s, still structures the life of the immigrants and their descendants today. Several surveys published on the Muslim population in France show the strong relationship between Muslim immigrants and their practice of Islam.

The 1989 study by the Institut français d’opinion publique (the French Institute of Public Opinion, IFOP, a French Institute producing surveys on public opinion) – since renewed in 1994 and 2001 – shows that the religion of origin continues to play an influential role among Muslims in France.\(^{56}\) The IFOP survey, based on a sample of people who declared themselves as living in a Muslim family,\(^{57}\) asked these individuals\(^{58}\) to categorise themselves as

\(^{53}\) The law of 1901 (\textit{loi relative au contrat d’association du 1 juillet 1901}), which defines the legal conditions for the creation of a voluntary organisation, was modified in 1939. A decree (\textit{décret-loi portant statut particulier des associations étrangères et associations composées d’étrangers}), has introduced a particular regime for foreign organisations, which have the obligation to obtain an administrative authorisation from the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, any organisation counting foreigners as a quarter of its members, or having at least one foreigner in its executive council, was considered to be a foreigners’ organisation. The law adopted in October 1981 abrogated the articles concerning the foreign organisations (articles 22 to 35) in the law of 1901 and removed this notion.


\(^{56}\) The French Institute of Public Opinion, IFOP, is a French Institute producing surveys on public opinion. The IFOP surveys are established on the basis of two samples: a first sample representative of the French population (people aged at least 18 years old) and a second sample of persons (aged 16 and over) who declared themselves as belonging to a Muslim family living in France. The sample of the Muslim population is not described as being representative, in that there are no reliable statistics in France on the Muslim population and hence it is impossible to build a representative sample. So the IFOP worked from the statistics of the INSEE on immigration in France (see the website of INSEE, www.insee.fr) and studies conducted previously.

\(^{57}\) The survey was conducted in November 1989 with two different populations. A first sample representing the French population was constituted of 948 persons of 18 years old and over. The interviews were made with people in their homes. The second sample (representing the Muslim population) includes 516 persons of 16 years old and over who declared themselves as belonging to a Muslim family. The study was carried out in France (in cities of at least 20,000 inhabitants), with the exception of the Atlantic region, where Muslim people are not numerous. For the men, the interviews were conducted at home, while for the women the interviews took
“believers and followers of Islam” (i.e. those who held Muslim beliefs, and practised the rituals and requirements of the religion), “only believers”, “persons who recognise their Muslim origin”, and “persons who do not have a religious affiliation”. The results are as shown below in Table 4.

Table 4. Faith and practice of Muslims in France (1989, 1994, 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ self-declared degree of religious belief and practice</th>
<th>Percentage of Muslim respondents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believers and followers of Islam</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believers of Islam</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons who recognise their Muslim origin</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons who do not have a religious affiliation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IFOP59

The strength of religious attachment among Muslims is even more obvious according to figures determining religious faith. In a study on Muslims who have declared a religious affiliation (“les musulmans déclarés”60), Claude Dargent notes that the level of faith inside the Muslim population is very high, with 95 per cent declaring a belief in God. However, such an indicator of faith is not relevant enough, according to the author, to define the relationship of Muslims with Islam. The studies on this population do not systematically use the same indicators to estimate the level of practice of the individuals.

In her survey on “geographical mobility and social insertion” (Mobilité Géographique et Insertion sociale, MGIS),61 Michèle Tribalat analysed the religious practices of Muslim parents and their children. As shown below in Table 5, she found that among immigrants from Algeria and Morocco, women represent a higher proportion of “regular followers” of Islam than men, and regular practitioners are also more prominent in the Moroccan immigrant community than they are in the Algerian one. Immigration from Algeria is thus characterised

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58 The Muslim population studied in the survey is constituted of French citizens and foreigners who declare themselves as being Muslim or of Muslim origin, and who are living in France.
60 This study concerns persons who declared an attachment to Islam in an answer to a question on their religious affiliation. It uses surveys made by the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP) in French régions, on the basis of samples of 700 persons. From these samples, obtained in every région, a representative sample of the total population was elaborated. The report published by Claude Dargent was made on four recent surveys of the OIP (on 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001) and a sub-sample of 844 Muslims.
61 Michèle Tribalat, De l’immigration à l’assimilation, p. 248. The MGIS survey was carried out in 1992, and concerned three populations: immigrants, children of immigrants and people of French origin. Only immigrants from the following countries were included: Spain, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, plus countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The immigrants are individuals of foreign nationality, living in France and aged from 20 to 59 years old in 1992. The sample is composed of 704 African immigrants, 1,393 Algerian immigrants, 1,395 Moroccan immigrants and 1,600 Turkish immigrants. For the sample of the children of immigrants, there are only children of Algerian immigrants (814 individuals), of Portuguese immigrants (509 individuals) and of Spanish immigrants (598 individuals). Finally, 1,882 persons form the sample of people of French origin. To constitute the sample of the immigrants, Michèle Tribalat used the data of the INSEE Census of 1990. On the other hand, she used the permanent demographic sample (EDP) for the sample of the children of immigrants. The EDP is a sample of persons born in France of immigrant fathers. Created in 1975, the EDP has been reconstituted each year and permitted to collect statistical information on the same individuals since 1975 and to supply a longitudinal data base.
by its greater detachment towards Islam, while Moroccan immigrants show a stronger affiliation to their religion.

Table 5. Degree of religious practice among Algerian and Moroccan Muslim immigrants (1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Proportion of respondents (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>No religious affiliation or no religious practice</td>
<td>Religious practice at regular time</td>
<td>No religious affiliation or no religious practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Tribalat

Tribalat’s survey also included statements from immigrants concerning their respect of Muslim food restrictions and of the fast during the month of Ramadan. As shown below in Table 6, most of the immigrants surveyed observe the fast during Ramadan, with Moroccans most likely to do so (82 per cent of men, and 86 per cent of women). Women are more likely than men to fast. As they are less likely to be in paid employment than their husbands, women may benefit from more opportunities to follow their religious practices. The prohibition on the consumption of alcohol is less respected by the Algerian immigrants than it is by the Turkish ones.

Table 6. Respect for the Ramadan fast and for Muslim food prohibitions among Algerian, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants (1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Proportion of respondents (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observing Ramadan fast</td>
<td>Not eating pork</td>
<td>Not consuming alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Tribalat

Compared to the first generation of Muslim immigrants, young people have a weaker religious attachment, especially those whose parents do not share the same origin (i.e. one parent is French, and the other foreign or French but of foreign origin). The case of children of Algerian origin is particularly relevant.


63 The food (dietary) prohibitions in Islam concern the prohibition on the consumption of pork, the prescriptions on halal meat and the ban on alcohol consumption.

64 Tribalat, 1996.
As shown above in Table 7, French citizens of Algerian origin born in a “mixed family” are the most likely to reject all forms of religious affiliation (60 per cent) or to declare that they do not practise any religion (27 per cent). 30 per cent of individuals who grew up in an Algerian family express no religious attachment, 38 per cent said they were not involved in any religious practice and just 22 per cent said they follow religious rules occasionally. There was no significant gender difference in the results. Even if they are more often involved with regular or occasional practice of Islam, a large number of women or girls still declare themselves as having no religious membership or practices, and this proportion is even more important when one of the woman’s or girl’s parents is of French origin. The influence of French ancestry on religious orientation is confirmed by Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj. According to their figures on immigration from the Maghreb, “28 per cent of those who have a ‘mixed’ ancestry declare themselves Muslim, against 78 per cent for the others.”

The differences in religious attachment according to gender are examined by Guy Michelat, in an article published in the book *Crépuscule des religions chez les jeunes?*. He notes that, whatever their age, women are more likely than men to report identifying themselves as “practising” their religion. So, among 100 women aged 16–35 years old, 27 per cent declare a weak religious practice, as compared to 42 per cent of the men. Among those aged over 35, 6 per cent of the women report a weak practice of Islam, which is much less than men (28 per cent). Furthermore, women are more often in the “middle practice” group than are men. Nevertheless, if they are more practising than the men, Muslim women remain more often outside public places of worship, such as mosques or prayer rooms. Being almost exclusively male public places, these religious spaces are not used by women.

The most recent study of Claude Dargent, carried out between 1998 and 2001 on the basis of a sample of 844 Muslims, asked respondents about their frequentation of a mosque. The results obtained between 1998 and 2001 reveal that 12 per cent of Muslims declared that they

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Table 7. Degree of religious practice among young people of Algerian origin (1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of the parents</th>
<th>Degree of religious practice – share of respondents (%)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No religion None Occasional Regular No religion None Occasional Regular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria + France</td>
<td>60 27 6 7</td>
<td>58 23 14 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian</td>
<td>30 38 22 10</td>
<td>30 28 24 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French population</td>
<td>27 43 26 5</td>
<td>20 35 36 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Tribalat

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67 Guy Michelat, “Pratiques et croyances religieuses: détachements et hétérodoxies” (“Religious Practices and Beliefs: Divisions and Heterodoxies”), in Yves Lambert and Guy Michelat (eds), *Le crépuscule des religions chez les jeunes? Jeunes et religions en France [The Twilight of Religious Practice among Young People? Young People and Religion in France]*, Paris: L’Harmattan Collection Logiques sociales, 1992, pp. 43–63. G. Michelat used the data of IFOP survey published in 1989. The sample was of 516 persons who had declared themselves as being members of a Muslim family. The questions about the daily prayer, the Ramadan fast, the prayers on Friday at the mosque, the prohibition on pork and alcohol, and the definition used by each interviewee to define his or her religious practice, helped the author to establish a scale of practice (weak, average or strong).
go to the mosque once or several times a month, while 40 per cent only go occasionally, mainly for special religious festivals or ceremonies. The remaining 48 per cent declared that they never go to the mosque.\(^{68}\)

However, the details of the data obtained between 1998 and 2001 about attendance of prayer at the mosque show that the development of this practice is very recent in the Muslim population in France. As shown below in Table 8, occasional practice is the option most often chosen. However, the proportion of Muslims who declared that they never go to the mosque decreased between 1998 and 2001.

**Table 8. Prayer practice at the mosque (1998–2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Each month</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C. Dargent\(^{69}\)

In 2005, in their sample of the French population (people born in France or naturalised) coming from Africa or Turkey, Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj noted that 59 per cent of these individuals declared themselves as Muslim, while 20 per cent declared themselves as being without religion. In other words, in comparison with the results obtained by M. Tribalat in 1995, for young people of Algerian origin (of whom 30 per cent declared themselves as being without religion), figures obtained in 2005 show that young people are more religious than they were 10 years ago. Concerning religious practice, both authors confirmed that practices concerning the prohibition on alcohol, or observance of prayer or the fast, are still strongly respected in 2005: 75 per cent of the Muslims declare themselves as not drinking alcohol, 43 per cent as praying every day, and 83 per cent as fasting during the Ramadan month.\(^{70}\)

The *hijab* issue, and the adoption of the law on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools,\(^{71}\) have created numerous debates.\(^{72}\) Adopted in March 2004, this law concerns the prohibition of religious symbols and includes the Muslim *hijab*, the Jewish *kippa*, the Sikh turban and large Christian crosses. Nevertheless, it authorises discreet symbols, such as the wearing of small crosses, Stars of David or Hands of Fatima. However, in spite of the public and political debates that accompanied the adoption of this law, this question concerns only a minority of the female population. Even if statistics on the number of girls or women wearing

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\(^{68}\) Claude Dargent, “Les musulmans déclarés en France,” p. 27.


\(^{70}\) Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, *Français comme les autres: enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, p. 29.

\(^{71}\) Loi n°2004-228 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law no. 2004-228 covering, in the application of the principle of laicism, the wearing of symbols or clothes showing a religious appurtenance, in public schools and colleges].

\(^{72}\) Before the adoption of the law, a commission on secularism in France (Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République) chaired by Bernard Stasi, Mediator of the Republic, was created. This commission had suggested the prohibition of religious symbols in public schools.
the hijab in France are not available, according to the study of S. Brouard and V. Tiberj, the majority of the French population of African and Turkish origin are favourably disposed towards the prohibition of the headscarf in schools. Between 53 per cent and 59 per cent of them support the prohibition, while 80 per cent of the national population is favourable to it.\(^7\)

Although the majority of the Muslims in France support the law, this question has divided the population. According to both researchers from CEVIPOF, the more people approve the principle of secularism, the more they are likely to be in favour of the prohibition of the hijab at schools (for more on the debate about the hijab in France, see section I. 3.1).

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\(^7\) Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, *Français comme les autres: enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, p. 43.
3. Education

3.1 Data collection issues
Due to the absence of statistical data disaggregated on the basis of religion, there are no specific analyses of the Muslim population, within the broader studies on the schooling of immigrants and people of foreign origin. There are surveys concerning immigration that focus on populations from the Maghreb. However, there are limitations on the data available. For a long time, educational institutions refused to count the number of pupils with a “foreign origin”. For this reason, the children of immigrants cannot be traced in the data supplied by the Ministry of Education.

The difficulties so often faced by these children, and the impact of this on their educational attainments, led the Ministry of Education, as well as researchers in various fields, to develop their knowledge of the experience of pupils of foreign origins in the school system. While most of the studies consider the socio-economic conditions of immigrant families to be an important obstacle for the integration of their children in the school system, their results diverge as far as the impact of cultural factors or discrimination at school are concerned.

3.2 Census data on the educational achievement of adult immigrants
The educational achievement level of the first generation of immigrants varies according to their country of origin. As shown below in Table 9, the 1999 population census indicates that among individuals aged 30 to 49 years old, immigrants are twice as numerous, proportionally speaking, as non-immigrants among those who have only a primary level of education (41 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively). Immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia are particularly numerous, proportionally speaking, in having no diploma or only a primary level of education (70 per cent of immigrants from Turkey are in this category). However, 27 per cent of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa have a university diploma. Immigrants from this region are generally characterised by a higher level of educational achievement; in many cases, immigrants from this group came to France to finish their studies, and educational opportunities constituted an important reason for emigration to France.

Table 9. Level of education for immigrants aged 30–49 years old (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin:</th>
<th>No diploma or elementary school level</th>
<th>High school level or professional diplomas (CAP, BEP)</th>
<th>GCE</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant population</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrant population</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National population</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE

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74 INSEE, Population census 1999; published in Les immigrés en France [Immigrants in France], édition 2005.
3.3 Educational achievement of Muslim children

Statistics on education are mainly produced by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research (Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche), and the Ministry’s Directorate of Evaluation and Planning (Direction de l’Évaluation et de la Prospective, DEP).

Also relevant is a long-term study carried out by Centre d’études et de recherches sur les qualifications (Centre of Studies and Research on Qualifications, CEREQ), which uses two samples of pupils: one of those who finished school in 1992 and one of those who finished school in 1998.75

A 1995 DEP study reveals the influence of ethnic and social background on the success rate of children at secondary school level (see Table 10 below). The study uses a sample of 17,830 pupils who started secondary school (le collège) in 1995. The school situation of the children was analysed year after year, and two thematic surveys have been published: one about the family and its influence on schooling paths in 1998 and one about the representations of the pupils on their schooling and their professional future.

The study revealed that among children born in an immigrant family,76 65.2 per cent did not have to remain longer in the elementary school, held back and repeating a year, while for children of foreign origin, the corresponding figure is 81.5 per cent. In their French and mathematics examinations, which are organised for all pupils when they start secondary school, children from French families obtained better grades than those from immigrant families. Within immigrant families, the girls in general obtain better examination results than the boys, but the differences between the two groups are not so important, particularly concerning the mathematics exams.

Table 10. Success rate at the secondary level – breakdown for immigrant, non-immigrant and mixed families (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success rate in national exams (secondary level)*</th>
<th>Non-immigrant family</th>
<th>Mixed family77</th>
<th>Immigrant family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Children from working-class families</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French examination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics examination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For children who started secondary school in 1995
Source: DEP78

75 These surveys were organised by the CEREQ using two samples of pupils: (1) a sample of pupils who finished school in 1992 (Generation 92: 26,356 young people among whom 4,270 young people have at least one of their parents born abroad), and (2) a sample of pupils who finished school in 1998 (Generation 98: 47,041 persons among whom 10,085 young people have at least one of their parents born abroad).

76 An immigrant family is composed of two parents born abroad and with a foreign nationality.

77 A mixed family is composed of one parent born in France and the other born abroad and with a foreign nationality.

78 Ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, direction de l’Évaluation et de la Prospective (DEP), panel des élèves entrés au collège en 1995; INSEE, Les immigrés en France [Immigrants in France], édition 2005, p. 99. (A part of the DEP results were published in this book but not only in this one.)
A 1996 study by the DEP (made by the Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche and the Direction de l'Évaluation et de la Prospective) tried to explain the difficulties faced by children from immigrant families. It showed that nationality did not constitute the most relevant factor in explaining the differences observed between the experiences of pupils of foreign origins and French children at school (see data on pupils with a GCE diploma). In fact, children’s migration experience had more influence on their integration into the French school system than did the fact of migration.

The study revealed that factors such as spending several years abroad before experiencing the French schooling system, being born abroad, or the time spent by the parents in France were all important. The data show that “[pupils who are immigrants] face education failure more often, their educational experience is shorter than the other pupils and they leave school more often without a diploma, are proportionally more numerous in less valued programmes.”79 To quote only some figures, almost half of the children from immigrant families80 experience failure (repeating or being held back for a year) in elementary school, and only 33 per cent are allowed to proceed to high school, as opposed to half of the French pupils.

Research by Zahia Zeroulou in 199881 focused on success at school for young people of Algerian origin living in the north of France (the Lille région). Zeroulou found that the specificity of the children of immigrants, in comparison with French young people with the same social and economic background, lies in the family’s experience of migration. Parents’ aspirations and expectations of the education system differ, depending on their migration trajectory and the reasons for their settlement in France.

Zahia Zeroulou identifies two types of families. The first group consists of young people who have achieved a university-level qualification, while children of the second group are characterised by situations of school failure. While improving their social position may be a common aim for all the immigrants from the Maghreb, not all are ready to make the same sacrifices and to undergo the same constraints. Z. Zeroulou found that the parents of the first group think that the school system will help their child’s integration into French society. Convinced that this school strategy could offer their children a good professional position in France, these parents are ready to abandon their desire to return to the country of origin, and accept their definitive settlement in France. By contrast, parents of the second group consider their migration to France as only a temporary “economic stage” in their project of social mobility. The migration experience has many negative repercussions on their way of life and on their children, and schools – and the other institutions with which the immigrants from the Maghreb are in contact – are seen as having a bad influence, which modifies the identity of the children.

The majority of Muslim parents have confidence in the French school system. Through observation of the parents’ social and professional position before their settlement in France, Zahia Zeroulou finds that the rejection of school integration is a strategy more often adopted by parents with a working-class background, or coming from peasant and rural families; parents who have migrated from urban centres are more likely to express trust towards the

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80 The DEP sample is constituted of foreign pupils and pupils of foreign origin.
French school system. However, although her research indicates that the social background of the parents has an influence on their school strategies this does not automatically correlate to the school results of the children.

This finding is confirmed by a recent article (2005) by Sonia Tebbakh. This shows that the lack of investment in the school by parents demonstrated the feeling of insecurity that they felt with regard to their own future in France. In other words, being unable to give more sense to their own settlement project in France (but only an economic justification), these parents do not more succeed in developing strong strategies of integration in French society for their children. Financial difficulties can lead certain parents not to invest in the success at school of their children.

According to Tribalat’s 1996 study, pupils of foreign origin who were born in France were less likely to attend high school than the general population. However, this is largely explained on the basis of their socio-economic background – 80 per cent were children of workers, as compared to 43 per cent of the French pupils. The same observation can be made in relation to diplomas. Young people of Algerian origin are more often without a diploma – 25 per cent of the boys and 22 per cent of the girls, against 11 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively, for French pupils.

Considering the specific obstacle of some parents’ illiteracy, Algerian parents have shown a strong determination to support the efforts of their children. Their behaviour could explain the proportion of French pupils of Algerian origin who have obtained their GCE. As shown below in Table 11, the proportion of GCE pupils among the children of working-class parents is 26 per cent for boys of Algerian origin, which is the same as for boys of French origin.

### Table 11. Social and domestic characteristics of the French pupils with a GCE diploma (1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Indicators</th>
<th>Share of pupils with a GCE diploma (%) – breakdown by origin of the pupil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children from all social backgrounds</td>
<td>Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children from working-class families</td>
<td>Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Girls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Tribalat

It is interesting to note that while both Tribalat’s 1996 study and the 1995 DEP one disaggregate data by gender, the conclusions that they reach are different. Effectively, Tribalat’s study found that whatever the social group observed, girls of Algerian origin do not obtain better schooling results than boys. On the contrary, the DEP study in 1995 showed that

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when they started secondary school, the girls are a little more successful than the boys, and that this is the case for all the girls, whether born in an immigrant family or not. According to Tribalat’s study, girls of Algerian origin are the only case where results do not differ by gender: 28 per cent of Algerian girls have a GCE, against 29 per cent of boys (see Table 11 above).

More recent studies
A 2003 study by Claude Dargent provides information on the educational achievement level of Muslims, specifically.\textsuperscript{85} Based on OIP\textsuperscript{86} data, the study uses a sample of the Muslim population within which young people are strongly represented. The survey focuses on “musulmans déclarés” (self-declared Muslims), and includes both foreigners and French citizens, of the first and second generations. Dargent isolates the 18–34-year-old category, in which individuals have a better educational level (i.e. more diplomas) than their elders.\textsuperscript{71} He then compared this sample of the Muslim population with the corresponding one for the French population as a whole.

As shown below in Table 12, the results of this study show, first, that this Muslim population group contains a higher proportion of people with a low level of education (primary level only), while people who have graduated with a university degree are less numerous, proportionally speaking; the proportion with a General Certificate of Education (GCE – known as the baccalauréat général in France) is more or less the same as for the national population, but it seems that Muslim students have difficulties attaining a more advanced level or a diploma.

### Table 12. Level of diploma in the Muslim population in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of diploma</th>
<th>Share of respondents (%)</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No diploma or primary school level</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school level or professional diploma (BEP, CAP)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE + 2 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University diploma (3 years after the GCE)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C. Dargent\textsuperscript{87}

This situation is confirmed by a study of Roxane Silberman and Irène Fournier, published in January 2006.\textsuperscript{88} The study uses data from the CEREQ survey, which was based on two studies.

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\textsuperscript{86} The Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (Interregional Political Observatory on Politics, OIP) is a centre of studies and research on decentralisation and public opinion, created in 1985 by Sciences Po Paris and the National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS).

\textsuperscript{71} For immigrants aged 30 to 49 years old, the proportion of them who have an educational achievement level lower than the high school diploma is as follows: 77 per cent for Algerians; 75 per cent for Moroccans; 76 per cent for Tunisians; 58 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africans; 88 per cent for Turks. Figures published by INSEE, based on the National Census of 1999. INSEE, Les immigrés en France [Immigrants in France], Paris: INSEE, 2005, p. 95.

samples of pupils, one of those who left school in 1992 and one of those who left school in 1998. The results are as shown below in Table 13.

**Table 13. Educational level of young people of foreign origin (1992 and 1996)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CAP-BEP</th>
<th>GCE (general diploma)</th>
<th>GCE (professional or technological sectors)</th>
<th>Undergraduate or postgraduate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two parents born in France</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** R. Silberman and I. Fournier

Jean-Paul Caille’s 2005 article on the professional projects of the children of immigrants explains the reasons why the academic results of young people of Muslim origin in higher education are not as good as others. Comparing young people born in an immigrant family with those born with two parents of French origin, young Muslims – with the exception of those of Turkish origin – have the same chances at high school diploma level as young people of French origin. The proportion of young people with origins in the Maghreb or Sub-Saharan Africa who obtain their high school diploma is comparable, and sometimes superior, to that of young people of French origin. However, at university level, young Muslims have more difficulty finishing their school studies and obtaining their diploma.

Several reasons for this can be identified. First, many select a university programme because they did not succeed in obtaining a place at a school preparing technical diplomas (DUT, Diplôme Universitaire Technologique, or BTS, Brevet de Technicien Supérieur). They also choose fields of training that currently have significant rates of unemployment, such as the social and economic fields. Nevertheless, factors relating to discrimination in the labour market also explain the difficulties faced by young Muslims (see section 4.3).

**Conclusions**

The results from the studies mentioned above indicate that young Muslims do not all follow the same school path, and that their results differ according to their country of origin.

Young people with origins in the Maghreb are slightly more likely to obtain a high school diploma, but a large proportion of them also graduate from a school with a rather low level of education. They show a preference for general fields rather than for professional fields.

---


Young people with origins in the Maghreb have comparable results at GCE exam level to those of young people of French origin. However, although they are numerous in pursuing their studies at university level, they are less successful in obtaining a diploma there. Young people of Turkish origin follow the same path as young people of Portuguese origin. They often choose professional fields, and many of them obtain a CAP or BEP level diploma, rather than a high school diploma.

Among all the immigrant families from Muslim countries, it is those from the Maghreb who show themselves to be the most ambitious for their children. They want their children to obtain their high school diploma and pursue education at a university. They also believe in the utility of such diplomas in gaining access to the labour market, and mostly refuse their children permission to choose a field of professional training. The situation is different for Turkish families. This can be seen by looking at the type of diplomas that young people hope to obtain. As shown below in Table 14, young people of Turkish families mostly wish to obtain a diploma of professional training (such as CAP or BEP), but less often hope to obtain a GCE.

**Table 14. Preferred type of diploma for pupils (2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family origin</th>
<th>CAP or BEP</th>
<th>GCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed (one French parent/ one immigrant parent)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the Maghreb</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Turkey</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CEREQ91*

Again, this difference between young people with origins in the Maghreb and those with origins in Turkey may be explained by their *migration experience*. As shown below in Table 15, based on data from the CEREQ study, young people of Turkish origin are also more likely to be born abroad, and arrive in France later than other children of foreign origin. Young people with origins in Sub-Saharan Africa are from a more recent immigration, and this is the reason why their proportion in the statistics on higher education remains rather low. Nevertheless, this group is more likely to possess a diploma than other groups of immigrants, which could in future constitute an advantage for their children and help them to pursue higher education.

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Table 15. Birth and settlement of second-generation immigrants (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of respondents (%)</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in France and:</td>
<td>one of their parents was born abroad</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both parents were born abroad</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born abroad and arrived in France:</td>
<td>before high school</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after high school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEREQ92

3.4 Spending on education by families

The strong geographical concentration of the Muslim populations in socially disadvantaged parts of cities also has an impact on the distribution of pupils of foreign origin in schools – it is not unusual to find schools in which the majority of pupils are children of immigrants.

The research of Catherine Barthon93 in the Versailles area showed that pupils of foreign origin are mainly found in schools in working-class suburbs, which are almost exclusively frequented by the children of workers and employees. The French educational system distributes pupils according to their place of residence. However, parents from the middle or upper classes generally refuse to send their children to the assigned school if there is a strong concentration of foreigners and children of immigrants in that school. Many instead choose private institutions or try to obtain another placement. According to Barthon, foreign pupils and their families do not possess enough financial resources and cultural capital to adopt the same schooling strategies.

Table 16 below shows the figures that Barthon found regarding the amount spent by families on the schooling of their child. Concentrating only on foreign pupils, and not those merely of foreign origin, Barthon’s study found that the schooling expenses (for school stationery, school insurance and so on) for foreign families were lower than those for French families. Among the Muslim families included in the research, Moroccan and Tunisian families were those who spent the least on the schooling of their children. Algerian families dedicated on average €266.94 per schooled child, which is approximately €60.98 euros more than that spent by Moroccan and Tunisian families.

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Table 16. Educational expenses (1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French citizens</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By birth</td>
<td>By naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenses for all school-age children</td>
<td>868.2</td>
<td>862.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses per child</td>
<td>512.38</td>
<td>500.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The amounts have been converted into euros, as they are in francs in Barthon’s article.

Source: C. Barthon

Immigrant families are also distinguished by their attitudes towards school. Immigrant families are often ambitious and wish their children to achieve a place at university. However, this ambition does not correspond to a stronger involvement in following up the schooling of their children. Fewer than 40 per cent of immigrant families declare that they sometimes or regularly help their children to do their homework, while the corresponding figure for families of French origin is 77 per cent. In the same way, immigrant families are less often involved in parents’ associations.

3.5 Discrimination in the education system

The French school system is strongly marked by its commitment to the republican school model, within which detachment from ethnic, national, social or cultural differences is presented as a guarantee of equality. Foreign origin should be considered a neutral factor, and in the observations expressed by teachers in the pupils’ files, for example, it is indeed rare to see any reference to the pupil’s ethnic affiliation – except for pupils confronted with schooling problems, failure or difficulties with the French language.

It is also interesting to note that studies on racism show that schools and teachers are rarely considered to contribute to discrimination. In 1990, a study by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (the National Scientific Research Centre, CNRS) showed that pupils of North African origin rarely accuse their former teachers of racism, even when their school results were not satisfactory or when their relations with their teachers were not excellent.

Nevertheless, this absence of suspicion with regard to the school system and its administration does not protect schools from the phenomenon of discrimination, or from the “ethnicisation” of school relations, to quote Véronique de Rudder. This term describes the process by which the use of ethnic affiliation becomes one of the determining referents of the action of the school system, or an element of the interaction between the pupils and the school authorities.

This situation was demonstrated in research carried out in 1985 by J.-P. Payet, which looked at the comments of teachers in staff meetings. This survey found that the nature of these comments varies according to the nationality of the pupils. Discussions between teachers are more about the abilities and performances of the pupil when he or she is of French origin, and more about the pupil’s behaviour and learning experiences when the pupil is of foreign origin.

A 1996 study conducted by Christian Poiret focuses on families from Sub-Saharan Africa and finds that teachers are influenced by existing stereotypes (often negative) about African families, in their relationship with the pupils coming from African families.

3.6 The hijab issue

The wearing of the headscarf (hijab) by schoolgirls first started to provoke discussion and controversy in 1989. The first episode was in Creil and the second one occurred in 1994.

Despite the debate and the confrontations provoked by this issue in public opinion and in the political sphere, in many cases solutions were found through discussion, or mediation between the girls wearing the hijab and the directors of schools. Hanifa Chérifi, who was in charge of organising these mediation processes, stated the following:

“In 1994, when the crisis was very strong and intense, 300 affairs were identified and each time a mediation was necessary. In 2002, 150 conflicts required the intervention of the mediator. Very often, the situation was solved by mutual agreement. The girls agreed to take off their hijab in the classroom, rather than being in conflict with the school institution for several months.”

Among the pupils, the majority of Muslim girls renounced the wearing of the hijab. When they refused to remove their headscarf, the girls chose to join a private school or to leave the public school and to be schooled in the National Centre of Learning at Home (CNED Centre National d’Enseignement à Distance). During the year 2004–2005, Hanifa Chérifi drafted a report for the Minister of Education Gilles de Robien concerning the law of 15 March 2004 about the prohibition of religious symbols at school. According to her, the law did not provoke identity or religious tensions within French society: the total number of religious symbols listed during the year 2004–2005 was 639, which represented “less than 50 per cent of the symbols listed during the previous year”. Out of 639 cases, 626 concerned headscarves, 11 Sikh turbans and 2 Christian crosses. The hijab affairs are concentrated in six school academies with an important immigrant population: Strasbourg, Lille, Créteil, Montpellier, Versailles and Lyon. Finally, 47 pupils (including 44 Muslim girls) were excluded.

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101 The Mediators of the Ministry of Education receive complaints concerning the functioning of the public utility of the Department of Education. These can be from the pupils or the students and by the school staff. Cited by Caroline Brizard, “Ecole: légiférer ou pas?” [“School: To Legislate or Not?”], Le Nouvel Observateur, n°2010, 15 May 2003.
The issue of the hijab returned to public prominence during the adoption of the law concerning the prohibition of religious symbols at school. Through this law, the Government decided to follow the instruction given by the Commission de réflexion sur la laïcité (“Commission Stasi”). The Commission suggested integrating into a text of law concerning secularism in France the following arrangement: “Out of respect for the freedom of conscience, dress and symbols showing religious or political membership are forbidden in elementary schools, secondary schools and high schools. Any penalty is proportional and imposed after the pupil has been invited to conform to his/her obligations. According to the report of the Commission, the dress and religious symbols forbidden are such symbols as a large cross, headscarf or kippa. Discreet symbols such as small medals or crosses, or small symbols (the Star of David for Jews or the Hand of Fatima for the Muslims) are allowed. The Commission also makes it clear that this new rule must be explained to the pupils and the school staff. The penalty should be applied only in the last resort. The current procedures of mediation must be maintained and developed.

Opponents of the wearing of the hijab insisted in their discourse that girls wearing it were suffering from the domination and the authority of their fathers or their brothers. However, in a book entitled Les féministes et le garçon arabe, Nacira Guénif-Souilamas and Eric Macé showed that this discourse stigmatised Arab men, by accusing them of oppressing girls and women in general. Indeed, during the previous hijab episodes, opponents of the hijab have used the secularism argument. Through all the debates concerning the headscarf issue, the voices of young Muslim women were seldom heard in the media. Contrary to the arguments of opponents of the hijab, these women are not always ‘manipulated’ by their parents, their brothers or Islamist activists. Some of them choose to wear the headscarf as a sign of their faith, while others adopt it to free themselves from the authority of their father or brothers. Indeed, by wearing the hijab they can occupy the public space more freely. Without attracting the glance of men, they are no longer considered an object of seduction, capable of arousing male desire.

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104 Loi n°2004-228 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics.
4. Employment

Analysing the situation of French Muslims in the labour market reveals a similar situation of social discrimination to that with regard to education. Not only do they suffer more often from unemployment than the rest of the French population, but they also encounter more difficulties finding a long-term and full-time job. They are underrepresented in executive positions, but are twice as likely to work in a factory, as compared to the general population. Thus 40 per cent of Muslims in employment work in a factory, compared to 21 per cent of the workforce as a whole.

4.1 Employment rates among the first generation

From the “mass immigration” period in the 1950s, to the economic crisis in the 1980s, Muslim immigrants have represented an important source of manpower in specific employment sectors (industry) where the work was considered too hard, tiring and badly remunerated, and therefore not very attractive for French workers. During the most important periods of immigration, these unqualified foreigners were employed in production, in the construction sector, industry and tertiary activities. This foreign manpower was able to meet the important needs of the economy and fill the deficits in manpower.

In an article dedicated to the foreign manpower in France, Mouna Viprey notes that when immigration was stopped for economic reasons in 1974 (except for EU citizens), it put an end to one process and ushered in a new political management of immigration issues. Her figures concerning the number of foreign workers show a gradual decrease of this number from 1982 to 1988 and an increase in the number of unemployed people in the immigrant population. The total number of foreign wage-earners decreased from 1,131,276 in 1988, to 1,100,978 in 1998. Within the Muslim population, there was a stabilisation between 1982 and 1988, as shown below in Table 17.

Table 17. Proportion of foreign wage-earners by nationality group (1982, 1985, 1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Proportion of the population of wage-earners (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Viprey


Between 1982 and 1988, the proportion of the French workforce from North Africa and Turkey remained stable, and only the proportion from Sub-Saharan Africa increased. These were mainly student immigrants who arrived in the 1970s and subsequently entered the French labour market because of the crisis in their home countries during this period.

Today, the profile of the Muslim immigrant workers has considerably evolved. They still occupy the least qualified professional positions, and are overrepresented in the construction and automobile sectors. The proportion of female immigrant workers has increased, although they are concentrated in precarious and part-time positions.\footnote{J. Bodelieu and C. Borrel, “De plus en plus de femmes immigrées sur le marché du travail” [“More and More Immigrant Women in the Labour Market”], \textit{INSEE Première}, n°791, 2001.}

The survey on employment made by INSEE, based on figures from the 1999 census, shows that at that point there were 2.1 million immigrant workers,\footnote{According to the Census, an immigrant worker is a worker with a foreign nationality and born abroad.} who constituted 8.1 per cent of the working population. Table 18 shows the distribution of these workers in the various sectors – 44.1 per cent are workers and 25.1 per cent are employees,\footnote{An employee is a wage-earning person who works in an office or in administration, without having any managerial responsibilities. A worker is a wage-earning person who carries out work in execution and production, notably in the sector of industry.} but only 10.1 per cent are in executive positions, and they are almost absent in the farming sector (0.7 per cent). These statistics also reveal that immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and other African States are concentrated in the labour market as workers: 48 per cent, 58.2 per cent and 39.8 per cent, respectively. 71 per cent of immigrants retain the nationality of their country of origin, and as a consequence are excluded from working in the public administration. Thus, few immigrants work in the public sector. In 1999, 78 per cent of those immigrants with a stable position were wage-earners in the private sector. The immigrants are also less often self-employed or employers.

Suzanne Thave notes that, according to the 1999 census data, “most of the natives of Turkey, more than half the immigrants\footnote{According to the terminology used by the INSEE, an immigrant is a person living in France who was born abroad and has declared himself or herself as having a foreign nationality or as having been naturalised. Indeed, an immigrant who after several years of residence in France applies for French nationality, and obtains it, will continue to be considered in the INSEE surveys as an immigrant and not as a French citizen. In other words, figures given here refer to individuals who can have either the nationality of their country of origin or French nationality.} […] from Morocco, and nearly half of those from Algeria and Tunisia, are members of the working class”\footnote{Suzanne Thave, “L’emploi des immigrés en 1999” [“The Employment of Immigrants in 1999”], \textit{INSEE Première}, n°717, May 2000.} (see Table 18).
### Table 18. French workforce (1999) – breakdown by professional category and country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional category</th>
<th>France (all)</th>
<th>Immigrants (total)</th>
<th>Immigrants – breakdown by country of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of the workforce (%)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, shopkeepers, managers</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and intellectual occupations</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers with no qualifications</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Suzanne Thave

According to the article of Fanny Mikol and Chloé Tavan, the census of 1999 showed that 12 per cent of workers and the employees from Turkey, and 7 per cent of Tunisian immigrants, became self-employed workers.\(^{\text{116}}\) Alain Boyer also showed that Turkish immigrants often settle in rural areas, and have specific strategies of social integration through the acquisition of accommodation, the development of businesses, and the creation of economic relations with the country of origin through companies of import-export or travel agencies.\(^{\text{117}}\) Finally, this examination of the labour market shows an increase in the number of immigrants working in the tertiary sector, notably in services to private individuals where immigrant women are strongly present (such as cleaning services).\(^{\text{118}}\)

The employment rate among Turkish immigrant women is lower than among Algerian and Moroccan women. If for the Algerian immigrant women the rate of activity decreases with age, on the contrary, women coming from Sub-Saharan Africa are not in the same situation, because they generally join the labour market at the age of 45.\(^{\text{119}}\)

Compared to other immigrant populations, where women’s work is more accepted, Muslim first-generation women (mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey) stay much longer at

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Among the data published by INSEE, the 2002 employment survey showed a difference between the first generation of immigrant women and the girls born into immigrant families. The second generation has wider professional experience than the women of the first generation. Furthermore, when they are unemployed, this situation is more temporary and more often explained by the end of a job contract. Those immigrant women who do not have a job explain this by health or personal reasons (family situation).

There are several reasons for this. First, the participation of women in the labour market is rarely tolerated by their husbands. Second, Muslim mothers are generally responsible for large families, so they are completely monopolised by their children and their various domestic tasks. Finally, as they are strongly attached to the traditions of their country of origin, the mothers do not consider entering a public space when they have been taught to stay outside of it. Gradually, things are changing. Women’s economic activity rates have increased, particularly where Muslim men are unemployed. In those cases, the woman’s work represents an important financial contribution for the family.

### 4.2 Employment rates among the second generation

Data available on the employment of young people of foreign origin describe various aspects of their situation: social mobility, employment, difficulties of professional integration and the situation of each immigrant population. In an article published by INSEE in 1990, Jean-Louis Borkowski described the social mobility of the descendants of immigrants: 24 per cent of the children of immigrants born in France are employees, while 30 per cent are executives. However, a child whose father is an employee or executive has a greater chance of obtaining the same professional position than a child whose father is a worker does. Upward social mobility occurs when changes happen in the employment structure between the generation of the fathers and that of the children. Such an evolution is mainly provoked by the transformation of the production system and the disappearance of less qualified positions occupied by the immigrants.

Data from the 1999 census show that the second generation of Maghrebi origin encounter more difficulties. The great majority of young people aged 19 to 29 have a job or are looking for a position: 69 per cent of young people of French origin are in this situation, as compared to 66 per cent of those of Maghrebi origin. The children of immigrants are more confronted with unemployment: their unemployment rate is 30 per cent as opposed to 20 per cent for the young people of French origin. When the parents are natives of Algeria or Morocco, the unemployment rate of the young people is approximately 40 per cent.

In 1995, Thave and Lefranc made the same observation and showed that concerning employment, among the descendants of Muslim immigrants, the situation of the North African members is, in fact, the most unfavourable. For example, the employment activity levels of the descendants of immigrants aged 20–29 years old is higher for Turks, Sub-Saharan Africans and Moroccans than it is for Algerians. Undergoing strong pressure because of unemployment, North Africans also have more difficulties in becoming independent. They stay at home much longer than other immigrants. Among the families of Turkish immigrants,

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90 per cent of boys and girls get married between 25 and 29 years old.\textsuperscript{123} Although they get married, children of Turkish origin continue to live with their parents after their marriage. The explanation for this situation does not lie in economic reasons and so can be attributable to a traditional domestic model, according to which young couples live with their parents. Thave and Lefranc also observe that young women of Turkish origin choose to stay at home and do not enter the labour market; nearly half do not work. The high unemployment rate within this population (almost 50 per cent) probably discourages these girls from looking for a job. Moreover, among Turkish families, including the second generation, it is solely the men who are the breadwinners.\textsuperscript{124}

Table 19, below, illustrates the difficult situation faced by young people of Algerian origin with regard to unemployment. Alain Frickey and Jean-Luc Primon show that the young people of Maghrebi origin with a university degree are confronted with unemployment and great difficulties in their entrance to the labour market.\textsuperscript{125} When they find a job position, these young people are often unsatisfied with their professional situation. They feel that they occupy a position which is not as high as their skills warrant and consider themselves to be badly paid. Both authors explain this situation by the fact that these young people and their families are strongly involved in schooling, and have to face obstacles to succeed in integrating into the labour market.\textsuperscript{126} If the young people of Maghrebi origin are the most often confronted with problems of professional integration, the children of a mixed family know a situation comparable to that of the young people of French origin.

### Table 19. Unemployment rate of young people who finished school in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Parents’ origins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 3 years in the labour market</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 5 years in the labour market</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEREQ\textsuperscript{127}

On the basis of the empirical work carried out by CEREQ,\textsuperscript{128} Yael Brinbaum noted in 1994 that the girls experience the same difficulties as the boys: “[they] do not escape the gender disparities in the labour market and are facing unemployment more (34 per cent against 28 per cent of the men of foreign origin, and 28 per cent of girls of French origin against 19 per


\textsuperscript{124} Nouzha Bensalah, Familles turques et maghrébines aujourd’hui [Turkish and Maghrebi Families Today], Paris: Maisonneuve Larose, 1994.


\textsuperscript{126} Alberto Lopez and Gwenaëlle Thomas, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: le poids des origines socioculturelles,” pp. 293–305.


\textsuperscript{128} This is the third sample group of the CEREQ (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications), which carried out interviews with young people who graduated from high school in June 1994 (with a general diploma or a professional one). Using the two previous samples available, Yael Brinbaum worked on 2,928 young people between 16 and 25 years old (60 per cent boys and 40 per cent girls).
From the CEREQ sample group (“Generation 98”), Alain Frickey, Jake Murdoch and Jean-Luc Primon show that it takes longer for girls to obtain this first position, and that this job is often part-time.

### Table 20. Professional integration of second-generation immigrants, for their first employment position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>After how many months was the first job position found?</th>
<th>Part-time job (%)</th>
<th>Temporary job (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young people born into a North African family</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people born into a French family</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEREQ

Irène Fournier and Roxane Silberman show that the greater risk of unemployment among young people in the second generation for those who migrated from outside the EU cannot be accounted for by their educational levels. They published a survey on the professional future of young people who graduated from high school in 1989. The cohort comprised 12,516 individuals, who were divided into four groups: individuals with two parents born in France, individuals with only one parent born in France, a group of children whose two parents were born in the EU (mainly of Portuguese origin), and a final category of young people whose parents are immigrants from non-EU countries (mainly from the Maghreb).

The analysis of this cohort in October 1993 (four years after the end of the study) showed that the unemployment rate of the young people of Maghrebi origin was 30 per cent, twice as much as the unemployment rate for children of French origin. Some explanation for this situation could be found in the different school strategies employed by the children of French origin, and by the children of immigrants. The descendants of North African immigrants “have more difficulty in completing their studies or their academic goals”. Unlike the children of Maghrebi origin, the majority of the descendants of Portuguese immigrants chose to pursue professional training rather than going to university. According to Silberman and Fournier, this professional career choice is more advantageous for them. As they are able to find a position in the company where they spend a period of placement while still at school, the vocational training enables them to enter the labour market more easily. Conversely, a graduate or postgraduate degree does not provide them with the same practical experience.

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The large proportion of Muslim immigrants in the industrial sectors also has an impact on their ability to build a strong social and professional network that enables them to help their children find a job. When these children look for a job, a lot of parents use their contacts to help them enter the labour market. Yet not all parents have the same level of resources. Again, Muslim parents are at a disadvantage, not only with regard to French parents, but also with regard to other immigrant parents. Among Portuguese immigrants, parents actively involved in the construction sector as self-employed craftsmen, or as employees in small companies, succeed in helping their children who have been trained in the same field of activity to secure better opportunities to find a job.133

Currently, many Muslim immigrants find themselves unemployed, in early retirement or idle (because of illness or a permanent disability). This is largely due to major job cuts and the job restructuring that the industrial sector underwent during the 1970s and 1980s in France.

4.3 Employment and anti-discrimination legislation
The Pleven Law of July 1975, modified in 1985, protects employees against discrimination by employers.134 In particular: employers are prohibited from taking discriminatory measures in job offers (article 225-1 of the Penal Code); employers are prohibited from justifying a refusal to employ on the grounds of origin, traditions, political beliefs, actual or alleged affiliation or non-affiliation to an ethnic group, nation, race or religion (clause L 122-45 of the Labour Code and 225-1 of the Penal Code); employers are prohibited from taking discriminatory measures during the execution of the contract of employment and on occasions of laying off (clause L. 122-45 of the Labour Code and 225-1 and 225-2 of the Penal Code), and so on.

In the fight against the discrimination in the labour market, the French State has developed several actions and programmes. At the legislative level, several laws were strengthened by the French legislative, notably since 2000:

- The law of 16 November 2001 relative to the fight against discrimination allows the victims to pursue legal suits;
- The decree of 8 December 2003 creates the Commission Interministérielle de lutte contre le racisme which defines the policy that needs to be created;
- The law for Equal Opportunities n°2006-396 adopted in March 2006, which proposes several measures concerning employment and education. For example, the law permitted the improvement of the HALDE powers.

4.4 Research on discrimination in the labour market
With regard to the professional integration of the Muslim population in France, discrimination in the labour market represents another obstacle. The first research concerning the question of discrimination in the labour market was developed in France in the 1990s, often on the initiative of trade unions. Indeed, in a 1992 report by le Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (High Council of Integration, HCI),135 there was an attempt to highlight the growing difficulties faced by foreigners and people of foreign origin in the labour market. Since then, various studies have been published by trade unions and organisations, and the HCI has gathered testimonies from individuals and members of public authorities. One of these recent studies

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134 Clause 225-2 of the Penal Code condemns perpetrators to a punishment of imprisonment (two years) and/or to a penalty of 200,000 francs for discriminatory practices in the labour market.
135 Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, Foreigners and Employment, 1992. The High Council of Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration) is a public authority that gives advice to the Government about integration policies.
that had a great scientific and media impact was the survey of Philippe Bataille made at the request of the CFDT (a French trade union).\(^{136}\)

The 1998 HCI report examined both the situation of foreigners and that of people of foreign origin. They found that having French nationality does not prevent discrimination in the workplace. The authors of the report note that discrimination in the workplace has become a daily practice:

> Discriminatory practices exist in job offers when job agencies mentions “white race” or by codes explicit enough such as BBR [blue, white and red, the colours of the French flag, to signify that the employer wants only applications from French people and not from foreigners or children of immigrants]. Usually, though, discrimination is not visible, but results from the practice of a company and is reinforced by the person looking for a job and by the job agencies.\(^{137}\)

These public or private agencies that deal with employers refusing to employ people of foreign origin operate preliminary selections among the job-seekers following these criteria. The justifications used by the companies, the instigators of discriminatory practices, are numerous: it could be that the employers do not want to have difficulties with their customers (according to a 1996 IFOP survey,\(^ {138}\) 20 per cent of employers put forward this argument), the employers think that foreign employees could create tensions among their staff, or they simply prefer to employ French people and give priority to national citizens (48 per cent of the managers share this opinion).

It is not possible to know exactly how many employers are responsible for discriminatory practices. Most reports are published on the basis of empirical work and testimonies, and show that this problem causes significant tensions between the political sphere and the victims. A report by the Inspection générale des Affaires sociales in 1992 made an enquiry into the local social organisations in four regions: Île-de-France, Rhône-Alpes, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

The MGIS survey, by an analysis of the first quantitative data on this point, “showed that this feeling is not general in the immigrant population and the discrimination is more perceived by people with difficulties in social integration”.\(^ {139}\) When faced with discrimination, the behaviour of the young French Muslims may vary. They can give up on their efforts to integrate with the host community and find a job in the labour market. Strongly affected, they can overreact at the sight of provocation and excess of language in their relations with job agencies.

A testimony collected in a job agency, quoted in a 1997 study by Mouna Viprey on the integration into the labour market by young immigrants or the second generation of immigration, confirms this fact: “We exclude them voluntarily from certain jobs in which […]


\(^{137}\) Haut Conseil à l’intégration [High Council for Integration], *Lutte contre les discriminations: faire respecter le principe d’égalité*.

\(^{138}\) Survey by IFOP in September 1996 on demand of a public institution (Direction de la Population et des Migrations).

the employer does not want this kind of people [...]. We are not in a strong bargaining position, so we are bound by the conditions imposed by those who offer jobs.”

In 2004, a survey of young university graduates who were the children of South European immigration (from Spain, Italy and Portugal) and Maghrebi immigration (from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), demonstrated the difficulties that this group encountered in finding a job, despite their high level of education. The young people of Maghrebi origin begin their professional life with instability and an insecure position more often. This situation is characterised by a part-time job for the young women of Maghrebi origin and by a temporary job for the young men of the same origin. These young people also experience unemployment after their studies more often and over a longer period than young people of South European and French origin do.

Qualitative interviews with the young people of Maghrebi origin showed that many believed that they had been victims of racial discrimination, but without being able to provide any evidence of this or without being able to refer to a specific experience. The existence of discrimination is attested by interviews with people in charge of recruitment who claim to respect the law, but use subjective elements to evaluate job applications (such as the level of integration of the applicant of foreign origin or his or her capacity to fit into the company in spite of any cultural differences). These elements are often unfavourable to applicants of North African origin.

These discriminatory practices do not only involve employment. In his work dedicated to racism in the workplace, Philippe Bataille reminds us that regarding discrimination issues, the problem does not lie in the absence of French citizenship (many immigrants and their children are in fact French citizens), or the use of the French language or professional qualifications. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that they continue to be considered as migrant workers. The young people of Muslim origin, that is, the children of these migrant workers, face precisely this issue. Much like their parents, employers continue to regard them as children of foreigners, and thus foreigners themselves.

In 2004, the persistence of discriminatory practices was exposed. Jean-François Amadieu, director of the Observatoire sur les discriminations (Observatory on Discrimination), published a survey and some “testing” in order to demonstrate the existence of discriminatory practices in the recruitment process developed by companies in France. By sending a CV to different companies, he showed that a CV from someone of foreign origin was more often refused.

In 2006, Roxane Silbeman and Irène Fournier established that many young people with origins in the Maghreb or in Sub-Saharan Africa declare themselves as having been victims of discrimination during the recruitment process: this was the case for 40 per cent of boys of

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140 IRES (Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) rapport final pour le FAS, March 1997.
143 The Observatoire des discriminations is a part of the Centre of Studies and Research on organisations and social relationships (Pantheon-Sorbonnes University Paris I). It publishes surveys on testing experiences and inequality phenomena in the labour market.
144 A Maghrebi name was used on the CV.
Muslims in the EU - Cities Report: France

Maghrebi origin (who explained that their name was a motive for discrimination) and 40 per cent of boys of sub-Saharan African origin (who consider themselves to be victims of discrimination due to the colour of their skin).  

**The hijab issue**

The “headscarf issue” aroused some debates and polemics in the labour market, because of the case of Muslim women who were made redundant because they were wearing the Islamic headscarf (*hijab*). In 2002, a mail-order company laid off one of its employees, arguing that she did not agree to wear her *hijab* in a more discrete way. The women had worn her headscarf when she was taken on, and at that time her religious symbol did not represent an obstacle. A few months after her arrival at the company, the woman was transferred to headquarters and the company asked her to wear her *hijab* without hiding her neck, her forehead and her ears. The woman refused, and the company decided to lay her off. The judicial authorities (Conseil des prud’hommes, Court of Appeal of Paris) subsequently cancelled the lay-off decision because it was based on her religious convictions and is forbidden by French law.

In 2003, a member of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Transport was also punished by her administration because of her Islamic veil. The Ministry judged that the young woman had committed a crime regarding the republican principles of secularism and had compromised the neutrality of the State services. The non-respect of the neutrality principle can be used by employers, but the company needs to prove this by objective arguments (for example if the employee tries to promote his or her religious faith in the workplace).

4.5 **Initiatives to counter discrimination in the labour market**

*EU-funded programmes*

Thanks to EU funds (the EQUAL programme), a national action programme, ESPERE, has been created in order to develop specific training concerning the issue of discrimination in the labour market for State employees. These include employees at the Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi (National Employment Agency, ANPE), Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes (Association for the Training of Adults, AFPA), *missions locales* and local institutions involved in job and training actions.

The national programme EQUAL LATITUDE tries to combat discrimination in the temporary job agencies (*sociétés de travail temporaire*) and in companies. The actions are developed in collaboration with Adecco and Adia, companies offering temporary jobs, the State and l’Institut du Mécénat de Solidarité (IMS), which gathers together companies involved in social actions.

The EQUAL ELMER Programme is managed by IMS, and tries to encourage the practices of non-discrimination and ethnic diversity in large companies such as Peugeot Citroën (PSA) and Axa.

Finally the EQUAL PLURIEL media project concerns the ethnic diversity in Television and Radio public companies (such as France Television’s network of public television channels in France).

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Programmes to combat discrimination have also been created in the trade union sector, for example the EQUAL Programme of CFDT (a French trade union).

*State initiatives*
State employees of the employment agencies and the AFPA have received training in order to fight against discrimination and to take into account this kind of difficulties when they help immigrants or their children to find a job.

The State concluded a series of agreements with the various partners of the labour market to promote the integration of descendants of immigration. It signed an agreement with l’Assemblée permanente des Chambres des Métiers (Permanent Assembly of Trade Rooms, APCM) for the 2003–2005 period, to facilitate the access of this population to professional training. The APCM was in charge of stepping up action towards the companies in order to convince them to employ the young people of foreign origin. Agreements of this type were also signed with representatives or trade unions of companies working in the sectors of building, engineering and telecommunications.

The State finally mobilised a series of means at the local level by the creation of Commissions for the Promotion of the Equality of Opportunity and Citizenship (COPEC) acting at the local level (see also section 4.2). At the local level, since 2004 the IMS has mobilised companies in order to create with them jobs in poor districts, where a large proportion of immigrants and their children are living. This programme will continue until 2006 and is being implemented in the Parisian suburbs (Seine-Saint-Denis, Aulnay and la Plaine Saint-Denis) and in the town of Havre.

The population of immigrant women and the girls from the second generation are also helped by social programmes. Set up by the Ministry of Employment, the Chrysalis project brings together local governments, associations, public employment agencies and training structures, to fight against the difficulties encountered by women living in poor suburbs in gaining access to the labour market. Actually, ten cities are involved in the starting up of this project, among which there are Marseille and Strasbourg. The “Talents des cites” programme also funded a business project developed by young people from these districts.
5. Housing

5.1 Data on the housing situation of Muslims
As in many other sectors, debate around the housing situation of Muslims in France is dominated by the republican taboo on ethnicity. In other words, there are many questions with regard to the construction of public housing, its management by State bodies, and the policies for its allocation, for which, in terms of ethnicity or race, no answer is provided. The rejection of such a debate has allowed the public authorities to avoid officially recognising the existence of disparities in access to housing on the basis of nationality. For a long time the State referred to the housing problems of immigrants in terms of “social exclusion”, but refused to admit the existence of racial discrimination in this area. However, thanks to recent reports and surveys denouncing discriminatory practices, today there is evidence of some change in the attitudes of the State authorities in France.

The high increase in immigration in the wake of World War II took place in a context marked by a housing shortage. It was difficult for immigrants to find housing, and they were forced to live in woefully inadequate housing in the big cities. On the outskirts of Paris, Lyon, Grenoble or Marseille, shanty towns became the homes of all those who could not find a decent home, not even in the unsanitary blocks of flats. Moreover, the Muslim immigrants faced a more difficult situation than other European immigrants. According to research by Patrick Simon in 1998,148 during their settlement in France, 40 per cent of the immigrants from Algeria, Morocco or Sub-Saharan Africa encountered poor housing conditions, against 30 per cent of Portuguese immigrants.

Faced with this problem, the Government’s solution in the 1950s was to build specific housing residences for immigrant workers. This included building blocks of flats, as well as establishing the Société nationale de construction pour les travailleurs algériens (National Construction Union for Algerian Workers, SONACOTRA) and the Fonds d’Action Sociale (National Fund for Social Projects in favour of immigrants, FAS). At the same time, the removal of the shanty towns was initiated149 and unsanitary housing was replaced by temporary block of flats for the immigrants and their families. These political decisions resulted in a major improvement in the situation of immigrants. Between 1975 and 1990, the number of foreign families living in a precarious housing situation decreased from 10 per cent to 4 per cent.150

In the 1970s, the immigrants progressively gained access to social housing – habitations à loyer modéré (council houses, or HLMs as they are known in France). Initially, middle-class and working-class people of French origin lived in these HLMs, but in the 1970s the significant improvement in their living standards enabled them to abandon the public housing scheme and buy their own properties. They were replaced by immigrant families of more modest means. So from the 1970s onwards, the HLMs came to be increasingly occupied by immigrants.

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149 Loi Debré de 1964 and loi Vivien de 1970.
A housing survey conducted by the INSEE at the end of 1996 confirmed the strong presence of immigrants in the HLM sector: “More than 50 per cent of Algerians, 47 per cent of immigrants from Morocco, 42.5 per cent from Tunisia and 40 per cent of Africans and Turks were occupying council houses.” The strong presence of immigrants in HLMs can be ascribed to their limited financial means and to a housing shortage in the private sector, which imposed unequal conditions of access and selection.

The 1999 Census showed that 56 per cent of immigrants were renting accommodation in council houses, because the private sector was too expensive. Among immigrant families, more than 50 per cent of immigrants from the Maghreb lived in council houses, and many families from Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa also live in council houses. Their arrival in France in the 1960s, a period marked by the development of council houses, could explain their strong representation in this type of accommodation.

5.2 Discrimination in the housing sector

From a look at the results of opinion surveys on racism and discrimination, it is easy to see that there are problems of discrimination in the housing sector. In the MGIS data (1992), for example, around 25 per cent of North African and Turkish immigrants, and 32 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africans, reported that they had personally faced discrimination in the housing sector.

The discriminatory practices described by the victims included hostility on the part of the public bodies managing the HLMs. Indeed, the employees of these structures tried to discourage applicants, by explaining to them that they have little chance of obtaining accommodation. The bodies in charge of council housing are also accused of not justifying the rejection of applications from immigrant families.

However, the problem of the lack of statistical data needs to be stated again. Studies about the existence of racism and xenophobia in France, conducted every year by the National Consultative Commission of Human Rights, contain no data about discriminatory practices regarding housing. Nevertheless, several elements of these studies reveal the existence of this phenomenon.

In 2000, for example, checks implemented by SOS-Racisme (an association fighting racism), on the computer files published by public organisations in charge of the public housing (HLM), exposed the ethnic classification used for the allocation of flats in Marseille. This classification arranged the ethnic category of the applicant for public housing in categories such as “France”, “Maghreb”, “African” and “Asian”. This ethnic classification is prohibited by French law, because the national commission overseeing the use of computer data (Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés, CNIL) authorises the sole use of nationality as a criterion.

151 Groupe d’étude et de lutte contre les discriminations (GELD), Les discriminations raciales et ethniques dans l’accès au logement social, p. 11.
155 The CNIL controls the conditions in which computer information about individuals is collected (for instance during a survey) and checks if it is done with respect for people’s private life and their individual rights.
The free call service 114,\textsuperscript{156} which since 2000 has dealt with complaints of discriminatory practices, has also revealed evidence of the existence of discrimination in access to housing. In October 2000, a report of the Groupe d’Etude et de Lutte contre les Discriminations (Group for the Study of, and Fight against, Discrimination, GELD) indicated that 12.2 per cent of calls to the service concerned discrimination in this sector. Discriminatory practices included, for example, immigrants or people of foreign origin being offered flats largely located in poor and deprived areas. The GELD report also argues that the difficulties involved in filing a housing application, in collecting all the official documents and in meeting all the conditions, are in themselves an obstacle for foreign people. For example, a housing applicant should have been a resident of a city for several years in order to obtain an offer (this condition is inherently discriminatory for immigrant families).

The identification of discriminatory practices in access to housing is a complex process, in that a great number of actors intervene in the allocation of a flat. Although, in theory, the decision on allocation should be taken by a committee of each housing institution, in practice it is often influenced by other intermediaries who receive the application and who have to send them off the housing institutions. Someone seeking a council house (HLM) may send an application directly to the public housing institution, or to other bodies (such as the local Préfet, the city council, the county council or his or her employer) who are allowed to select applications and to refer them to the committee of each housing institution. Each of these actors has the authority and the power to accept or reject an application. It is within these selection processes that discriminatory practices can take place. All too often, the intermediaries reject an application on the grounds of the applicant’s skin colour or his or her nationality.\textsuperscript{157} However, as the discrimination is often concealed by other unfounded justifications for the rejection, the victims are not able to provide evidence of racism.

Finally, immigrants have spoken about the hostility and racism from some intermediaries.\textsuperscript{158}

In 2000, Government policies were introduced to reinforce social diversity in housing and a law was passed to make public housing institutions and municipal bodies ensure social heterogeneity in council houses (HLMs).\textsuperscript{159} In passing this law, the French Government aims to prevent the creation of poor and rich HLMs. In practice, however, far from achieving its goal, this law was used to control the ethnic composition of council houses. Many immigrant families received a rejection of their application because of the obligation to ensure the social diversity of some blocks of flats. Testimonies of families also speak about practices of selection that are unfavourable to immigrant families, who are \textit{a priori} considered to be

\textsuperscript{156} The Government established this free call service on 16 May 2000, to allow persons who are victims or witnesses of racial discrimination to denounce such attitudes. The information collected during the calls is then transmitted to the local Commissions for access to the citizenship (Commissions d’accès à la citoyenneté CODAC) which are in charge of investigating these denunciations. They will meet those victims who have agreed to communicate their identity, and may initiate administrative or legal pursuits with the judicial authorities.


\textsuperscript{158} Annie Maguer, “Les difficultés d’accès ou de maintien dans un logement des jeunes immigrés ou issus de l’immigration” [“Difficulties of Gaining Access to or Holding onto Housing for the Young Immigrants or Children with an Immigrant Background”], \textit{Migrations Etudes}, n°105, February 2002.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Loi SRU n°2000-1028 13 Décembre 2000, loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain} [Law on Solidarity and Urban Regeneration].
troublemakers, likely to create problems (with the neighbours, with their children, and so on) in the neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{160}

The difficulties in and obstacles in the way of getting a council house are even more numerous for Sub-Saharan African families (such as Guinean, Senegalese and Zairean families). These families are mainly found living in unsanitary homes in the private sector. They are also to be found living in squats, with a great deal of support from social organisations.\textsuperscript{161} Moreover, the available council houses are often unsuitable for the needs of African families, who require bigger flats.\textsuperscript{162}

The policies adopted by the government in this sector reveal the inability of the public authorities to protect immigrant populations, and it is Muslim families who are mostly exposed to housing problems and discrimination. The conditions of access to public housing are not fully set out in the law; there are only rules about the way to apply and the conditions of allocation. There is legislation promoting the right of socially disadvantaged people to obtain housing – the Besson Law, adopted in May 1990, identified the various actors in the housing allocation process, and the priority criteria that have to be met for an application to be accepted. The Law on Exclusion of July 1998 strengthened the 1990 law in the context of social crisis and housing shortages. However, none of these measures has explicitly considered immigrant families as socially disadvantaged populations needing priority to secure housing. Yet the statistical data available in the GELD report (2000) prove this fact, namely that immigrant families are a part of the population facing real economic and social difficulties.

The fact of being born in France and not being an immigrant does not facilitate access to the accommodation. A study by Annie Maguer, published in February 2002, shows that young people are particularly exposed to discrimination. The research was carried out in three areas: Evry, a Parisian suburb, Villeurbanne, a suburb of Lyon, and Vienne, in the Isère département. It was based on interviews with young people of foreign origin and with the State employees of local governments and council housing bodies. The research found evidence that the young immigrants or children of immigrants are discriminated against when they look for accommodation. They are considered a risk with regard to others by the council housing bodies. Furthermore, the council housing bodies systematically propose to these populations accommodation in poor districts, or only in districts where young people were born and grew up. Annie Maguer talks about a phenomenon of assignation à résidence.\textsuperscript{163}

The access to private accommodation is even more problematic for the foreign populations and their children. In an article dedicated to this subject, published in 2004, Franck Chignier-Riboulon\textsuperscript{164} describes the strategies used by these populations to face discrimination. The first

\textsuperscript{160} Groupe d’étude et de lutte contre les discriminations (GELD), \textit{Les discriminations raciales et ethniques dans l’accès au logement social}.

\textsuperscript{161} Recent current events reveal the complexity of the housing situation of the immigrant populations (mainly of African origin). The biggest squat in France, in the municipality of Cachan (a suburb of Paris), was recently evacuated, although it sheltered numerous families with a regular situation (i.e. who had residency in France).


\textsuperscript{163} Annie Maguer, “Les difficultés d’accès ou de maintien dans un logement des jeunes immigrés ou issus de l’immigration,” p. 4.

strategy makes it necessary for these populations to directly reveal their foreign origin to real estate agencies, and to avoid the taboo on the question. The second strategy consists in keeping silent about their origin and being discreet on the subject, in order not to be identified. The last method is used by mixed couples in which one of the partners is of French origin. The partner who is of French origin is the only one who looks for accommodation and negotiates with real estate agents. The partner of foreign origin “stays outside” and does not intervene.
6. Health and social protection

6.1 Data on Muslims and health

Statistical data on the health of the Muslim population, specifically, do not exist. As for other sectors, data published on the various immigrant populations will be used as a proxy. Several conclusions can be drawn from data on the populations from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey. This situation obviously has its advantages and its disadvantages. One disadvantage is that individuals are automatically counted as “Muslims”, even if we know that all of them cannot be automatically defined as such (see section 2 on identity). One advantage consists in underlining the diversity of structure and evolution existing within the Muslim population living in France.

Little attention has been paid to the health condition of foreigners, immigrants or their children in France. In health statistics, the criteria of nationality and birth are hardly ever mentioned, and where they are, they are not analysed. France makes again an exception in this regard, as compared to other EU countries, such as the United Kingdom, and this situation obviously has several consequences with regard to the information available on this subject.

The justifications often given for this lack of data on the immigrant and foreign populations are of a political, ethical and scientific nature. For those who support the restrictions on data about the origin of individuals, any analysis of the health condition of immigrant populations is in danger of provoking a xenophobic backlash and leading to prejudice against foreign populations. From a scientific point of view, certain researchers consider that information about nationality or origin provides only secondary clarifications on the issues of health, which are more determined by socio-economic factors.

In addition to these arguments, it is necessary to mention the existing republican and universalistic political tradition in France, which enables us to understand the French hesitations in regard to any production of data based on ethnicity. 165 “There is hardly any difference between the health issue and other issues for which the same silence has prevailed on the basis of similar arguments: […] refusal to recognise the facts of discrimination, the determination to promote a model of integration. Health also has a particular dimension of dramatisation because it involves suffering and sometimes death, but also involves threats when it is about infectious diseases.” 166

Discussing the health condition of immigrants such as the Muslim population is supposed to entail dealing with social uncertainty, inequalities and integration problems. Indeed, these populations face great social and economic difficulties, including their poor integration into the labour market and their settlement in deprived districts, and uncomfortable and woefully inadequate facilities. All these elements have an impact on their physical and psychological state of health. 167

165 The Law of 1979 on computers and liberties strongly restricted the collection of data on the origin of the persons in order to fight against statistical surveys with xenophobic objectives, and the National Computer and Liberties Commission (CNIL) considers the data on nationality to be sensitive, because they can give indirect information about “the racial origin” or the religion of the persons.
More frequently and seriously confronted with health problems, the immigrant populations also have a poorer opinion of their health than the non-immigrant population does. In 2005, the INSEE established that over the period from 1999 to 2003, 14 per cent of immigrants considered that they were in poor or very poor health (against 8 per cent for non-immigrants), while 60 per cent considered themselves to be in good or very good health (against 71 per cent of non-immigrants). The same data showed that the low average incomes of immigrants do not permit them to have efficient social protection; they are less often holders of medical insurance (62 per cent of immigrants, against 87 per cent of non-immigrants), and 22 per cent benefit only from the State social protection (i.e. they do not have a private health insurance).

6.2 Access to the health care system

In terms of access to the health care system, French regulations under legislative and administrative texts provide for free access to the system. Indeed, the French social welfare provides, under certain conditions (e.g. the medical care for foreigners who do not have a residence permit and who have been living in France for less than three years may only be provided by hospitals) for the care and assistance of any sick person, whether a foreigner or an immigrant, even if that person remains illegally in the country.

Nevertheless, some evidence reveals that immigrants and foreigners use the health system less than the rest of the French population. For example, in an article dealing with the health of foreigners and immigrants, Didier Fassin showed that foreigners are the most likely to go, and indeed make up an absolute majority of those who do go, to the free health centres: “While they represent 6.3 per cent of the French population, they are 62 per cent of the patients of these centres; among these, 77 per cent of foreigners are without any social protection, or nearly twice as many as French citizens.”

This situation is also described in a study published by Andrée and Arié Mizrahi on the free health centres. According to both researchers, the patients consulting these centres share some common characteristics: they are usually rather young men (rarely children and very rarely old persons) living on their own. The majority of them do not work, more than half of them have no permanent housing, more than 60 per cent of them have no social protection, and foreigners are in the majority among them. However, the foreigners visiting free health centres are not representative of the percentage of the various foreign groups in the population. For example, the structure of the nationalities is totally different, with most foreign patients coming from Sub-Saharan Africa.

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169 Didier Fassin, “Peut-on étudier la santé des étrangers et des immigrés?” [“Can One Study the Health of Foreigners and Immigrants?”], *Plein droit*, n°32, April 1998.
Table 21. Main characteristics of the patients of the health centres managed by the French NGO, Médecins du Monde

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of health centres</th>
<th>31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observation period</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People observed</td>
<td>Patients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients who have already taken medical advice</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New patients</td>
<td>19,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of total number of patients who have taken medical advice in one of the 31 health centres (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients under 16 years old</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients aged 40 years old and over</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients living alone</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed patients</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients without social protection</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients without permanent housing</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andrée Mizrahi and Arié Mizrahi

The first reason explaining why people seek medical advice in the free health centres is the fact that they have no health cover. The second is the difficulty of paying for the medical expenses beforehand and waiting for the refund from the health services. Otherwise, these patients do not present any specific pathologies, but their pathologies are mostly aggravated by their living conditions, and obviously by the way in which medical treatments are delayed when they need those.

The observation of AIDS-related data shows that foreign populations are particularly affected by this disease. Drawing on data revealed by INSEE, the Institut de la veille sanitaire (the organisation in charge of observing and analysing sanitary and medical situations in France) published a report on AIDS cases declared among foreigners living in France. This survey concerns the official registration of AIDS cases in the adult population – people who are 15 years old or over, have a foreign nationality and are settled in France. These people’s disease was diagnosed between 1978 and 1998. The various nationalities concerned by this report were gathered in eight geographical groups, and many of them came from predominately Muslim countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. On 30 June 1998, 46,973 AIDS cases were registered. Among these, 14 per cent concerned patients of foreign nationality living in France, as shown in Table 10.

The study shows that foreigners living in France, and Muslims in particular, are greatly disproportionately affected by the disease. The increase of the number of foreigners among AIDS cases since 1996 can be accounted for by the increase in immigration waves coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. However, these recent African immigrants often do not know what

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174 Every doctor diagnosing an AIDS case for an HIV-positive patient must fill out a statement and send it to the public health services. The statements are then recorded by the “institute de veille sanitaire”.

57
AIDS represents and means. A lot of them are infected by the virus at an advanced stage, but are not aware of their infection. Consequently, a misunderstanding of the AIDS virus delays their diagnosis and the medical treatment. Furthermore, many foreigners have not been diagnosed and have not benefited from the requisite medical treatment. The results of the study suggest that the access of HIV-positive foreigners to therapeutic treatment in France is limited. AIDS cases among the immigrant population demonstrate the difficulty that these foreigners have in gaining access to effective medical treatment because of their social, economic, legal status and living conditions.

Table 22. Number of AIDS cases declared since the beginning of the epidemic – breakdown by nationality (June 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total number of AIDS cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>2,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>1,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of foreigners</td>
<td>6,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (of French nationality)</td>
<td>40,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality unknown</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Florence Lot

As for the information about the health of Muslim immigrants, the question of the aging of this population is essential. These immigrants worked in France and a lot of them decided to settle in France and live out their retirement in the country. Their occupations, which often involved exhausting and tiring manual jobs, contributed to the rapid acceleration of their aging. Affected by social crises, and sometimes getting sacked by the age of 50, Muslim immigrants have hardly any chance of finding work at this age, so they are forced to retire by the age of 60. Many have difficulties expressing themselves, reading and writing in French, so they have difficulty in completing forms such as their retirement application. These immigrants have often had great job mobility also, meaning that they worked for many companies and several employers. As their work status was sometimes precarious, their employers did not register them with the French employment authorities. Gathering a record of all their past jobs poses a great difficulty for Muslim workers.

The pensions of these immigrants do not represent a lot of money. Salaries during the working period were not very high and were not received for a long time because of the periods of unemployment or incapacity. The meagre income of the pensions sometimes forces them to return to their country of origin (this is mainly the case for North Africans and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). The expectations of the family from the country of origin, and their hope of financial resources thanks to the return of their immigrant parents, create huge pressure on immigrants and encourage them to stay in France. It is important to emphasise the fact that immigrants in early retirement are obliged to stay in France and cannot return to their country with a pension before the age of 60 years.

Other factors play a role in their decision to return to their home country. The assistance provided by the health care system in France is quoted by numerous immigrants to explain their choice to stay in France after their retirement. There are sometimes agreements between the countries of immigration and France to allow the retired worker to gain access to social benefits and pension schemes, even when they decide to return to their home country. For example, an agreement of this type was signed between Algeria and France (in January 1965) allowing the transfer of pensions to Algeria (such as pensions for retirement, early retirement or disability). If no agreement has been signed between France and their country of origin, then immigrants must claim their pensions in France.\textsuperscript{177}

\textbf{Table 23. Proportion of immigrants aged more than 55 years old – breakdown by age and country of origin (1999)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Aged 55–64 years old</th>
<th>Aged 65 years old and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia /Laos /Vietnam</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (immigrants)</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (whole population)</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE\textsuperscript{178}

Among immigrants living in France who are aged 65 or older, Muslims (making up around one third of this group) are less numerous than European immigrants (Spanish or Italian, for example). Within this group, Tunisian immigrants make up the largest group among Muslims, at 15.9 per cent of all immigrants aged 65 and above, living in France – Algerians make up 14.7 per cent, Moroccans 6.4 per cent, other Africans 3.2 per cent and Turks 5.4 per cent.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{177} Agreements on social protection were signed between France and the Maghreb countries in 1965 (9 July for Morocco and 17 December for Tunisia). Agreements with Sub-Saharan countries and Turkey were developed in the middle of the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{178} INSEE, census of the population 1999.

However, these data do not specify the reasons for the observed differences between the two groups of populations. The proportions of the populations aged 65 and older can be interpreted as the sign of a significant mortality rate, as evidence of a definite return of these populations to their home country, or as the result of a recent influx of immigrants who have not aged yet (as is the case for the population of Sub-Saharan African immigrants).\textsuperscript{180} According to the analysis published by INSEE on the immigrant population in 2005,\textsuperscript{181} the age-structure of the immigrants according to their country of birth shows the various phases of the immigration. For the populations where the wave of migration started in the nineteenth century (i.e. from Southern Europe), the proportion of old immigrants is important. But certain populations (i.e. from the Maghreb) suffer a greater mortality rate or contain a larger number who go back to their country of origin when they reach the age of retirement. These factors explain the weak proportion of immigrants aged 65 years old and over.

\textsuperscript{180} Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse (CNAV), \emph{Le vieillissement des immigrés en France: état de la question}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{181} INSEE, \emph{Les immigrés en France}, édition 2005, p. 42.
7. Policing and security

7.1 Muslims and the police force
The relationship between the police and the French Muslim population is sometimes tense. There are complaints from Muslims about discriminatory practices and the conduct of certain police officers. However, there has been some hesitation on the part of the police in conceding that the attitudes of some of its members do not correspond to the republican and democratic requirements of equality and justice.

The idea that the police are exemplary and professional is common in the public and in the police force. Yet, as with other public institutions, silence and denial regarding complaints of discrimination symbolise common attitudes. A study published by Sophie Body-Gendrot and Catherine Withol de Wenden in 2001 reveals the existence of this phenomenon. Conducted by GELD in 2000–2002, this survey is the result of an empirical investigation into the relationship between police training bodies and the young people living in the suburbs around Paris and Marseille. The study found that, while illegal police practices are a rare occurrence, when they do occur they are minimised or denied. The testimonies of policemen are often considered to be more reliable than the testimonies of the victims of discrimination. According to the sociologist, Laurent Bonelli, “Judges do not want to discredit the police force. [...] When there are ten testimonies against the statements of the policemen, it is the credibility of the witnesses that is questioned.” In other words, the case is often dismissed straight away and does not give rise to any legal charges.

Nevertheless, in the opinion of Fabien Jobard, the police have progressively been held more to account, notably since the 1990s. He ascribes this to a set of legal amendments passed since 1993, with the aim of preventing discrimination. The amendments include requirements for the compulsory presence of a doctor during an arrest at the police station, and the presence of a lawyer from the very moment of arrest, and the creation of the National Commission of Ethics (Commission Nationale de déontologie de la sécurité).

Since the law of December 2004 (loi n°2004-1486 30 December 2004 creating the High Authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equality) that set up the independent authority, the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality, HALDE), the burden of proof rests on the (physical or moral) person accused of direct or indirect discrimination. Nevertheless, in practice victims always feel at a disadvantage when they press charges on the grounds of discriminatory practices, because of their actual or alleged ethnic origin. The free call service 114, which deals with complaints of discriminatory practices, indicated that between May 2000 and August 2002, 8 per cent of the calls involved the security forces. The complaints included allegations of acts of provocation committed by the police, verbal and physical violence (mostly during identity controls), physical assaults, spitting, insults and

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184 Comments of Laurent Bonelli, Liberation, on 15 January 2003.
185 Comments of Fabien Jobard, L’Humanité, on 12 November 2005.
186 For more details on HALDE’s mission, see Part II of this report.
187 For further details on the 114 service, see section 5.2 of this report. Statistical data about the 114 service, based on a GELD report, is available at http://www.social.gouv.fr/htm/pointsur/discrimination/stats114.htm (accessed 18 January 2007).
humiliation. All too often, these complaints concerned young men, or parents complaining of situations concerning their children.

7.2 The impact of 9/11

Debate on the role and the position of Islam in France is persistent and proves that this religion provokes fear and suspicion within the French population. Even before the 11 September attacks, the phenomenon of Islamophobia was a reality in French society, but these attacks had a direct impact on the situation of French Muslims and the security obsession was reinforced. The number of actions conducted by police forces have increased, and the Muslim population is being controlled. In a book describing the development of Islamophobia in France since the US terrorist attacks, Vincent Geisser uses the example of the hijab issue since 1989, the racist attacks against mosques, and the opposition of local political leaders to the building of mosques, as indications of the hate on part of some sections of French society against Islam and Muslims.

The Muslim population has come under particular police scrutiny since 2001, and the possible risks of terrorism in France. Young Muslims are victims of harassment in identity checks. The difficult relationship between these young people and the police also relates to the geographical concentration of the Muslim populations in city suburbs, in deprived districts rife with crime. This environment worsens the relationship of these young people with the police, and with the governmental authorities in general. Similarly, the police admit to doing emergency work in these areas, during which they use ethnicity and age as criteria in their security interventions on the ground. “The habit of judging individuals according to their alleged ethnic background is acquired on the ground, during professional training. Racial criteria […] allow individuals to be distinguished. […] in the same way as age or gender […].”

It is also in the name of security that the Muslim leaders and representative are supervised by police forces. The county services of the Renseignements généraux (in charge of the protection of the French territory and national security) have organised investigations into some Muslim leaders – one case concerned the Muslim representative of religious organisations in the Parisian suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis, in 2002. There are also suspicions against Muslims working in airports. In 2002, for example, an employee at Roissy airport was accused of being member of a terrorist network. He was the victim of a family plot organised by his mother-in-law, who suspected him of being responsible for her daughter’s death. Some discriminatory practices have also been identified in security and cleaning companies working in airports and public buildings (Ministries). After September 2001, these companies received instructions from their customers (i.e. airports and Ministries) asking them to check if their Muslim employees are members of terrorist networks or asking them to dismiss groups of workers.


7.3 Muslim representation in the police force

The problem of racial discrimination by the police is sustained by the lack of diversity in the constitution of the security forces. Muslims are underrepresented in the personnel of the army and the police.

In 1998, the Government of Jean-Pierre Chevènement attempted to encourage the integration of the children of immigrants into the police forces. He created the position of “security assistants” (adjoints de sécurité, ADS), aiming through this to recruit persons without qualifications, on the basis of a simple interview. After three years of professional experience, the recruits would have the possibility of becoming a State employee, provided that they sit an exam. In 1997, of the 34,284 ADS working in the police forces, around 41 per cent had passed the exam and become State employees. In 2002, they were between 50 and 60 per cent, and in 2003, 57 per cent. This low success rate may be explained by the poor qualification level of applicants, particularly with regard to French examination results.193

Without the collection of official ethnic data, estimates of the proportion of Muslims in the security forces vary. In a report published in 2004, at the request of the Ministry of the Interior, the first Minister of Equal Opportunities (Ministre délégué de l’égalité des chances,194 a post established in June 2005), Azouz Begag, stated that a census of people of North African origin working in the police forces could only be taken in an indirect way: “Nevertheless, when we estimate this presence from the family names of police constables, figures remain too vague […]. For example, in January 2004, in the National Police Force, which comprises more than 11,000 security assistants, estimations of the numbers of young people of Maghrebi or African origin can vary from 5 per cent to 15 per cent.”169 “As for police superintendents,195 we estimate at a dozen the number of persons with a North African origin. There would be 300 officers.”196 These figures, even if they do not accurately show the extent to which Muslims are integrated into the police forces, do nevertheless indicate that North African descendants’ participation is low.

To promote the integration of young people born into Muslim families, Azouz Begag has suggested reinforcing the information campaign about job opportunities existing in the police forces. In that way, young people of foreign origin may be more likely to consider the security forces as a possible career option. Meetings between members of the police forces and young people could provide a way to exchange points of view and to permit to the children of immigrants to obtain a better understanding of this professional environment. The Minister of Equal Opportunities has also proposed to offer an educational training programme to young people of foreign origin who would like to apply for security jobs and to take national exams. The results of his report have shown that the failure of applicants of foreign origin is

169 In 2000, a report of the General Inspection of the National Police Force (IGPN) considered the proportion of young people of North African origin working in the security forces to be 5 per cent.
195 A superintendent is in charge of managing the police forces composed of officers and gardiens de la paix (the officers have a better level of qualification than the gardiens de la paix, who could be designated as police employees). According to the decree n°2005-939 2 August 2005 (defining the missions of the superintendents), the superintendent is in charge of the technical organisation of police forces operations and has authority over the staffs.
196 Azouz Begag, La République à ciel ouvert, p. 23.
explained by their poor level of French. Offering them the possibility of improving their knowledge of French could allow them to succeed in the exams.

The experiences or programmes developed abroad in countries where the proportion of Muslim minorities in the police forces is higher (such as the United Kingdom) could be an example for France. Finally, Azouz Begag thinks that the issue of integration of young people of foreign origin in the police forces needs to become a political priority and should be discussed through a national conference organised by the Ministry of the Interior. In order to promote a more positive image of the police forces, he has proposed that a specific police group (la Brigade anti-discrimination) could be created to fight against discrimination in the security forces and in French society.
8. Participation and citizenship

8.1 Muslim organisations in France

One of the main features of French Islam is a longstanding problem of public organisation. The Muslim population of France is not adequately represented by a central body able to deal with the issues and the interests existing in the community. These difficulties may be attributable to a lack of consensus between the various constituents of the Muslim population and the approach of the French Government, which tends to multiply its negotiations with different people from the Muslim community, in order to maintain its position as a unique and privileged interlocutor. In the name of secularism, the State is supposed to limit its interventions concerning the organisation of all religious communities, but the facts demonstrate otherwise.\(^{197}\)

The constant growth in the number of followers of Islam is a strong indicator that religion remains important beyond the first generation of immigrants. Islam became visible in the public debate during the strikes organised by Muslim workers in the 1970s.\(^{198}\) The passage in 1981 of a law (décret-loi portant statut particulier des associations étrangères et associations composées d’étrangers) giving foreign nationals the right to create social organisations inadvertently created a legal framework for religious associations. Numerous organisations of this type were accordingly created in the 1980s, including two main Muslim organisations: Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (Union of the Islamic Organisations of France, UOIF) and Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (the National Union of the Muslims of France, FNMF).

The UOIF was set up in 1983 as the French branch of the Union of the Islamic Organisations in Europe. Close to the Muslim Brotherhood, it benefits from the financial support of the Gulf States. The UOIF claims to comprise more than 200 local organisations and exists thanks to densely populated local networks structured around young people and women (for example, the Young Muslim Women of France, the French League of Muslim Women, and students' organisations). Its annual congress, which is organised in the city of Bourget, brings together several thousand persons (in April 1999, 5,000 persons attended). It also runs the European Institute of Human Sciences of Saint Léger de Fougeret (Nièvre).\(^{199}\)

The FNMF was established in 1985 by dissidents of the Mosque of Paris and the representatives of several Muslim communities. However, some of these subsequently withdrew from the organisation, so it is currently heavily dominated by the Moroccan community of France. According to Dominique Baillet,\(^{200}\) in an article dedicated to North African organisations in France, the FNMF gathers together 500 local Muslim structures, of which around 50 are located in the Parisian suburbs. Funded by Saudi Arabia until 1993, it also works thanks to the members’ contributions and is widely dominated by the Moroccan community of France.\(^{201}\)

The Muslim Institute of the Mosque of Paris unquestionably remains the oldest organisation, as it dates back as far as 1926. This Institute, supported by privileged links with the Algerian

\(^{198}\) Gilles Kepel, Les banlieues de l’islam.
State, was intended to become a shining beacon and disseminator of Islamic culture and a place of gathering for the community. It boasts the authority of 150 imams\textsuperscript{202} by means of five muftis\textsuperscript{203} and claims to control 200 mosques.

Heavily dominated by the North African populations, these organisations are also made up of organisations set up by other waves of Muslim immigration. In practice, the religious structures rarely transcend national and ethnic divides; only the associations of young Muslims endeavour to draw together people with diverse ethnic backgrounds.

Among the organisations representing the Turkish population, it is necessary to mention the Tendance nationale – Union islamique – founded in 1981 and connected to the Milli Görüs group, an Islamic organisation founded by Turkish immigrants. This group has strong links with the Islamist Party (now better known as the Party of Prosperity) and the Islamic Association of France (AIF) founded in 1984 and strongly connected to the German fundamentalist movement Kaplan, run by Jamalledin Hocağlou.\textsuperscript{204}

In addition to these national organisations, it is necessary to include all the associations that exist at the local level, through the creation of prayer rooms in the 1980s within the districts of the Muslim population. The members set up organisations and negotiated the arrangement of prayer rooms in housing estates with public authorities, housing institutions and representatives of the municipality. In an article dedicated to the situation of Islam in the French suburbs, Jocelyne Césari\textsuperscript{205} notes that in 1995 there were 1,000 Islamic organisations running prayer rooms. However, improvements in the organisation of Islam, and the increase in the number of prayer rooms, did not mean a more legitimate status in France for Islam. The report written by Gilles Kepel on his work on Islam in France is instructive: “In most cases where an Islamic organisation became the owner of a prayer room [….] the premises bought consist of one building, which is not allowed to be identified by a sign outside […].”\textsuperscript{206}

In the 1990s, ten years after the social movements against racism and for equality, new organisations were again set up for religious purposes. These organisations will model their philosophy and their agenda on the principle of a dual allegiance: to Islam and the French nation. In December 1987, the Union of Muslim Youth (UJM) was founded in Lyon. The Young Muslims of France (JMF) was founded in July 1993, with the support of the UOIF. The slogan symbolising the action of the UJM was the following: “French people, yes; Muslim also.” The newspaper of the organisation also stated the following: “We assert our rights, enshrined in the French Constitution, to freely profess our religion and also to participate as citizens in the national effort to build a country of peace, tolerance and brotherhood […].”\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{202} The imam is the believer who conducts the community prayers on Friday but is not equivalent to a member of the clergy, because this religious hierarchy does not exist in Islam.
\textsuperscript{203} The mufti is a theorist and an interpreter of Muslim canon law.
\textsuperscript{204} Isabelle Rigoni, \textit{Mobilisations, actions et recompositions. Migrants de Turquie et réseaux associatifs en France, en Allemagne et en Belgique} [Mobilisations, Actions and Recombinations. Migrants from Turkey and Associative Networks in France, Germany and Belgium], thèse de science politique, Université Paris VIII, January 2000.
\textsuperscript{206} Gilles Kepel, \textit{Les banlieues de l’islam}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{207} Cited in Gilles Couvreur, \textit{Musulmans de France: diversité, mutations et perspectives de l’islam français}, p. 75.
The creation in 2000 of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Muslim Council, CFCM) was an attempt to unify all the religious and political tendencies existing in the Muslim population in France. The CFCM was first conceptualised by Jean-Pierre Chevènement and concluded by Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2003, and composed of a national council and regional structures. However, the CFCM encountered difficulties in demonstrating its legitimacy.

8.2 Muslim political participation
Analysis of Muslim participation in the political arena and in the drawing up of public decisions in France is not easy. The national and State political tradition adopts a universalistic model, often presented as the antithesis to the Anglo-Saxon models. Indeed, public opinion insists on the inseparable character of the Republic, so any claim for identity or multiculturalism is always excluded from the public arena. All individuals have to keep their cultural or religious participations to themselves. Currently, this view on the situation is a little simplistic. If, effectively in the name of the Jacobin tradition, France refuses, for example, to pass specific legislation in favour of the populations of foreign origin, the country is perfectly happy to concede the presence of distinguishing features in some public spheres of society. The case of the wearing of the hijab is illustrative. The prohibition of the Islamic headscarf\textsuperscript{208} is only limited to schools.

Rather than discussing the denial of the cultural and religious identities of a minority in the public arena (such as the identities of French Muslims), it is possible to observe the opposite, namely that the political system is not always fit for dealing with issues of ethnicity. Political parties and organisations have made attempts to use the ethnic factor.

During the 1980s, the Socialist Party wanted to take advantage of the movement of young people against racism and their demands for equality, by trying to develop networks and support inside this population. It allowed the founding of social organisations such as Sos-Racisme and France Plus,\textsuperscript{209} and became a strong political supporter of the children of North African immigrants.

More recently, French right-wing parties have also recognised that the descendants of Muslim immigrants represent a political force, and that it could be beneficial to obtain their political support. Hence, in 2002, two French ministers of North African origin\textsuperscript{210} were included in the first Government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin. For a long time, right-wing parties were frightened of encouraging electoral movements of ethnic minorities, leaving it to left-wing parties to embrace such a policy. At present, though, right-wing parties seem to be changing their views. Their efforts still remain modest, namely in the promotion of French candidates of North African or African origin during elections. Moreover, the access of these children of immigrants to the National Assembly is always complex, because this political institution continues to be closed to this part of the French population. For example, in the National Assembly there are no members of North African or African origin. In Europe, France again looks like an exception.\textsuperscript{211}

If the political history in France provides some examples of how the claims of ethnic minorities have been used by political organisations in order to obtain their political support,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{208} Under the law introduced in 2004 (\textit{loi n° 2004-228 sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques}).
  \item \textsuperscript{209} France Plus is an association created in 1985 by the Socialist Party in order to encourage the descendants of immigrants to register on the electoral rolls and to participate in the elections.
  \item \textsuperscript{210} Tokia Saïfi, State Secretary of Ecology, and Hamlaoui Mekachera, Minister of Veterans.
\end{itemize}
it is impossible to find such examples within the Muslim community. Indeed, the religious factor has never allowed the political parties to strengthen their influence over, and their support from, the Muslim community. Similarly, hardly any Muslims use religion as a political flagship to launch their political campaigns. During the passage of the last law banning headscarves at school, the UOIF attempted to come across as the spokesperson of the girls concerned and as the main opponent of the law. However, this movement was essentially made in a bid to reaffirm the strength of its networks inside the Muslim community, and in order to strengthen its role of intermediary between this population and the political authorities. If some ethnic candidates may sometimes appear during elections (i.e. the political parties include candidates from ethnic minority populations on their lists), these are promoted especially for the sake of appealing to the population of immigrants and people of foreign origin, but not for the Muslim population specifically. Furthermore, these “ethnic lists” remain an isolated phenomenon. All too often, this is done as a response to complaints about the absence of candidates of foreign origin and the elitism of the political bodies, rather than to claims from the minorities themselves.

Divided by internal conflicts between its members and external conflicts with different organisations, the CFCM has tried to find its place in the national political debate. Following the kidnapping of the French journalist Florence Aubenas (who worked for Liberation, a French newspaper), the CFCM acted as an intermediary, sending off a delegation to Baghdad, which served to strengthen the CFCM’s legitimacy. Earlier this year, the debate around the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed published by a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and their publication in the French press, prompted the unions of the CFCM to lodge a complaint against Charlie Hebdo and France Soir, in which the Danish caricatures appeared. In spite of these examples, however, the CFCM remains an organisation that still does not completely fulfil its role as an intermediary with the French Republic.

8.3 Citizenship

Acquisition of French nationality by birth
The automatic adoption procedure of French nationality for a child born in France was modified in 1993, making access to French nationality more difficult. A child born in France of foreign parents could become a French citizen following an administrative formality (official declaration of will, made between the ages of 16 and 21 years old). However, the law adopted in March 1998 restored the *jus soli* (*le droit du sol*) and the automatic character of the acquisition for all the children aged 18 years.

Acquisition of the nationality by marriage
A foreign spouse must apply for French nationality. He or she can do this four years after the marriage, but should provide some evidence and respect some conditions:

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212 *Loi n° 2004-228 sur les signes religieux dans les écoles publiques.*
213 Fiammetta Venner, *OPA sur l’islam de France.*
214 During the European elections of June 2004, a list “France Diversity”, widely founded by persons of North African and African origin, wished to defend minorities, to favour their participation in the European representative authorities and to fight against discrimination.
• When the person applies for French nationality, he or she must still live with his or her spouse, and must be able to provide evidence of commonality of life between the two partners. The period of commonality of life is five years, in the case that, at the time of the nationality application, the foreign spouse cannot demonstrate that the couple have lived in a continuous and regular way in France, during at least three years from the date of the marriage.

• The partner of French nationality must prove that he or she possesses French nationality.

• The foreign spouse must also demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the French language.

Acquisition of the nationality by naturalisation
This mode of acquisition of French nationality is decided by decree. The decision is made on the basis of the discretionary decision of the administration, which can refuse an application, even if the conditions are gathered.

The applicant must live in France at the time of naturalisation procedure and has to prove a regular stay in the country. In addition, a delay is imposed on each applicant (condition de stage): when a person applies, he or she has to wait for several months before his or her application can be taken into account by the State services. This delay is reduced if the applicant can prove a period of residence of five years before the deposit of his or her application, in the case that the applicant obtained a university diploma in France. This delay is cancelled in the case that the applicant is a former member of the French army or has refugee status in France.

Regarding all the conditions imposed, the applicant has to provide evidence of his or her good character, and cannot have been sentenced for any criminal activity (whether such sentences were pronounced in France or abroad).

The applicant must prove his or her assimilation to the French community, notably by a sufficient knowledge of the French language and of the rights and the duties conferred by French nationality. The level of assimilation is checked during an individual interview with an agent of the Préfecture.
Part II. Policy context

1. The political context

In a study dedicated to the colonial history of France, Pascal Blanchard\textsuperscript{217} emphasised the fact that Islam in France today is still influenced by this colonial past. Indeed, the representative organisations of the Muslim population were created on the initiative of the political authorities, and have not succeeded in maintaining their autonomy and their independence. This approach can be noted in the creation of the CFCM or the Foundation for Islam, in accordance with the decision of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. Alongside the CFCM, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin also introduced the creation of a Foundation for the Works of the Islam of France (the organisation of the Fondation pour les oeuvres de l’islam is still in progress), which was required to manage French or foreign private donations for the creation or maintenance of Muslim places of worship in France, and to subsidise the training of imams.

The right-wing and left-wing parties cannot claim to have found an effective solution with regard to the situation of Islam in France. In January 2004, the designation of the first préfet of North African origin reignited the debate about the place of Islam in the French Republic. Presented by Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy as a Muslim préfet, Aissa Dermouche aroused several debates between the various political personalities. If Nicolas Sarkozy used this “affair” to defend his idea of affirmative action (discrimination positive), opponents of the promotion of a Muslim préfet were numerous both in the right-wing and in the left-wing parties. Several members of the Union pour un Movement Populaire, UMP (the party in Government), criticised Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposition. In his programme, the Minister of the Interior and the President of the UMP insisted on the fact that the model of republican integration must have a reforming character and develop affirmative action: “We must have a specific action in favour of equal opportunities. I spoke about affirmative action, about the Muslim préfet; I spoke about the financing of mosques. All these taboos, I underlined them, because my conviction is that it is also necessary, on these subjects, to ‘redraw the lines’.”\textsuperscript{218}

Nicolas Sarkozy, in a speech that was only supported by his supporters in the UMP, suggested adapting the 1901 law on secularism (loi relative au contrat d’association du 1 juillet 1901) in order to permit the use of State funds for the construction of mosques. By choosing to create a Foundation for Islam in France, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin has rejected any modification of the 1901 law. Moreover, in 2003, the previous Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, did not support the proposition of affirmative action developed by Nicolas Sarkozy. He declared the following: “The central idea is to help the children of immigrants to find their place in society. I do not desire that we qualify them by their religion but by their integration process.”\textsuperscript{219}

For the Socialist Party, the idea of affirmative action represents a political risk and could have as a consequence the development of communautarism. French political history shows that the French Socialist Party maintained important links with the immigrant population and has

\textsuperscript{217} P. Blanchard, N. Bancel and S. Lemaire (eds), La fracture coloniale.
\textsuperscript{218} Discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy about the UMP project on immigration, Meeting of the UMP party, 9 June 2005, available on the UMP website http://www.u-m-p.org.
defended the immigrant population against racism. By involving itself in the fight for equality and against racism, the party created a lot of expectations and ambitions among immigrants. However, today a lot of the socialist political propositions have been abandoned. For example, the proposition that the right to vote be given to foreigners from non-European countries was put forward by F. Mitterrand during his presidential campaign, but the idea was abandoned just after his victory in the same elections in 1981. The disappointment accumulated by the immigrant populations and their children is real, and certain members decided to stop supporting the left-wing political forces.

The ethnic minorities involved in the Socialist Party have denounced this situation and asked their representatives to give more consideration to the immigrant populations, and in particular to French people of North African origin: “The 1980s have been, for the French citizens of foreign origin, a period of fight against racism […]. Years later, the dominant feeling is clearly of disappointment regarding the consequences of this political fight. The situation shows that elected members of foreign origin are almost absent in the democratic authorities […] Are they such good voters for the Socialist Party, but such bad candidates for carrying its colours?”

Since the last presidential elections in 2002, the Socialist Party has tried to develop its speech on immigration, notably by focusing on the fight against discrimination. However, they refused to defend the idea of affirmative action. They also maintain their attachment to French secularism and did not express any opposition to the adoption of Nicolas Sarkozy’s law about the prohibition of religious signs at school (loi sur les signes religieux à l’école).

Islam and the Muslim population also aroused the attention of the extreme right, including the National Front (Front National, FN) of Jean-Marie Le Pen. The discourse of the FN on this subject is clear – it speaks about an Islamisation of the country. According to the President of this party, France and its identity are in danger due to the presence of a Muslim population whose religious values are in complete contradiction with French society and culture; the French State and the political authorities are not aware of this danger and let the communautarisme and Muslim fundamentalism become powerful in France.

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221 See the website of the National Front: http://www.frontnational.com/accueil.php.
2. The public perception of Muslims

The image of Muslims, and public perceptions of and opinions regarding Muslims, have considerably evolved over the last ten years, according to the social or political events concerning the Muslim community in France and its relations with the rest of the French population.

In the 1980s, as the economic and social situation in France deteriorated, young North Africans became the scapegoats of society’s frustrations and fears, and of xenophobic attitudes in France. The “anti-immigrant atmosphere” was reinforced by the electoral successes of the NF in the local elections of March 1983. Tensions between young people and the police forces increased during the summer of 1983, and about 20 young people were injured or killed by the police.222

In an analysis concerning immigrants, François Gaspard and Claude Servan-Schreiber wrote as follows: “From Dreux to Marseille, from Roubaix to Grenoble, from Mulhouse to Toulon, our country encountered a strong political crisis in 1983 – the unexpected and harsh distribution of ideological racism in an election campaign. Within a few weeks, the presence of foreigners became an issue, disturbing the local elections, concealing their real target.”223

Accused in NF speeches of being responsible for the insecurity in France, immigrant populations – among which Muslims are numerous – felt isolated, and had to confront anti-Arabic racism. Even their traditional allies within the SP remained silent, and the party suffered an obvious defeat during the local elections to the benefit of the right-wing parties, which did not hesitate to enter alliances with the far right. It was in this context, the “First March for Equality and against Racism” (“la Première Marche pour l’Égalité et contre le Racisme”) was organised by second-generation North Africans. In the middle of the 1980s, demonstrations were not the only way for the children of Muslim immigrants to defend their right to live in France. Some other young people, also confronted with unemployment and racism, took a fresh look at Islam and decided to look for a solution to their exclusion in their religion.

Whereas during the 1980s many questions arose as to the legitimate right of Muslims and their children to stay in France, the loyalty of these populations towards France was closely scrutinised during the 1990s. The representations of Islam and its believers in the media led French public opinion to call into question their attachment to the country, and to its republican and secularist principles.

In 1989, the “headscarf affair” appeared in the media. Three Muslim girls wearing Islamic headscarves were expelled from their school in Creil, a suburb north of Paris. According to Alain Gresh, this event in Creil created important debates. After the impact of the Iranian revolution in the media, French hesitations regarding the Islamic religion had increased at the end of the 1980s. The media coverage of the Creil case developed an atmosphere of suspicion towards the Muslim populations: “Magazines dedicated different articles to this headscarf crisis [Creil, in 1989], and television channels did the same; opinion was divided. Reading the

222 After the revolt of young people in poor districts around the city of Lyon during Summer 1981, a climate of tensions between the children of immigrants living in these districts and the police forces was born. In Summer 1982, the young people considered to be responsible for the increase of violence in the suburbs were victims of xenophobia expressed both by some inhabitants of the districts and by some policemen.

same documents ten years later, we are impressed by the gap between these three girls and the apocalypse that was announced."

After this case, France was perceived as a very anti-Muslim country, notably among the Muslim population of France. A survey published by the *Nouvel Observateur* weekly in August 1990 confirmed the anxiety of the French population towards Islam: 78 per cent of the population rejected the Islamic headscarf and considered that young Muslims should not wear it at school. The political instability in Muslim countries such as Algeria also frightened the French, lest they should witness a propagation of these crises in France, and see French Muslims supporting the Islamic cause. Nevertheless, in the Algerian civil war, the Muslim community decided to remain outside this crisis and to support French positions when those were considered fair and respectful towards Islam.

In 1995 France saw the development of Islamic movements and endured terrorist attacks on its territory. Indeed, in the eyes of numerous children of Muslim immigrants, Islam represented the opportunity to reconstruct their social life. In a study dedicated to young French Muslims, Farhad Khosrokhavar tried to explain the reality of the “Islamisation phenomenon”, which was used to describe the development of religion within the second generation in the 1990s. As they no longer believed in their future in French society, some Muslims chose to use Islam to provide them with a new dignity. The social profile of these new Muslims was also described by Jacques Barou in three surveys conducted in 1994 in towns such as Lyon and Grenoble.

However, this process of Islamisation developed in a limited way within the Muslim population and does not reveal the variety of religious profiles existing in the French Muslim community. Once again, during this period, French public opinion looked at the Muslim community with anxiety: “Contrary to what people feared, the great majority of Muslims in France had no sympathy for the religious extremists, and only a badly integrated minority were able to enter sporadic alliances, as was the case with Khaled Kelkal and the Roubaix networks […]”

After the attacks of 11 September in the USA, the image of Islam in French society did not improve. In September 2001, the IFOP polling institute published the results of a survey about Islam in France and the reactions to the terrorist attacks. Table 12 shows the position of the French population when they were asked what Islam meant to them.

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225 Survey conducted from 18–20 August 1990 on a representative sample of 1,000 persons (from the population of people aged 18 and over). Quota method (gender, age, professional position of the householder).
227 Three terrorist attacks took place in France in 1995: on 25 July in the Saint Michel suburban train station, on 17 August at the Place de l’Etoile, and on 17 October on a suburban train between the Orsay Museum and Saint Michel stations. This series of attacks was attributed to the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), an Algerian terrorist organisation, and on 29 September Khaled Kelkal, suspected of being an active member of this terrorist network, was killed in Lyon by the French police.
228 Farhad Khosrokhavar, *L'islam des jeunes*.

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Table 24. Public perceptions of Islam (1994 and 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents were asked if they associated the below-mentioned values with Islam:</th>
<th>Share of poll respondents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of women</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanaticism</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of Western values</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sondage IFOP231

As shown in Table 12, in 2001 the French population still linked Islam with negative images. 22 per cent of those surveyed still considered that Islam was to be equated with fanaticism, for 18 per cent Islam meant submission, and 17 per cent found that this religion rejected Western values. In comparison with figures recorded in 1994 for the previous survey, the figures of 2001 mark an improvement of Islam’s image in France, since in 1994, French people were more likely, statistically speaking, to associate Islam with fanaticism (37 per cent) and with submission (24 per cent).

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3. The media perception of the Muslim population

The image of Muslims and Islam in the French media very often varies according to the international context. Muslims do not have a significant influence on the public representations of their community. As a media subject, the Islam of France is observed and interpreted in the light of international events, such as the Iranian revolution, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, or the war in Iraq. The treatment of Islam by the media is also dependent on social crises in which the immigrant populations, or Muslims, play a role (such as disturbances in the suburbs, violence, school, and the headscarf issue).

In a work dedicated to the media image of Islam in France in newspapers and television programmes, Thomas Deltombe shows that media interest in Islam began during the Iranian revolution. At this point, Islam was strongly associated with Ayatollah Khomeini. There was concern even then with regard to the presence of Muslims in France. In this period, the media insisted more on the cultural and religious differences that define these foreigners, and the incompatibility between their practice and French society.

The 1980s were symbolised by a climate of xenophobia due to the tensions and confrontations between young people and the police forces in the French suburbs. The immigrants and their children were then accused of failing to integrate into French society, and the media promoted this kind of speech. The Rushdie affair, from February 1989, and the headscarf issues in the Autumn of the same year, strengthened this climate of suspicion against Islam. Islam became for a few months a central subject of current events, with the headscarf affair in Creil benefiting from an extraordinary degree of media coverage. The researchers Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar explain it in the following way: “If the debate was so intense, it is precisely because [the headscarf affair] revealed that the country is different from the representations described in books or by the political leaders.”

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the division of the world between Islam and the West. The crises and conflicts in Iraq and the Algerian civil crisis encouraged the media to concentrate their attention on Muslims, and in particular on the young people. They discovered them little concerned by the outside crises and not influenced by the fundamentalist groups. After that, the media – and in particular television – tried to modify its vision of the Muslim community in France. They have insisted on the diversity of this community, divided, according to them, between “moderates”, who receive support, and “fundamentalists”, who are described as the national enemies.

Disappearing from television screens at the end of the 1990s, Islam reappeared with the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001. After 11 September, the media understood that they needed to be careful, and not encourage misunderstandings and prejudices about Islam. At first, they reminded people that the Muslim community in France had unreservedly condemned the attacks against the World Trade Centre. Afterwards, the media became interested in the risk of development of Islamism and radicalism on French territory. The media were then interested in those young people from the suburbs involved with Islamic activists and sent to Afghanistan to follow a programme of military training for jihad.

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The fear of terrorism sometimes led the media to make mistakes. This is what happened, for example, when they presented the explosion, in September 2001, of a chemical factory in the city of Toulouse (AZF factory) as a possible terrorist attack.234

2002 was also marked by the denunciation of the development of anti-semitism within the Muslim population in France. An increase of anti-semitic acts around the time of the second Intifada, in Autumn 2000, led journalists to speculate on the responsibility of Muslims. Accused of hating Jews, Muslims are also presented as sexist and disrespectful towards women. In the suburbs, cases of rape against Muslim girls by young men of North African origin were denounced as a proof of the sufferings experienced by the women in suburbs marked by crime and Islamism. The degradation of the status of the women is then explained by the development of radical Islam in these districts, and the power of the fundamentalists, all of which encourages the submission of women and their confinement to the private space.

In 2004, the media debate concerned – for the third time since 1989 – the hijab issue, while in fact the number of girls wearing a headscarf at school had actually decreased. In other words, since 2001, the image of the Muslims through the French media had greatly worsened.

4. Integration policy

4.1 Muslim organisations

The attitude adopted by the political authorities towards the Islamic religion shows how they perceive this religion and what place they intend to give it within the French public space. The existence of various Muslim organisations in France compelled the political authorities to consider Islam as an element of the political debate. The evolution of the Muslim organisations encouraged the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, to create a structure representing all the members of the Muslim community. In March 1990, he gathered the main Muslim organisations together within the Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France (Council of Reflection on Islam, CORIF), a consultative authority which was supposed to provide the Government with ideas on how to deal with Islam. This first attempt at organisation tried to meet two targets: “On the one hand, to break with the rector of the Mosque of Paris, and on the other to allow the Muslim population to be more united, so as to define a unique Muslim interlocutor.” This initiative, quickly abandoned after the change of Government in 1994, marked an evolution in the public treatment of Islam, which used to be treated as a mere security question.

In 1994, the designation of a new Minister of the Interior created a new relationship between the political authorities and Muslim organisations. Indeed, Charles Pasqua offered to make an agreement through an official text defining the Islamic religion in France. The result of this proposition was tensions between the French State and the Muslim organisations, because of the elaboration of this text and the nature of the document. Only the rector (the religious representative of authority) of the Mosque in Paris, who is a friend of Charles Pasqua’s, was associated with the drafting of the text, and the agreement was interpreted by numerous organisations as a new stage in the construction of a “French docile Islam”, without any autonomy on either spiritual or institutional aspects. According to Alain Boyer, “The text had to state the rules of the game, defining the relationships between Muslims and the republican country of human rights, a way to regulate tensions and a contract with authorities and French society.” Opponents of the text proposed by the Minister established the Haut Conseil des Musulmans de France (High Council of the Muslims of France, HCMF), which disappeared very quickly.

The return of Jean-Pierre Chevènement as Minister of the Interior in 1997 was the opportunity to restart the process of organising the Islamic religion in France. In 1999, he set up a consultation and several think tanks, with the aim of creating a representative structure of the Muslim population. Finally, this new step was compromised by the resignation of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and the difficulties of the participants in carrying on their work in a new political context.

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235 This body was in charge of advising the Minister on the different practical aspects of Islam (for instance defining the beginning of the Ramadan fast, creating the Muslim cemeteries, and so on) and thinking about the conditions of the future organisation of Islam in France.
Two main reasons are given to account for the absence of a Muslim representative authority able to take part in the management of this community. The first is that the French State still has a paternalistic attitude towards the Muslim population – inherited from the colonial period – and maintains a specific relationship with Islam (in comparison with that created with other religions). The second explanation insists on the diversity of the Muslim structures and the lack of coordination between them. The collaboration between organisations is nevertheless essential to the development of the practical conditions of Islam.

The creation of the CFCM (see also section 8.1) is too recent to assess whether this new structure has resolved these various difficulties. Elaborated by Jean-Pierre Chevènement and concluded by Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2003, the CFCM is made up of regional councils and a national council. The 4,032 representatives who elected the members of the council on 6 April 2003 were designated by the mosques, their number depending on the size of every place of worship and not on the number of prayers (the size of the congregation). The recent kidnapping of two French journalists in Iraq, and the subsequent mobilisation of members of the CFCM on their behalf, allowed commentators to speak about a new legitimacy of this structure. According to Franck Frégosi, “This story of the hostages above all allowed us to rediscover that the CFCM existed.”

Since its creation, the CFCM has faced a series of crises. It has had to face several divisions and attacks, and so far has not attained the objectives that were set when it was created. The former treasurer, Kamel Kabtane, rector of the mosque of Lyon, had denounced from October 2004 the lack of coordination between the regional councils and the executive committee of the CFCM. Both Fouad Alaoui (head of the UOIF and member of the CFCM) and Dounia Bouzar (member of the executive committee of the CFCM) expressed similar criticisms in 2005, when both members decided to resign (and only Fouad Alaoui agreed to return to the CFCM afterwards). A recent example of the internal divisions within the CFCM occurred during the voting of the law proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy banning the wearing of the headscarf in schools (la loi sur les signes religieux à l’école).

The UOIF (see section 8.1) expressed confused positions, officially supporting the act, while members of this organisation took part in demonstrations of protest against the same act. According to political analyst Fiammetta Venner, author of a survey on the UOIF, representatives of the organisation even denounced the act on the Al-Jazeera television channel.

Political initiatives in favour of the integration process have concerned the immigrant population and their children as a whole, rather than the Muslim community of France per se. Measures adopted during the last ten years have emphasised two situations: the republican model of integration has its limits as far as the persistence of the exclusion of ethnic minorities in terms of employment, housing and education is concerned, while French society

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239 Franck Frégosi, “Les contours fluctuants d’une régulation étatique de l’islam.”
240 In April 2003, the Fédération des Musulmans de France (National Union of the Muslims of France, FNMF) obtained 16 seats, the Mosque of Paris 6 seats, and the Union of the Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF) 13 seats. The Turks and the independents obtained the remaining 6 seats. The renewal of the executive committee in June 2005 confirmed the victory of the FNMF (19 seats) against the Mosque of Paris (10 seats) and the UOIF (10 seats). The representatives of the Turkish Muslims obtained one seat in the CFCM executive committee, and the final three seats returned to the independents.
242 Fiammetta Venner, OPA sur l’islam de France.
and its institutions are often guilty of discrimination towards ethnic minorities, and strongly compromise the opportunities for the integration of these people.

4.2 Administrative structures
With regard to French administrative organisation, there is not one specific level that is most active in the area of immigration. All political and public levels are concerned. In addition, the French State is trying to organise the Islamic religion in France, and the FCMC is also based on a dual structure (a national level and a regional one).

Ministry for equal opportunities
Due to the social handicaps experienced by certain districts in France, Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy had suggested providing institutions in these districts with more public funding. However, rather than defending the idea of affirmative action, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin has preferred to strengthen the Government’s action in favour of promoting equality of opportunities. Therefore in June 2005 he created a ministry dedicated to the promotion of equal opportunities (Ministre délégué de l’égalité des chances), under the responsibility of Azouz Begag, a sociologist who had written a report in which he recommended various measures promoting a better integration of second-generation North Africans, notably in the police and security forces (see section 7.3).243

The missions of this Ministry consist in improving the employment situation and the professional integration of the victims of social exclusion, such as young people, persons living in poor districts, and children of non-European immigration. The objective was also to encourage variety of recruitment in businesses, administration, media and political institutions. According to a decree that was enforced in December 2005, the Government decided to nominate prefects in charge of promoting the equality of opportunity in six French counties (Bouches-du-Rhône, Essonne, Nord, Rhône, Seine Saint Denis and Val d’Oise).

In the school system, the Ministry has also insisted on the necessity of encouraging the selection of young people in selective and prestigious schools. This idea was also developed by the Director (Richard Descoins) of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Political Studies Institute of Paris, IEP), known as “Sciences Po”. A higher education establishment recognised for its prestige and its selectivity, “Sciences Po” decided to set up a more open recruitment policy and to encourage the integration of students coming from the working class and from immigrant families. Therefore, the Institute set up agreements244 with secondary schools situated in “priority educational zones” (Zone d’Education Prioritaire, ZEP), suburbs where people experience social and schooling difficulties and where the State offers stronger financial support. These agreements allow these schools to select candidates and to transmit their application to “Sciences Po” which has adapted its competitive entrance examinations for students coming from these schools.245

Independent anti-discrimination bodies
The evolution of European legislation on the fight against discrimination also led France to modify its legislation. The adoption of the EU Race Directive in June 2000 led to the creation of HALDE (High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality, Haute

243 Azouz Begag, La République à ciel ouvert.
244 Information about the agreements between Sciences Po Paris and the high schools in the ZEP zone is available for consultation on the website of Sciences Po Paris: http://www.sciences-po.fr.
245 Instead of the traditional written tests (general essay, history exam, language exam and document commentary), applicants from the ZEP schools only sit for an oral exam.
As an independent authority, HALDE’s mission is to inform the public about discrimination, support the victims of discrimination, and promote the fight against discrimination.

HALDE was preceded in 2000 by more localised, less centralised, measures, such as the creation of a free telephone call service for persons who had been the object or witnesses of racial discrimination (114 service). These denunciations of cases of discrimination were treated by the Commissions Départementales d’Accès à la Citoyenneté (CODAC) – local committees defending the access to citizenship. Created by the Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, in 1999, CODAC met with victims of discrimination, and in cases where the victim had decided to lodge a complaint, transmitted a description of the alleged discrimination to the judicial authorities.

The creation of HALDE introduced some modifications, with CODAC replaced by the Commissions pour la promotion de l’égalité des chances et de la citoyenneté (Committees for the Promotion of the Equality of Opportunities and Citizenship, COPEC). Composed of members of civil society and representatives of the State, COPEC will work more in partnership with local NGOs. COPEC members include representatives of civil society, such as people working in the social or educational sector, and State employees working in the département authorities (Conseil général or Préfectures).

As indicated in the name of the structure, the COPEC exists at the département level, but regional collaboration permits, for example, the organisation of professional training for all COPEC members in the région. Indeed the members of the COPEC are supposed to treat denunciations of discrimination made through the 114 service. When this service receives telephone calls from people who have been victims of discrimination and have decided to lodge a complaint against the author of the discrimination, the COPEC members have to transfer the complaint to the judicial authorities. They meet the victims and decide what procedure is best adapted to the situation.

Regional administrative structures
French administrative structures are very complex. In each area studied in this report, there are several structures and levels that participate in the management of each area (education, employment, housing, and so on).

The municipal level is essential in order to fight against social exclusion, and city policy (la politique de la ville) tries to resolve the socio-economic difficulties existing in specific areas in the city, such as the poor suburbs existing around city centres.

At the national level, a specific Ministry (Ministre délégué à la ville) dedicated to city issues and policies exists, and is in charge of developing city contracts (contrats de ville) signed between the State and the local structures (collectivités locales) at the municipal, county (département) and regional levels. Today, the Ministry of Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing is responsible to the city policy through the Delegation for Cities (Délégation interministérielle à la ville).
All these public and political partners determine several actions (*actions concertées*) and policies in favour of urban and economic development, social solidarity, education and security. The law on SRU (*solidarité et renouvellement urbain*), adopted in December 2000, was introduced to reinforce social diversity in social housing and encourage housing institutions and municipal bodies to ensure social heterogeneity in council houses.

Public intervention in city areas frequently employs the principle of a vertical collaboration between the State (through its different ministries) and the local governments.

For example, the “Chrysalis” Project was established by the Ministry of Employment and signed between local administrative structures and associations (such as NGOs and similar organisations), the public employment agencies, and seeks to promote access to the labour market for women living in poor districts. The Project was developed at the municipal level, for example in Marseille and Strasbourg.
Part III. City selection

1. Marseille

Marseille is the capital of the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) région, which has an estimated total population of 4,743,000 people (INSEE: 2005). The région has the second highest representation of Muslims. In 2000, according to the figures of the Ministry of the Interior, Muslims made up 20 per cent of the population of the région. Given that estimates of the number of Muslims in France generally vary between 3.5 and 5 million persons, the number of Muslims in the PACA région would be between 700,000 and 1 million people.

The city of Marseille has long been an important place of immigration from Muslim countries. Due to its important port, the city was the first passage for numerous Muslim immigrants arriving in France. The first migrants from Kabylia (Algeria) arrived in 1910 and worked in the port. Until the end of World War II, Marseille was a place of transit for the French colonial empire, open to the East and marked by intense industrial activity. The settlement of these first Muslim workers, from the beginning of the twentieth century, was followed by the subsequent recruitment of manpower from the Mediterranean Sea and Africa. The arrival of troops from the French Empire, including infantries from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly took place in the port, but many later settled in the city at the end of the conflict. Others arrived afterwards thanks to their employment in the merchant navy. These small communities of Africans organised themselves in Marseille according to their origin, and formed groups among the population of dockers. The Muslim immigrants mainly found employment in factories, and in less highly qualified jobs. The construction and chemical sectors are also important employers.

In Marseille, ethnic solidarities have led to the creation of groups of Muslim workers in certain parts of the city. The first immigrants opened shops, coffee shops and hotels near the Porte d’Aix (from la rue Saint-Barbe to la rue des Chapeliers). There is also a strong concentration of Muslims in the city centre. Following the construction of council estates around the city, the Muslim populations left the suburbs in the 1970s. Today, the Muslim population is concentrated not only in the housing of the northern districts (the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th arrondissements), but also in the city centre.

The emergence of Islam in the public space appeared in a significant way in Marseille in the 1970s, during strike actions within the immigrant population. These social conflicts concerned rent increases, living conditions, and the absence of prayer rooms in the residencies for immigrants workers. According to Jocelyne Césari, author of a study on the Muslim population in Marseille, the first prayer rooms were created in 1975. The Er Rahmaniyyà organisation was formed by four Algerian shopkeepers in the 1st arrondissement. This first creation was followed by other initiatives in the suburbs.

In 1988, Cheik Abbas, from the Mosque of Paris, supported the creation of the first union of Islamic organisations in the PACA région, la Fédération régionale des musulmans du Sud de la France, on 12 June. Although the NGO network has considerably evolved and progressed

249 Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité, Ministère de l’Intérieur, Agence pour le développement des relations interculturelles [Minister of Employment and Solidarity, Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations], L’islam en France.
since the creation of this first organisation, the Muslim community of Marseille has still not succeeded in obtaining permission for the construction of a big mosque in Marseille. Discussed during the last municipal elections of 2001, the project is still in progress.

On the political side, in Marseille the foreign communities try to integrate with the local authorities. On 29 June 1990, the mayor, Robert Vigouroux, officially created Marseille-Espérance, an organisation that includes representatives of the various religious communities in the city. Its objectives are to fight intolerance, ignorance and lack of understanding, and to favour mutual knowledge and dialogue between the religious communities. Inside the local political bodies, the City Council of Marseille includes some persons of foreign origin, in particular from the Maghreb, such as Myriam Salah-Eddine. Rèbia Benarioua. Samia Ghali and Sérèna Zouaghi.

2. Grenoble

According to estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, 15 per cent of the Muslim population (525,000 to 750,000 people) live in the Rhône-Alpes région. Lyon is the capital of the région, while Grenoble is the capital of Isère, one of the county’s départements (municipalities). Although Grenoble is not a big town, it might be interesting to include this town in the OSI “Muslims in the EU” project, in order to assess the influence of the small local context on the integration of Muslims in France.

Previous empirical work in this city has shown that even if there is not a comprehensive historical study on the constitution of Muslim immigration in Grenoble, there is some available information (essentially on the Algerian population) to prove their existence from the mid-1930s. The study conducted by Albano Cordeiro and Nadir Boumaza between 1939 and 1982, on Algéro-grenoblois, considers that Algerian immigrants were already settled in Grenoble before 1939, without clearly indicating the number: “The Algerians are already present in Grenoble, as has been attested to us by advisers; one of them indicated to us the case of a family that was forced to give a French first name to their son born in Grenoble.”

The first waves of Muslim immigrants in the city settled in the centre, around la Vieille Mutualité, les rues Très-Cloîtres, Brocherie and Chenoise. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the first immigrants occupied these districts, living in the former military buildings of the city (le foyer-caserne Bizante and le foyer de la Poudrière). In the 1970s, the construction of HLMs in the south of the city permitted Muslim families to move into flats (particularly in Villeneuve, Teisseire, Abbaye and Jouhaux). At the same time, the municipality of Grenoble and the Socialist mayor Hubert Dubedout, tried to organise the rehabilitation of the Alma-Très-Cloîtres district, and to build more residences for immigrant workers.

Grenoble is one of the cities less affected by the problems of the suburbs (banlieues), by comparison with cities such as Paris or Lyon. A strong NGO network helps ensure the “social peace” inside the suburbs. The municipality of Grenoble is represented by members of the Socialist Party, who have tried to support and finance the social organisations working on the ground. In this city characterised by various ethnic minorities and a political life dominated by the Socialist Party, the provision of financial support and equipment to NGOs is important.

The public recognition of Islam, in the form of the construction of a big mosque, is still in discussion. In March 2003, the various interlocutors of the Muslim community of Grenoble,

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251 Sonia Tebbakh, *Identités politiques des Français d’origine maghrébine*. 
as well as the municipality, validated the project. With 60,000 Muslims living in the département of Isère, the prayer rooms are not able to welcome all Muslims.

On the political side, the mayor, Michel Destot, proposed in October 1999 the creation of a Consultative Council of the Foreign Residents of Grenoble (CREG). While an EU Decision allowed people from the EU to register as voters and to be eligible to stand in the local elections, the city council of Grenoble decided to also integrate foreigners from non-EU countries into the local political life. CREG has become “an authority of dialogue having as its vocation the favouring of the democratic participation of foreigners in the local life […] The group could make a proposition to the City Council or be consulted by the mayor on municipal issues”.

Since the last municipal elections, three persons from the Muslim community have been participating in the City Council: Abderrhamane Djellal, Sadak Bouzaïene and Zohra Chorfa.

3. Paris (and the Île-de-France région)

As well as being the capital city of France, Paris is also a French département. The Île-de-France région comprises eight départements, including Paris (the others are Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val-d’Oise Essonne, Yvelines and Seine-et-Marne). The département of Paris is divided into 20 arrondissements.

The Parisian suburbs make up the areas with the highest proportion of Muslims in France. The 1999 census showed that 1,611,008 immigrants live in the Île-de-France région: 466,608 from the Maghreb, 238,984 from Sub-Saharan Africa and 50,125 from Turkey. These immigrant populations represent almost 50 per cent of the immigrant population in the région. In addition, this strong proportion is reinforced by the descendants of these immigrants, on which no accurate data are available.

The arrival of the first waves of Muslim workers coincided largely with the alterations of the city. The housing of these first immigrants often lacked running water and proper sanitary facilities. The migration of single men from Muslim countries (such as Algeria) to the métropole from the late nineteenth century through to World War II, through an accumulation of individual short-term stays, actually contributed to the construction of relatively cohesive Muslim residential areas in the outlying regions of Paris, and the close suburbs of Saint-Denis and Aubervilliers (Seine-Saint-Denis département), and Gennevilliers (Hauts-de-Seine département).

Vestiges of these centres of immigration still remain, such as the 13th arrondissement, around the Place d’Italie, with the Mosque of Paris, the 18th arrondissement. Today, the Strasbourg Saint-Denis area in the north central part of Paris maintains a Muslim profile, with a strong proportion of North African immigrants.

A lot of bidonvilles (shanty towns) are located in the Parisian suburbs (Champigny, Nanterre and Saint-Denis). By the late 1960s, the shanty towns of Champigny alone housed around 14,000 people. The destruction of the bidonvilles and the relocation of their residents occurred gradually, over a period stretching into the mid-1970s. These measures have

252 La lettre de la citoyenneté [The Letter of Citizenship], n°47, September–October 2000.
253 INSEE, Atlas des populations immigrées en Île-de-France [Atlas of Immigrant Populations in Île-de-France], INSEE, Recensement 1999.
exacerbated a situation of socio-spatial division between the city centre and the working-class suburbs (such as Aubervilliers, Drancy and Bobigny in the Saint-Denis département\textsuperscript{255}).

The renovation programmes of the 1970s did not succeed in changing public perception of the suburbs. They are still considered to be places of crime and violence, and the most recent riots, of November 2005, reinforced this bad reputation. They were also considered to be places of Islamisation. If we cannot agree with this description, we notice that the Muslim presence is strong, notably through the NGO network, Muslim shops and organisations.

It is recommended that the OSI “Muslims in the EU: City Reports” Project should select for monitoring not only the city of Paris, but also the areas around the capital. The North African population is essentially living in the départements of Seine-Saint-Denis, Yvelines and Val-de-Marne. However, the population of immigrants with origins in Sub-Saharan Africa is strongly represented in the city centre, in particular in the 18\textsuperscript{th}, 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} arrondissements. The OSI Project should therefore select two of these three arrondissements, together with three cities in the suburbs: Bobigny in the Seine-Saint-Denis département, Vitry-sur-Seine in the Val-de-Marne département and Cergy in the Val-d’Oise département.

| Table 25. Proportion of immigrants in Seine-Saint-Denis, Yvelines and Paris (1999) |
|---------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|
|                                 | Maghreb | Sub-Saharan Africa | Turkey |
| Seine-Saint-Denis               | 107,194 | 54,168   | 13,393  |
| Yvelines                        | 39,430  | 17,066   | 3,415   |
| Paris                           | 99,632  | 51,006   | 5,927   |
| Île-de-France                   | 466,608 | 238,984  | 50,125  |

Source: INSEE\textsuperscript{256}

4. Lille

The 1999 census and data on Lille city show that the Muslim population is strongly represented by immigrants from the Maghreb. Indeed, 39.7 per cent of immigrants in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais région are from North Africa. While the proportion of people from Algeria and Morocco has increased, immigrants from Tunisia are now less numerous. As for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Senegalese immigrants are the most numerous.\textsuperscript{257}

The composition of the Muslim population in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais région is especially dominated by the population from the Maghreb, in particular the Algerian population, which has been historically present since the 1930s. Indeed, organisations militating for the independence of Algeria settled down in the region where the workers had arrived from the beginning of the twentieth century and occupied jobs in coal factories.

This region and the city of Lille today do not escape the same problems of unemployment and exclusion that principally concerned the children of Muslim immigrants living in the suburbs of Lille-South. Recognised as being a sensitive urban zone, the district of Lille-South is mainly inhabited by immigrant populations and their children, with the immigrants from the Maghreb being most numerous there. In December 2004, out of the 20,000 inhabitants of


\textsuperscript{256} INSEE Census, 1999.

\textsuperscript{257} Profils, n°1, INSEE Nord-Pas-de-Calais, January 2002.
Lille-South, more than 1,100 had a difficult social situation and lived thanks to State assistance (RMI, *revenu minimum d’insertion* – a State allowance). This district also experienced violent riots in November 2005, and continues to have a bad reputation because of the social problems and violence that exist there.258

The district of Lille-South is also characterised by the presence of the main mosque of the city, the Al-Imane Mosque.259 The imam, Amar Lasfar, was active in setting up the opening of a Muslim secondary school (the Averroes secondary school) and the creation of a Muslim Institute (Avicenne Institute), which was opened in September 2006, and proposing training for imams in the French language. This Institute wishes also to be considered as the first Muslim university in France, by schooling students up to the doctoral level and by awarding diplomas. Introduced by the president of the National Union of the Muslims of France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France, FNMF) Mohamed Béchari, the Avicenne Institute proposes an education on the Islamic history of civilisation and, finally, develops the reflection and the research around the question of Islam in France and in Europe.

The municipality is composed of members of the Socialist Party, the Ecology Party and the Communist Party, and has shown itself particularly favourable to the demands of Muslims of the region. For example, the mayor, Martine Aubry, authorised the municipal swimming pools to organise a special opening for women only in order to permit Muslim women to attend the swimming pool without men’s presence.

Due to these elements, the city of Lille is interesting for the OSI Project, because the municipality collaborates actively with the Muslim organisations, contrary to other municipalities, which create obstacles in the way of the projects of mosque construction or the opening of private Muslim schools.

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258 Nicolas Faucon and Arnaud Dufresne, “A Lille-Sud les jeunes souffrent d’une double discrimination” [“In Lille-South the Young People Suffer a Double Discrimination”], *La Voix du Nord*, 20 November 2005.
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