Muslims in the EU:

Cities Report

GERMANY

Preliminary research report and literature survey

2007
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List of acronyms

bpb Federal Office for Political Education (*Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*)
BfV Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*)
CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*)
IGMG Milli Görüs
IPD Institute for Inter-religious Pedagogy and Didactics (*Institut für Interreligiöse Pädagogik und Didaktik*)
MJD Young Muslims in Germany (*Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V.*)
PKS police criminal statistics (*Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik*)
RTS Council of German Citizens of Turkish Origin (*Rat der Türkeistämmigen Staatsbürger in Deutschland*)
VIKZ Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*)
ZMD Central Council of Muslims (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*)
Background

This research paper, focusing on the situation of Muslims in Germany, was commissioned by the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP)\(^1\), of the Open Society Institute (OSI).\(^2\) Similar reports have also been prepared for Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

The overall aim of this series of research papers is to provide a comprehensive review of available research and literature on Muslims in each of these countries, including a bibliography covering the most relevant recent publications. Another aim is to facilitate the selection of a number of EU cities for inclusion in a proposed new OSI monitoring project to be initiated in 2007 — “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”. This project will address policy on Muslims at the city, or municipal, level, as opposed to the national level, which is the more usual level of analysis for cross-country monitoring. It follows on from previous EUMAP reports addressing the situation of Muslims in Europe, in particular the 2004 report “Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens”.\(^3\)

Each of the research reports follow the same methodology, to provide comparative information across the countries covered, according to a common methodology prepared by EUMAP.\(^4\) Part I of the report evaluates the availability of data and other information on the situation of — specifically — Muslims in Germany, in the following areas: population, identity, education, employment, health and social protection, policing and security, and participation and citizenship. Part II addresses the policy context in Germany, in particular with regard to the perception of Muslims, integration policy and administrative structures. Part III looks more specifically at the potential suitability of four cities in Germany with significant Muslim populations for inclusion in the OSI “Muslims in the EU” city monitoring project — Berlin, Duisburg, Frankfurt and Hamburg.

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\(^1\) Full details on the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) can be found at www.eumap.org.
\(^2\) Full details on the Open Society Institute (OSI) can be found at www.soros.org.
\(^3\) The full report, as well as previous EUMAP reports on the situation of Muslims in France and Italy, can be found here: http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/britishmuslims
\(^4\) The methodology for the research papers is available on the EUMAP website (www.eumap.org)
Executive Summary

In Germany, the official statistics agency is, for reasons of privacy, not entitled to collect data about the religious orientation of the population. Only data on the basis of citizenship are available. The Muslim population of Germany is estimated at around 3.0 to 3.2 million, representing between 3.6 and 3.9 per cent of the total population (82.44 million), and around one third of all foreigners (7.3 million). These figures include foreigners (around 2.4 million), naturalised German citizens (500,000) and converts (100,000). Muslims thereby comprise around one third of the 7.3 million foreigners in Germany.

The majority of Muslims in Germany have origins in Turkey — some 2 million of the Muslim foreigners and almost all of the Muslim naturalised German citizens (more than 600,000). The second largest Muslim population have origins in Bosnia and Herzegovina (around 167,000), followed by Iran (82,000), Morocco (80,000) and Afghanistan (66,000). There are also many Muslims with Lebanese, Pakistani, Syrian, Tunisian, Algerian and Indonesian backgrounds.

In 2003, one third of those with origins in Turkey and without German citizenship were born in Germany, compared to 16.5 per cent of the Bosnian immigrants, 8.7 per cent of the Iranians and 21.0 per cent of the Moroccans. As for the Afghan foreign population, only 12.6 per cent were born in Germany. From January 2000, a new citizenship law has provided easier access to citizenship, by granting citizenship to children of foreign parents born in Germany, under certain circumstances. However, in practice the number of naturalisations, in particular of Muslims, has been steadily falling from 2001.

The first wave of Muslims arrived in Germany as labour migrants in the 1960s and 1970s — predominantly from Turkey, but also from North Africa and Yugoslavia. From the 1980s, however, most Muslims arrived in Germany as refugees and asylum seekers, fleeing conflict and persecution. In particular, many arrived from Turkey (especially Kurds, Yezidis and Assyrians) and from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, following the conflicts in the region. The labour migrants were usually concentrated in certain districts with low rents and the settlement pattern of this time is still visible in the residential distribution of Turks today. Predominantly, or formerly, industrialised areas — such as Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg, Augsburg-München, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Nürnberg, Darmstadt and Göppingen — are still centres of Turkish life in Germany. Only a few Turkish immigrants live on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.

There are Muslims in Germany of the first, second, third and fourth generations. The population is rather fluid, particularly as, in the past, many Muslims from Turkey returned to their homeland on retirement. A German Muslim collective identity is yet to be fully developed. This can be partly attributed to the fact that the majority (at least 80 per cent) still do not have German citizenship, but even Muslims born and brought up in Germany tend not to be regarded as ‘full’ Germans by their fellow citizens. Muslim organisations, and especially their representatives of the second and third generations, play an important role in strengthening this collective identity. In particular, there is a tendency among younger Muslims to challenge the divisions along national and ethnic lines existing in the various different Muslim organisations and communities.

Muslim religious organisations also play an important role in the life of Muslims in Germany. The most important religious groups amongst the Turkish population are Sunni (63 per cent) and Alevi (12 per cent). Given the non-hierarchical structure of Islam, Muslim organisations in Germany do not intend to nominate a single representative for all the different branches of belief. However, they have recognised the necessity of unity, in order to be accepted as a partner for dialogue and to
be granted the status of a corporation. As yet, Muslims do not enjoy the same rights as Christian Churches and other religious communities to collect official taxes or teach religious education in schools. There was a fruitful process of Christian-Muslim inter-religious dialogue from the 1980s on, but this has stalled since 2001.

There are an estimated 700,000 German pupils with a Muslim background currently in schools and higher education. It is difficult to analyse their educational attainment levels, however, as official statistics, as well as the majority of the literature, only refer to foreign students. There is evidence that foreign children significantly underperform in education, both with respect to their exam results, and to the numbers moving on to further education or professional education after secondary school. Suprisingly, foreign children of the second generation have even worse results than those children who immigrated after starting school. One reason for this is the concentration of immigrant children in schools where the majority of the pupils are disadvantaged, in terms of their economic and social background.

Children with a Turkish background face particular difficulties with the German language, as they use it comparatively rarely in their everyday life. Furthermore, their families are often from rural Turkish origins, without previous experience of any higher education. However, this should not necessarily limit their chances of attending higher education in Germany. Research reveals that many such families, particularly with conservative and religiously oriented parents, tend to prioritise discipline and encourage their children’s educational aspirations. The situation is more difficult, however, for the many Muslim pupils, in particular Palestinians, with a refugee background and an insecure residency status. This can significantly limit their opportunities for further education and training.

There is evidence that the current general overall negative opinion about Islam and Muslims can also affect the classroom. The issue of Muslim religious education (RE) lessons has also generated controversy. Throughout the different federal states in Germany, RE lessons have been offered to Muslim children on a voluntary basis, but to date only one Muslim community (Islamische Föderation, in Berlin) has been recognised, and been permitted to teach religion at regular school classes. In general, there is a lack of Muslim teachers with the languages skills needed to teach RE in German, although a study course on Islamic RE has recently been created at the University of Münster.

Foreign nationals are consistently overrepresented in unemployment figures. Turkish nationals are in the worst situation; they have an unemployment rate of 23 per cent and comprise up to one third of all unemployed foreigners. The problem of unemployment is strongly linked to education and apprenticeship. However, when comparing only those without qualifications, a much greater proportion of foreigners are unemployed (three quarters), than are Germans (one third). As well as being overrepresented in unemployment figures, young immigrants are also concentrated in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. They mainly receive training in a narrow range of professions, such as in the fields of industry and commerce, handicraft and jobs that are self-employed, and are not strongly represented in the field of public service.

Muslims generally face the same disadvantages as other immigrants in accessing the labour market. Key barriers include discrimination and, often, an insecure residence status. Lack of access to citizenship reinforces marginalisation and further restricts access to the labour market for immigrants. Today, individuals without citizenship living in Germany are generally only entitled to work if no unemployed German, member of an EU member State or national of an already privileged third country, can be found for the job. Finding employment has become increasingly difficult, given the high levels of unemployment in Germany. Asylum seekers and persons with an
exceptional leave to remain often do not have a right to work in Germany or face a long wait before such permission is granted.

Many studies have highlighted the problems of discrimination in the employment market faced by immigrants, in particular those with Turkish origins. There have been reports of discriminatory behaviour within the employment administration, and of discriminatory advertisements in newspapers and the internet. Levels of discrimination have been found to be more significant in semi-skilled jobs than in more highly qualified ones. The employment market is still segmented along ethnic and national lines, with striking difference between natives and immigrants in the fields of earnings, participation, employment and unemployment.

There are some additional specific difficulties faced by Muslims. Members of certain Muslim organisations that, although legal, have been officially labelled as Islamist (see below) will be excluded from some fields of employment, such as civil servants in the field of security. Another issue concerns employers’ tolerance towards religious duties, such as the Friday prayer and the five daily prayers, or the provisioning of the work canteen with halal food. In Germany, no legal regulations exist with regard to these matters, which are left to the judgement of the individual employer. For Muslim women, there can be additional barriers to employment. In Berlin, for example, from January 2005, a new law excludes all religious signs and symbols — including the hijab (headscarf) — from schools and other public services. Public discussion around the law has, in fact, had a worse effect than the law itself. This generally portrays Muslim women as either oppressed and dependent, or political activists from the Islamist sphere, which has had negative consequences on their employment situation on the private sector.

The generally worse social situation of immigrants can impact on their health status. For example, a striking number of children with Turkish origins show obesity. There is evidence that immigrants with a Turkish background fall ill more frequently than German natives from chronic, non-transferable diseases, such as coronary heart conditions and diabetes, as well as infectious diseases such as hepatitis. Also, psychosomatic illnesses seem to be appearing more often among the first-generation Turkish immigrants.

Muslims are generally satisfied with their treatment in German hospitals. Medical personnel generally treat all patients equally without regard to national background or religion, and even highly stigmatised aspects of the Muslims’ appearance, such as the headscarf, cause few problems or conflicts. Nonetheless, a reluctance to make use of certain health services, especially in the field of psychology and psychotherapy, is still prevalent especially amongst elderly immigrants. The German Red Cross has published a practical guide, directed at medical staff, on how to deal with Muslim patients.

The one group that has no access at all to health and social protection in Germany is the considerable number of the so-called illegal immigrants, many of whom are Muslims. All persons and institutions that help those ‘illegals’ are culpable of aiding and abetting illegal entry and illegal residence, and by law every official institution must report any case of illegal residence. Only private networks fill this gap in access to healthcare.

The poor housing conditions of immigrants are well-documented. Foreigners are disadvantaged in the housing market. They generally have less living space compared to German households while their households are generally bigger. They also pay more, on average, on rent than do Germans, probably due to discriminatory practice on the housing market. On the positive side, however, the equipment of the apartments is constantly improving, as the old and barely renovated houses that
have been allocated to labour immigrants since the start of the waves of migration are gradually improved, and more and more flats of social housing are assigned to immigrants.

Muslims in Germany mainly live in urban areas, where many are concentrated in so-called ‘ethnic districts’ in central locations. These ethnic districts are characterised by an absence of any tendency of immigrants to move away as soon as their socio-economic situation improves. Instead, immigrants have a strong tendency to stay and make investments in their original districts in order to improve their old neighbourhoods.

There is evidence that segregation is growing rather than diminishing. In parts of Berlin, for example, increasing segregation between Germans and Turks can be observed. In several cases the economic crisis seems to be causing the collapse of neighbourhoods. However, while public debate often accuses the immigrant population of a voluntary self-segregation from mainstream society, this segregation was already present at the beginning of the wave of immigration; it was a forced one, due to discrimination on the housing market. There have been proposals to reduce the concentration of foreigners in certain districts, through a prohibition on foreigners moving in, or the forced relocation of foreigners. However, Muslim organisations consider that such measures would be discriminatory. Instead, they suggest that public policies should offer incentives to the native German population to move into these areas, by making them more attractive in terms of school education and living conditions.

Although Germany adopted the General Law on Equal Treatment in August 2006, which transposes four different EU Directives, the new law is considered by some anti-discrimination offices to be weak in several areas, including in the housing market. Here, the new law still permits the unequal treatment of people in some situations. Policy allows landlords to refuse to take non-German tenants, where they argue that this is necessary to balanced socio-cultural mixture in the houses and neighbourhoods in question.

Asylum seekers in Germany, many of whom are Muslims, are accommodated in central reception centres, and then dispersed throughout the country. There are no general guidelines guaranteeing minimum standards for accommodation inside the poorly equipped asylum centres. The freedom of movement of asylum seekers is also geographically restricted and to enforce this restriction, often coupons instead of money are given to the asylum seekers, which can only be converted in the district concerned.

Surveys of Muslims in Germany reveal that the large majority regard themselves as German and would like to be naturalised, and think that it is important to continue the process of integration. However, the proportion of Germans who consider that relations between Muslims and Western countries are generally bad is the highest of all Western countries. Muslims tend to trace the general suspicion towards them back to the German media’s one-sided coverage of topics connected to Islam. Since 11 September 2001, there has been a rise in the explicit blaming of Muslims as a group for all kinds of crimes, including terrorism. Police raids on mosques receive front page media coverage, although the fact that the majority of such raids lead to few arrests or charges is only given limited media followup.

The debate around Islam has also entered the political arena, with almost all political parties using the problem of security related to the ‘Islamic threat’ or ‘the Turkish problem of integration’ as a tool to attract voters, block laws connected to an immigration reform, support stricter laws on controlling individuals with regard to security. The emotional public debate surrounding the building of mosques has, in particular, been used by some politicians for their own political ends.
While some individual politicians with cultural Muslim backgrounds can be found even at high levels of the political parties, only a very few immigrants who see themselves as Muslims and identify with religious Muslims’ interests are present on the political stage. As yet the needs of the Muslim communities have not been recognised by Germany’s political parties and very few Muslims are members of these parties. This very limited political representation of Muslims in Germany can be attributed to their poor levels of academic attainment and lack of citizenship rights, as well as to discrimination.

Muslim organisations therefore play a particularly important role in representing the interests of Muslims. However, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, official attitudes towards Muslim organisations hardened, as levels of general distrust and scepticism towards the Muslim population grew. German officials increasingly seek to deal with issues relating to Muslims and Islam independently, rather than in cooperation with Muslim organisations.

Relations between officials and Muslim organisations are severely hampered by the fact that the German internal Intelligence Service (Verfassungsschutz) has labelled many of them as Islamist — although these organisations would not themselves agree with such a labelling. The Federal level Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and coordinates and evaluates the activities of the 16 local offices within the respective federal states. The most important duty of the Verfassungsschutz is the observation of movements and activities that contravene the Constitution of the Federal Republic. A mere mention within a report of the Verfassungsschutz leaves an organisation highly stigmatised.

The judgement of the Verfassungsschutz plays a critical role in the shaping public and institutional opinion and attitude towards a Muslim organisation. This has many important consequences. Membership of such an organisation jeopardises an individual’s prospects of being granted German citizenship. For Muslim organisations, a mere mention on a list of the Verfassungsschutz makes official funding practically impossible. Before funding any Muslim initiative, official institutions usually request an evaluation from the Verfassungsschutz. Similarly, journalists check with the Verfassungsschutz before writing about a Muslim organisation or initiative. Thus any positive media coverage is practically excluded for organisations listed by the Verfassungsschutz. Political parties have also excluded Muslim organisations from policy-making, mainly on the grounds that they are being watched by, or are on the lists of the Verfassungsschutz.

In a kind of vicious circle, these circumstances exclude Muslims connected with Muslim organisations from urgently needed work with young people and for integration, while, at the same time, projects working in these areas do not include such Muslims, even though they may have the skills to reach young Muslims.

Until now, only a few major initiatives have directly targeted Muslims and their needs. Most initiatives target the integration of, or discrimination against, people identified as being foreigners or as having a Turkish origin, rather than specifically Muslims of different origins.

Relations between the police and Muslims are marked by a growing tension and scepticism. German security politics also impact negatively on cooperation between the police and Muslim organisations. Many Muslim organisations are targets of observation — and sometimes (mainly in the case of mosque associations) of searches.

There are few police officers in Germany with a Muslim background. Recruitment of Muslims into the police is restricted by the fact that most Muslims do not have German citizenship. Official figures concerning Muslims and policing are unreliable, as German criminal statistics do not
provide details on the religious background of either offenders or victims. Cases of an anti-Muslim nature are usually either not reported as such, or are not reported at all. The issue of juvenile crime among Muslims has been a particular focus for the media. In 2006, there was huge media coverage of a plea from teachers in a school in the Berlin district of Neukölln for help to deal with the unruly behaviour of their mainly Muslim pupils. Although a similar plea for help had come from an ‘all-German’ school, in Gardelegen in Sachsen-Anhalt, the incident in the Berlin school was used by some politicians to push for a faster deportation of foreign juvenile offenders.
Part I: Research and literature on Muslims

1. Population

1.1 Immigration history and settlement pattern

*The first waves of migration*

West Germany officially began to recruit workers from Turkey in 1961, which started the first wave of Muslim migration into the country. Recruitment contracts were later signed with other countries with Muslim populations — with Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). However, Turkish migrants have been by far the biggest group of Muslim immigrants and even today represent the most important group of Muslims in Germany. The height of the labour migration occurred in 1968 (Schiffauer, 2005: 1130). The workers were expected to depart after their work was done, but only half of the four million migrants actually left Germany (Thalheimer, 2003).

In November 1973, this phase of recruitment was officially stopped. However, this did not have the intended effect of diminishing the number of foreigners living in Germany. On the contrary, fearing even stricter controls on immigration, those Turks working in Germany brought their families to Germany. Family reunion and marriage migration subsequently became the dominant form of migration after 1973 (Wolbert, 1984). Due to this change in the character of migration, the migrants moved out of workers’ accommodation and rented their own apartments, usually in rundown, inner-city areas (Schiffauer, 2005: 1131).

The settlement pattern of this time is still visible in the residential distribution of Turks today. Predominantly, or formerly, industrialised areas — such as Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, Duisburg, Augsburg-München, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Nürnberg, Darmstadt and Göppingen — are still centres of Turkish life in Germany. Only a few Turkish immigrants live on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (Schiffauer, 2005: 1130). The labour migrants were usually concentrated in certain districts with low rents. This phenomenon was encouraged by official policies and supported by public opinion at the time; however, today this is widely criticised in public discussion (Blaschke, 2004).

Another wave of immigration from Turkey was initiated by the second coup d’état in 1980 and the civil war in South East Turkey (Schiffauer, 2005: 1131). The immigrants — Turks and Kurds — were critics of the regime, coming to Germany as asylum seekers; altogether around 125,000 people. One major group was that of the Yezidis, who were granted collective asylum on the grounds of religious persecution. The Yezidis have communities of considerable size in Celle, Lower Saxony, and in Emmerich, Nordrhein-Westfalen. Kurdish asylum seekers also arrived, coming from the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Compared to other Western countries, Germany has the highest share of Kurds amongst its immigrant population.

The Assyrians, a Christian minority in Turkey and other countries, fled in considerable numbers from Turkey, where they were involved in the war of the military against the PKK. They also arrived from Iraq, where they suffered under the regime of the Baath party of Saddam Hussein. About 35,000 of them found a new home in Germany and today have communities in Berlin and Wiesbaden/Mainz (Kleff, 1984).

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5 The Yezidis are Kurdish-speakers who practise the Yezidi religion. They come from Turkey, as well as from Iraq and Syria, with small numbers also from Iran.
Recent migration trends
In 2000, about 2.1 million Turkish immigrants lived in Germany, most of them in the urban agglomerations of Nordrhein-Westfalen and Baden-Württemberg. However, these figures are deceptive, as they do not include the number of approximately 600,000 German citizens of Turkish origin.

Apart from these guest-workers, the immigration history of most of the non-Turkish immigrants with a Muslim background in Germany is more recent, and has its roots in several international conflicts. These resulted in refugees and asylum seekers coming to Germany and going back — or being sent back — to their countries in rising and decreasing waves. Many of these new immigrants came from the Balkans, Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Approximately one third of Muslims in Germany have origins other than Turkish (Blaschke, 2004: 78). The Afghan diaspora in Germany is the largest in Europe. Since the fall of the Taliban, however, the refugee flow of Afghans coming to Germany has diminished significantly, due both to improvements of the life in Afghanistan and to more limited chances of receiving asylum in Germany — for example, there were 5,837 applications for political asylum in 2001, and 2,772 in 2002 (Blaschke, 2004: 88). There is a significant number of Pakistanis in Germany, and also of Indonesians and refugees from the Balkans. Most of those from the Balkans are Muslims — from Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The German Government has been widely criticised for its practice of deporting traumatised refugees back to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later to Kosovo (Al-Ali et al., 2001) At the end of the war about 160,000 Kosovars lived in Germany (Blaschke, 2004: 91). A return benefit programme was introduced, and those who did not want to return were deported by force. The majority of the Bosnian and Balkan refugees living in Germany at present have only temporary refugee status, and many live in fear of deportation. As a consequence, Bosnian refugees do not have a well-established community infrastructure in Germany (Bodiroga-Vukobrat, 1999).

The German Arab population was approximately 290,000 in 2002 (Blaschke, 2004: 91). Many Palestinians enter the country as official refugees from other countries, making it difficult to obtain precise numbers for this immigrant population. The United Palestinian Community of Berlin-Brandenburg claims that 60,000 Palestinians live in Germany today (Larzillère, 2003). Beyond the group of labour migrants from Morocco and Tunisia, most of the Arab migrants arrived in Germany as refugees or asylum seekers.(Schmidt-Fink, 2001).

1.2 Estimates of the size of the Muslim population
The Statistisches Bundesamt, the official German agency for statistics, is, for reasons of privacy, not entitled to collect data about the religious orientation of the population. Only data on the basis of citizenship are available, which can be used to help draw vague conclusions on the religious affiliation of residents. However, figures derived from this kind of analysis need to be treated with some caution. First, many residents of countries with a Muslim majority have a faith other than Islam. Second, a Muslim background tell us little about the individual’s identity as a Muslim. Furthermore, naturalised immigrants no longer appear in the statistics with their original, or their parents’, national background, and can thus hardly be identified as Muslims.

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Professor Dr Rita Süssmuth, former President of the German Bundestag and head of the Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung⁷ (Independent Commission on Integration) has stated that even her Commission was not able to establish the exact number of Muslims living in Germany.⁸

Koenig (2003) puts forward a total figure of 3,040,000 Muslims, of whom 80 per cent are foreigners (i.e. people without German citizenship) and the remainder (608,000) are German citizens. This estimate refers to the number of immigrants who came from countries where a majority of the population holds an Islamic belief. The percentage of Muslims in the country concerned is applied to the number of immigrants from this country in Germany. In this way a vague percentage of Muslim immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority can be arrived at.

Blaschke (2004) speaks of an estimated number of up to 3.2 million⁹ Muslims in Germany, including 100,000 German converts.¹⁰ (By comparison, the total German population was 82,438,000 people on 31 December 2005.)¹¹ The lower limit of Blaschke’s estimate is reached by counting the size of the foreign population in Germany stemming from countries with a majority Muslim population — 2,449,486 people, of whom 2 million are of Turkish origin.¹² The upper limit of 3,130,415 also includes the number of naturalised persons from these countries (for details, see Blaschke, 2004: 72).

However, as Professor Süssmuth states, these figures do not reveal the number of believing and practising Muslims, or to which different branches within Islam they belong. Gerdien Jonker has determined that around 10 per cent of the Muslims in Germany are active in the religious community and a further 30 per cent adhere to the fasting regulations and observe the religious holidays (Jonker, 1999: 21). Blaschke, however, considers this figure to be an underestimate, as most Muslims at least use religious environments in order to ritualise their passages of life (Blaschke, 2004: 70). Blaschke & Bruinessen (1995) also emphasise the point that it is important to take into consideration the fact that the large majority of Muslims in Germany come from Turkey, which is the most secularised country of the Middle East.

Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005) tried to measure the degree of religiosity amongst Turks in Germany within their comparative study of German Turks and French Turks, Euro-Turks. A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union? By evaluating 1,065 interviews with citizens of Turkish origin in Germany and 600 in France, they found that 7.5 per cent of German Turks defined themselves as “quite religious” (compared to 10 per cent of French Turks). Some 2.4 per cent of German Turks (and 10 per cent of French Turks) seem to be rather agnostic or atheistic (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 61).

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⁷ The Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung (Independent Commission on Integration), which is appointed by the Federal Minister for the Interior, presents recommendations for future immigration policies. Some of these concern recommendations on how to determine the necessary level of immigration, and how to regulate and limit this immigration. For further information about the Commission, see the homepage of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, at http://www.bmi.bund.de

⁸ Introductory speech, at the conference of the Kultusministerz (KMK) Under the title “Lerngemeinschaft. Das deutsche Bildungswesen und der Dialog mit den Muslimen” (Learning Alliance. The German Educational System and the dialogue with Muslims) the Kultursminister (Minister for Education) held a conference in Weimar from 13-14th March 2003. The contents of the conference can be viewed online at: http://www.kmk.org/doc/publ/Lerngemeinschaft.htm (accessed 29 January 2007)

⁹ See also: Deutscher Bundestag, “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die große Anfrage zum Islam in Deutschland” [The Federal Government’s response to the large inquiry into Islam in Germany], 8 November 2000.

¹⁰ Estimates of the Zentrum für Türkeistudien.


A survey by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (2001: 3) determined that the different Muslim religious groups amongst the Turkish population in Germany are as follows: 63 per cent are Sunni Muslims, 12 per cent are Alevi (a sect in its own right, which developed out of Shia Islam), 2 per cent are Shia Muslims, and 7 per cent Yezidi, Assyrian or Armenian Christians (8 per cent of the immigrants did not reply).

The Muslim communities in Germany are still divided mainly by language and national origin as well as by religious affiliation, even if certain attempts to change this can be observed (see Section I.8). The main ideological differences within Islam are those between Shiites and Sunnis. But the Sunnis of Turkish and Arabic origin have separate mosques and cultural centres.

There is also division between ethnic Kurds and Turks. Of the more than two million immigrants from Turkey, 500,000 are ethnic Kurds. The remainder, from other ethnic backgrounds, are mainly from different Turkish peoples (mostly Azerbaijanis) (Schiffauer, 2005: 1132).

The Zentrum für Türkeistudien (Centre for Turkish Studies)\(^{13}\) has estimated that there were 100,000 German converts in 1999 (1999: 113). They are often organised in Muslim associations established by German Muslims, for example the Deutsche Muslim-Liga e.V. (German Muslim League), founded in 1952 in Hamburg.

1.3 Demographics

Asylum seekers are almost exclusively first-generation, and sometimes second-generation, immigrants, whereas labour migrants are often third-generation and fourth-generation immigrants (UNHCR, 1998).

By the end of 2003, of the 7,334,800 foreigners in Germany, 57.9 per cent stemmed from countries with former recruitment contracts for labour migrants. The biggest group, people with Turkish nationality, make up 25.6 per cent of all foreigners. In comparison, for example, Bosnians made up 2.3 per cent of all foreigners, Iranians 1.1 per cent, Moroccans 1.1 per cent and Tunisians 0.3 per cent. Of those with Turkish nationality, 46.2 per cent were women (compared to 42.3 per cent of Iranians, 39.8 per cent of the Moroccans, 48.1 per cent of the Bosnians and 32.4 per cent of the Tunisian immigrants), 27.8 per cent under the age of 18 and 62.8 per cent under the age of 35.\(^{14}\) (By comparison, for the overall population of foreigners in Germany, the age group under 18 makes up only 18.3 per cent.) In 2003, 654,853 of the 1,877,661 Turkish foreigners (34.9 per cent) in Germany were born in Germany, compared to 16.5 per cent of the Bosnians, 8.7 per cent of the Iranians and 21.0 per cent of the Moroccan immigrants. As for the Afghan foreign population, only 12.6 per cent were born in Germany.\(^{15}\)

Detailed demographics are hardly available in Germany. The question of the numbers of Muslims who are first-, second-, third- or fourth-generation migrants is especially difficult to answer, as the Muslim population is still constantly fluctuating. While a large percentage of immigrants with a Turkish background are deciding to emigrate from Germany, a considerable number of people are still coming into the country. This constantly renewing first generation is especially made up of young immigrants, so that the age of the immigrants does not say anything about their status as

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\(^{13}\) The Zentrum für Türkeistudien (Centre for Studies on Turkey) was founded in 1985, with the aim of encouraging and organising scientific research, and collecting information about the most important issues of German–Turkish relations. However, today its activities are much broader, and since the institute is affiliated to the University of Duisburg-Essen its staff members also give lectures there.


first, second or third generation. Figures of this kind would be very useful and could thus be an important contribution of the planned research project in Germany.

For all Muslims in Germany, Schiffauer explains that unmarried (single, divorced or widowed) women aged 15 years or older are highly underrepresented in the population (just half the size of the group of men with the same characteristics). The older generation (60 years and older) is also underrepresented, as many of this age group decide to spend their retirement in their home country. The numbers are rising, however. In 1999, 124,000 Turks in this age category were living in Germany, comprising 5 per cent of the total number of immigrants; for the German population as a whole, 16 per cent are in this age category (Schiffauer, 2005: 1132).

The national groups that make up the German Muslim population are mainly from Turkey (1,877,661 foreigners in 2003), Bosnia and Herzegovina (167,081), Iran (81,495), Morocco (79,794), Afghanistan (65,830), Lebanon (46,812), Pakistan (35,081), Syria (29,476), Tunisia (24,533), Algeria (16,974), Indonesia (12,660) and Jordan (10,448), with lower numbers of foreigners from countries with a Muslim minority, such as India.

1.4 Citizenship and access to citizenship
According to estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, of the 3.2 million Muslims living in Germany at the end of 2000, 480,000 (mostly originating from Turkey) had German citizenship (Berliner Zeitung, 26 August 2003) (Blaschke, 2004: 74).

The historical German approach to questions of nationality and citizenship is an ethnic one, emphasising the constructed common descent, rather than one based on political self-conception. With the separation of Germany in 1949 into two different states, the Federal Republic of Germany claimed exclusive responsibility for all Germans in the West and the East, as well as of those people of German descent who lived in Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. For this reason an all-inclusive form of citizenship had to be found, which made the ethnic understanding of citizenship functional (see Bosse, Vior, et al.). Following this logic, the former German Aussiedler and Übersiedler, on the one hand, had a totally different immigrant status from the so-called “guest-workers”, as well as asylum seekers and refugees, on the other (Koopmans, 1999: 167). The former have the right to settle and full access to citizenship rights, whereas the latter have only restricted opportunities for immigration and no citizenship rights. Most asylum seekers are not entitled to work and have only restricted freedom to move and settle.

From January 2000, the new citizenship law (Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht, see Section I.8) has provided easier access to citizenship and has introduced a partial ius soli (territorially based right) by granting citizenship to children of foreign parents born in Germany, under certain circumstances. It is therefore seen by many as a chance to improve the integration of immigrants and their families (Bosse & Vior, 2005: 21). Recent statistics show a declining number of naturalisations, including for those with a Muslim background. As shown below in Table 1, the overall number of naturalisations has been constantly diminishing since 2000, but the fall is more striking for persons coming originally from countries with a Muslim majority.

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16 Aussiedler: emigrants of ethnic German origin from Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and Asia.
17 Übersiedler: German residents, who — at the time of the German separation — resettled from East to West Germany and also (rarely) vice versa.
18 Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats: Deutsches Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht.
Table 1. Number of naturalisations (2001–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisations of All Foreigners</td>
<td>178,089</td>
<td>153,547</td>
<td>140,731</td>
<td>127,153</td>
<td>117,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisations of Muslim Foreigners</td>
<td>118,889</td>
<td>103,606</td>
<td>92,799</td>
<td>73,995</td>
<td>Approx. 57,456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal statistics Office)\(^{20}\)

Schiffauer (1999) explains that for a long time there was not only a marked hesitancy on the part of the German authorities to grant citizenship to non-ethnic German immigrants, but also a reluctance on the part of those immigrants to apply for citizenship, as this had the perceived stigma of “betraying” their national background (Schmidt-Hornstein, 1995). The now observable decline in the number of naturalisations might be due to the growing hostility towards Muslims in Germany. However, further research still has to be done in this field, as naturalisation rates for non-Muslim foreigners are also diminishing constantly. The declining number of Muslims taking up German citizenship is highly problematic, as it is the prerequisite for political participation and real integration into German society, including also the claiming of minority rights.

2. Identity

2.1 Muslim collective identities

Literature concerning Muslim identity in Germany mainly focuses on questions of individual identity, which are referred to in further detail below. However, the collective identity of Muslims in Germany is also worth analysing, as interesting and far-reaching changes can be observed here.

Towards a German Muslim collective identity

The first generation of Muslim immigrants in Germany believed that, as labour migrants, they would stay amongst the non-Muslim majority for a while before returning to their home countries. They retained this myth for a very long time (Schiffauer, 2005). The second and third generations consist of Muslims born in Germany, who no longer think about going “back home” and must find a place for themselves in German society.

The German citizenship law has only recently opened up towards aspects of a *ius soli* (territory-based law), moving beyond its traditional *ius sanguinis* (derivation-based law). This change allows children to be born as German citizens, even when their parents do not have German citizenship. Even though the legal situation, as well as the political atmosphere, does not make it easy for young Muslims with an immigrant background to feel that they are an integral part of the German society, increasing numbers are claiming their right to citizenship. German Muslims are also becoming increasingly self-conscious in speaking and living out a German Muslim identity and way of life, which is not determined from outside — more precisely, it is not determined by the non-Muslim German public and politics.

The situation of young Muslim men is discussed by Nikola Tietze (2001), comparing Germany and France. For Germany, she focuses on young male members of the Turkish organisation Milli Görüs (IGMG) in Wilhelmsburg. Studying a group of young men in the IGMG mosque in Wilhelmsburg, she comes up with a typology similar to those of other researchers. First, she explains that the strong discourse of difference in Germany, where immigrants of the third generation are still called “foreigners”, also has an impact on their way of identifying with Islam. Second, the discourse of exclusion at the national level is accompanied by a strong identification with the district (reflecting German federalism and an intense *Kiezdenken* — strong identification with the district where one lives).21 On this level a tendency towards pragmatic solutions, which focus on the singular case, can be observed. She notes that “coping with conflicts occurs on the local level, while each case is treated apart and disconnected from the question of which social standing should generally be applied to Islam. The character of the political culture in Germany, being very much law-oriented, causes and facilitates this process” (Tietze, 2001: 221).

In France, however, Tietze finds the discourse of equality to be dominant, which allows the immigrants to act as equals. The relation to the home country is not important in this regard, and their demands are formulated from French citizens to French citizens. The fact of inequality is, however, felt more acutely before the background of this discourse. The commitment to Islam becomes a means to denounce social and economic marginalisation. The dilemma of the young men arises from the fact that that the commitment to Islam, as an argument within the public

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21 This identification was the conclusion reached in the light of qualitative interviews within the survey. The author explains that this identification is not only the expression of individual lives, but is also based on the form of organisation of German society and the meaning of local units within the national network of relations. The adoption of the town or the district as one’s own legitimises the identification with German society and forms the only way to demand a social inclusion in spite of an “extra-territorial” difference (Tietze, 2001: 205). Tietze’s analysis is based on several portraits and qualitative interviews of young Muslim men in France and Germany.
discourse, is a taboo. Because of this, the expression of difference, which was originally only used to denounce social and economic discrimination, becomes in France a cultural and political antagonism, which slowly excludes the individual from the public sphere.

The study of Schirin Amir-Moazami also compares Germany and France. By analysing discussions about the wearing of the headscarf (hijab), she focuses on the relationships of power and representation. While young Muslim women in France criticise the intolerance of French society, young female Muslims in Germany often stress the tolerance of German society. Taking a closer look, however, one can observe that the situation in France is taking place against the background of the promise of equality by the French Republic, and the bitter awareness that this promise has been broken. By contrast, in Germany, the background to the praising of tolerance is a general feeling of missing affiliation to German society. Tolerance is experienced as tolerance towards “foreigners” who, even in the third generation, are still not considered to be a natural part of the society.

Schirin Amir-Moazami confirms the findings of Tietze, in that, like the young men, young women in Germany are also politically oriented towards Turkey. These women see themselves as not being an integral part of society, like anybody else, but rather as being ‘tolerated’ by the majority society. However, this is only one side of the story. The other side is the fact that the women are, by this very act of adoption, becoming able to act and communicate; they get actively involved in complex processes of negotiations and in this way transcend their ascribed position. The women become active carriers of counter-discourses.

A German Muslim collective identity is yet to be fully developed, but certain developments can already be clearly observed. In particular, many of the younger members and representatives of those organisations are challenging the divisions along national and ethnic lines in the various different Muslim organisations and communities.

This can be observed, for example, within the Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V. (Muslim Youth Germany, MJD), which emphasises the German language as a lingua franca amongst its members and integrates young Muslims from all ethnic backgrounds. The MJD was founded by young Muslims in 1994 in the “House of Islam”. It was a forum of German-speaking second-generation Muslim high school students. Their engagement in the MJD was attractive because it permitted a Muslim engagement beyond the narrow confines of the ethnically homogeneous Islamic communities set up by the first generation. The aim of the organisation was to help Muslim youngsters to integrate into society as self-confident young Muslims and to consider themselves as members of this society, while at the same time upholding and maintaining their Muslim identity. The MJD is today a nationwide organisation, with branches in different cities. It has organised several projects, including the “Ta’ruf” Project in Berlin (see sections I.8.2 and I.II.2).

In Berlin, in 2002, some young Muslim academics founded the association INSSAN e.V., with the aim of building a mosque and cultural centre that would be more representative of the diversity of the Muslim population. The association follows similar principles to the MJD; fostering a German Muslim identity and bringing together Muslims from all national backgrounds, as well as emphasising dialogue and contact with the non-Muslim society. Some parts of Milli Görüş (described by Schiffauer, 2004) and other bigger organisations also try to bring forward this kind

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22 The Islamic Community Milli Görüş is the European branch of the Islamist party founded in Turkey in 1968. Originally the aim of the party, which has a history of being outlawed and reconstituted, was the reintroduction of the Sharia in Turkey. In the meantime, it pursues a reformist course, accepting Kemalism as its framework (Schiffauer, 2005: 1136).
of identity politics. For example, Synnove Bendixen, from the Centre for Metropolitan Studies,\textsuperscript{23} is currently carrying out field research amongst young Muslim girls in Berlin that explores issues of identity, and the young women’s strategies for creating their own spaces of belonging.\textsuperscript{24}

An important role within these processes is played by German Muslims, although this term is itself open to various discussions about identity. Native German converts to Islam play a certain role and have often founded their own organisations. One of these, Ayyub Köhler, has recently become the Head of the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of Muslims, ZMD).\textsuperscript{25} In addition, many of the active members of Muslim organisations, especially younger representatives, are German citizens and children of bi-national marriages with one German partner. So legally they are German Muslims, but because of their outward appearance they are often not seen as “full” Germans by the German population.\textsuperscript{26} The same holds true for Muslims born and raised in Germany who are German citizens but both of whose parents originally immigrated into the country. Even their self-perception is often of not being a ‘real’ German, as they are not regarded as ‘full’ Germans by their fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{27}

Muslim organisations, and especially their representatives of the second and third generations, also play an important role in strengthening this collective identity as German Muslims and the self-conscious representation of Muslims in Germany, as upholding and maintaining the Islamic faith, as well as expressing and emphasising these issues and developments to the German public. Their common struggle for minority rights, especially the right to be different and accepted, is to be seen as an act of active integration. However, this kind of activism is actually sceptically perceived as Islamist and thus hostile. Its protagonists are widely seen as hostile strangers within the German society (Schiffauer, 2006).

Religious identities
Religious attitudes and extremist behaviour are not only linked in the public opinion in Germany, but also in some scientific literature. The field of religious — especially Islamic — fundamentalism is broadly covered in Germany in the popular scientific and journalistic area (see, for example, Scholl-Latour, Konzelmann, Theveßen) as well as in the scientific field (for example, Bassam Tibi). Furthermore, for certain authors, questions of Muslims’ individual identity are always linked to these issues.

One example is the survey of Wilhelm Heitmeyer \textit{et al.}, published in 1998, \textit{Verlockender Fundamentalismus} (Seductive fundamentalism). Heitmeyer and others questioned 1,221 young Muslims (aged between 15 and 21 years old) about their attitudes in relation to religion,

\begin{itemize}
  \item The Centre for Metropolitan Studies is an internationally oriented research centre, which focuses on issues concerning the modern metropolis. It is situated at the Technische Universität Berlin (TUB). Its core is the “Graduiertenkolleg”, a cooperative endeavour between the three Berlin universities (Freie Universität – FUB, Humboldt-Universität – HUB and Technische Universität – TUB), and New York University and Columbia University in New York (http://www.metropolitanstudies.de/).
  \item Field observations and expert interview with Werner Schiffauer, August 2006.
  \item The Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) was founded in 1994 as an umbrella organisation of 19 different Muslim head organisations and cultural centres of various national origins. It understands itself to be the discussion and action level of its member organisations and contact organisation for the German State, the administration and the other groups of the society.
  \item Interviews with active members of Muslim organisations, including: the general secretary of the ZMD, Aiman Mazyek, the president of the head organisation Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD), Ibrahim Al Zayat and the former chair of the MJD, Chaban Salih,. Interviews with other German Muslims, who are not ethnically German, also revealed the same experiences of not feeling accepted by the German public as fully German. See also Meng (2004).
  \item Field observations and qualitative research. In Germany, ethnic Turks are always referred to as Turks in common parlance, just because they look Turkish. The awareness that a German person can look Arabic or Chinese has not penetrated deeply into the popular consciousness yet.
\end{itemize}
nationalism and extremism. Even though the research shows that the majority of religious Muslim young people are far from the political-fundamentalist sphere, the survey still concentrates on this minority, and views religious attitude as the first step towards taking on fundamentalist ideas and being politically exploited.

The question of whether extremist ideas generally — or only rarely — develop on the basis of particular religious attitudes is answered in a different way by other authors. For example, the premise of a close link between “strong religiosity” and a “Turkish-oriented lifestyle”, which rarely leaves any space for “opportunities of differing German behaviour”, as Riesner puts it, (Silke Riesner, 1990: 166), is contradicted by studies of Schiffauer (1991) and also Renate Pitzer-Reyl (1995).

Meng (2004) studied Muslims of the second generation who are members of Muslim organisations, in order to test the commonly held assumption that Islamist organisations are counterproductive for integration. Meng surveyed and compared the social profile and the interpretation patterns of members of two Muslim organisations, Milli Görüs and DITIB, a branch of the official religious authority in Turkey. Meng connects qualitative with quantitative methods. For the quantitative part 500 graduates were contacted, who had left school ten years prior to the year of the survey, 1999. 106 of them took part in the survey. The qualitative part focuses on two group interviews, one with the women and one with the men of the Milli Görüs community in Bremen. In this study, a higher degree of organisation within the Muslim organisations seems to be connected with a higher degree of educational and professional integration, but also of social segregation. There are differences also between the members of DITIB and Milli Görüs in their degree of integration. This can be seen, for example, from members of Milli Görüs reading newspapers to a much greater extent, and also reading Turkish and German newspapers with equal facility.

Meng also discovered an interesting difference between men and women of his case study. While women argued in favour of an authentic Islamic transmission, not tolerating any aberration, men saw a more flexible space of interpretation inside the Islamic sources. He explains this difference as “stigma-management” by the women, who have to cope with a double frontline inside the Islamic organisations: they have to find their positions in demarcation towards the traditional patriarchy of the men that perceives itself as Islamically legitimate, and also towards the anti-Islamic ascriptions of the German society.

Both Tietze and Meng draw the conclusion that being raised in a conservative community such as Milli Görüs can by no means be equated with socialisation into Islamic radicalism, and that the contrary may even be true to a certain extent.

In the field of collective Muslim identity, the work of Irka Christa Mohr (2004) is very interesting. In her study Islamischer Religionsunterricht in Europa (Islamic Religious Education in Europe), she analyses the development of curricula for Islamic education in schools. As the Islamic values and attitudes of the future generations in Germany are crucially influenced by Islamic education, the curricula are an important field of study. She compares two concepts, one of the ZMD and one of the Institut für Interreligiöse Pädagogik und Didaktik (Institute for Inter-religious Pedagogy and Didactics, IPD).

The key concept of the IPD’s approach is called Qur’anic didactics. According to this approach the centre of the education is not placed on the text as liturgy or doctrine but on understanding the text in relation to one’s own life. A difference is made between the narrower meaning, which is linked to the cause of the revelation — and the broader, analogous meaning. This approach does not aim to fix the meaning but — on the contrary — the opening up of as many levels of understanding as
possible. The concept was also the basis for the curricula of the Islamische Föderation (Islamic Federation) in Berlin, which only slightly changed it for its teaching in Berlin schools.

2.2 Identities of Muslim women
In most scientific studies of the 1980s concerning Muslim women of the second generation, their overall situation was viewed as being problematic, with Islam playing the crucial role in impeding their free action and positive integration (Klinkhammer, 2000: 19). An overview of the eurocentric picture of Muslim women is given by Reuter (1999: 60–67). A study that explicitly focuses on eurocentric and one-sided views towards Muslim women has been carried out by Irmgard Pinn and Marlies Wehner (1995).

Klinkhammer (2000; 2003), in her qualitative-empirical survey, develops a typology of “forms of lifestyle” from the different backgrounds of her female Muslim interviewees. She made 19 interviews, which were tape-recorded, and had many conversations with Muslim women of Turkish and German origin during her participating observation at events of communities, academies and the like. The field of research involved Sunni Muslim women who were raised in Germany and whose parents had emigrated from Turkey to Germany. Klinkhammer aimed at considering as many different types of religiosity as possible. The research method of the tape-recorded interviews was a mixture of the thematically organised interview, which is based on a guideline, and the narrative interview. The sample includes Muslim women who are members of a Muslim organisation and who wear a headscarf, along with Muslim women who are not members of such an organisation and/or do not wear the headscarf. Except for one case, only women with an average or high level of education were chosen for the interviews. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the language skills of these women (as well as their higher disposition for giving interviews). Second, such women generally make up the active part of Muslim women, those who are pushing the Muslim communities in Germany for changes.

For Klinkhammer, it makes a big difference if the women interviewed have been raised within a Muslim family, have had an experience of conversion or had been generally looking for a sense of purpose in life when they found Islam. She discovers that for those who have grown up in Muslim families, the feeling of cultural difference or strangeness is central, and that Islam systematically structures their days. For those who had an experience of conversion, the conscious turning to Islam happens before the background of discrimination (this case is explained in depth as an ideal type by Nökel) and is characterised by self-discipline and the struggle for the right to be different. The third type shows a subjective and internal handling of the religious duties.

Karakasoglu-Aydin (1999), in her study of female university students of education and pedagogues of Turkish origin, focuses more on the meaning of Islam for the lifestyle of the individual and searches especially for the effects that an Islamic orientation has on attitudes towards education. Karakasoglu-Aydin differentiated, with regard to her interviewees, between atheists, spiritualists (who are looking for a sense of purpose in life without being attached to a certain belief), secular Sunnis (who locate their very individual kind of belief within the private sphere), pragmatic ritualists (whose religious ritual practice plays a constant but not dominant part in life) and idealist ritualists (who systematically organise their lives according to Islam). The research method consists of qualitative interviews, which were organised by a guideline. Karakasoglu-Aydin uses the specific adaptation of problem-focused interviews by Mayring (Karakasoglu-Aydin, 1999: 156 ff).

The choice of the subjects was determined by the methodology of “theoretical sampling”, which means that all theoretically possible forms of appearance of the observed attributes are considered within the composition of the observed group. In this way Karakasoglu-Aydin conducted
interviews with 7 Alevis and 19 Sunni Muslims, 9 without headscarves and 10 with headscarves. They were all Bildungsinländerinnen, which means that they had pursued their educational career in Germany, and were all studying educational sciences at least at the end of the basic studies. She makes the important observation that all the different types of Muslim women of the second generation held a similar view towards education, in that they objected to a rigid style of upbringing. They all aimed at a partnership between parents and children, where autonomy, self-consciousness and maturity are the goals of education, and a separation has been made from the “traditional Turkish” educational ideal of the parents.

Sigrid Nökel (2002) approached the complex positioning of young Muslim women of the second and third generations vis-à-vis the German majority, the society of origin, and their parents, by designing a collective biography of the second generation of Muslim women in Germany. Her analysis focuses on 18 young women from the areas of Bielefeld and Frankfurt, whom she recruited with the help of the snowball principle. The criteria for her choice were age (between 18 and 28 years old) and the self-definition as Muslim. Nökel describes the process of Islamisation as a process of self-education, self-discipline and self-control. She describes how the women live through the phases of the struggle for acceptance. In the first phase, in school, they often adopt the stereotyping ascriptions\(^{28}\) of teachers and other pupils as foreigners and guest-workers, which results in feelings of strangeness. In the second phase, they start developing strategies for winning acceptance by being good students, although this also leaves them with a feeling of insecurity, because it seems to be built on symbolic submission. The third phase is marked by the discovery of the right to be different and, in the same way, the accentuation of religion.

There are many organisations and institutions of Muslim women in Germany. The most important of these include the following: Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum muslimischer Frauen e.V. (Centre for Encountering and Advanced Training of Muslim Women, BFMF), in Cologne; Zentrum für islamische Frauenforschung und -förderung (Centre for Islamic Research on Women’s Issues and Encouragement of Muslim Women, ZiF), in Cologne; Netzwerk für islamische Frauen e.V. (Network for Islamic Women, HUDA); and AG Muslimische Frau in der Gesellschaft in Berlin (Working Group — Muslim Woman within Society), Berlin.

\(^{28}\) In the study of Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann on foreign youngsters in higher education, a young Turkish woman quoted the statement of her teacher, who said “A Turkish girl will marry anyway, so attending the secondary level of the Gymnasium is not worthwhile” (Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann, 2005: 8).
3. Education

3.1 Statistics
With respect to the number of Muslim students in schools and higher education, the problem is the same as in any other field, namely that no official numbers exist. Official statistics, as well as the majority of the literature, only refer to foreign students.29 Estimates speak of about 700,000 German pupils with a Muslim background.30 The educationalist Havva Engin speaks of 6 per cent (Engin, 2001), whereas the overall number of pupils with an immigrant background in Germany is estimated as making up about 22 per cent by the recent PISA studies of 2003 (PISA-Konsortium, 32 ff), fluctuating between 10 per cent in the new federal states and 36 per cent in certain old states. The representation of Muslims probably also fluctuates in a similar way, according to the federal state, city, district or even school in question. For example, a percentage of 60 per cent and above is usual for the Berlin districts of Kreuzberg or Neukölln32 (see also section III.1).

3.2 Muslims in education
One of the central problems for Muslim pupils is the overall negative opinion about Islam and Muslims, which also affects the atmosphere of the classroom. While public debate at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s spoke of ‘class’ as the crucial line of conflict, it later turned towards the ‘foreigners’, who were blamed for many social problems. In the last few years, the ‘foreigners’ became ‘Muslims’, while the negative connotations stayed or even worsened.

In 2005, Jonker & Schiffauer carried out research about different “conflict-groups” between Muslims and non-Muslims in German society.33 Within some group discussions in school, both Muslim pupils and Muslim parents stated that they personally felt this shift from being seen as foreigners to being viewed — and also blamed — as Muslims. Also, the statements of certain teachers in these discussions were telling. In one school, for example, a young female teacher...
stated that Muslims were demanding too much, and that she preferred not to put too much emphasis on religion, while she viewed herself and her school as being open and tolerant, and not having any problems with Muslim girls wearing headscarves. However, one of her female Muslim pupils stated, after the official discussion, that it was a well-known fact amongst the pupils that girls with headscarves were not even admitted to the school.\textsuperscript{34}

The refugee backgrounds of many Muslim pupils, mostly children of Palestinians, have been analysed by the school talks as another source of conflicts and problems. It was found that many families have long fugitive histories, were living in refugee camps already in Lebanon, and are confronted in Germany with years of insecure residency status. The parents often have no work permits, or only the right to get a job if no German or EU national is found for it. In this situation, the parents are often unable to raise their children properly, while teachers generally think that they are not interested in their children’s educational career. For children without a residency permit, the chances for an apprenticeship are also very low. In some federal states (such as Berlin) they are even forbidden to take up an apprenticeship, and until recently this was without regard to the duration of their stay in Germany (Pelzer, 2003). This frequently led to wasted educational and professional career opportunities, and left highly frustrated young people and families.

The background of most of the Muslim pupils in Germany is one of Turkish rural origin, without any higher education. As Schiffauer explains, this has been a problem for the children attending school and higher education in Germany. However, on the other hand, some parents — especially the conservative and religiously oriented ones — have showed more discipline and did not watch television as much as other families with low levels of education. Through emphasising the reading of religious books, reading had also quite a high importance, which in turn raised the children’s level of education and encouraged their educational aspirations (Schiffauer, 2003). The role of Muslim organisations in the psycho-social stabilisation of youngsters has been shown by Tietze (2001).

The recently published book \textit{Islam im Klassenzimmer} (\textit{Islam in the Classroom}) is more a collection of practical experience and advice than a scientific study.\textsuperscript{35} In 2002 a group of scientists (Werner Schiffauer, Gerd Baumann, Riva Kastoryano & Steven Vertovec, 2004) carried out an ethnological field research project amongst Turkish pupils at schools in different European cities.\textsuperscript{36} The study focused on the process of political enculturation and provided a deep insight into the structures and particularities at work in German schools, and in society as a whole, that pose problems for foreign, and especially Muslim, pupils, and are often difficult to analyse for both teachers and pupils. While the untold underlying presuppositions are identified as central sources of conflict by the scientists, the cultural and religious difference of pupils and their parents are generally blamed for many problems.

\textbf{3.3 Religious education in schools}
Many of the general problems of immigrants in schools are also valid for Muslims, but there are some additional issues concerning pupils with a religious Islamic background. One of these is the question of religious education, which is being quite widely debated in Germany.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} “Conflict-talk” within the Ethnobarometer project “Europe’s Muslim Communities – Security and Integration post-11 September” on 12 September 2005.
\textsuperscript{35} About “Schule ohne Rassismus” see also Section II.2 Integration policy.
\textsuperscript{36} Berlin, Paris, London and Rotterdam.
Although religious freedom should be guaranteed under the Constitution, and religious education in State schools is a constitutional right in Germany, it has been argued that these guarantees only apply to the Christian religions, or “to the religions traditionally present within Western Europe, thus excluding Islam” (Robbers, 2000: 148). The State is obliged to pay for a religious education class, to be established within the school curriculum, as long as there are a certain number of pupils of any one denomination within the same school. The content of these lessons should adhere to the State’s goals on upbringing and education, as well as the composition of the religious communities in question (Blaschke, 2004: 164 ff).

Religious education is different in each federal state, as it is part of the responsibility of the Länder. In Berlin, for example, religious education is voluntary. The choice is at the moment between Christian religion, Muslim religion and Lebenskunde (knowledge about life). Since this year the obligatory subject of ethics has been established and is likely to displace religious education in the long run. In other federal states, such as Bremen, religious education is obligatory. In Brandenburg an integral subject LER (life structuring, ethics and religion) has been established recently as a parallel to religious education. Even Protestant and Catholic educational courses are sometimes taught apart, as in Bavaria. Hamburg has for 25 years had a special form of religious education for everybody, which is a sort of comparative religion class.

Throughout the different federal states in Germany, and within the realm of the Muttersprachliche Ergänzungsunterricht (native tongue complimentary courses, MEU), religious instruction has been offered to children of the Islamic faith on a voluntary basis. (Faruk Sen and Hayrettin Aydin, 2002: 95). However, the only Muslim community yet to be accepted as a religious community, and thus be entitled to teach religion at regular school classes, is the Islamische Föderation (Islamic Federation) in Berlin. In Hamburg, there was an attempt to widen the curriculum for religious education to include “religion for everyone”, by creating a comparative religion class. (Sen and Aydin, 2002: 95). But here the lack of teachers with a profound knowledge of the different religions poses another problem. Even Muslim teachers speaking good German are difficult to find, as there has only recently been created a study course on Muslim religious education at the University of Münster.  

One issue concerning Muslim pupils, as well as others, is the representation of Islam in schoolbooks. Herbert Schulze found generalisations supporting negative prejudices in several schoolbooks in Europe (Schulze, 1994) and proposed to include Muslims in the development of these materials. The Islamrat (Islamic Council) of Germany held a conference where this kind of cooperation was also favoured, in order to avoid the hardening of stereotypes already in infancy (Islamrat, 2001).

Online article available at amana online at http://www.amana-online.de/pp/aa/iru_mw_01.shtml (accessed 12 December 2006); Hartmut Lehmann,: Multireligiosität im vereinigten Europa – Historische und juristische Aspekte, 115–134 Wallstein Verlag; Also Marschke 2003; Thorsten Anger 2003; Simone Spriewald 2005; Gottwald 2001; Schifferauer 2003.

38 In 2004 the professor for Islamic sciences, Professor Muhammad Sven Kalisch has been appointed professor for the subject “Religion des Islam” at the University of Münster. Münster is the first German university that will qualify teachers for Islamic religious education.

39 The Georg-Eckert-Institut in Braunschweig is currently developing new material about the Islamic world for schoolbooks. Further information available in German at http://www.gei.de/deutsch/projekte/islam.shtml (accessed 12 December 2006).

40 The Islamrat (Islamic Council) was founded in 1986 in Berlin, to head an umbrella organisation comprised of different Muslim organisations. The Council refers to itself as a national example for coordination and common agency among Muslim organisations in Germany. It has member organisations representing Muslims of different national origins, one of the most important being the Turkish Milli Görüs.
3.4 Muslim educational attainment levels

Secondary education in Germany is divided into two levels — Sekundarstufe I and II. The first level (Sekundarstufe I) embraces all types of school up to the tenth form, excluding the professional schools. The school types of this level are: Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium (until the tenth form), as well as new forms such as Hauptschule-Gymnasium and Regionalschule. This level can be finished after the ninth form with the certificate, Hauptschule 9th form, and after the tenth form with different certificates. These entitle the student to start an apprenticeship, a higher qualified education at a professional school, or to pass onto level II at a Gymnasium (high school) or Gesamtschule (comprehensive school). The second level (Sekundarstufe II) generally embraces the years 11, 12 and 13 and finishes with the Abitur (university entrance diploma). After the school reform of 1989, following the joining of the new federal states, the Abitur can be reached in some states already after the twelfth form.

Referring to the educational achievements of children with immigrant backgrounds, Gogolin (2001) states that three times as many foreign children (meaning Bildungsinländer — pupils who do not hold German passports, but who pursued their education in Germany) as German children only go on to enter Hauptschule (secondary school) after primary school, with no further or higher education after that.

Further evidence on the poor educational attainments of immigrants can be drawn from the following data: 17 per cent of foreign young people did not attain any qualifying school certificate in the year 2004/2005, compared to 7.2 per cent of the German pupils. 41.7 per cent did not achieve more than the Hauptschulabschluss (CSE) compared to 23.2 per cent of the Germans. Only 8.2 per cent of the foreign pupils attended Abitur, while 25.7 per cent of German pupils qualified themselves for attending university.41

Foreign young people also have fewer chances in professional education. In 1998 about one third of foreigners aged 20 to 29 remained without a professional qualification, compared to only 8 per cent of the Germans of the same age group (Gogolin 2001). This negative trend continues at the higher education level. By the age of 22, only half as many foreign students as German ones can be found in universities and Fachhochschulen (universities of applied sciences). By the age of 26, the German students in these areas are nearly three times as numerous as the foreign ones (Gogolin, 2005: 2).

However, Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann (2001) analyse the university as the only field where a certain success of students with an immigrant background can be found. The work of Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann focuses on the group of Bildungsinländer (university students who do not hold German passports, but who pursued their education in Germany). At the same time they state that the distinction between the group of Bildungsinländer and that of Bildungsausländer (foreigners educated outside Germany) is not very enlightening when referring to the actual experiences of the young students. Many of those who are counted as Bildungsausländer have in fact lived as Pendelmigranten (oscillating migrants) between their country of origin and Germany even at an early age. On the other hand, there are also not a few students from other countries (Turkey or other non-EU States) who no longer appear in the statistics as foreigners, because they used the easier process of naturalisation since 2001 to acquire German citizenship.

The latest PISA studies (2003) provide evidence of certain German particularities concerning the educational achievements of immigrant pupils. In contrast to all other countries, in Germany those children who were born in the country (i.e. the second generation) had even worse results than those who immigrated after starting school. The competences in mathematics, for example, for children without any immigrant background, who made up 79.4 per cent of the tested pupils, are 24 points better than the median of all the children tested. Children with one parent born abroad, who made up 5.2 per cent of the survey, were still 5 competence points above the median. Those who immigrated into the country with their families, 8.5 per cent of the survey, are 49 points below the median (the average of all the countries in this group of children lies 34 points below the median).

The really astonishing result is, however, that concerning the pupils whose parents had migrated into the country but who were born and educated in Germany. They made up 6.9 per cent of the survey. Their results, at 71 points below the median, were worse than those of children who migrated to Germany. Here the average of the tested countries is only 19 points below the median, so Germany marks a real difference from the other countries in this regard.

While the motivation to learn is sometimes even higher with immigrant children, they do not reach the same standard as the native ones. This gap is especially high in Germany. One of the aggravating factors is the concentration of immigrant children in schools where the majority of the pupils are disadvantaged in terms of their economic and social background (PISA 2003).

The study also differentiates between the countries of origin of the children with immigrant backgrounds. Amongst other results, the study found that children with a Turkish background use the German language comparatively rarely in their everyday life. Their competences in mathematics and reading are beneath a level that could allow success in an apprenticeship and profession.

Professor Gogolin locates an important factor for the poor educational achievements of immigrant pupils in primary schools, which are not well adjusted to the needs of foreign children growing up with two and more languages (Gogolin & Neumann, 1998; List, 1995). However, there are few studies yet available in Germany about the balance of these languages.

The Hamburg Untersuchung von zweisprachigen Schulanfängern (Hamburg Study on bilingual children) established that among bilingual children no child uses one language exclusively (Reich 1999, but also a study of Berg et al., 2000). Recent studies show that primary schools are not meeting the need to teach reading to children in all the languages they live with (Gogolin & Kroon, eds, 2000; Gogolin, 1994). Gogolin (2001: 4) states that the German educational system is unable to carry out the task of providing education opportunities that transcend the origin, class or social standing of the child.

Radtke (2001) places the main responsibility for the poor educational achievements of immigrants with the school system itself. Different studies (Baker Lenhardt, 1988; Alba et al., 1994) have

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42 PISA 2004 Zusammenfassung des PISA-Konsortiums Deutschland (summary of the PISA Konsortium Germany), 25.
43 PISA 2004 Zusammenfassung des PISA-Konsortiums Deutschland (summary of the PISA Konsortium, Germany), 34.
44 Primary schools include different age groups in the different federal states. In most Länder it includes the classes 1 to 4 and the age group from 6 to 10 years old. In Berlin and Brandenburg it includes the classes 1 to 6 and the age group from 6 to 12 years old.
found that the system provides unequal chances. The differences in educational opportunities that exist between the federal states (see Weishaupt, 1996), or even between different cities and districts within one state, also indicate a certain role of politics. For example, Baden-Württemberg has a high concentration of foreign children in special schools for children with learning disabilities (Kornmann et al., 1996) — a highly questionable type of school, which is more commonly found in Eastern European countries than Western Europe.  

According to Kornmann, Baden-Württemberg is the federal state with by far the worst levels of discrimination against foreign children and young people. When compared to other states, for 2002 Baden-Württemberg is, by a significant margin, the federal state with the most serious levels of discrimination against foreign children and young people. Foreign children in this federal state were found to have a nearly 3.5 times higher risk of attending a special school for children with learning disabilities than German ones.

At the same time, the Index for the Gymnasium lies at 0.38 and for the Realschule at 0.49. That means that the chance of attending one of these schools is not even half as high for foreign children as for Germans. Radtke also sees a dramatic change in the last 20 years of regrouping of the different parts of the population attending certain types of school. This has led the Hauptschulen of the congested urban areas to not only become so-called Restschulen, but also so-called Türkenschulen (schools for Turks) (Radtke, 2001: 4). The highly debated letter of the desperate teachers of a Berlin school (see section III.1. Berlin) refers to this problem as being at the root of the recent escalations.

Also critical of the institutional structures of school is Havva Engin, who, like Gogolin, accuses German schools of providing a “monocultural habitus” (Engin, 2003; Gogolin, 2003). Boos-Nüning (1998), Gomolla-Radtke (2002), and Diefenbach (2004) also identify a structural discrimination inside important institutions of society. The early separation of pupils within the threefold school system has been particularly criticised as discriminating against immigrant children. Even the Commissioner of the UN on the right to education, Vernor Munoz, identified during his visit to Germany in 2005 the early and social differentiation in German schools, and discrimination against immigrant children.

Instead of seeing the lack of German-language competences and the social origin of the immigrant children as the only reasons for their poor levels of educational achievement, Heike Diefenbach (2004) focuses in her study on mechanisms of the educational institutions that lead to disadvantages for non-German children. Besides different individual problems, such as the fact that Turkish or other children with immigrant backgrounds cannot use their bilingualism as an advantage, because their language is not accepted as a foreign language, relevant in school, the main problem is identified within the threefold school system. This system, which is still

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46 The study is based on a “Relative Risk Index”. Baden-Württemberg had a “Relative Risk Index” of 3.41 for the year 2002. Relative Risk Index = 1 means that foreign pupils are neither over- nor underrepresented. RRI = 0.5 means that foreign children attend the respective type of school half as often as German children. RRI = 2 means that foreign pupils attend the respective type of school twice as often as German ones.

47 The “Relative Risk Index” for the Gymnasium lies at 0.38 and for the Realschule at 0.49. That means that the chance of attending one of these schools is not even half as high for foreign children as for Germans.

48 Restschulen: literally “rest schools”, meaning a type of school that includes mainly children from precarious social backgrounds and with very low levels of educational achievement.

49 The letter is documented in Der Spiegel-online of 30 March 2006, available at [http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/0,1518,408803,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/0,1518,408803,00.html) (accessed 10 January 2007).

50 The early ending of primary school is described above. In most of the federal states children have to choose, at the age of 10, which type of school they will attend in the future.
predominant in Germany, causes an early exclusion of children with immigrant backgrounds from further and higher education.

According to Diefenbach the discriminatory attitudes of individual teachers cannot fully explain the observed inequalities. She instead sees one of the problems in the limited means of schools and teachers, who try to avoid the efforts of heterogeneous classes by displacing difficult pupils into different channels. Diefenbach discusses different possible explanatory approaches for the ethnic separation visible within the school system — leaving higher education almost exclusively to the native German children and the lower education schools mainly to children with immigrant backgrounds. The author holds the institutional discrimination responsible for the observed inequalities and asks for reforms within educational policies. As one example Diefenbach, like Radtke, points to the scientifically proven fact that schools for children with learning disabilities are — contrary to their designation — used to get rid of children with poor German language competences.

Britta Marschke (2003) postulates an antagonism between the norm and reality, which is especially significant in school (Marschke, 2003: 49) but visible throughout the whole of society. While modernity is propagated, traditional social forms are maintained (see also Esser, 1983). Marschke highlights the importance of intercultural pedagogy, adapted to a pluralistic and globalised society, both for education and for the society as a whole.

Yasemin Karakasoglu-Aydin plans to establish a section of “Intercultural education“ at the University of Bremen, which would focus on the situation of children and young people from immigrant backgrounds, concepts of intercultural education inside and outside of schools, and the meaning of Islam in the pedagogical context.

Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann (2001), among others, have been focusing on young immigrants, and also Muslims in particular, in university51 (Karakasoglu-Aydin & Neumann, 2001). In 1999/2000, 35.5 per cent of the foreign students were so-called Bildungsinländer (BMBF 1999/200). The biggest proportion of Bildungsinländer was found amongst the Turkish foreign students, 80 per cent of whom had a German Abitur (university degree)52 Even if the parents often have no experience of university life, which poses certain difficulties for the students (Karakasoglu-Aydin, 2000), they generally support the will to higher education, including for their daughters (Rosen, 1997: 78–83). In spite of their more disadvantaged background, Karakasoglu-Aydin sees a high level of Selbstplatzierungsleistung (capacities of positioning themselves) amongst the students with a Turkish background. In choosing their field of study, the Bildungsinländer primarily look for practicality, that is, how relevant the course is to finding employment, even on the international stage. However, further studies have to be done to reveal more details about immigrant students’ choice of fields of study.53

Among the few universities that meet the concerns of the special situations and skills of immigrant students are the Türkischlehrerinnenausbildung (training teachers for Turkish language) at the University of Essen, and the Lehramt für Türkisch (teachers’ training for Turkish language) in Hamburg. The University of Essen also offers a special project for children of foreign employees, where the students make their first steps in teaching and contact to pupils.

51 See also the article of Karakasoglu-Aydin (1998): “ ‘Kopftuchstudentinnen’ türkischer Herkunft an deutschen Universitäten. Impliziter Islamismusvorwurf und Diskriminierungserfahrungen”, [“Female ‘Headscarf-Students’ of Turkish origin at German universities. Implicit accusation of Islamism and experiences of discrimination”], in Bielefeld, Heitmeyer, Politisierte Religion, [Politicalised Religion], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
One important factor within the education formation would be ‘Islamic theology’. As Karakasoglu-Aydin (2001: 9) states, one well-discussed issue at the moment is the scientific discussion about religions other than Christianity. At present, there is no place for the training of Muslim theologians and teachers of religion, or for the authentic encountering of non-Muslims with Islam, in any German university.
4. Employment

4.1 Employment rates

Foreign nationals are consistently overrepresented in unemployment figures. Their unemployment rate of approximately 20 per cent is almost twice as high as that for Germans, which stands at about 11 per cent (Vollmer, 2004: 143; Blaschke, 2004: 122). Turkish nationals are in the worst situation by far, with an unemployment rate of 23 per cent and comprising up to one third of all unemployed foreigners. In 2004, a historic peak of unemployment rates amongst foreigners was reached, of 20.5 per cent (Migrationsreport 2005, 95).

A strong linkage exists between the fields of education and apprenticeship, and the problem of unemployment. About three quarters of unemployed foreigners are unqualified, compared to only 32 per cent of Germans. Young Turks are more affected by unemployment than all other groups. In some federal states, the unemployment rate within the juvenile Muslim populations is estimated as being up to 30 per cent (Blaschke, 2004: 123). They are the ones who have most problems in the fields of education, apprenticeship and employment, which Goldberg and others ascribe to a great extent to discrimination against them (see Goldberg, Mourinho & Kulke, nd: 12 ff).

As Vollmer states, foreign nationals in Germany are on average far less educated than Germans. In their article about the professional education of young immigrants, Christel Alt and Mona Granato describe a decline over recent years in the numbers who start an apprenticeship, even if over the same time their attainment levels improved, and they belong to a great extent to the second and third generations (Alt & Granato, 2001; also Granato & Werner, 1999). However, the extent to which this lower proportion of apprentices is due to the general decline of the foreign population (because of naturalisations) or to harder access has yet to be analysed in further detail.

Young foreigners mainly receive training in the fields of industry and commerce, handicraft and jobs that are self-employed. They are not strongly represented in the field of public service. The apprenticeship of young immigrants is concentrated to only a few professions. Girls — who have generally even worse chances than boys — mainly work as hairdressers, dentist’s assistants and medical secretaries, while immigrant boys are mainly found in the fields of mining and in the textile industry. Alt & Granato explain that this reduction to only a few professions is not due to the career aspirations of the young immigrants, nor to their lacking enthusiasm in looking for an apprenticeship, but that it is obviously due to exclusion and discrimination (Alt & Granato, 2001: 3).

Young immigrants are also disadvantaged in the professional area. They are more likely than Germans to seek apprenticeships in occupational fields. However, in no occupational field is their percentage of apprentices, equivalent to their percentage of citizens. In 1998, about one third of foreigners aged between 20 and 29 had not achieved any accepted professional certificate, while for Germans the corresponding share is 8 per cent. Consequently, young foreigners are overrepresented in unemployment figures, and also in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs — where three times as many young foreigners as Germans can be found.

4.2 Barriers to access to employment

The access of Muslims to the employment market is difficult to explore, as the majority of figures available are based on estimates and place a strong emphasis on employees with Turkish origins. However, employees’ religious backgrounds are not registered in employment statistics, and the

54 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Hrsg.): Berufsbildungsbericht 2001, Bonn, April 2001, p. 82.
national origin for non-citizens does not provide sufficient information to allow one to draw firm conclusions on religious affiliations.

Muslims do face some specific barriers to employment. However, generally Muslim immigrants face the same disadvantages regarding access to the labour market in Germany as do other immigrants. In addition to their lower levels of educational attainment, their often insecure residence status can be a barrier to the employment market, as can their ethnic background. The most extremely underprivileged persons are asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, many of them being Muslims, who are completely excluded from the labour market (see also Blaschke, 2004: 123).

The work permit
The Berlin Ausländerbeauftragte (Commissioner on Foreigners), Professor Barbara John, named the fields of employment and education as central pillars of integration, as immigrants can only gain skills and self-esteem with the help of a job. Nevertheless, the work permit is often systematically refused.55

Foreigners living in Germany are generally only entitled to work if no jobless German, member of an EU member State or national of an already privileged third country, can be found for the job. For asylum seekers and persons with an exceptional leave to remain (Duldung), long waiting times or an overall working prohibition can be added. Under the old law — which was substituted by the new law for the regulation of immigration (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in 2004 — foreigners residing in Germany were granted full and equal access to the labour market after five to six years of legal residence. The new law extends this right to additional groups of foreigners, such as accepted refugees or accepted asylum seekers.56

German labour market policy became restrictive towards immigrants after 1973, and in many cases excluded them totally from the labour market (Vollmer, 2004: 144). Until 2000, asylum seekers were not allowed to work at all, regardless of the duration of their stay in the country. Since 2000, they have been able to gain a work permit after one year of residence, but can only be employed if no German or other EU citizen is found for the job. This has become more and more difficult, as levels of unemployment are generally increasing in the country and German nationals are ready to work in the formerly unattractive fields that were formerly left to the immigrants. In addition, family members of foreigners who came to Germany have to endure a two-year ban from the labour market after having been granted residency. The new law on immigration (Zuwanderungsgesetz), however, grants them direct access to the labour market, equivalent to the status of their partners already living and working in Germany. Those groups without an equal access to the labour market are granted this right after three years of work or four years of residence since the new law has come into effect. However, asylum seekers and those with an exceptional leave to remain (Geduldete) still lack this right.

Specific issues for Muslims
Special difficulties for Muslims have also recently come up, such as the issue of teachers wearing headscarves (see section I.4.3). In addition, members of certain Muslim organisations also suffer a restriction in their access to the labour market, if this organisation has been labelled as Islamist by the Verfassungschutz (the internal Intelligence Service) — see section I.8.2. They generally will not be allowed to work as civil servants in the field of security, as in these fields a Regelanfrage

(regular application) at the Verfassungsschutz is obligatory. Often they even face difficulties with their residency permits or the receipt of citizenship because of their membership of these — otherwise legal — organisations. Schiffauer has given an interesting insight into the functioning of the stigmatising of certain organisations by the Verfassungsschutz (Schiffauer, 2006).

Other issues of access to the labour market that concern Muslims in particular are the questions of employers’ tolerance towards religious duties, such as the Friday prayer and the five daily prayers, or the provisioning of the work canteen with halal food. In Germany, no legal regulations exist with regard to these matters, which are left to the judgement of the individual employer.

4.3 Discrimination in access to employment
Two different studies, one regularly issued by the Zentrum für Türkeistudien (Centre for Studies on Turkey) (Goldberg & Sauer, 2003) and one regular analysis of the Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration (Expert Council for Immigration and Integration) (Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration, 2004), investigate the experience of unequal treatment felt by immigrants. They both draw an alarming picture of the male population in Germany with Turkish origins. Up to one third of the interviewees feel discriminated against in one crucial field of social life because of their ethnic origin. At least every fifth interviewee with Turkish origin has been the victim of insults and/or offensive or abusive behaviour.

In its annual report of 2004, the Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration (Expert Council for Immigration and Integration) analysed forms of direct and indirect discrimination within the statistical data of the central fields of employment, education and apprenticeships. Referring to direct discrimination, the survey found out that the denials of access to bars, restaurants and discotheques, along with the rejections by landlords when looking for accommodation and by employers when looking for employment, have been most strongly felt by young foreigners (Turks 11 per cent, people from the former Yugoslavia 9 per cent, and Italians and Greeks less than 6 per cent). For people with Turkish citizenship the number of cases when they were not served in a store has doubled since 1995. The interviewees also reported discrimination on the part of official offices, the police (24.4 per cent) and in court (16.1 per cent). Referring to employment, there have been reports of discriminatory behaviour within the employment administration and of discriminatory advertisements in newspapers and the internet (‘Germans Only’, ‘No Headscarves’)

As far as indirect or institutional discrimination is referred to, the survey commissioned by the EUMC (EUMC, 2004) found that the employment market is still segmented along ethnic and national lines. Striking differences can be observed between natives and immigrant groups of the population in the fields of earnings, participation, employment and unemployment. In the field of services, incidents such as those of cab centres letting their clients choose between a ‘German’ and a ‘foreign’ cab driver are regularly reported.

Goldberg, Mourinho & Kulke (1995) executed an empirical study on discrimination against Turkish immigrants in the labour market, which showed that levels of discrimination were more significant in semi-skilled jobs than in more highly qualified ones. In the more highly qualified fields, however, the commercial sector — and especially the banking and insurance sectors — discriminates significantly against Turkish aspirants. This study showed for the first time empirically that a de facto discrimination against foreign employees is taking place in Germany.

A survey on employment-market discrimination against foreign employees in Germany is part of a series of surveys that the ILO undertook in different countries within the project “Against discrimination against foreign employers and ethnic minorities within the field of employment”.

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Fictive profiles of one representative of the native majority population and one representative of the largest foreign minority in the country, in Germany the Turks, were constructed. With qualitatively equal curricula vitae and professional certificates they applied for vacancies by letter and by telephone or blind at public and private employers for jobs with middle and higher qualification levels, _inter alia_ in the fields of gastronomy, construction, industry, services, technology, nursing and commerce. The Rhein-Ruhr-Gebiet region (the area of the Rhein and the Ruhr) was chosen as the region for testing.

**The headscarf debate**

When speaking about discrimination against Muslims in the labour market, one important issue in the last years has been the “headscarf debate”. In 2000, a female Muslim teacher was prohibited by the federal state of Baden-Württemberg from working in public schools unless she removed her headscarf. With the support of Muslim organisations, the teacher, Fereshta Ludin, took her case to court. In 2003, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) finally decided that the parliaments of the federal states should pass additional laws to either generally forbid or permit the wearing of religious garb by teachers.

Supporters of the prohibition interpreted the headscarf as a symbol of the oppression of women by patriarchal structures and societies, which could not fit in with the values of gender equality that should be represented in German public schools. In public debate, the headscarf was even identified as a symbol of intolerance and inequality (for example, in Amir-Moazami, 2004: 139). Social scientists treating this matter, such as Boos-Nünning and Karakasoglu-Aydin (2004), found that the wearing of headscarves, especially by young educated women, was generally due to self-determined and self-conscious motivation. However, these studies were not taken into consideration when several federal states promoted prohibition laws in the following months.

In January 2005, the Neutralitätsgesetz (Law on Neutrality) was passed in Berlin, which excluded all religious signs and symbols from school and other public services. The headscarves were interpreted by politicians as being a religious symbol, and so were subsequently banned from all civil servant and employee professions with superior functions. All demonstratively religious symbols, such as the headscarf, large Christian crosses and the Jewish skullcap, are included in this prohibition. The law is relevant for teachers, judges, policemen, prison officers and district attorneys. Small crosses worn by Christians were interpreted as jewellery and excluded from the law. Other federal states regard the equal treatment of religions even less in their respective laws against teachers with headscarves. Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Niedersachsen and the Saarland have prohibited only the headscarf from schools, and Hessen has introduced this ban on the headscarf for all civil servants.

Public discussion around the law has, in fact, had a worse effect than the law itself, generally portraying Muslim women as either oppressed and dependent, or political activists from the Islamist sphere. This has had negative consequences also on the employment situation on the private market.

**4.4 Employment initiatives**

One possible solution for Muslims facing discrimination in the labour market, or even particular prohibition laws, is autonomy. One possible effect of this is the strengthening of ‘parallel

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57 See an overview at Heide Österreich 2004.
58 It is even interpreted as a “sign of hatred” by the head of the conservative CDU in the local parliament of the Saar-Landtag, Peter Hans. _Saarbrücker Zeitung_, 25 February 2004.
59 For discrimination cases see also Blaschke; Sanela, 2000, pp. 84–85.
structures’, an emotionally debated topic in German media and politics, which speak about ‘parallel societies’ as a strong countermovement against integration.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, so-called ‘ethnic businesses’ (Schiffauer, 2004; Blaschke, 2004: 124) have been set up, both as an attempt to satisfy the growing demand for certain goods and services from labour migrants and their families, and soon also as an option to ensure ongoing financial security. Many of the entrepreneurs of foreign origin — most of them with Turkish, but also Moroccan and other, backgrounds — conduct business in the restaurant and retailing business, but increasingly also in the service sector.

According to the Zentrum für Türkeistudien (Centre for Studies on Turkey) there are around 60,000 Turkish business firms in Germany, and several counselling measures also have been initiated to respond to their specific problems. One of the most influential is the Association of Independent Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (MÜSİAD), whose members are religiously oriented tradespeople and entrepreneurs. To improve the vocational training situation of young people, amongst other goals, the organisation cooperates closely with educational institutions (Blaschke, 2004: 125).

Certain measurements to improve the employment situation of immigrants have also been established by the Federal Government. An overview is given by the Federal Government’s Commissioner on Immigration, Refugees and Integration in the Migration-Report 2005 (p. 101 ff).
5. Health and Social Protection

5.1 The health status of immigrants
The health status of, and frequency of certain illnesses among, immigrants in general have been explored in detail only during the last ten years. At the beginning of the waves of immigration, certain illnesses were named in ways that hinted at an increased occurrence among labour migrants — for example, the gastric ulcer, which was called the *Gastarbeiterulcus* (labour migrants’ ulcer) — but no detailed studies were made at this time.

The more recent data show, however, that immigrants with a Turkish background fall ill more frequently than German natives from chronic, non-transferable diseases, such as coronary heart conditions, diabetes mellitus and lipometabolic disorders, and also infectious diseases such as hepatitis. Also, psychosomatic illnesses seem to be appearing more often among the first-generation Turkish immigrants (Bilgin, 2003). A survey among children of non-German origin in an inner-city district of Berlin found that the generally worse social situation of immigrants had a particularly bad impact on the health status of children. A striking number of children with Turkish origins showed obesity — 23 per cent of these children were heavily overweight, compared to 14 per cent of native Germans and other immigrants (Butler, 2003).

Another recently discussed aspect of immigrants’ health status is the different perception of diseases and pain among many immigrants, which often collides with the perceptions of the medical staff in Germany. Consequently, a different interpretation takes place of illnesses suffered by immigrants, which are generally summed up with the attribute of *Mittelmeersyndrom* (Mediterranean syndrome). One aspect of this is the increased reporting of pain on the part of the patients, while doctors and psychologists often diagnose other, especially psychosomatic and psychological, diseases. Some doctors criticise the increased using of this labelling, as it often hides a helplessness on the part of medical staff faced with a misconception between doctor and patient. Also a phenomenon called ‘polypragmasy’, a kind of misdiagnosis, is a result of language and cultural barriers between patients and physicians (Blaschke & Sabanovic, 2000). These conflicts, however, have been acknowledged, and the general tendency is towards a more culturally sensitive approach that considers different concepts of illness and physical or psychological syndromes (Wesselmann, 2002).

5.2 Access to health care
The health system, and in particular the hospitals in Germany, form a sort of protected area for Muslim immigrants, as the nursing staff generally treat all patients equally without regard to national background or religion. Even highly stigmatised aspects of the Muslims’ appearance, such as the headscarf, cause no problems or conflicts in the field of health services (Wunn, 2006). A reluctance to make use of certain health services, especially in the field of psychology and psychotherapy, is still prevalent especially amongst elderly immigrants, because of language problems, fear of discrimination or culturally determined reservations. One group, however, which has no access at all to health and social protection in Germany is the considerable number of the so-called illegal immigrants, many of whom are Muslims.

One study looking in particular at the characteristics and requirements of Muslim patients has been recently carried out by Ina Wunn (Wunn, 2006). She interviewed Muslim patients of various origins and backgrounds, and found that they were basically satisfied with their treatment inside

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60 For the different perceptions of pain and also gender aspects of treatment and research, see Borde; Rosendahl, 2003.
the hospital, which was judged to be attentive and competent. She found no real conflict between the requirements of the Muslims’ religious practices and the necessities of the everyday life in the hospital. Wunn mentioned, however, certain fields where was room for improvement, such as more sensibility in contacts with female patients — from any cultural and religious background — and an acknowledgement of their sense of shame. She also mentioned a further adoption of Muslim requirements with regard to nutrition, hygiene and facilities for worship, such as rooms for prayer or arrangements with Muslim organisations to provide for an Imam for the Friday prayer as well as for spiritual guidance.

In the late 1990s, the German Red Cross published a practical guide, directed at medical staff, on how to deal with Muslim patients experiencing death and grief (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 1998). The guide also included a consideration of gender-specific hygiene measures (respect for intimate space, aspects of physical touch), the specific behaviour of both patients and visitors (perception of pain, number and frequency of visitors) and the provision with appropriate food.

A special ward for Muslim patients was set up by the hospital Bertaklinik in Hannover in 2005. While different Muslim organisations appreciated this step, others speak of a counter-integration, if important social facilities such as hospitals are separated ethnically. Wunn judges the motivation for setting up this ward as being purely economic (Wunn, 2006: 179). Turkish medical practices transfer their patients into the new clinic, which helps the hospital’s financial situation. Wunn does not regard the ward as Islamic or ethno-medical, as neither the special facilities nor the medical staff are sufficient for the specific needs of Muslim patients.

In spite of this generally positive situation for Muslims regarding health protection, there is still a group of about one million people who live without a residency permit in Germany. Contrary to the basic human rights of human dignity and intactness of body and soul (Article 3 of the Constitution), there are still legal regulations in Germany that prevent a considerable number of immigrants — many of whom are Muslims — from gaining access to basic health and social protection. Basically all persons and institutions that help those ‘illegals’ are culpable of aiding and abetting illegal entry and illegal residence. Article 75 of the Foreigners’ Law (Ausländergesetz) demands that every official institution directly contact the Ausländerbehörde (Aliens Department) and report any case of illegal residence. While in France and other countries an organisation of the Ministry of Health provides health services to foreigners with an irregular residency status, in Germany only private networks fill this gap. One of these is the Büro für medizinische Flüchtlingshilfe — Netzwerk (Office for Refugees’ Medical Help — Network), which was founded in 1996 in Berlin (Lindert, 2003: 146).

5.3 Social security
With regard to social security, there are certain specific requirements of Muslims that are supported by the social services, while others are not. Mathias Rohe gathered together these particular cases in an article about the legal treatment of Muslims in Germany (Rohe, 2004). In case of financial need, the social security funds are obliged to pay for a boy’s circumcision, for the ritual washing of the body of a deceased Muslim, or for the burial at a Muslim cemetery, including the possible transportation costs. However, in the city of Mainz the claiming of the right to wear a niqab (which leaves only the eyes open) by a young Muslim woman was dismissed by the Administrative Court of Mainz, because it was judged that this would prevent the woman from finding employment.63

63 A young Muslim woman wearing the niqab in the city of Mainz, the capital of the federal state of Rheinlandpfalz, was asked several times by the local Sozialamt (social welfare office) to take it off, because it would prevent her from
With regard to polygamous marriages, the Social Law (Sozialgesetz) regulates the *per capita* division of pensions among widows who were living in a polygamous marriage. However, German law differentiates between the mainly private aspects of marriage and the predominantly public ones, especially those relating to immigration law, where only the first wife is supplied with a residency permit (Rohe, 2004: 94 ff).

finding a job. After she insisted on her *niqab* the office stopped paying the welfare money (*Sozialhilfe*) to the young lady, which was judged legal by the Administrative Court of Mainz. It was judged that the fact that the woman was insisting on wearing the *niqab* showed that she was not really willing to work, as her clothes formed a barrier towards the labour market. Reference to the case can be found for example in the press releases of the Administrative Courts online, available at [http://www.jurawelt.com/gerichtsurteile/pressemitteilungen/oerecht/vg/7271](http://www.jurawelt.com/gerichtsurteile/pressemitteilungen/oerecht/vg/7271) (accessed 10 January 2007).
6. Housing

6.1 Housing situation of Muslims
The housing situation of Muslims in Germany is, especially in the urban areas, characterised by an inner-city structure. Compared to the circumstances in other European countries, the German cities show no belt-structures, as in France, or inner-city problem areas, as in the United Kingdom, but there is a concentration of immigrants in ethnic districts in central locations (Schiffauer, 2004: 1133 ff).

What is also significant in these ethnic districts is the absence of any tendency of immigrants to move ‘up and away’ as soon as their socio-economic situation improves and they can afford accommodation in more distinguished wealthy districts. Instead, as Schiffauer explains, it can be observed that immigrants have a strong tendency to stay and make investments in their original districts in order to improve their old neighbourhoods. This corresponds to the general lack of mobility that can be observed in German society as a whole, with a strong identification to the surrounding district, called Kiez (neighbourhood culture). This behaviour does not exclude people with an immigrant background. Even if, to a certain extent, especially young immigrants or Germans with immigrant backgrounds do not feel accepted by German society, and thus identify more with their status as ‘foreigners’ rather than as German citizens, they still often strongly identify with their respective Kiez (neighbourhood).

In the Berlin district of Neukölln, the young immigrants — most of them of Muslim origin — have even formed different groups with their own tee-shirts, baseball caps and other items, carrying the name or number of the district or neighbourhood. Some of the young immigrant inhabitants of the district of Neukölln, which has been especially stigmatised in the recent months and years (see section III.1), have created a kind of counter-culture against exclusion.64

As the political scientist Volker Eichener states in an interview with the Islamische Zeitung, in certain socially disadvantaged areas this kind of youth culture can be a great social problem.65 Most of the young people whom he interviewed did not associate their clique with solidarity, but with pressure, hierarchy and aggression. This milieu, where the young people grow up, leads to a subculture with its own value systems and ways of behaviour, which are formed by youth gangs.

As opposed to immigrants of the 1960s and 1970s, those who came later in the 1980s (for example, Arab refugees) did not concentrate in the same manner in certain ‘ethnic districts’. One reason might be the fact that many of them were only granted residence status for a limited period of time (Kapphan, 1999).

Exact data concerning Muslims in the housing market are not yet available. Certain studies exist that refer to the situation of Turks in this area, but again no information about the religious background is recorded. In 2002, the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs issued a representative study (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialforschung, 2002), which provides information, for example, on the choice of domicile or on the size of immigrants’ apartments.

Detailed information about the housing situation of immigrants in general is also provided by the Federal Commissioner for Integration (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Integration) in her report of 2005. The Muslim population is only referred to in one paragraph (p. 123 ff), which

64 Qualitative Research.
65 Islamische Zeitung, October 2005, pp. 1–2.
concerns the publicly debated issues of “parallel societies” and the dangers of “ghettos”. In this part of the report, the Commissioner criticises the connection of Muslim communities with the negatively associated term “parallel societies”, which originally had the opposite connotation, when applied to independent social structures in the otherwise repressively or dictatorially ruled countries in transformation of Eastern Europe. She states that the emphasising of religious values is not directly linked to parallel and unconnected social structures, as the political and media debate in Germany postulate.

Häußermann & Kapphan (2000) also refer to the debate on whether the concentration of immigrants leads to negative forms of “ghettos” and seriously hampers their chances in life, or allows the accommodation and integration of newcomers and provides supports for the foreign community while exclusion from the majority society still exists in many areas.

Referring to the immigrant population as a whole, their poor housing conditions have been documented for a long time in social reports and scientific studies (see Hanesch, 1994, or Häußermann & Siebel, 1996). The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research, DIW) found out in 2001 that foreigners are disadvantaged in the housing market. They generally have to be content with less living space (74 sq m on average) compared to German households (90 sq m), while their households are generally bigger than the German ones. However, the equipment of the apartments is constantly improving, as the old and barely renovated houses that have been allocated to the labour immigrants since the start of the waves of migration are gradually improved, and more and more flats of the social housing are assigned to immigrants.

In spite of their worse housing conditions, foreigners pay more on average in rent (€422) than do Germans (€407). This is probably due to discriminatory practice on the housing market, where the more affordable rooms are reserved for Germans, while foreigners have less choice and have to be content with worse conditions and higher rents (see also Häußermann & Siebel, 1996, and Zwick, 2003).

Asylum seekers in Germany, many of whom are Muslims, are accommodated in central reception centres, and then dispersed throughout the country. There are no general guidelines guaranteeing minimum standards for accommodation inside the poorly equipped asylum centres. The freedom of movement of asylum seekers is also geographically restricted. The German regulations concerning asylum seekers, being among the strictest in Europe, allow only movement within the boundaries of the local district to which the person has been assigned (see Blaschke, 2004: 126). To enforce this restriction, often coupons instead of money are given to the asylum seekers, which can only be converted in the district concerned.

Referring to ethnic segregation, the Commissioner on Integration explains that the social security provisions of the State concerning unemployment, illness and invalidity have as yet avoided an economic situation and social exclusion of immigrants comparable to cities in the USA (Blaschke, 2004: 118 ff). However, Schiffauer states that these policies seem to have come to an end, because in parts of Berlin, for example, such as Kreuzberg or Neukölln, increasing segregation between Germans and Turks can be observed, and in several cases the economic crisis seems to be causing the collapse of neighbourhoods. The quality of schooling also plays a crucial role in this process (Schiffauer, 2005: 1134). Eichener fears an Americanisation of the German cities, with not only immigrants, but also socially disadvantaged Germans, in danger of social disintegration and

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exclusion. He showed, within the TRAFO\textsuperscript{67} project of the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, that segregation was growing rather than diminishing.

The Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Community in Germany, TGD) states, in its paper concerning the politics of equal treatment, that public debate about the density of accommodation not only leaves the real problems untouched, but also nurtures xenophobic ideas in society. They consider that ideas for proposed ideas for reducing the concentration of foreigners in certain districts — measures such as a prohibition on foreigners moving in, or the forced relocating of foreigners — would be discriminatory and prevent people from exercising their basic right to freely choose their domicile. Instead, they suggest that public policies should offer incentives to the native German population to move into these areas. To reach this goal, measures should be taken to make the areas in question more attractive in terms of school education and living conditions. The TGD also demands more public effort in the fields of “Quartiers management” (special State programmes to support disadvantaged districts) or intercultural social work to prevent conflicts between groups of tenants of different origin. Apart from this, they plead for affordable accommodation in all quarters of the town, to promote better contact and understanding between different people and cultures.

While public debate often accuses the immigrant population of a voluntary self-segregation from mainstream society, this segregation was already present at the beginning of the wave of immigration; it was a forced one, due to discrimination on the housing market. Volker Eichener carried out studies at the end of the 1970s that showed that conscious and active discrimination on the part of the property managers forced segregation, while the majority of immigrants wished to live in mixed or even only German areas.\textsuperscript{68} To this day, the concentration of immigrants in certain districts is more the effect of involuntary, rather than voluntary, segregation. This segregation is an economic, as well as an ethnic, one, as less well-off people generally cannot choose their housing situation as they wish, and immigrants are additionally discriminated against when applying for rooms to rent. Already on the telephone or when reading a name, the national origin can often be determined by property managers, and foreigners are often excluded (Eichener, 1988; Kapphan, 1995). This causes many immigrants to arrange for rooming among each other, which in turn heightens ethnic segregation.

6.2 Discrimination in the housing sector
As in other areas, many problems faced by immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular, with respect to housing, are due to direct, indirect or institutional discrimination. The Centre for Studies on Turkey (Zentrum für Türkeistudien), in its study on discrimination against people with a Turkish background in Germany, found that 15 per cent of the discriminatory experiences were reported in the field of housing market and neighbourhood (Goldberg & Sauer, 2003: 111).

Cases of property management centres that rent their rooms “only to German-speaking tenants” are frequently reported. Many cases of discrimination are also reported in State institutions. An evaluation of the anti-discrimination projects of the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen showed that over one third of the cases of discrimination were experienced within the field of public authorities, reported by persons dealing with these agencies (Ausländeramt, Sozialamt, Standesamt, Arbeitsamt). In her 2005 report, the Federal Commissioner on Integration mentioned

\textsuperscript{67} Transferorientierte Forschung an Fachhochschulen in Nordrhein-Westfalen (TRAFO – Transfer-Oriented Research at Technical Colleges in Nordrhein-Westfalen). The TRAFDO programme aims at strengthening of the research and development structures at Technical Colleges (Fachhochschulen) in Nordrhein-Westfalen, at transfer of knowledge between science and local economy and especially at the improvement of innovative abilities of smaller and medium size enterprises for the advantage of the location of Nordrhein-Westfalen.

\textsuperscript{68} Interview in the Islamische Zeitung, October 2003, p. 2.
that this discriminatory behaviour of official institutions violated the Gleichbehandlungsgebot (Imperative of Equal Treatment — a general principle within the constitution), as well as Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung, 2005: 269).

Anti-discrimination offices have for a long time demanded the adoption of a law against discrimination, which has been demanded by the EU for three years. Germany finally adopted the General Law on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) in August 2006, after the country had already been condemned by the European Court of Justice in February 2006 for failing to meet the deadline for transposing the EU Directive (2000/78 EG). The law transposes four different EU Directives: the Race Directive 2000/43/EC, the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC, the Gender Directive 2002/73/EC and the Directive 2004/113/EC about the equal treatment of men and women concerning the supply with goods and services.

Different anti-discrimination organisations in Germany appreciate the final adoption of the law, but still criticise the backwardness behind the guidelines of the EU in several areas, including the housing market. Anti-discrimination organisations explain that the law permits the unequal treatment of people in this sector. The renting of rooms is one of the exceptions of the anti-discrimination law. It allows property managers to refuse non-German tenants, using the argument of the need for a balanced socio-cultural mixture in the houses and neighbourhoods in question. The AGG has fixed an exception concerning the renting of rooms. These exceptions are not covered by the directive. For reasons of a balanced social and cultural mixture in the house and the neighbourhood, property management is legitimated by the law to refuse people as tenants because of their cultural or social background.

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69 See the press release of the ADNB, Anti-Discrimination Network Berlin, and statement of different anti-discrimination organisations.
7. Security and Policing

7.1 Internal security issues
Relations between Muslims and the Verfassungsschutz, the German internal Intelligence Service, are particularly problematic and impact on many other important areas, including relations between Muslims and the police and official cooperation with Muslim organisations.

The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV) is a German national intelligence service. The BfV is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and is governed by a president. Its most important duty is the observation of movements and activities that contravene the Constitution of the Federal Republic. Although it also acts on an autonomous basis, the BfV mainly coordinates and evaluates the activities of the 16 local offices within the respective federal states (Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz), with respect to the protection of the constitution. These local offices are departments of the Ministry of the Interior. They are not subordinate to the BfV, but, like the police force, to the Minister of the Interior for the respective federal state.

Especially problematic is the role and the power of definition, which in practice — although this is not stated in the Constitution — is given to the Verfassungsschutz. The Verfassungsschutz has labeled many Muslim organizations as Islamist, although they themselves would not accept such a label (see section I.8.2). A mere mention within the Verfassungsschutzbericht — the report of the Federal or state level Verfassungsschutz (the internal Intelligence Service) — leaves an organisation highly stigmatised. The statements of the Verfassungsschutz are generally accepted as Behördenzeugnisse (testimonies of State agencies). From politicians to journalists, every public person or institution forms its opinion and attitude towards a Muslim organisation on the basis of the judgement of the Verfassungsschutz (see also section I.8.2).

Within the naturalisation process, for Muslims the Verfassungsschutz is generally asked to provide information about the individual’s membership of any Muslim organisation that is judged (again by the Verfassungsschutz), to be hostile towards the Constitution. Such a judgement would then prevent the granting of citizenship.

7.2 Policing issues

Muslim / police relations
The overall relation between the police and Muslims is generally marked by a growing tension and scepticism. Even if cooperation between the police and Muslim organisations is in certain cases improving, it is generally limited and hampered by German security politics, which are often driven by scepticism and mistrust (see section 7.1). Many Muslims praying in the mosques on Fridays have already been witnesses of harsh raids by police. Similarly, most (or all) of the Muslim organisations are targets of observation, and sometimes of searches (see section I.8.2).

Due to often highly ideological political and media discussions, there is no great differentiation in the German public between the issues of Islamic terrorism, Islamism, and the general phenomenon of immigrant crime. In recent years, nearly all the political parties have drawn attention to aspects

Footnotes:
70 Further information about the work of the BfV can be found (in German) on its official homepage at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/ (accessed 10 January 2007).
of security to attract potential voters, using the image of the ‘foreign criminal’ to stoke public fears and promote demands for more restrictive policies on foreigners and asylum seekers (Blaschke, 2004). Here, a study on the representation of ‘foreigner criminality’ in the media focuses on the interaction between discourses on immigration and criminality, and raises the question of different reporting on criminal offences committed by Germans or non-Germans (Jäger et al., 2002).

The number of police officers in Germany with a Muslim background is still very low, estimated as forming less than one per cent (Türkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg, TBB). More detailed data or references to ethnic or religious affiliation are not available, either on the local or national level. The only figures available are those of the police students. In Berlin in 2002, for example, fewer than 0.5 per cent of the police students had a Turkish ethnic background (TBB). A prerequisite for becoming a police officer in Germany is German citizenship, and one of the reasons for this low percentage might be the problem of recruiting sufficiently qualified staff with a non-German or immigrant background (Meyer, 2003). This, despite the fact that the ‘role model effect’ and the language competency that police officers from an ethnic minority can bring, have been shown to be important factors for gaining access to violent or potentially deviant non-German offenders. A new study about Muslims as police officers is currently ongoing by Barbara Theriault at the Viadrina University in Frankfurt/Oder.

**Statistical data**

The data of the German police criminal statistics (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, PKS) do not provide enough material to allow one to draw conclusions on the religious background of either offenders or victims. Even the nationality is only recorded in the case of foreign criminal suspects. The conclusions drawn by certain scientific studies depend sometimes highly on the chosen viewpoint. Referring to Muslims as victims of crime, the anti-discrimination NGOs point to the unreliability of official figures, as a high percentage of the cases is either not reported as being of an anti-Muslim nature, or not reported at all.

**Criminality**

The issue of juvenile crime among Muslims has been a particular focus for the media. Regardless of the fact that the overwhelming majority of juvenile offenders have just one or two criminal convictions, the media highlighted a small number of Turkish and Arabic young people who were multiple offenders (Blaschke, 2004). Incidents such as the teachers’ cry for help in the school in the Berlin district of Neukölln heightened this issue again (see section III.1). However, while the teachers who asked for help mainly blamed politics for their situation, the press coverage focused mainly on the cultural and religious background of the — mainly Muslim — pupils as the reason for their behaviour. Some time before this, however, a similar plea for help by an ‘all-German’ school, in Gardelegen in Sachsen-Anhalt, did not attract even remotely the same attention. The incident in the Berlin school was even used by certain politicians as a reason to ask for a faster deportation of foreign juvenile offenders. German law allows quite a vast latitude of judgement with regard to the deportation of foreign offenders. Crime linked to drug abuse is often directly avenged with the deportation of (also juvenile) offenders.

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72 See for example online article in Der Spiegel, “Notruf der Rütli Schule”, [“Call for help from Rütli School”], 30 March 2006, available at [http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/0,1518,408803,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/schulspiegel/0,1518,408803,00.html) (accessed 10 January 2006).  
Brettfeld & Wetzels recently published a study based on a series of interviews with pupils in Germany, of which 8 per cent indicated Islam as their religious affiliation. The study dealt with the interaction between religious orientation and the incidence of criminality. It found that Muslim juveniles were the most disadvantaged social group and had often even experienced violence within their own socialisation, whether in family or social settings. Brettfeld & Wetzels (and also other studies in this field; Heitmeyer, 1997) stated that it was a combination of these factors that led to a higher incidence of criminality and not their religious affiliation as Muslims (Bretfeld & Wetzels, 2003).

Within the area of sociological research on young people, the literature on the criminal behaviour of young men with an immigrant background is vast. The different explanatory approaches are as follows: the theory of cultural conflict (between parents and children), the Anomietheorie (discrimination, experienced violence during socialisation) and Kontrolltheorie (theory of control) (heightened attention and control towards immigrants). (See Walter & Trautmann, 2003, and Bannenberg, 2003.) The Federal Ministry of Internal Security has also mentioned the influence of domestic violence on the juvenile disposition for violence (BMI, 2001: 506 ff).

As a consequence of the intense media debate on juvenile crime, several programmes have been initiated in the last few years at the national and federal levels. However, conclusions cannot yet been drawn about the effects of current public debate on the concepts behind established programmes and measures in the field of crime prevention (Meyer, 2003). The criminologist Professor Dr Christian Pfeiffer carried out empirical studies on the relation of the tendency towards violent behaviour and the feeling of rejection of young Turks in Germany75 (Pfeiffer, 2000).

The interpretation of statistics often depends heavily on the point of view of the analyst. The Federal Commissioner on Integration (Migrationsreport 2005: 287 ff) quotes a figure about unreported cases of young foreigners, stating that the criminality rate is — with the exception of violent offences — even lower than that of German young people, when the type of crime and the socio-economic circumstances of the offender are considered carefully (Schumann, 2003, and also Bannenberg, 2003). The opposite opinion is held by the Erste Periodische Sicherheitsbericht der Bundesregierung (First Periodic Security Report of the Federal Government), 2001, which states that even after carefully considering all the circumstances, foreigners are proportionally overrepresented in crime rates as offenders (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2001: 323).

The Federal Commissioner on Integration also mentions the fact that foreigners with a safe residency situation do not show any particularities at all regarding criminality. About 70 per cent of the foreigners suspected of delinquencies are only in possession of a precarious residency permit or none at all (Migrationsreport 2005, 285). The report also lists different State measures on crime prevention, and emphasises the importance of a successful integration policy as an important part of crime prevention.

Victims of crime
The number of Muslims among the victims of criminal acts has not been counted at all until now. However, several anti-discrimination NGOs are chronicling, and assembling reports on, racist

http://www.ac-company.org/en/pdf_products/dossier_deportation_ger.pdf#search=%22Europ%C3%A4isches%20Netzwerk%20f%C3%BCr%20die%20Zielgruppe%20mobiler%20Drogengebraucher%20Dossier%22 (accessed 10 January 2006).
attacks against foreigners, where the nationality of the victim is often mentioned. These NGOs are especially active in the new federal states and Berlin, and are announcing a common press release and chronicles of the reported crimes by mid-September 2006,\(^{76}\) including the cases in Berlin and the new federal states.

Reports for the whole country are released by a research institute, the European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS), at the University of Bamberg (the EFMAS is the German section of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, EUMC). However, these include only the officially reported cases and thus do not cover the high number of unreported cases.

A Muslim human rights organisation in Duisburg (HDR) has published an article about the number of unreported cases of racist attacks.\(^ {77}\) An employee of the association Opferperspektive (Perspective of the Victims) in Potsdam explains that almost every day an incident of a violent attack by right-wing extremists happens in the federal state of Brandenburg, while the media only focuses on certain cases, and the politicians often refer to such cases as “exceptions”. Referring to another activist of an NGO, the police often report these incidents as ordinary fights, in order to avoid problems and additional work.

Even cases of discrimination by State institutions, including the police, are reported in Germany. Frank Gesemann treated this issue in his article on the mutual perception of immigrants and policemen (Gesemann, 2001: 363). Even human rights organisations such as Amnesty International\(^ {78}\) regularly highlight violations of human rights by German State organisations. The former head of the Integrationsbeauftragte (Commission on Integration) of Berlin, Barbara John, stated at a conference on migration\(^ {79}\) that, after noticing a growing tension between the police and immigrants and the rise of a counter-culture, she had invited immigrants to tell their stories during the training of young policemen. She explained that as a result of this training course the young policemen came to look at the immigrants just as they look at any other citizen, and that due to this success such direct contacts have become standard of the training of policemen in Berlin.

7.2 Military
The number of soldiers in the German military forces with a Muslim religious affiliation is estimated as being several hundred, but detailed data on Muslim soldiers are not yet available (Zentrum Innere Führung, 2002). They only appear as victims of verbal abuse related to right-wing extremism in the annual report of the Ombudsman for the Armed Forces (Deutscher Bundestag, 2004). In 2000, the Zentrum Innere Führung of the Bundeswehr (Centre for Internal Leadership of the Federal Armed Forces) published a paper on the topic of Muslims in the armed forces, in which officers and sergeants are called on to prevent any discriminatory incident against Muslims, and the central role of the Bundeswehr towards integration of foreigners is highlighted. However, there are still various forms of unequal treatment in the Bundeswehr, as there are no obligations to provide Muslims with their own prayer room, and the food provisions do not respect the requirements on halal slaughtered meat and Muslims are not — like other soldiers — provided with spiritual guidance of their own religion.

7.3 Prisons
The Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Office, EUMC) states, in its 2001 annual report, that in 1999, 18 per cent of the prisoners in German prisons were non-Germans. Again, this figure does not reveal the number of prisoners with a Muslim religious affiliation.

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\(^{76}\) Oral statement of the NGO “Reach Out” within a phone call on 24 August 2006.

\(^{77}\) See http://www.hdr-org.de/

\(^{78}\) See http://www.amnesty.de.

\(^{79}\) See http://www.ramesch.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=145.
However, the numbers of Muslims in prison cited in certain smaller studies are highly questionable. Fröhmecke mentions a study in Düsseldorf in 1999 that counts 22 per cent of all prisoners as Muslims, but explains this high number with the closeness of the airport, which could account for a high number of delinquencies in the field of violations of the Foreigners’ Law (Ausländergesetz) and smuggling (Fröhmecke, 2005, 32). Older studies spoke of Muslims as comprising 42 per cent, or even 62 per cent, of prisoners included in the survey (Chaidou, 1983; Schaffner & Kneip, 1983), because the authors were mainly speaking to labour migrants, and so Muslims would be overrepresented in the sample. A recent study from January 200480 counts 11 per cent Muslims in the JVA (Justizvollzugsanstalt — penitentiary in Freiburg. Fröhmecke himself speaks of a lower limit of about 5 per cent of Muslims among the prisoners in Germany.

Prisoners with a Muslim affiliation are legally entitled to demand a religious caretaker representative of their own religious affiliation, but the practical handling of this issue is the responsibility of the specific federal state (Blaschke, 2004: 134). Fröhmecke, in his study on Muslims in German prisons, states that even if the religious freedom of Muslims in prison is not yet fully assured, there is no need for political action, as specific problems can be solved individually. As far as spiritual guidance for Muslims is concerned, he sees no need for this, as he states that Islam does not know such a service (Fröhmecke, 2005: 244). In each individual federal state, this rule is applied differently. In Berlin, for example, there is a specific Muslim organisation, Entegra e.V., which takes spiritual care of Muslim prisoners and their families, and advises them also after release.81

80 Badische Zeitung, 3 January 2004, p. 31.
81 See website of Entegra e.V. at http://www.entegra-ev.de.
8. Participation and citizenship

8.1 Political participation and exclusion

Only a very few immigrants who see themselves as Muslims and identify with religious Muslims’ interests are present on the political stage. Although individual politicians with cultural Muslim backgrounds are found even at high levels of the political parties, as yet the needs of the Muslim communities has not been recognised in the platforms of Germany’s political parties. This lack of representation can be seen concerning the restrictive legislation on issues of integration and citizenship that continue to prevail, as these are some of the issues of the utmost importance for the Muslim communities in Germany (Blaschke, 2004: 117). Similarly, other demands of the Muslim communities, such as the need for religious education, building representative mosques and other issues, are hardly ever backed by any political party.

The number of Muslims participating in political parties is also very low. In a survey carried out in 2001 by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), 96.5 per cent of the 1003 respondents responded in the negative to the question “Are you a member of a political union or party in Germany?” (95.1 per cent of the men and 98.2 per cent of the women).82

As in most of the other fields of research, questions of political participation generally do not specifically address the Muslim population specifically, but rather immigrants and foreigners in general. There have, however, been various discussions and conferences on this subject, organised by foundations such as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.

When speaking about Muslims and participation, many authors (Joppke, 1999; Bielefeld, 1998) and official institutions83 focus on the status of Muslims in the secular constitutional State, and their dangerous tendency to form Parallelgesellschaften84 (parallel societies), as well as the question of integration. Integration is often directly connected with the demand towards Muslims to open up and integrate into society. It is generally considered to be first and foremost a duty of the immigrants. This is especially the case for Muslims, whose different culture and religion are often implicitly held responsible for their poor integration, as sticking to Islamic values seems to be in contradiction to the values of the Constitution.

Debate on the political participation of Muslims is therefore directly linked to Islamic extremism and fundamentalism, and the perceived dangers for the liberal society (see, for example Lemmen, and numerous publications of Bassam Tibi). Many Muslim organisations in Germany are under the surveillance of the Verfassungsschutz, which generally makes the issue of their political participation in society a highly questionable topic (Kleff, Lemmen, Kandel85). Only a few authors analyse this issue in a less emotive manner.86

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82 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Represäntativuntersuchung, [The Situation of foreign workers and their families in Germany – A representative survey], 2001.


84 A detailed overview of the different sociological explanations and attitudes towards the phrase Parallelgesellschaften is given by Jörg Hüttermann (Hüttermann, 2006: 219 ff).

85 Johannes Kandel of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung alleges that Islamists – a term which he uses together with, and not sharply differentiated from, the term “the organised”, meaning Muslim organisations and associations – follow destructive politics of identity, and are generally ‘keepers of identity’ rather than promoters of integration. See for example: “Organisierte Muslime in Deutschland. Zwischen Integration und Abgrenzung” (“Organised Muslims in Germany. Between Integration and Separation”), in “Islamismus. Diskussion eines vielschichtigen Phänomens”, (“Islamism. Discussion of a multilevelled phenomenon”), 2005, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Abteilung
In 2004 the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Office for Political Education, bpb) established the Muslimische Akademie\textsuperscript{87} (Muslim Academy), in order to encourage the public and political participation of Muslims in Germany. The founders of the academy, most of them Muslims, aimed to establish a forum for discussion on a neutral platform. However, representatives of Muslim organisations are more critical, seeing this as representative of the way in which German officials increasingly seek to treat issues of Muslims and Islam independently, rather than in cooperation with them.\textsuperscript{88}

In their book about the political participation of immigrants in Germany with a Muslim background, Bosse & Vior claim that especially since 11 September 2001, immigrants with a Muslim background are often suspected of being potential terrorists. The view that all immigrants with a Muslim background are potential terrorists (see Policy Context — Perception) is prevalent not only among parts of the population but also among official bodies. The latter increasingly use secret service methods of surveillance on Muslim citizens (Schiffauer, 2004: \textit{Vom Exil- zum Dispora-Islam}).

This scepticism with regard to Muslims is not limited to certain extremist groups; rather, Muslims are confronted with it in Germany wherever they attempt to claim their rights in society, or just want to be actively present in the public sphere. As Schiffauer states (2004: 355), in contrast to most minorities in the country, the Muslim minority is confronted with a remarkable counter-solidarity of the whole society. Unlike most issues relating to immigration, they even lack the support of the coalition partners of the left, who often have even stronger resentments against Muslims, being nourished by a mixture of feminism and secularism.

The problem of the relatively low political participation of Muslims in Germany has been partially explained as a result of institutional discrimination in schools and other institutions (Bosse & Vior, 2005: 10 ff; Schiffauer, 1998). It is argued that the low level of success of immigrants in school, which is one of the reasons for a reduced potential to defend their own rights later also on the political stage, is not only due to open discrimination. The authors look for the reasons of exclusion in discriminatory effects of practices that are considered as ‘norms’ in the German institutions, and of which they are not conscious. They outline how the school education of young people with a Muslim background affects their political participation.

The discussion about structural or institutional discrimination has not gone far in Germany yet. The problems of young immigrants in school are pointed out clearly by the Pisa studies (PISA, 2003) (see section I.3.Education). However, these have been quickly explained by a lack of ability or willingness on the part of the children and their parents or generally with their cultural strangeness. This is even the subjective impression of young Muslims.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{86} For example Schiffauer (2003), \textit{Muslimische Organisationen und ihr Anspruch auf Repräsentativität: Dogmatisch bedingte Konkurrenz und Streit um Institutionalisierung [Muslim organisations and their claim to representativeness: dogmatical competition and disputes about institutionalisation]}. 

\textsuperscript{87} Information on the establishment of the Muslim Academy is available on the bpb website at http://www1.bpb.de/popup/popup_druckversion.html?guid=F1MAV7 (accessed 10 January 2007).

\textsuperscript{88} For a statement (in German) of the Zentralrat der Muslime (Central Council of Muslims, ZMD) on the establishment of the Muslim Academy, see http://islam.de/1194.php (accessed 10 January 2007).

\textsuperscript{89} See also Caliskan/Manjuk/Manolcheva/Vior (2003, 5). The authors base their demand for further studies in this field, finding out where such negative self-esteem comes from.
\end{footnotesize}
Blaschke et al. focus on another big area of political exclusion — citizenship. Only 20 per cent of Muslims in Germany are naturalised citizens. (On naturalisation rates, see also Section 1.). As only citizens are granted the right to vote and actively take part in the political sphere, Muslims are still largely marginalised within parliamentary politics (Blaschke, 2004: 113).

8.2 Muslim organisations

Given the very limited political representation of Muslims in Germany, Muslim organisations play a crucial role in representing Muslims’ interests, and in the area of participation and the claiming of minority rights. As this claiming of rights has only begun recently, resistance in the majority society is still strong. As Schiffauer explains, Muslims, and in particular conservative ones, symbolise the quintessential ‘other’ for a great part of the German public. Consequently, the claiming of rights, especially the right to be different, creates suspicion and fear (Schiffauer, 2006).

Relations between officials and German Muslim organisations are complicated by the role and power of definition that is given to the Verfassungsschutz, the German internal Intelligence Service (see section I.7.2). The Verfassungsschutz has, in effect, been assigned the task of drawing the line between ‘real’ and ‘misguided’ Muslims, thus solving the problem of the Muslim ‘other’, which cannot be resolved within politics and society (Schiffauer, 2006).

The Verfassungsschutz has labelled certain Muslim organisations as Islamist. This includes, among others, Milli Görüs and the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD). This labelling does not reflect the self-perception and statements of these organisations, but only Muslims supporting this sort of labelling are accepted in the debate. The dilemma for Milli Görüs, which is one of the most important actors with regard to the claiming of the right to difference, is explained in detail by Schiffauer (2004).

Before funding any Muslim initiative, official institutions are bound to reassure themselves by requesting an evaluation from the Verfassungsschutz. Hence, a mere mention on a list of the Verfassungsschutz makes official funding practically impossible. Similarly, as many journalists also check with the Verfassungshutz before writing something positive about a Muslim organisation or initiative, it also means that a positive mention in the media is (difficult to gain) for those organisations. In a kind of vicious circle, these circumstances to a large extent exclude practising Muslims from urgently needed work with young people and for integration, while the projects working in these areas do not include Muslims, who could really reach these young people.

The extent to which scepticism and hostility towards many Muslim organisations is dividing society even more can be seen in the consequences of many Muslims not openly speaking out about their memberships. Similarly, organisations try to hide their contacts with other organisations,

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90 The Berlin Senator of Education expressed this fear when referring to the introduction of Islamic education in schools: “I think that the question of Islam/Islamic teaching activates concern and fears in our population. Being a politician I can feel that [...] There is the fear that the presence of Islam, and of Muslims, might gradually change our culture, which is Western through and through” (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000: 4).

91 One of the hand-picked ‘accepted’ Muslim scientists is Bassam Tibi, who acted as political advisor on the headscarf case and supplied Cultural Minister Schavan with the necessary advice for the following statement: “[...] the wearing of the headscarf is not part of the religious duties of a Muslim woman. This is recognisable, for example, in the fact that a majority of Muslim women do not wear the headscarf” (press note 119/98). Amir-Moazami points out that this attitude is “characteristic of Western approaches to Islam, which since colonial times have contributed to determining which form of Islam was legitimate and authentic” (Amir-Moazami, 2004: 137).

92 Group interviews with journalists within the project “Europe’s Muslim Communities: Security and Integration after 11 September”.
which have been labelled Islamist or are otherwise sceptically viewed by the German politics and/or public, in order to be able to carry out their basic religious necessities, such as Islamic education in school, the building of mosques or the ritual slaughter. This tactic of concealment in turn heightens the suspicions on the part of journalists and politicians, who have little empathy with, or understanding of, minority organisations, and the pressures and problems that they face. Thus, such organisations are constantly seen as potentially hostile or non-integrative towards the German society, and are therefore in constant danger of not being granted their religious and civil rights.

It is not easy to prove that Muslim organisations are not supported by official institutions or State funding. The Verfassungsschutz does publishes an annual report which details all organisations that are being watched or are considered as problematic regarding their respect of the Constitution. However, the linkage between such mentions of an organisation within the report, and the exclusion of the organisation from State support, is not official. In fact, officially, the Ministry of the Interior even denies the fact that any such exclusion of certain Muslim organisations from public funding exists. The following examples illustrate some cases in which Muslim organisations encountered problems due to their labelling by the Verfassungsschutz. However, the experiences of Muslim organisations, as well as their representatives and members, of this kind of institutional discrimination are diverse. Official policies are not always as clearly articulated as in these cases, which makes it hard to prove and discuss them.

*Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V. (Muslim Youth Germany, MJD),* (For further details on the MJD, see also section I.2.1)

The MJD “Ta’ruf” Project is one of the very few projects of a Muslim organisation to receive funding from a German State agency. Established in 2003, the project aimed to correct preconceived and traditional ideas about religion, and to counteract the abuse of Islamic arguments for the justification of aggressive behaviour. It was funded by the Ministry of the Interior. However, Schiffauer explains (“Der unheimliche Muslim”, 2006) that this, and the fact that the MJD had worked well together with Jewish and Christian groups, still did not prevent an offensive media campaign that started in November 2003. This left the MJD and its staff stigmatised as anti-semites with strong connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, seeking to spread their Islamist ideas in public schools. Even protests from the Catholic Young Community and others could not keep the Ministry of the Interior from cutting their support for the project overnight.

Schiffauer sees the “logic of rumours” working within this media campaign. First, the slightest contact with any person who has a bad reputation within the German Verfassungsschutz is enough,

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93 For the social background of conflicts around Islamic symbols, see the analysis of Jörg Hüttermann, 2006.
94 Expert interview with Lydia Nofal, member of the Executive Council of INSSAN e.V., 28 September 2006.
95 The information in the following paragraphs refer mainly to an expert interview with Chaban Salih, the former chairman of the MJD in Berlin and press relations officer of the organisation INSSAN e.V., on 5 October 2006 in Berlin. Both organisations have had bad experiences with the stigmatisation by State institutions. Salih explained that while he was working for the Federal Ministry for Youth and Family, accompanying the Entimon programme for the funding of youth projects in 2002/2003, he learned that of 250 funded projects, only two were applied for by Muslim organisations, one of them being “Ta’ruf” Project of the MJD and the other one from the Muslim women’s organisation BFMF. Salih accompanied five projects that had Muslim cooperation partners, but where the funding was applied for by another organisation — this being nearly the only way for Muslim organisations and initiatives to obtain public funding.
96 The Berlin daily newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel* stated the following on 7 November 2003: “The Verfassungsschutz sees it as proven that there are close connections. The association was founded in the ‘House of Islam’ which is a member of the Central Council of Muslims. The Central Council again is a head organisation, a member of which is the Islamic Community, which again is influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.”
to get “infected” with the virus of Islamism.\(^97\) Second, the readiness to believe negative rumours becomes evident in the taking over of the rather far-fetched argumentation by the Verfassungsschutz by the different journalists, who did not even check the statements or speak to any of the responsible persons for the project (Schiffauer, 2006). Even the fund-administering office of the Ausländerbeauftragten (Commissioner on Foreigners) was heard to regret the decision, but could not withstand the political pressure after the media campaign.

The MJD project to counter racism, prejudice and violence amongst young Muslims was thus rudely ended, and any further work in this field carried out by a Muslim organisation has been made practically impossible or at least excluded from any further State funding. After this incident, the MJD had great difficulties in continuing their important work with young Muslims in Germany.

During a conference organised by a Christian youth organisation in Vlotho, from 27-28\(^{th}\) June 2005, representatives of the Verfassungsschutz stated that the MJD was on their list of Islamist organisations. During the debate, MJD representatives asked the representatives of the Verfassungsschutz how they came to this evaluation of the MJD as being Islamist and a member of the international Muslim Brotherhood — a charge which the MJD itself rejects. In their answer, the representatives of the Verfassungsschutz referred to the fact that the Islamic bookshop Green Palace, which is run by the MJD, stocks a copy of the book of the Islamic scholar Qaradawi, *Erlaubtes und Verbotenes im Islam (The Allowed and the Forbidden in Islam)*. First, the scholar is known as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and is thus himself seen as a link between the organisation and the Brotherhood. Second, among many other unproblematic topics, the book also speaks about the death penalty for apostates. The MJD objected that 99 per cent of the book — a standard work for Muslims — is compatible with the German legislation, and that the paragraph about apostasy, which was written 50 years ago in Egypt, is not held relevant at all for the Muslims in Germany. However, this does not change the attitude of the Verfassungsschutz towards the MJD.

**INSSAN e.V**

Another example of the discrediting effect of a mention of an organisation by the Verfassungsschutz, or the evaluation of an organisation as being Islamist, is an incident that happened to the Muslim organisation INSSAN e.V. in Berlin. A member of the Executive Council of INSSAN, Lydia Nofal, was invited to take part in an event, “Berliner Brücken” (Berlin Bridges), organised by the Catholic Academy in Berlin in cooperation with the United Religions Initiative (URI), from 29 September to 3 October 2006. However, some time later the member had her invitation withdrawn, with the apology of a representative of the URI. It was emphasised that the contribution of INSSAN would be highly appreciated by the organising institutions, but that event was funded by the Ministry of the Interior, which had threatened to withdraw its funding if a representative of INSSAN were to be invited to the stage discussion.

A member of the URI explained that URI itself wished for the contribution of INSSAN and planned further cooperation, and even asked the spokeswoman of INSSAN to be amongst the guests in the audience. However, the Ministry of the Interior had referred to INSSAN as Islamist and excluded any participation of INSSAN in the event. Even after INSSAN voluntarily withdrew from participating, the event was cancelled because of the refusal of the Ministry to further fund it, due to the whole debate having become too public while it should have stayed confidential between the Ministry and the organising institutions.

\(^97\) For the use of metaphors that associate illness and disease when reporting about Islam, see section II.1 on the perception of Muslims.
“Kurban und Dialog” Project

Another incident revealing the politics of the Ministry of the Interior happened recently and has not been concluded at the time of writing this report. The Evangelische Akademie Loccum planned to hold a conference from 8-10 December 2006, in cooperation with a project on inter-religious dialogue, “Kurban und Dialog”, in order to promote and support the work of this project. “Kurban und Dialog” is a dialogue project in East Africa, which distributes money amongst needy Muslims and non-Muslims, and institutes an inter-religious forum in the region, where representatives of the different religions meet and discuss matters.

The Evangelische Akademie supports this project and had already received a verbal promise on the part of the Ministry of the Interior to fund the conference. This promise was, however, recently cancelled, with the justification that one of the initiators of the project, Mustafa Yoldas, who is a member of Milli Görüs, was to be present at the event. Yoldas offered to let the Evangelische Akademie send another member of the project team to present the project at the conference, but his offer was not accepted by the manager of the event. She explained that he was too important for the project and his work was too respected to allow her to just “uninvite” him because of the fear that the funding would be cut.

As Yoldas explained, the dialogue project had already had problems in the past with extending its work, because the Christian Churches had been warned by the Ministry of the Interior not to support the project. Yoldas also suffered severe personal consequences due to this political action of the Ministry of the Interior. Because of his membership and active work within the Milli Görüs mosque in Hamburg (Zentrumsmoschee), Yoldas lost his job as a translator for the Bundesamt zur Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for the Acceptance of Foreign Refugees). Although the Federal Office had been very pleased with his work, they dismissed him after receiving information from the Verfassungsschutz about his activity in the Milli Görüs mosque, which was per se interpreted as political activity, thus discrediting him as an objective translator.

8.3 Muslim religious representation

An important process, and one that is specific to Germany, is the Christian-Muslim inter-religious dialogue. This was initially established at the beginning of the 1980s and had developed quite fruitful debates and contacts until the terror attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of this incident, the levels of general distrust and scepticism towards the Muslim population grew, and certain self-proclaimed specialists on Islam set in motion a spate of supposed uncovering of fundamentalist and dangerous worldviews held by Muslims within the Christian-Muslim dialogue, and warned many of those who had been curious and open towards Muslims not to be naïve or blindly optimistic. Those who still supported the dialogue, such as the Protestant Bishop Jepsen, have been harshly criticised for their readiness to communicate with Muslims, and practically muzzled. However, despite the still prevailing atmosphere of distrust, certain contacts between Christians and Muslims have recently begun to be re-established and strengthened.

Further details of the conflicts within the inter-religious dialogue are analysed by Levent Tezcan. As Islam in Germany has not yet reached the status of a public corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), Muslims still do not enjoy the same rights as Christian Churches and other

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98 Expert interview with Mustafa Yoldas on 20 November 2006.
99 Outcome of qualitative research.
religious communities do, to gather official taxes or teach Islamic religious education in schools. Islam does not have a hierarchical structure, as do the Christian churches, and Muslims in Germany do not intend to nominate a single representative for all the different branches of belief. Nonetheless, the Muslim organisations in Germany have recognised the necessity of “speaking with one voice” towards the German officials, in order to be accepted as a partner for dialogue and to be granted the status of a corporation.\footnote{Three different representatives of Muslim organisations gave statements about the unification process in an article of the monthly newspaper \textit{Islamische Zeitung} (\textit{Islamische Zeitung}) on 8 July 2006.}

The topic of religious education is one of the few issues concerning Muslims discussed in German literature and public opinion (see section I.4.3). Only one organisation, the Islamische Föderation (Islamic Federation) in Berlin, has yet managed to be recognised as an official corporation, and started to teach Islamic lessons in Berlin schools from 2002 (see section III.1.Berlin). The Federation fought in the courts for the status of a public corporation for more than 20 years. When they finally won the processes, the reaction by German officials and the media was extremely critical,\footnote{See, for example, \textit{Taz},“Die schleichende Islamisierung: Schulalltag in Berlin” [“The creeping Islamisation: the everyday schoolday in Berlin”], 1 December 2004 , available at \url{http://demo.ebiz-today.de/gesellschaft/islam,149,Die_schleichende_Islamisierung_Schulalltag_in_Berlin.news.htm}, (accessed 8 January 2007).} as the Federation is linked to Milli Görüs, which is seen in a highly critical light by the Verfassungsschutz. Schiffauer, however, argues that the authorisation for the Federation to give Islamic lessons at Berlin schools is an important sign, because a growing social participation of Muslims and Islamic organisations can only strengthen those parties and persons who promote an active part of these groups in the German society (FAZ, 22 September 2001, no. 221, p. 45).
Part II. Policy context

1. Perception of Muslims:

1.1 Public opinion

Muslim migration to Germany began in the 1960s, due to the need for workers in Germany. According to a representative survey among German Muslims carried out by Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv in 2002, the majority of Germany’s Muslim population regards itself as German: 82 per cent want to stay in Germany and up to 65 per cent want to be naturalised (Survey of Islamarchiv (Islamic Archive), 2002). Also important to note here is the strong wish to integrate into German society on the part of most of its Muslim population: 89 per cent think that it is important to continue the process of integration, while only 5 per cent do not want to integrate (Survey of Islamarchiv (Islamic Archive), 2004).

One can notice a growing interest in Islam since the Iranian Revolution, and since 11 September 2001 the media has been bursting with ‘information’ on Islam. In spite of the above figures, however, Muslims are portrayed as a threat to the majority of the society. Islam is associated with negative notions such as ‘oppression of women’ and ‘terror’, or adjectives such as ‘fanatical’ and ‘radical’ (Survey of the Institut für Demoskopie (Institute for Opinion Polls). Allensbach, on behalf of the newspaper Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 2004).

According to a study of the Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence) at the University of Bielefeld, around 30 per cent of Germans living in the new federal states and 23 per cent of those in the old states hold the opinion that “Muslims should be refused permission to migrate to Germany”. The regular survey on antisemitism, islamophobia and xenophobia by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (“Deutsche Zustände” [“German conditions”]) found that the percentage of persons who declare at least a partial feeling of strangeness in the own country due to the presence of Muslim co-citizens, has risen from 35 per cent in 2004, to 39 per cent in 2006. Nearly on in three Germans declare that Muslims should be banned from immigrating into the country. The proportion of Germans who think that relations between Muslims and Western countries are generally bad is, at 70 per cent, the highest of all Western countries.104

1.2 Media coverage

Muslims tend to trace the general suspicion towards them back to a one-sided coverage of topics connected to Islam in the German media. Indeed, new studies prove this to a certain extent.105 In a wider sense, Islam and Muslims are a popular topic in the German media. Unfortunately, the reality of Muslims’ diverse ways of living, ways of thinking and worldviews, and their problems and social backgrounds in Germany, find no or little reflection in the media.

It can be said that Muslims are viewed as a homogeneous mass, one that is frightening and backward (Sabine Schiffer, Vortrag, 2004). Since 11 September 2001 one can measure a rise in the explicit blaming of Muslims for all kinds of crimes, including terror, forced marriage and honour killings, as well as for the oppression of women.106

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103 Information available on the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv website at http://www.islamarchiv.de
105 Sabine Schiffer (2005), Der Islam in der Presse, Ergon.
106 Sabine Schiffer (2005), Der Islam in der Presse, Ergon.
One very obvious example of misinformation of the public is the way in which newspapers cover raids on mosques. Research over some months in 2002 led to the following result (Schiffer, 2004). Announcements about the raids on mosques were always placed on the front page. But although 99.99 per cent of the mosque raids remained without any result, the article informing readers about this could only be found in the inside part of the newspaper on the left-hand side, where it is less apparent, or was missing totally. In this way, the meaning of the mosque has changed in the public view from a place of worship and community to a place of conspiracy (Schiffer, 2004).

In public discourse, the difference between Islam, and Islamism and extremism seems to have vanished. More and more phrases such as ‘Islamic Terror’, ‘Muslim extremist’ and ‘cancer/ulcer of Islamism’ can be read in German newspapers and journals (Schiffer, 2004). Another recent study resulted in the statement that German media reported crimes committed by foreigners differently from the way in which it reported those committed by Germans (Blaschke, 2004). One very common procedure is to mention the delinquents’ foreign nationality or background (even if their nationality is German), as opposed to not mentioning it when the offender is of German descent. This kind of media coverage leads the general public to the conclusion that Islam and its adherents are a threat to the German society and its values.

Schiffauer makes the interesting argument of a ‘moral panic’ underlying these discourses. He explains that the threat of terrorism is not the only reason for demonising Islam and Muslims, but that a “growing number of naturalisations turn Ausländer [foreigners] into citizens and threaten to change the balance of power between the ‘established’ and the ‘outsiders’” (Elias, 1993). (Schiffauer, 2006: Der unheimliche Muslim). The atmosphere of a moral panic is “characterised by an exaggerated presentation of the threats for society, by a generalised atmosphere of distrust and by a widespread tendency to witch-hunt.” (Schiffauer, 2006: 1)

As far as the granting of citizenship is concerned, the argumentation of Schiffauer became even more evident when the federal state of Baden-Württemberg introduced in 2006 a questionnaire for naturalisation entitled Gesinnungsfragebögen (questionnaire about one’s convictions). The aim of these questions, which only target Muslim foreigners, is to find out whether the aspirant to citizenship has really internalised the values of the German nation or is maybe just pretending to do so. Disregarding the fact that most native Germans would not be able to properly answer the questions about culture and history, the aim of the questionnaire is exactly what Schiffauer describes — to establish the sharp distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ so symptomatic of German political and public attitudes, which have not yet internalised the only recently accepted label of a country of immigration.

Some examples from the Baden-Württemberg questionnaire are as follows. One is the question “What do you think about the fact that homosexual people hold official offices in Germany?” The applicant for the German citizenship also has to make a statement about the following phrase: “Humanity has never experienced such a dark age as under democracy. Before the human being can free himself from democracy, he has to understand that democracy cannot bring him any good.” Statements also have to be given to the following: “What do you think about the statement that the wife has to obey her husband and that he may beat her if she does not obey him?” Another question addresses attitudes towards education. “Your adult daughter/wife wants to dress just like other girls and women as well. Would you try to prevent it? If yes, with what means?” About terrorism and anti-semitism: “Some people blame the Jews for all the evil in the world and even argue that they were behind the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York? What do you think about these arguments?” The applicant can still lose his/her citizenship years later, if it becomes

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107 The term ‘moral panic’ was coined by Stanley Cohen in 1972 and taken up and systematised by Goode and Ben Yehuda in 1994.
known that he/she answered the questions in the wrong way, that is, in such a way that he/she tried to hide his/her real opinion.

1.3 Islam in German political discourse
In recent years, the debate around Islam, and the problems associated with it, has also reached politics. Almost all political parties use the problem of security related to the ‘Islamic threat’ or ‘the Turkish problem of integration’ as a tool to attract voters, to block laws connected to an immigration reform, to support stricter laws on controlling individuals with regard to security, or to exclude Muslim organisations from policy-making.108

The Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany, CDU) is a party known for its conservative values, which traditionally views the immigration law (Einwanderungsgesetz) as too liberal. Since 11 September 2001, the CDU has increasingly combined its agreement to this law with a call for a tightening of security measures. They are now able to use the general fear of terrorism as a means to strengthen their position. Another very clear example of the anti-Islamic sentiments of this party is the way in which ideological arguments are used to oppose Turkey’s accession to the EU. Based on the fact that the majority of the Turkish population is Muslim, it is said that Turkey does not fit into ‘Christian Europe’ (Blaschke, 2004).

Following the London bombings, the head of the CDU for the federal state of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Christian Wulff, called for video surveillance of mosques to combat the terrorist threat in Germany. This example shows how quickly direct links are made between terrorists and average Muslims, simply because they have the same religion. This call was followed in Osnabrück and Braunschweig, small towns in Niedersachsen, where in a large-scale operation the identities of all attendees of the mosque for Friday prayer were checked. The mosque was searched, a whole neighbourhood was locked so that nobody could leave, and identities were checked. As in most cases of such missions, the result was zero. One surprising fact about this raid was that there was no evidence of a security threat that led to it. It was simply done as a preventive measure.109

Another object of emotional public debate is the building of mosques. The official objections usually include issues such as noise pollution, traffic flow and parking problems (Blaschke, 2004). The fact that there are other, underlying, objections can often be seen in the discussions that evolve out of press conferences held around the building of a mosque, or the plan to build one. The rejection of building applications for mosques is often used by political parties in their election campaign to draw the attention of the potential voter to one party. A very clear example can be seen in the Berlin district of Neukölln, where a building application was rejected due to the size of the planned building, a Muslim cultural centre. However, in a press conference, the responsible Senator for Berlin, Stefanie Vogelsang (CDU), uttered her relief about the rejection, due to her suspicions about the Muslim association INSSAN e.V., which was behind the building application. She openly suspected people from the responsible association of supporting suicide attacks, extremism and Islamism, although without being able to prove her claims.110

108 Field observations and interviews with experts.
110 On the press conference, see, for example, the article of the Berlin newspaper Der Tagesspiegel, 2 August 2006, available at http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/archiv/02.08.2006/2690926.asp (accessed 10 January 2007).
Another exclusion of Muslims and their organisations takes place in the field of politics at both the national and the municipal level, when it comes to the necessity for a dialogue partner, whether to discuss the question of Islamic religious teaching in public schools or to find cooperating partners for integration programmes. Although Muslim organisations and umbrella organisations exist in abundance, they are almost always rejected as a possible partner, for several reasons.

First, the organisations can never speak for all Muslims in Germany, due to not being organised at this national level. As a result, they also do not have the authority to make decisions for all Muslims. The same is, for example, the case with the Zentralrat der Juden (Jewish Central Council), which does not represent all Jews in Germany or all synagogues. This led to an internal fight between reform communities and the Orthodox-led Zentralrat in recent years. This is also the case for several, if not all, evangelic churches.

Second, there are organisations, such as Milli Görüs, that represent a large number of Turkish Muslims, but which are also rejected as a dialogue partner, due to them being watched by the Verfassungsschutz (see section I.8.2). However, although this has been done since the organisation was founded, a violation of the Constitution was never reported.\footnote{The case of the stigmatisation of Milli Görüs, and the role of the Verfassungsschutz in defining ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslim organisations by naming them as Islamists, are explained in further detail by Schiffauer (2004).}

Existing Muslim organisations and associations are excluded from policy-making and from speaking for the people whom they represent. Instead, the German Government chooses at will with whom to talk.\footnote{One recent example for this was the discussion around the preparations for the Islam Konferenz held on 27 September 2006 and the invitation policy. Only five representatives of umbrella organisations were invited, as opposed to nine individuals who in most cases never even claimed to represent any part whatsoever of the Muslim population of Germany. See also commentary, “Der Gipfel!” [“The Limit!”], by Irmgard Pinny available, Dienstag, 26 September 2006, available at http://islam.de/6919.php (accessed 10 January 2007).} On the other hand, a clear preference for the Diyanet\footnote{Diyanet is the same as the DITIB (Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi), the Turkish organisation with strong connections to the religious authority of Turkey and the organisation with the highest number of members in Germany.} has become apparent in recent years. The Diyanet refused to take part in any initiative by other Muslim umbrella organisation to unite under one big umbrella organisation. This could be seen at the first summit for integration in July 2006, hosted by Chancellor Angela Merkel. Here, hardly any representatives of Muslim organisations — such as Kenan Kolat from the Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland (Turkish Community Germany) and Bekir Alboga from DITIB — were invited.

Schiffauer (2006) explains that the growing presence and self-consciousness of Muslims and their organisations, leading also to the claiming of rights and sometimes court verdicts in favour of Muslims, are generally highly irritating to the German public and politicians. As Muslims are not yet felt to be an integral part of society, their public claims are seen by many as an “abuse of our courts”. Schiffauer quotes Johannes Kandel from the Social Democratic think tank, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:

> Muslim representatives should ask themselves what kind of practices could be considered offensive in a non-Muslim environment (e.g. the call to the prayer or ritual slaughter) and how a balance based on mutual respect could be achieved between Islamic cultural practices and the culture of majority society. They try, however, to put through their interpretation of Islam by means of the German courts (Kandel, nd: 6).
2. Integration policy

2.1 Anti-discrimination bodies
Discrimination is forbidden in Germany under the Constitution. In cases of discrimination, counselling is offered by welfare organisations, workers’ unions and Integrationsbeauftragten (Commissioners on Integration). Until now, only some cities have offered a State-funded anti-discrimination office (Leitstelle gegen Diskriminierung) — for example Berlin, where the office was mainly set up on 1 February 2005 because of the worry about a discriminatory effect of the prohibition of Muslim women with headscarves from working as teachers and in some other public places. There are plans to improve this situation, in accordance with the new anti-discrimination laws.

2.2. Initiatives addressing Muslims
Until now only few major initiatives have been known that directly address Muslims and their needs. Muslims in Germany are mostly identified as Turks or as foreigners. Due to this perception, one can rather find initiatives that target the integration of or discrimination against people identified as being foreigners or as having a Turkish origin, rather than Muslims of different origins.

Aktion Courage
Aktion Courage is an NGO that supports the integration of foreigners in politics and society. In 1999, a project for the “integration of Muslims and Muslim organisations in Germany” was founded, which aims at linking Muslim organisations with organisations that represent the majority of the German society.

Schule ohne Rassismus (School without racism)
“Schule ohne Rassismus” is a project that is organised by and for pupils. Its aim is to work actively against discrimination and racism. The open-space series “Islam and Me” was developed to find out what pupils had to say about this topic. The open space was intended to give them an opportunity to speak about this topic in a free way, and exchange experiences and ways to solve problems. More than 1,000 pupils participated between 2003 and 2005 in Berlin, Hannover, Dortmund, Neunkirchen, Cologne and Bremerhaven.

An evaluation of this project reveals the problems that the initiators encountered in some of the open-space discussions. “Islamist pupils” dominated the discussions with their “greater knowledge of Islamic history”, their “Islamist worldview” and their “self-confident, aggressive and ruthless way of discussing the topic”. The initiators discovered afterwards that these were pupils that frequently attended a mosque that is close to al-Hamas. In the rest of the report, this mosque is only

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114 According to Article 1 of Constitution, human dignity is protected, according to Article 3, equality and equal rights are guaranteed, and according to Article 4 freedom of religion and conscience are guaranteed.
117 Interview with the Federal Coordinator (Bundeskoordination), Schule ohne Rassismus – Schule mit Courage, Berlin. Further details available on the project website at http://www.schule-ohne-rassismus.org/
118 By Sanem Kleff and Eberhard Seidel, in cooperation with Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz, die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, die Stadt Hannover.
called “the al-Hamas Mosque”. The project faced similar problems at another school in Berlin, also due to the “dominant behaviour” of “Islamist pupils”. The author of the evaluation seems to hold the activities of some of the pupils at the Islamische Föderation responsible for this behaviour.

The evaluation reveals a biased view towards some pupils, as well as a lack of ability, and reluctance, to deal and work with pupils’ argumentation and behaviour. One reason for a biased view within this and other projects, such as “Islam in the classroom” organised by the same people, might be the fact that no practising Muslims are involved in the structuring and carrying out of the activities.

Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V. (Muslim Youth Germany, MJD)
Another project involving Muslim pupils and their views was the “Ta’rif” Project, which was carried out by the MJD in 2003. One of the goals of the project was to correct preconceived and traditional ideas about religion, and to counteract the abuse of Islamic arguments for the justification of aggressive behaviour. This project was funded by the Ministry of the Interior and is, to date, the only project of a Muslim organisation to receive funding from a German State agency. However, the project was ended when the Ministry suddenly decided to cut its support, following a media campaign that had labelled the MJD as Islamist and Anti-semitic. This was despite protests on behalf of the MJD from organisations such as the Catholic Young Community. (For further details on this incident, see section I.8.2 on Muslim organisations).

Interkultureller Rat (Intercultural Council)
The “Islam Forum”\(^{120}\) is a project of Interkultureller Rat, in cooperation with the Groebe-Stiftung and the Rat' der Türistänmligen Staatsbürger in Deutschland (Council of German Citizens of Turkish Origin, RTS). The Forum aims for dialogue between different representatives of Muslim organisations, the non-Muslim civil society and the State. In several cities, such Forums are frequently organised and have shown that dialogue with Muslims about integration matters is possible. The organisation has received acknowledgement from several politicians, including Rita Süssmuth, the former President of the Bundestag, and Angela Merkel, the Federal Chancellor.

Rotes Kreuz (Red Cross)
In 1998 the German Cross published a practical guide for medical staff on how to deal with death and grief for Muslims in German hospitals (see section I.6 on health).

Älter werden in Deutschland (Growing Old in Germany)
In 2001, the Ausländerbeauftragte (Commissioner on Foreigners) of the German Government, in cooperation with the Red Cross, the Workers’ Welfare Organisation, and several local offices, developed an information campaign called “Growing Old in Germany”. Elderly immigrants constitute a new group of patients in the German geriatric care institutions. These institutions are now challenged to provide elderly Muslims with adequate and specific facilities, such as prayer rooms and specific food. The project provides information material on geriatric care in Germany directed towards elderly immigrants, in order to overcome possible barriers and fears.

\(^{120}\) Interview with Dr Jürgen Micksch, Interkultureller Rat (Intercultural Council). Further details on the Council available at http://www.interkultureller-rat.de/
3. Administrative Structures

The administrative structures in Germany are divided into three main levels: Bund (the Federal Government), Bundesländer (Federal states) and Gemeinden (communes).121

The Federal Government (Bund) is the highest administrative level. It includes the 12 Federal ministries, the Bundespräsidialamt (Office of the Federal President), the Bundeskanzleramt (Office of the Federal Chancellor), the Bundespresseamt (Federal Public Relation Office) and the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Court of Auditors), which is independent from any current government. The ministries have an administrative function besides their political function (legislative activities). Its administrative characteristics are the execution and control of laws and edicts, which are issued by the ministries according to their field of reference. Subordinate to the ministries are authorities that still function at the federal level, then authorities that function at the regional level, then authorities that function at the state level, but are still bound by the instructions of the Bund.122

The next administrative level is the 16 Federal states (Länder), which are organised in parallel to the Bund. They dispose of own constitutions and federal organs. Accordingly, they are governed by parliamentary governments and thus have a State-like character of their own. Analogously to the Federal Chancellor, there is the Ministerpräsident (Prime Minister) for each Federal state. In the city states (such as Hamburg, Bremen or Berlin) this function is fulfilled by the mayor. The the other highest authorities of the federal state are the single Fachminister (Compartment Minister), the Ministry for for Federal Affairs and the also independent Landesrechnungshof (Court of Auditors). Subordinate to the ministries are the Landesoberbehörden, which fulfil the special tasks of their respective ministry. At a level below these are the Landesmittelbehörden, which are better known as Regierungspräsidien or Bezirksregierungen (district governments). On the lowest level, and thus most strongly empowered to regulate people’s lives, are the untere Landesbehörde (lower Länder authorities). These include the Staatsanwaltschaft (district public prosecution authority), which is regulated by the Justizministerium (Ministry of Justice), the Finanzamt (fiscal authorities), which are subordinate to the Landesfinanzminister, and the Landesschulämter (education authorities), which are the last state level instance of the Ministry of Education.

The last and lowest levels in the threefold German administration system are the Gemeinden (communities). These form an independent political-administrative level, but are assigned to each federal state according to that state’s law. The size of a city or Gemeinde varies (for example, Frankfurt or Berlin are Gemeinden, just as small cities are). They are organised by Kreise (districts) or Landkreise (administrative districts), which unite all related towns, cities and villages, fulfill certain tasks and have a wider sphere of influence than the single Gemeinden. The administrative structures of the communities in Germany have developed in recent years, which has led to the situation that all have the same type of Constitution, which is called Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung. This Constitution was implemented by the American occupying force after World War II, and its central characteristics are direct election of the mayor and the Gemeinderat by the citizens. In this way, the mayor is at the top of the Gemeinde or Stadtverwaltung (city council), which is also divided into several authorities or administrative departments. Every town thus has, besides a financial administration department, also one for education and culture, as well as those

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121 A figure showing the administrative structures in Germany can be found on Wikipedia at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Administrative_Gliederung_Deutschlands.png (accessed 10 January 2007).
122 Further details on German administrative structures available (in German) at http://www.uni-muenster.de/HausDerNiederlande/Zentrum/Projekte/NiederlandeNet/Dossiers/verwaltung_deutschland.html (accessed 10 January 2007).
for justice, security and order. Subordinate to these administration departments are offices such as the Stadtkämmererei (finance department) or the Einwohnermeldeamt (registration of address office).

All in all, it is the Gemeinde or Kommune with its authorities and departments, which is in most direct contact with the people. At the same time, it is also this level which can be most strongly influenced by them. The German State relies heavily on so-called Freie Träger (responsible bodies) on this level. This is due to the system of subsidiarity. This system has gone through a lot of changes since the foundation of the new republic. Dominated by confessional welfare organisations in the beginning, it has now become a pluralistic system. It can be described as a system of cooperation between the State and welfare organisations in developing and implementing socio-political programmes. These welfare organisations are supported by federal preference, and financial grants and programmes. Therefore the State uses the organisations’ infrastructures, personnel and socio-political resources, in order to realise its own goals and programmes. The biggest organisations operating on the federal and municipal levels include Arbeiterwohlfahrt, or confessional organisations such as Caritas. The main characteristic of this system is the fact that the State delegates control and work to the welfare organisations and only interferes when their work is not sufficient in one programme or field of action.

Education
Each federal state is responsible for its own educational system, which can therefore vary from state to state. It is supervised by the Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister (Conference of Cultural Ministers) which operates on a national level. Its responsibility is mainly to bring the educational systems of the federal states onto common ground.

Employment
The Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Agency for Employment) is the national body that is responsible for placement services, career counselling, observation of the employment market and the supply of work permits, as well as for the payment of Arbeitslosengeld I (unemployment benefits) and Kindergeld (family benefits). It is subordinate to the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs and its central office is situated in Nürnberg. With its more than 600 branches, the agency is present in every community. Through the years, the employment market in Germany has changed fundamentally and the work of the agency became more and more insufficient. Since 2002, the agency has been involved in a process of progressing fundamental reform that has not ended yet.

Housing
The German State exercises influence on the housing market through a special system of subsidised housing. Important goals of this system are to create and maintain adequate housing also for underprivileged members of the society and to prevent the emergence (especially in cities) of social ghettos. This system has changed its face greatly through the last years of social reform. The number of council flats has fallen from 3.9 million in 1987 to 1.8 flats in 2001. The privatisation of council housing is increasing every year.

Health Care/Social Care
The Ministry of Health is responsible for issuing and developing laws, decrees und administrative instructions. Its central task is to secure and develop the effectiveness of the obligatory health insurance. Besides the State, health insurance, accident, health care and pension funds, doctors’ unions, employers and employees and their unions and welfare organisations play an active role in Germany’s health system. Health and social care is mostly offered by non-governmental bodies such as doctors, pharmacists, welfare organisations and medical enterprises. The system is mainly
financed through payments to health insurances. Socially underprivileged people can receive social aid from the government. Social aid is only given in cases where other financial aid and sources are not sufficient.

**Policing and security**
The German police are responsible for State security. As in all other cases, the federal states are responsible for their own police force, as well as legislation governing them. However, all such state level legislation refers to a common national police act. Each federal state has a department responsible for political crimes, such as terrorism and extremism within its police.

In each federal state there is also local office of Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV), the German national intelligence service (see section 1.7.1). The BfV coordinates and evaluates the activities of these 16 local offices (Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz) with respect to the protection of the constitution. However, these offices are not subordinate to the BfV, but are departments of the Ministry of the Interior of the respective federal state. The local offices of the Verfassungsschutz are separate from the police.
Part III. City selection

1. Berlin

Berlin population statistics
The situation of Muslims in the capital of Germany is, for several reasons, specific. Because of the German history of separation, it is the only town in the eastern part of the country with a considerable number of foreign, and especially, Muslim citizens. Due to this history, the Muslim community of Berlin is spatially quite isolated. The city also has a more secular political climate than the towns in the western parts of Germany, which sometimes means that issues concerning religion, such as the right to build mosques or provide religious education in schools, can be more difficult for the Muslim communities.

As shown below in Table 2, the number of Muslim foreigners in Berlin can be roughly estimated as being 160,000. In addition, it can be assumed that there are at least 40,000 Muslims in the city who are naturalised German citizens. The size of the Muslim population in Berlin can therefore be estimated roughly at around 200,000 people, or approximately 9 per cent of the total population of Berlin.

Socio-economic situation in Berlin districts with a high proportion of immigrants and Muslims
The concentration of Muslims, predominantly Turks, in Berlin is due to the settlement policies of the former West Germany at the beginning of the wave of immigration of the 1960s. Administratively, Berlin is divided into 12 districts (Bezirke), each of which is subdivided into a number of sub-districts (Stadtteil). The number of Muslims is especially high in the following areas in central Berlin — Kreuzberg sub-district (in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district), Wedding sub-district (in Mitte district) and Northern Neukölln district.

The Neukölln district has been of special interest to the media because of incidents such as the recent school riots (see below), and because its governing mayor has publicly declared that the integration policy has collapsed, and that the district would soon become the setting for riots similar to the recent ones in France.

In the districts of Neukölln, Kreuzberg and Mitte, the number of welfare recipients makes up more than 11 per cent of the population — the highest in Berlin (in Neukölln it is 14.3 per cent, in Mitte 13.2 per cent, and in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 13.0 per cent). This compares to an average of 8.1 per cent for the city as a whole, and as low as 4 per cent in the district of Steglitz-Zehlendorf. The number of foreign welfare recipients stood at 27.0 per cent of all welfare recipients in the city at the end of 2004. The share of households receiving housing benefit is 14.6 per cent for the city as a whole, but the highest rates are in Neukölln district (22.6 per cent) and Kreuzberg district (18.9 per cent).

The Berlin districts of Neukölln and Kreuzberg would therefore be of special interest for the OSI report on “Muslims in the EU”. Although public opinion has become focused on the issues of

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“parallel societies” and the poor integration of its Muslim population, there is in fact only very limited scientific evidence about the real extent of the social separation of Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ lives in the city and its impact on both the Muslim and the majority population, so the EUMAP report could provide some valuable insights.

### Table 2. Berlin Population statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population (2006(^{126}))</td>
<td>3,395,189</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population (2006(^{127}))</td>
<td>466,518</td>
<td>Equivalent to 13.8 per cent of the total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supposedly Muslim foreign population (2005(^{128}))</td>
<td>Approx. 160,000</td>
<td>Including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 117,736 Turks;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 10,403 from Bosnia-Herzegovina;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 7,915 from Lebanon.(^{129})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of other foreigners (2005(^{130}))</td>
<td>Approx. 300,000</td>
<td>Breakdown for those with a significant population in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin (i.e. more than 10,000 people) — out of a</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sub-total of 149,064:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 11,517 from France;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 11,517 from Croatia;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 10,134 from Greece;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 13,804 from Italy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 40,787 from Poland;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 14,005 from the Russian Federation;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 24,757 from Serbia and Montenegro; (these are</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not the numbers, that I gave in my paper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 12,556 from the USA;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 11,298 from Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisations (from 1995 to 2005) (2005(^{131}))</td>
<td>97,374</td>
<td>Of this total, around 50 per cent originate from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>majority Muslim countries (2005) — approximately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40-50,000 people in total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populations of the Berlin district of Neukölln (2005(^{132}))</td>
<td>305,999</td>
<td>Of which 22.2 per cent are foreigners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{128}\) As of 31 December 2005. This number reflects all the foreigners originating from countries where half or more of the population are Muslim. Due to this, the actual number of Muslims among them is probably lower. Information from the website of the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (Berlin state statistical office), available (in German) at [http://www.statistik-berlin.de/framesets/berl.htm](http://www.statistik-berlin.de/framesets/berl.htm) (accessed 10 January 2007).

\(^{129}\) Many are probably refugees from Palestine.

\(^{130}\) As of 31 December 2005. This number reflects all the foreigners originating from countries where half or more of the population are Muslim. Due to this, the actual number of Muslims among them is probably lower. Information from the website of the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (Berlin state statistical office), available (in German) at [http://www.statistik-berlin.de/framesets/berl.htm](http://www.statistik-berlin.de/framesets/berl.htm) (accessed 10 January 2007).

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Some important incidents of recent years:

**September 2002**: The Islamische Föderation (see below) started teaching at 20 Berlin schools. After 20 years of court procedures, the organisation won the right to teach religious lessons in public schools. Even today, however, there remains a great scepticism among the Berlin population and politicians towards this organisation. The Federation has close links with Milli Görüs and is thus regarded by the Verfassungsschutz (the internal Intelligence Service – see section I.8.2) as extremist/Islamist.

**June 2004**: Muslims and non-Muslims founded the Muslimische Akademie (see below), with the support of the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education). The stated aims of the academy are to encourage the participation of Muslims and to offer an independent forum for inter- and intra-religious dialogue (see also section I.8.2).

**27 January 2005**: The Neutralitätsgesetz (Neutrality Law) entered into effect in Berlin. This prohibits the wearing of religious symbols for those working in the public services — including teachers at general-education schools, judges and police officers. Educators at child care facilities are also included, but only if the parents bring up the issue. The law applies equally to all religions, but small items that are carried as jewellery, such as the Christian cross, are excluded. Before this law was created in Berlin, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the highest court of Germany) had delegated to the different federal states the question of whether Muslim teachers may wear the hijab (headscarf) in school. It concluded that an exclusion of these women from school would only be possible if the federal states had the relevant federal level laws concerning this question, and also if the religions had been treated equally in this matter (see also section I.4 on employment).

**7 February 2005**: A ‘Turkish’ woman, Hatun Sürücü (in fact a German woman of Kurdish origin) was murdered in Berlin. She was killed at a bus station in Berlin-Tempelhof by means of several shots to the head. As alleged criminals, the police arrested three of her brothers on 14 February 2005. A so-called ‘honour killing’ was presumed as the motive, because the woman had left her husband and her family and decided to lead an independent life. Before the murder several threats had been reported to the police. Her death caused horror throughout the whole republic and initiated a discussion about forced marriages and values of Muslim families living in Germany. The murder caused a broad discussion about ‘honour killings’ and also of forced marriages. More generally, it provoked discussion on the situation of Muslim woman, and the nature and dangers of ‘parallel societies’.

Professor Barbara John, the former Commissioner on Integration of Berlin, explained in her lecture about Islamic Youth Work within a conference in the youth organisation “Jugendhof” in Vlotho, Germany, from 27 to 28 June 2005, that the Muslim organisation INSSAN e.V. reacted to the murder and the following debates in the society by distributing a postcard against honour killings amongst Muslims throughout the whole republic and also other countries, which refers to Islamic sources condemning this practice. Professor John also explained that, despite the strong interest of the media in these issues at the time, the initiative was hardly recognised by any journalist and did not enter the public debate. She calls this ignoring of an initiative against honour killing of a Muslim organisation a metaphor of the interaction with Muslims in the society: an initiative that is worthy of being published and supported is not expected to come from the part of a Muslim organisation and is thus not recognised at all, which again strengthens the public opinion of Muslims never making statements on behalf of the German society’s values.
March 2006: The head of the Rütli-Schule Hauptschule (secondary school) in Neukölln district wrote a desperate letter to the Senator for Education, asking for immediate help, because violence in the school had made the lessons unbearable. Because of the immigrant (mainly Muslim) background of the majority of the pupils (over 80 per cent), the debate about the integration of Muslims, and also the problems of the educational system, was — once again — very animated. The school attracted international media coverage at this time.

Presence of Muslims in the municipal government

Turkish politicians with no decisively religious affiliation are mainly present in the parties of the left (Linkspartei/PDS; SPD; Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen). The Turkish politician Giyasettin Sayan (Die Linkspartei/PDS), from the Berlin House of Representatives (total 149 members), was the victim of a racist attack on 20 May 2006 in the district of Lichtenberg. The Berlin members of the Bundestag include: Keskin Hakki (Die Linke), Dilek Kolat (SPD), Ülker Radziwill (SPD), Evrim Baaba (Linkspartei/PDS), Özcan Mutlu (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen).

Muslim civil society organisations

The main Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin are as detailed below in Table 3. In September 2006, the Commissioner on Integration for Berlin, Günter Piening, presented the first conclusions of a recent survey covering 40 Muslim communities in Berlin. The interviews, which were conducted with the help of standardised guidelines, revealed that Muslim communities in the city are getting younger and more professional, and that cooperation with non-Muslim organisations has been considerably intensified.

Table 3. Muslim civil society organisations in Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Muslim civil society organisations:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DITIB</td>
<td>An offshoot of the official religious authority in Turkey. It has several mosques in Berlin, including one representative mosque with Islamic architecture, and a Muslim cemetery on a piece of land in Neukölln district, which was once donated to a Turkish diplomat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres, VIKZ)</td>
<td>The oldest Turkish-Islamic organisation in Germany. This mystically oriented organisation has several mosques in Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamische Föderation (Islamic Federation)</td>
<td>The Islamic Federation has 12 mosques in Berlin, the most important being the Mevlana-Moschee in Kreuzberg, which is the first contact point for Turkish Muslims in Berlin. The organisation is close to Milli Görüş. As the latter has no official representation in Berlin, its adherents (about 1,600 in Berlin) mostly attend the mosques of the Islamische Föderation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSSAN e.V.</td>
<td>Founded by some young Muslim academics in 2002, the organisation draws its members from the different Muslim communities in Berlin. It aims at finding a common German Muslim identity and building a mosque and cultural centre that would gather together different nations and serve as a contact point for different beliefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland e.V. (Young Muslims in Germany, MJD)</td>
<td>The first exclusively German-speaking, nationwide and independent Muslim youth organisation in Germany, the MJD was founded by and for young Muslims. (For further details on the MJD’s projects, see sections I. II.2.1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other relevant civil society organisations:

| Green Palace | MJD-run bookstore of Islamic literature, music and other items. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>The Berlin department of the worldwide relief organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜDESB</td>
<td>A non-religious school founded by Turkish Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamische Grundschule Berlin</td>
<td>The association Islam Kolleg Berlin e.V. founded the school in 1989.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Islamic primary school)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamische Zeitung (The Islamic</td>
<td>(<a href="http://www.islamische-zeitung.de">www.islamische-zeitung.de</a>) A monthly newspaper, edited by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper)</td>
<td>Weimar Institut in Potsdam (near Berlin) for the German-speaking Sufi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimische Akademie (Muslim</td>
<td>A newly founded organisation that seeks to provide a forum for discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy)</td>
<td>and debate independently from the major religious Muslim organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(see also section I.8. Participation and citizenship).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Duisburg

The city of Duisburg is in the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (capital Düsseldorf). It would be interesting for further research because it is typical for the area of the Ruhrgebiet, which was formed by industry and mining, and where a lot of labour migrants have settled since the beginning of the waves of immigration. Today, around 100,000 people in Duisburg, or around 20 per cent of the total population of the city, have an immigrant background. It can be estimated that the large majority of these are Muslims (see Table 4 below). The Muslim population consists not only of immigrants with a Turkish background, but also many people from Arab countries and the Balkans. Many of the immigrants are concentrated in the district of Duisburg-Marxlohe.

### Table 4. Duisburg Population statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General population (2005\textsuperscript{134})</td>
<td>501,564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population (2005\textsuperscript{135})</td>
<td>74,387</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supposedly Muslim foreign population (2005\textsuperscript{136})</td>
<td>Approx. 50,000</td>
<td>This only includes nationalities with over 100 representatives. Namely:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 41,910 Turks;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,875 from Bosnia-Herzegovina;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,059 from Macedonia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,021 from Morocco;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 932 from Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foreigners</td>
<td>Approx. 24,000</td>
<td>With a significant population in Duisburg (more than 1,000 people). Namely:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4,211 from Serbia and Montenegro;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,916 from Greece;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 3,470 from Italy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,418 from the Netherlands;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 2,422 from Poland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Naturalisations                               | 45,000 (in the last 10 years)                                          | In 2004, there were 1,591 naturalisations, of which 1,290 originated from countries with a Muslim majority.

Although the city of Cologne, which is not far away, is the domicile of all the bigger Muslim organisations, the Muslim community of Duisburg is much more active than that of Cologne, and more interesting developments can be observed there. The concentration of mosques is even higher in Duisburg than in Cologne, not least because of cheaper rents. However, the sometimes difficult social situation also creates tensions within the population, which are often lived out as non-violent conflicts between the different ethnic or religious groups (see below).

One issue that has been discussed a lot among Muslims of Turkish origin in Duisberg is the economic boom in Turkey, which they fear missing. Given that for many Turks the economic opportunities in Duisburg are not very promising, the possibility of their having a better future in Turkey makes many think about moving back to their original country of emigration.

\textsuperscript{134} As of 31 December 2005. Landesamtes für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen (The Office of and Statistics of Nordrhein-Westfalen state).
\textsuperscript{135} As of 31 December 2005. Landesamtes für Datenverarbeitung und Statistik Nordrhein-Westfalen. (The Office of and Statistics of Nordrhein-Westfalen state).
Important incidents related to the Muslim community

1995: Duisburg witnessed violent conflicts between Turks, who dominate the north of the town, and Kurds, who are mainly present in the south. The conflicts developed into severe street fights.

1995–1997: There was an ongoing conflict following the application of two mosque associations in Duisburg (in 1995) for permission to establish a call for prayer with loudspeakers, which provoked a lot of hostile reaction. The neighbouring church, for example, spread leaflets that “explained” that Muslims did not pray to the same god as Christians, and that a call to prayer would be a call for everybody in the neighbourhood to follow idolatry (Hüttermann, 2006: 181). The general atmosphere in the town was very tense at this time, often even bordering on violence, and the conflict was discussed across the whole country. Even today the issue is still in the consciousness of the Duisburg citizens.

Following these incidents, a working committee of all different religions was established to prevent developments like this in the future. The representatives of the mosque association waived their claim for the call to prayer and finally said that they could do without it. In general, the installation of loudspeakers for the call to prayer can be applied for in Germany, but is always highly politicised. It is not legally forbidden, but — as is the case with many attempts to build representative mosques — often other reasons, such as the disturbance of the neighbourhood, are found as objections to the call for prayer.

2001: A conflict arose in the district of Hüttenheim around a Muslim community wishing to build a mosque, and a citizens’ initiative was founded to oppose this building. The citizen’s initiative, and also the CDU, even used arguments such as environmental protection to oppose the construction of the mosque, because a certain number of trees had to be cut for the construction.137

2002: The building of a large and representative mosque was commenced in Warbruckstraße, in Duisburg-Marxlohe district, and should be finished in 2006. There have hardly been any conflicts around this project, which was, on the contrary, welcomed by the citizens of the area. After the great conflicts around the call to prayer in 1996, probably most of the present residents of the Marxlohe area today are either Muslims, or neighbours who are not disturbed by the construction. As the quarter is generally rather poor, it is hoped that the mosque will be a beautiful and representative building for the whole district. The project had been in preparation for at least ten years and with the Begegnungsstätte (meeting site), inter-religious dialogue should also be established there.

Presence of Muslims in the local government:
The Stadtrat (city council) of Duisburg includes one CDU member with a religious and Turkish-national background, one member of the socialist party PDS, who also has a Turkish background, but not a decisively religious affiliation, and two Alevi with a Turkish background — one with the Green Party and one with the liberal FDP.

Muslim organisations
Muslim Religious Organisations:
The DITIB, with 17 communities, plays an active role in the Muslim community of Duisburg. Since 2001 they are united under the city alliance DITIB-Duisburg. They see themselves as more liberal and less State-dominated by Turkey than the main community in Cologne.

137 Interview with Jörg Hüttermann, 4 September 2006.
Today there are around 60 different mosque associations in Duisburg. This includes Milli Görüs, which contributes constructively to the development of the Muslim community of Duisburg, and the VIKZ, with ten communities and three residential accommodation buildings for pupils, and the other Muslim organisations, which represent Muslims from all different national backgrounds, but mainly Arab and Bosnian. Shortly after the incidents of 1997, there were attempts to unite all the communities under the Forum Islamischer Gemeinschaften in Duisburg (Forum of the Islamic Communities in Duisburg, FIGID). However, these were hampered by the umbrella organisations in Cologne and the attempts remained unsuccessful.

Muslim NGOs:
HDR is a human rights organisation that was founded by Turkish Muslims. Among its activities, it reports on discrimination against Muslims in German, but mainly in Turkish.\textsuperscript{138}
TIAD is an organisation of Turkish businessmen, which has established good contacts with the majority society. They once even provided the town with funding for Christmas decorations, when the city’s financial situation was severe.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{138} Website of HDR [http://www.hdr-org.de/]
\textsuperscript{139} Website of TIAD [http://www.tiad.de/]
3. Frankfurt

The city of Frankfurt, in the federal state of Hessen (capital Wiesbaden), is another city that merits further research, due to its high number of Muslim inhabitants, and the quite complex connections between certain Muslim organisations and the local government. The total number of Muslims in Frankfurt is vaguely estimated as being 60,000\(^{140}\) (see Table 5 below). These conflicts can be seen as symptomatic of the overall attitude of German politicians towards Muslims and Muslim organisations, and of the one-sided definition of power of the State and the Verfassungsschutz, as to whether or not an organisation is worthy of being a partner for cooperation partner (see also section I.8.2). In addition, the negative effects of suspicion and mosque raids on the life of the Muslim community can be well observed in Frankfurt.

### Table 5. Frankfurt population statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General population (2002, 2003)(^{141})</td>
<td>646,889</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population(^{142})</td>
<td>139,413</td>
<td>Comprising: 21.6 per cent of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supposedly Muslim foreign population(^{143})</td>
<td>Approx. 46,000</td>
<td>Of which: 31,606 Turks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Other Foreigners                                       |                  | With a significant population in Frankfurt (more than 10,000):  
|                                                       |                  | • 12,522 from Serbia and Montenegro;  
|                                                       |                  | • 14,409 from Italy;  
|                                                       |                  | • 12,108 from Croatia. |
| Naturalisations from Muslim countries (2004)           | 2,060            | Mainly from Turkey, Morocco and Afghanistan (Total number of naturalisations: 3,232) |
| Naturalisations from Muslim countries (2005)           | 1,283            | Mainly from Turkey and Morocco (Total number of naturalisations: 2,471) |

**Important incidents in Frankfurt that influenced the Muslim community:**

Incidents that had a negative effect on Muslims and their connections to German society have included several mosque raids. The Taqwa Mosque was practically taken to pieces during a search two years ago, because of a suspicion of extremism, which could not be confirmed. In September 2005 a big raid was carried out for the same reason in the area around the main station, which was equally without result. Many Muslim organisations lament these incidents, which cast a damning light on them and Islam. Their attempts to enter into contact with society — such as the ‘open door’ policy for mosques on 3 October every year (carried out nationally in all the German towns) — are less and less responded to. Generally the hard work of creating trust and contacts with, for example, the Christian communities, is hardly deemed worthy of a newspaper article, and is easily destroyed by any incident in the town or the country carrying an extremist connotation.

**Presence of Muslims in the local government:**

Apart from Ausländerbeirat (communal councils that represent the interests of the foreign population and are democratically elected by those), Muslims are not really present in any official


\(^{142}\) As of 31 December 2004.

\(^{143}\) As of 31 December 2004.
institutions in Frankfurt. The change from the first to the second generation of Muslims — whereby the second generation knows better how to deal with the State structures — is only just taking place within the area of politics. Most of the immigrants in leading positions, for example in Frankfurt City Parliament, do not present themselves as Muslims, and often do not have a religious affiliation.

Important Muslim Organisations:
The DITIB is quite present in Frankfurt. It played an important role in setting up the study course on Islamic Religion at the University of Frankfurt and arranges for teachers to visit from Turkey. Its public speaker, Mr Kurt, is also active in the local representation of foreigners.

The Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen (Islamic religious society of Hess, IRH) is an ethnically heterogeneous Sunni and Shia umbrella organisation that unites several mosque associations. It operates mainly at the regional level, as well as in Frankfurt. It concerns itself with providing Islamic religious education at schools in the federal state of Hessen. Until today, however, it has been rejected by the federal state as a partner for cooperation partner, due to its mention in the Verfassungsschutzbericht (see section I.8.2) of the federal state of Hessen, in 2004 and 2005. This mention is very controversial and the circumstances are highly political. One of the issues concerned a fatwa issued in 1998 by the IRH, called the “Kamelfatwa” (Fatwa of the Camel), which attested the Islamic prohibition of female Muslim pupils from taking part in school trips lasting several days. Following the fatwa, Muslim women have not been allowed to make journeys that would take several days, without being accompanied by a close relative. The report of the Verfassungsschutz in Hessen of 2004 stated that “the IRH has never distanced itself from this fatwa.” The IRH, however, states on its homepage that it has been distancing itself from the fatwa in question for many years, for example in the Protestant News Service (Evangelischer Presse Dienst) of 20 January 2004. In clear statements, the IRH argued for the participation of Muslim boys and girls in school trips lasting several days. The IRH is also active in other fields, and speaks out on political issues.

The I.I.S.e.V. stays away from political topics. It was founded in 1995 by bi-national couples with convert partners, and its lingua franca and language of preaching is German. The community is ethnically heterogeneous, and its members also include converts with an immigrant background (mainly from Poland and Italy), as well as many pupils and students

The mosques with an Arab background are as follows: Taqwa Mosque, Abu Bakr Mosque and Tariq bin Ziyad Mosque.

144 The different accusations of the IRH by the Verfassungsschutz of Hessen are responded to on the homepage of the organisation, at www.irh-info.de
4. Hamburg

Hamburg would be a very interesting city to include in the monitoring because its Muslim organisations have found a novel way of cooperating among themselves, which also influences their contacts with important parts of the majority society. As shown below, in Table 6, it is estimated that there may be up to 106,000 foreign Muslims in Hamburg.

Table 6. Hamburg population statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General population</td>
<td>1,734,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population (2005)</td>
<td>258,225</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supposedly Muslim foreign population (^{147})</td>
<td>approx. 106,593</td>
<td>This total only includes nationalities counting over 100 people. This includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 59,267 Turks;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 13,787 Afghans;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,609 Pakistanis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,519 Indonesians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From the Balkans:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 401 from Albania;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4,585 from Croatia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 3,749 from Macedonia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 3,931 from Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Also:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 15,667 from Arab countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,718 from Southern African countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foreigners</td>
<td></td>
<td>With a significant population in Hamburg (more than 5,000):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 17,816 from Serbia and Montenegro;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 6,979 from Greece;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 6,009 from Italy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 19,389 from Poland;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 9,056 from Portugal;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 7,756 from the Russian Federation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 5,538 from Ghana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalised foreigners (2004)</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>(2,262 male; 2,073 female). Of these: (2,615) (1,457 male; 1,158 female) originated from countries with at least 50 per cent Muslim population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Hamburg, most of the active Muslim organisations — with the exception of the Turkish, State-associated DITIB — have formed a common organisation (Organisationsform) called Schura. (The name recalls the parliamentary aspect of a Muslim state of this name.) The Schura was founded in 1999. It brings together Sunnis and Shiites from all different nations, to decide and discuss together all the important issues for Hamburg’s Muslims. This kind of structure is still missing in most other federal states, as well as on the national level. The well-functioning Schura is also one reason

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\(^{145}\) Statistisches Bundesamt online (2006).
\(^{146}\) As of 31 December 2005. Statistisches Landesamt Hamburg (Hamburg Office of Statistics), from the (Melderegister).
\(^{147}\) This numbers reflects all foreigners from countries with half or more of the population being Muslim. Due to this, the actual number of Muslims among them is probably lower.
for the relatively good and stable relations between Muslims in Hamburg and politicians and other representatives of society.

_Muslims in the local government:_
Two women with Muslim religious affiliation are present in the local government of Hamburg: Mrs Güclü Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party), the Migrationspolitische Sprecherin (Spokesperson on Migration Issues) of the party, and Mrs A. Özoguz of the SPD (Social Democrats). They are in close contact with the Muslim organisations of Hamburg, and often support their claims. They are both Bürgerschaftsabgeordnete (Members of the Local Parliament) and part of the opposition, as Hamburg is actually ruled by the conservative party CDU.

_Important incidents regarding the Muslim population:_

**1999:** Founding of the Schura. The Zusammenschluss (coming together) of almost all the Muslim organisations in the town, with the exception of DITIB, was the first one on the federal level, and has since been copied in Schleswig-Holstein, Niedersachsen and Bremen.

**11 September 2001:** After the terrorist attacks in the USA, the atmosphere in Hamburg was conditioned by Rasterfahndungen (dragnet investigations without prior suspicion), and mosque raids and searches, especially because some of the terrorists came from Hamburg. However, the Muslim population’s well-established contacts with society helped to weaken the conflict and stigmatisation. Up to today, also the Landeskriminalamt (State Office of Criminal Investigation, LKA) has had a far more cooperative course towards the mosque associations, and the overall situation is far less repressive in Hamburg than in other federal states, such as Niedersachsen, Baden-Württemberg or Hessen.

**November 2001:** The local government of Hamburg changed from a Social-Democratic/ Green coalition to a conservative one. The previously good contacts between Muslim organisations and local politicians changed towards a total blockade by the conservative CDU towards the Muslim organisations. Nevertheless, the general situation in Hamburg remains much better than in many other parts of the country. The open attitude of the organisations and their integrative work since the 1990s has generally been very fruitful.

_Muslim organisations_
Hamburg is the domicile of several Muslim organisations. These include Union der islamisch Albanischen Zentren in Deutschland (Union of the Islamic Albanian Centres in Germany), Deutsche Muslim Liga (German Muslim League), a convert organisation, and the Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg\(^{148}\) (Islamic Centre Hamburg), the most influential Shiite institution in Europe. However, the Schura remains by far the most important organ and structure of Muslims in the town. Almost all the organisations communicate and cooperate by means of the Schura, which coordinates and unites all Muslim activities in Hamburg, with the exception of the Turkish DITIB.

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Open Society Institute
EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program

Muslims in the EU - Cities Report
Germany


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