Muslims in the EU:
Cities Report

Preliminary research report and literature survey

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List of abbreviations

Brå The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet)
SCB Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån) — the official statistics agency
SMR The Council of Swedish Muslims (Sveriges Muslimska Råd)
SST The Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities, (Samarbetsnämnden för statsbidrag till trossamfund)
SUM Sweden’s Young Muslims (Sveriges unga muslimer)
SWIMA The Swedish Islamic Medical Association
Background

This research paper, focusing on the situation of Muslims in Sweden, was commissioned by the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP)\(^1\), of the Open Society Institute (OSI)\(^2\). Similar reports have also been prepared for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.

The overall aim of this series of research papers is to provide a comprehensive review of available research and literature on Muslims in each of these countries, including a bibliography covering the most relevant recent publications. Another aim is to facilitate the selection of a number of EU cities for inclusion in a proposed new OSI monitoring project to be initiated in 2007 — “Muslims in the EU: Cities Reports”. This project will address policy on Muslims at the city, or municipal, level, as opposed to the national level, which is the more usual level of analysis for cross-country monitoring. It follows on from previous EUMAP reports addressing the situation of Muslims in Europe, in particular the 2004 report “Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens”\(^3\).

Each of the research reports follow the same methodology, to provide comparative information across the countries covered, according to a common methodology prepared by EUMAP\(^4\). Part I of the report evaluates the availability of data and other information on the situation of — specifically — Muslims in Sweden, in the following areas: population, identity, education, employment, health and social protection, policing and security, and participation and citizenship. Part II addresses the policy context in Sweden, in particular with regard to the perception of Muslims, integration policy and administrative structures. Part III looks more specifically at the potential suitability of three cities in Sweden with significant Muslim populations for inclusion in the OSI “Muslims in the EU” city monitoring project — Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.

\(^1\) Full details on the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) can be found at www.eumap.org.
\(^2\) Full details on the Open Society Institute (OSI) can be found at www.soros.org.
\(^3\) The full report, as well as previous EUMAP reports on the situation of Muslims in France and Italy, can be found here: http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/britishmuslims
\(^4\) The methodology for the research papers is available on the EUMAP website (www.eumap.org)
Executive Summary

The Muslim population of Sweden is estimated at between 250,000 and 400,000, representing between 1.8 and 4.4 per cent of the Swedish population (around 9 million people). About half of the Muslim population is concentrated in the capital, Stockholm, and 10-15 per cent live in Göteborg, the second city. There are around 50,000 Muslims in the third city, Malmö. The Muslim community in Sweden is very heterogeneous, and is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously diverse. The main Muslim groups have origins in Turkey, Iran and the Balkans, and there are also important numbers of Arab, African and Pakistani Muslims. As for most EU countries, the history of the Muslim community in Sweden dates to the first labour migrations of the 1960s and 1970s, mainly from Turkey and the Balkans. From the 1980s on, however, most Muslim migrants arrived as refugees, fleeing conflicts and persecution.

Overall, a main finding of this research report is the difficulty of finding specific data on the Muslim community in Sweden. This is mainly due to Swedish legislation and regulations governing the collection of data on religious affiliation. Also relevant is Swedish integration policy, which views integration as a general process involving both Swedes and people with foreign backgrounds, but which does not make any distinction between ethnic categories or religious affiliations. Another problem, not limited to Sweden, is that of defining who exactly ‘counts’ as Muslim, and whether degree of religious practice should be taken into consideration.

Most research on Muslims in Sweden has dealt with organisational questions and religious questions, including conversions to Islam. Although general information is available in key areas such as health, housing, employment and education, it is very difficult to find any specific data on Muslims. As Muslims in Sweden belong to diverse ethnic groups, it is difficult to locate them according to criteria such as ethnicity, linguistic or national criteria. In the past, Muslims in Sweden mainly organised themselves according to their ethnic or cultural backgrounds, but younger Muslims are taking steps to forge a common Muslim identity. There have been many debates on how best to be both Muslim and Swedish. Research has mainly focused on the ethnic and religious aspects of Muslim identity, and there has also been some research on Muslim women and Islam.

There is no official data on the number of Muslims attending Swedish schools, and also a lack of data or research on the educational attainment levels of Muslims, specifically. In general, people with a foreign cultural background do less well in education than native Swedes, but there are important differences between the various ethnic groups and between the generations. For example, the Iranian community in Sweden is generally highly educated. There are nine Islamic independent confessional schools in Sweden, mostly located in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. There has been a lot of debate and media coverage devoted to these schools, particularly on whether they contribute to segregation.

There is evidence of segregation in the labour market, with even highly educated immigrants encountering difficulties in finding employment. But again, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, given the lack of disaggregated data. People with a foreign background are more likely to be unemployed than the rest of the population, but unemployment figures are not available broken down by ethnic groups. Many immigrants turn to self-employment as the solution to the problems they encounter. It is likely that Muslims experience the same
problems concerning access to the labour market as other immigrants. There have been several legal cases concerning the right of women to wear the hijab (headscarf).

There is also no specific data on the housing situation of Muslims. However, studies addressing housing, immigration and segregation in general, indicate that differences in living conditions between immigrants and native Swedes have been accentuated over the last decade. Immigrants, including Muslims, live mainly in the segregated, disadvantaged suburban areas of the main cities (particularly Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), which can pose another barrier to employment. There have been a number of important Government initiatives addressing segregation and housing, including the Metropolitan Policy.

Studies have also shown that immigrants and people living in disadvantaged areas are more likely to suffer from poor health than the rest of the population in Sweden. Data on the health situation of Muslims specifically is not available. However, there have been a number of publications addressing the specific needs of Muslims, including in regard to food and prayer rooms.

People with a foreign background are generally under-represented in the military and the police, despite initiatives to boost their numbers. Although the police do collect data on hate crimes, there is evidence that many Muslims refrain from reporting incidents of discrimination or Islamophobia, in many cases because they do not believe that appropriate action will be taken. As yet, there is only limited information on how Muslims have experienced the war on terrorism, since 2001. However, many Muslims believe that they have been subjected to greater monitoring and analysis, as well as increased levels of discrimination.

The majority of foreign-born people in Sweden have Swedish citizenship, which is obviously an important factor with respect to political participation. There are frequent debates in Sweden on citizenship, with immigrants often criticised for not having enough knowledge of the Swedish language, or of Swedish norms and values. Although precise data is not available, many Muslims in Sweden hold citizenship, and there have been cases of Muslims elected to local city councils or to the national parliament. To counter marginalisation and isolation, Muslim organisations have encouraged Muslims to vote. They have also raised specific demands with the main political parties (including with respect to halal slaughter, which is forbidden in Sweden), but with little success.

There is evidence that Swedes generally hold negative and preconceived views of Muslims and Islam, with many considering Islamic and Swedish values to be incompatible. For example, there is only limited public acceptance of Muslim women wearing the hijab, or other types of veil, in public. In general, public perceptions, and media coverage, on Muslims and Islam has become more negative since 2001. In 2005, the Committee against Islamophobia was founded, with the aim of combating intolerance and Islamophobia and putting these issues onto the political agenda.

Swedish policy on immigrants has also evolved in recent years. In 1997, Sweden changed its political agenda from an “immigration policy” to an “integration policy”, which focuses on a dual process of changing the attitudes of both “Swedes” and “immigrants”. Further changes are now expected, after the Social Democrats lost the 2006 general election to the Conservative Coalition. In general, Swedish integration policy has not differentiated between
the various ethnic groups, or according to gender or religious affiliation. Its main aims are to promote equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background; a community based on diversity; and a society characterised by mutual respect and tolerance.

The main body responsible for promoting integration is the Board of Integration, which was established in 1998; however, this body is due to be abolished from the end of 2006. The Board is supported by the Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, which is responsible to ensure the implementation of integration policy.
PART I: RESEARCH AND LITERATURE ON MUSLIMS

1. Population

1.1 Availability of data on Muslims in Sweden

As is the case with most Member States of the European Union (EU), the history of Islam and Muslims in Sweden dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, with the arrival of the first workforce migrants. Prior to World War II, the Muslim presence in Sweden was almost absent. In the last census that included statistical data on religious belief, in 1930, only 15 individuals were recorded as Muslims (Svanberg & Westerlund, 1999: 13).

To protect individual freedoms, it is against the law (the Personal Data Act) to collect personal data on religious belief in Sweden, and governmental bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include data that could be sensitive for the personal integrity of the individual. This would include, for example, records containing data on religious affiliation or sexual preferences. Organisations such as Muslim ones can keep internal records, but this material is not official. The estimated number of individuals with a Muslim cultural background who live in Sweden is therefore based on figures that could be related to migration patterns, ethnic categories and nationality.

Research and collection of data on Muslims residing in Sweden emerged mainly in the 1980s. Research in Sweden reflects the pattern in Europe and the USA. From earlier annotated bibliographies on Islam and Muslims in Europe, it is clear that several Swedish researchers have paid attention to various aspects of Islam and Muslim affairs in Sweden. (See, for example, the following: Sander 1996 and Larsson 2004, which specifically deals with literature on Sweden; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1994; Blaschke et al., 2002, which also includes data on Sweden.)

This literature review focuses mainly on literature and so-called “grey literature” that explicitly deals with Islam and Muslims in Sweden between 1996 and 2006. Where possible, reference has also been included to literature that deals, more generally, with ethnic groups that are predominantly Muslim — for example Turks, Iranians and Somalis.

Research on Islam and Muslims in Sweden has mainly focused on organisational structures, and the history of Islam in Sweden, and this bias is clearly reflected in this literature review. Most studies have been based on figures given in earlier research (for example, the research

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5 The Personal Data Act. Text available in Swedish at http://rixlex.riksdagen.se/htbin/thw?%24%7BOOHTML%7D=SFST_DOK&%24%7BSNHTML%7D=SFST_DOK&%24%7BERRR%24%7BBASE%7D=SFST&BET=1998%3A204&%24%7BTRIPSHOW%7D=format%3DTHW (accessed 2 December 2006).

6 The term “grey literature” refers to publications issued by government, academia, business and industry where publishing is not the primary business activity of the organisation. It comprises newsletters, reports, working papers, theses, government documents, bulletins, fact sheets, conference proceedings, newspaper reports and other publications. It covers literature that is not yet formally published and has therefore not been subjected to peer review processes.

7 Although the most important references are provided in the text and in footnotes, it would have been impossible to write the following report without the extensive research conducted by earlier researchers. The bibliography presented in Annex 1 is particularly relevant. The references in the text are limited and restricted to the most relevant research, (while more information is given in the bibliography.)
carried out by Åke Sander and Ingvar Svanberg). Most data is repeated, with little fresh data appearing. This is by no means a criticism of those researchers who have laid the foundations for the academic study of Islam and Muslims in Sweden. However, it is a fact that knowledge of the situation and history of Islam and Muslims in Sweden is fairly limited and poor. While earlier researchers based their reports on interviews, field studies and surveys, most recent studies have been based on more limited data and more in-depth focused interviews. From this point of view, research on Islam and Muslims in Sweden has become more specialised and focused on specific topics. The earlier research had a tendency to be more general and broad in its approach.

Important data on housing, education, labour market and violence, can be retrieved from the reports produced by the Raxen network (European Racism and Xenophobia Information Network) of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), in Vienna. These data provide a general background, but they seldom contain any specific information about Muslims living in Sweden. However, the figures given for people with foreign backgrounds are of course of relevance also for Muslims.8

1.2 Muslim population estimates

The Muslim community in Sweden is very heterogeneous and complex. It encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, and a wide range of language variations. It is therefore not possible to analyse, present or view the Swedish Muslim community as a homogeneous phenomenon or a static group, and it is more correct to speak about Muslim communities in the plural. Despite, or perhaps because of, this complex background, most researchers have struggled hard to include information on the size and background of the Muslim population residing in Sweden, from the early publications on Islam and Muslims in the 1980s, up to the present day.

In the absence of reliable statistical data on religious affiliation, a large part of the research literature has focused on methodological problems related to the problem of counting or estimating the number of Muslims. Researchers such as Åke Sander (1990a; 1993a; 1994; 1997; Sander & Larsson, 2002) and Ingvar Svanberg (1993; 1995c) have paid close attention to the methodological problems that come with counting a group that is difficult to define.9 They have all reached the same conclusion — and this is also valid for the rest of Europe — namely, that it is very difficult to estimate the number of Muslims in Sweden if we lack common definitions of who is a Muslim. Due to the lack of a common definition, most estimates of the number of Muslims are based on simplifications or normative assumptions. Key methodological issues that researchers have faced include decisions on whom to include in a study of Muslims, in other words deciding who is a Muslim. Should the data only cover and include Muslims who are active and believing Muslims, or should the definition be wider and include persons who belong to a Muslim cultural tradition? Is a Muslim name enough for someone to be included in the Muslim category (see, for example, Brown, 2000)?

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From a numerical point of view, individuals with a Muslim cultural background make up an important part of the immigrant population of Sweden. With the help of data on migration patterns it is possible to make an indirect approximation of the number of Muslims residing in Sweden. Table 1, below, is taken from Sander and Larsson’s report on Islamophobia in the 25 EU Member States, written for the EUMC (forthcoming). The figures in the table are estimated on the basis of the national background and ethnicity of immigrants with foreign backgrounds in Sweden.

Table 1. Estimated Muslim population (1970–2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sander and Larsson (forthcoming)

Although some researchers have tried to break down the above figures according to ethnic categories, this process has proved to be difficult (Lappalainen, 2004: 45). All exact figures on ethnic background and the number of Muslims should be reviewed critically, and it should also be remembered that all figures are based on problematic approximations.

Instead of repeating figures that could be found in, for example, Sander (2004), this report will only highlight some of the most important aspects of the arrival and characteristics of some Muslim groups residing in Sweden. According to Sander, it is possible to divide the Muslim community in Sweden into seven different sub-groups: the Turkish Muslims, the “Arab” Muslims, the Iranian Muslims, the African Muslims, the Pakistani Muslims, the Balkan Muslims and others (Sander, 2004: 219). However, although many Muslims have come from countries such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Bosnia and Somalia, it is important to stress the point that Muslims in Sweden come from more or less all regions of the world. The Muslim community in Sweden is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously diverse.

The Muslim population of Sweden is estimated as being between 250,000 and 350,000 (compare, for example, Dittrich, 2006: 52, Sander & Larsson, 2002: 106–107, and Stenberg,

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10 Åke Sander and Göran Larsson, *The Situation of Muslim Communities in the EU — Manifestations of Islamophobia*. Vienna: EUMC (forthcoming). The title of this volume is preliminary and the date for its publication is unclear at the time of writing this report.

1999: 65). This compares to a total Swedish population of 9 million. Thus, Muslims constitute “1.8 per cent to 3.5 per cent” of the population in Sweden (Roald, 2002: 102).

According to figures given by the Samarbetsnämnden för statsbidrag till trossamfund (the Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities, SST), one third of Muslims in Sweden indicate that they are practising (i.e. they follow the prescribed laws of Islam and they regularly visit mosques and pray on a daily basis), while the remainder are secularised (i.e. they do not follow the laws of Islam and they see a separation between religion and State).12

According to the national statistics agency, Statistiska centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden, SCB), in 2005 5.3 per cent of the total Swedish population (or 479,899 people) were “citizens with a foreign background” (i.e. people born outside the Nordic countries),13 and 12.4 per cent (1,125,790 people) were born outside Sweden (and/or had two parents born outside Sweden).14

As shown below in Tables 2 and 3, Paul Lappalainen also presents statistical data for 2002 in his Analytical Report on Legislation for the Raxen National Focal Point Sweden, which provides an overview of the Swedish population. The data provided by Lappalainen reveal that the majority of foreign-born people in Sweden are Swedish citizens, as are those born in Sweden with two foreign parents.

Table 2. Demography — breakdown by country of birth and citizenship (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Swedish citizens</th>
<th>Foreign citizens</th>
<th>Total (Swedish citizens and foreign citizens)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>As a share of total population (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>653,994</td>
<td>1,053,463</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Sweden with two foreign-born parents</td>
<td>255,984</td>
<td>304,751</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One foreign-born parent and one native-born parent</td>
<td>533,794</td>
<td>553,772</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Sweden with two native-born parents</td>
<td>7,022,917</td>
<td>7,028,802</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,466,689</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,940,788</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Lappalainen, 200415

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14 This source indicates a total population of Sweden at the time of 9,047,752 people. Data available in Swedish on the SCB website at http://www.scb.se/templates/tableOrChart___26040.asp (accessed 2 December 2006).
Table 3. The five major foreign-born groups — breakdown by country of birth (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>191,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>74,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>62,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>52,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>52,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>434,353</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lappalainen, 2004

1.3 The main waves of Muslim immigration to Sweden

Regardless of methodological problems, it is nevertheless possible to outline a general history of Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Leaving aside the early history of Swedish contacts with the Muslim world, dating back to at least the sixteenth century (on this period, see, for example, Ådahl et al., 2002), the development of a significant Muslim presence in Sweden is dated to the period after World War II (see, for example, Svanberg & Westerlund, 1999, and Sander, 1991).

The first Muslim immigrants that came to Sweden were the Tatars who arrived from Finland and the Baltic region after World War II (Otterbeck, 1998). However, the number of Tatars was low, and immigration from the Muslim world started first at the end of the 1960s. From the 1960s up to approximately 1985, the immigration of Muslims to Sweden came primarily from Turkey and the Balkans. (On Turks in Sweden, see Svanberg, 1985, 1989 and 1995; on Bosnians, see Gustavsson & Magnusson, 1989, and Eastmond, 1998.) These first “Muslim” immigrants to Sweden were both people who were recruited by Swedish companies and people who were looking for jobs in Sweden, for example in heavy industry. They settled mainly in the three largest cities in Sweden — Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. This group consisted mainly of single men who came to Sweden in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

From the mid-1970s, the families and relatives of the first workforce migrants started to arrive in Sweden. Resembling many other Muslim groups, members of the Turkish community maintained a belief that they would return to Turkey. Many early workforce migrants seem to have shared this idea, and it slowed down the integration process in Sweden. It seems that this is one of the reasons why many early immigrants did not prioritise integration. However, other researchers argue that it is Swedish society and the “Swedes” that did not accept the Muslims and it is the attitudes of the “Swedes” that hindered Muslims from being integrated (see Roald, 2002: 105). For those who were religious, rituals were conducted in private, and prior to the end of the 1970s few Muslim and Islamic organisations were set up. Although from 1951, the law of freedom of religion (Religious Liberty Act) gave Muslims in Sweden


17 By “Islamic institution” I refer to mosques, Qur’anic schools, and so on, but Muslim institutions are a much broader category. Muslim organisations have their basis in local, regional or national traditions and cultures. See Sander (2004: 225).
the right to practise Islam, few mosques were available at that time and most Muslims practised their religion in privacy (on the freedom of religion, see Alwall, 1998). From an academic point of view, there are hardly any data for this period. Today (2006) six purpose-built mosques exist in Sweden (four Sunni Muslim mosques, in Malmö, Stockholm, Västerås and Uppsala, one Shia mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadiyya mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, and it was started in 1976). Currently there are plans for building mosques in Skövde, Växjö, Umeå and Göteborg.\footnote{This information is taken from Jonas Otterbeck’s online article on mosques from the Nationalencyclopedin (www.ne.se).}

During the 1980s — following the revolution in Iran in 1979 and the war between Iran and Iraq — Iranian immigrants became an important group (see, for example, Eyrumlu, 1997, Liliequist, 1996, and Utas, 1989). A large number of Iranians who came to Sweden were also exchange students at universities in Sweden. For example, at the time of the revolution 2,200 Iranian citizens were living in Sweden (Utas, 1989: 176). After the revolution and the following war with Iraq the number of political refugees increased. Compared to other Muslims, many Iranians chose to live a secular life in Sweden.

Due to developments in Iran after the revolution, many Iranians were hostile to religion, especially to Islam (see Liliequist, 1996, and Thurfjell, 1999: 36–37). However, in the 1990s Iranian and Shia Muslim community organisations were set up, for example in Stockholm. The end of the 1990s saw the number of Shia Muslims, predominantly of an Iranian background, in Sweden estimated as being approximately 60,000 (Thurfjell, 1999: 33). Besides Iranians, the Shia community consists also of people from Lebanon, Iraq and Uganda.

If the 1970s, and partly also the 1980s, were dominated by workforce and family migration, refugee migrants dominated in the 1990s. As in the rest of Europe, migration to Sweden in the 1990s closely follows the pattern of international conflicts and crises. For example, in the 1990s a large number of Kosovo Albanians arrived in Sweden after the ethnic conflicts had increased in the Balkans,\footnote{Prior to this period Albanians had also arrived as guest-workers in Sweden from the former Yugoslavia, but this group was not seen as political refugees (they were part of the workforce migration). See Magnusson (1989).} and at the beginning of the 1990s the Somali community (Helander, 1989; Johnsdotter, 2002) and the Bosnian community grew in importance (Gustavsson & Magnusson, 1989; Eastmond, 1998). Sander (2004: 223) reports, for example, that around 150,000 people from the former Yugoslavia applied for asylum in Sweden between 1990 and 1993 (and a large number of these asylum seekers were of a Muslim background). In 2004, 16,000 Somalis and 12,000 Ethiopians were estimated as living in Sweden (Sander, 2004: 222).

The total number of converts to Islam in Sweden is fairly low, estimated as being between 1,000 and 3,000 people, according to Roald (2002:102). See section 2.3 for further details.

In 1963 the Swedish Government decided to grant citizenship to anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years (see, for example, Roald, 2002). In 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s the question of dual citizenship was also debated (Roald, 2002: 103–104), and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual citizenship (Lappalainen, 2004: 5). On
the basis of existing data it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish citizenship, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden.

1.4 Patterns of settlement
The large majority of Muslims who have immigrated to Sweden have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö — the three largest cities in Sweden. Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. For example, Trollhättan, on the west coast of Sweden, close to Göteborg, received a large number of Muslims in the 1970s because they could offer jobs in the Saab car factory (Thurfjell, 1999; Westin, 2002). Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are problematic and uncertain. However, a discussion about the number of Muslims in the three cities is presented in Part III of this report.
2. Identity

2.1 Muslim ethnic identities in Sweden

Muslims in Sweden have mainly been organised according to ethnic or cultural patterns (see, for example, Sander, 1991). A large number of studies on Islam and Muslims in Sweden have focused on organisational structures and the internal struggle for power and influence that have divided Muslims living in Sweden.

The ethnologist Ingvar Svanberg, the migration researcher Charles Westin and the sociologist Åke Sander have published extensively on a number of ethnic Muslim communities. For example, Westin’s research has focused on the so-called Ugandan Asians, a group of Muslims who migrated from Uganda in the 1970s due to the political instability in Uganda. This small group lives mainly in Trollhättan, on the west coast of Sweden. Furthermore, Arabs, Turks, Somalis, Bosnians, Iranians, and smaller communities such as the Tatars (Muslims from Eastern Europe and Finland who came to Sweden in the 1940s after World War II), have been the object of several studies. Most studies have focused on the history and organisation of the ethnic group in question. See, for example, the following: Sander (1991); Sander (1996); Sander & Larsson (2002); Stenberg (2002) On Turks, specifically, see the following: Kuusela (1993); Soydan (1978); Svanberg (1985); Svanberg (1989); Svanberg (1995); Tolonen (1997); Turunç (1992).

2.2 Religious identities

Another important aspect of the study of Islam and Muslims in Sweden is the debate and analysis concerning the opinion against the building of mosques in Sweden.

This topic has been studied especially by Pia Karlsson and Ingvar Svanberg. The studies by Karlsson and Svanberg (see Annex 1. Bibliography) illustrate generally the fact that many Swedes have been reluctant to accept the building of proper mosques, and that the debate about mosques is closely related to issues of discrimination and racism in society. However, Karlsson and Svanberg also show that the Swedish administration has been slow, but fair, in its evaluation of plans for building mosques.

It is also evident that there are few purpose-built mosques in Sweden and that most Muslims are restricted to so-called “basement mosques” (and some of these basement mosques are not officially registered). As of 2006, there are six purpose-built mosques in Sweden — four Sunni Muslim mosques (in Stockholm, Malmö, Uppsala and Västerås), one Shia mosque (in Trollhättan), and one Ahmadiyya mosque (in Göteborg). In Göteborg, there are an estimated 15–20 basement mosques (depending on the definition of “basement mosque”).

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Stockholm, there are approximately 20 basement mosques, and in Malmö, 13 (see Part III: City Selection). However, any estimate of the number of mosques in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö is problematic, and these figures should be read critically.

Until the end of the 1980s, Muslims were organised on the basis of linguistic or ethnic groups (see, for example, Svanberg & Westerlund, 1999: 15–18, and Sander, 1991). With the establishment of purpose-built mosques (for example in Stockholm) the ethnic and theological divisions have been reduced but not erased. The purpose-built mosques are in general more attractive to a large variety of Muslims, as they are better located and have more functional facilities, as well as being larger and more beautiful than so-called basement mosques. Due to these advantages they are more practical and more symbolically charged than earlier basement mosques. Furthermore, many youth organisations have also started youth groups inside these mosques, and they are in general less limited by ethnic or cultural boundaries (see, for example, Larsson, 2003c). It should also be pointed out that the establishment of purpose-built mosques does not solve all the theological differences and tensions within the Muslim community. For example, in Malmö several groups have left the purpose-built mosque and started congregations on their own. Similar tensions are also present in Stockholm.

There is also a difference between and among the generations. Younger Muslims seem to be less interested in maintaining the divisions between the various ethnic groups. For example, the largest youth organisation, Sveriges unga muslimer (Sweden’s Young Muslims, SUM), is based on the Islamic faith, not on a specific ethnic affiliation (on this organisation, see, for example, Larsson, 2003c, Schmidt, 2002, and Schmidt, 2004). This organisation was started in 1995, and it has approximately 10,000 members, and is constituted of 40 local organisations.

According to SUM, the essential question for Muslims living in Sweden is to find a way of being both Muslim and Swedish (an argument that resembles, for example, the ideas of Tariq Ramadan). Several spokespersons are also trying to promote a so-called “blue-and-yellow” Islam — an expression evoking the colours of the Swedish flag (see, for example, Larsson, 2001, and Sander & Larsson, 2002). Although the study of generational differences has so far been poor, some researchers have focused on Muslim youth organisations and the use of new information and communication technologies (Larsson, 2003a; 2003b; 2004; 2005; Roald, 2001a; 2001b; 2003; Schmidt, 1999).

2.3 Converts to Islam

During the last decade, the importance of Swedish converts to Islam has been emphasised by both Muslim and non-Muslim researchers. (See, for example, the research by Roald, Ouis, Sander, Larsson, Westerlund, Sultán and Månsson.) Although the total number of converts is fairly low — approximately 1,000 to 3,000 persons, according to Roald (2002: 102) — the converts play an important role, as they often function as intermediaries between Swedish and Muslim communities and worldviews. The importance of this group of Muslims is due mainly to the fact that they function easily as mediators between the majority and minority cultures.

24 See website of Sveriges unga muslimer (Sweden’s Young Muslims, SUM), in Swedish, at http://www.ungamuslimer.nu/
They speak the Swedish language fluently, and are accustomed to both cultures. The importance of this group — especially of younger converts — was clearly demonstrated after the September 11 terror attack on the United States (Larsson, 2003b). When Muslims were invited onto talk shows on television or radio, many journalists chose to talk to young converts to Islam (mainly because they speak Swedish and they are familiar with the so-called Swedish culture and debate). In Sweden, several Muslim women converts — including, for example, Anne Sofie Roald and Pernilla Ouis (see Annex 1. Bibliography) — have played an important role in the media and the academic world.

Although the number of Swedish converts to Islam is low, some important studies have been carried out in this area. For example, Anne Sofie Roald (2004), Madeleine Sultán (1997; 1999; 2006) and Anna Månsson (1997; 2000; 2002; 2003) have collected and analysed important data. Roald estimates that between 1,000 and 3,000 individuals have converted to Islam (Roald, 2002: 102). Their studies have also paid attention to the reasons for conversion. This is often related to marriage, but converts have been attracted by the perception that Islam provides values that are different from Swedish values and that it provides believers with strict rules and regulations (see, for example, Sultán and Månsson).

Few studies have focused on “ordinary” non-Muslim Swedish males who have converted to Islam. Thomas Gerholm (1987 and 1988) deals with well-known Swedes who have converted to Islam — for example the artist Ivan Agueli (1861–1937) — while most other empirically oriented studies have so far focused on women converts. Despite their small number, the study of converts is actually one of the most heavily investigated research areas, at least with regard to the number of studies that have focused on this topic.

2.4 Muslim female identity

A large number of studies have also focused on Muslim women and Islam (for example, the following: Gustafsson, 1993; Hedlund, 1996; Karlsson, 1998; Karlsson, 2000; Mogård, 1984; Ornbrant, 1989; Ouis & Roald, 2003; Ouis, 2001).

For example, Anne Sofie Roald (1999) has carried out research among organised Muslim women, namely Islamic women’s organisations in Sweden (see also Larsson, 2001). Pia Karlsson is also conducting research among young Muslim women, and Madeleine Sultán Sjöqvist has published a thesis on women converts (2006).

Sara Johnsdotter has studied the discourse about female circumcision among Somalis in Sweden (Johnsdotter, 2002, and see also Stenberg, 2001). At the time of writing her thesis there were no documented cases of female circumcision in Sweden (however, in Summer 2006 two court cases documented the existence of this practice in the country). Johnsdotter focused her study on the debate about female circumcision that is ongoing and negotiated within the Somali community in Sweden.26


26 A short abstract from Johnsdotter’s study (in English) can be downloaded from http://theses.lub.lu.se/postgrad/search.tkl?field_query1=pubid&query1=soc_383&recordformat=display (accessed 10 December 2006).
2.5 Other areas of research
Some studies have also paid attention to clashes of cultural values and identities in Swedish schools, especially in relation to the celebration of Christian holidays, such as Christmas and Easter (Freudenthal, 1985; Fruitman & Fazlhashemi, 1996; Kanjah, 1988; Narrowe, 1985). Other studies have also addressed inter-religious marriages — that is, marriages between a Muslim and a non-Muslim (Haque, 1977) — and childhood and child rearing (Von Hirsch, 1996). Jonas Otterbeck has also studied the establishment and importance of a Muslim journal published in Swedish. His research on this topic focuses on identity process, globalisation and trans-nationalism (Otterbeck, 2000). Few studies have actually focused on the religious development in Sweden, and no studies have so far focused on, for example, the preaching and teaching of Islam in mosques in Sweden.
3. Education

3.1 Muslims and the Swedish education system
In accordance with the Education Act, and as detailed by the Skolverket (the Swedish National Agency for Education) — the governmental body that is responsible for education and schooling in Sweden — education is free of charge, and all children between the ages of 7 and 16 must attend school (if the parents wish, a child can start school one year earlier, at the age of six). The law does not make any difference or exceptions because of religious affiliation, ethnicity, gender, and so on. Municipalities have an obligation to provide a place for all six-year-olds in a pre-school class.

The Swedish Parliament and the Government lay down the curriculum, and national objectives and guidelines for the public education system, but most schools are run by the local municipalities or by independent schools (see below). It is possible for parents to be involved in schools via, for example, school boards and other parents’ associations. Pupils do not have to sit exams at the end of their compulsory school. The Swedish Government follows a policy according to which approximately 50 per cent of the population should go on to higher and further education at university colleges and universities. Although the numbers of students who continue and study at universities have increased during the last decade, pupils with a foreign background are less likely to continue at the university level.

Due to the statistical situation and current laws on personal integrity in Sweden, it is not possible to give a number of Muslim pupils attending schools. This lack is related both to regulations for collecting personal information, for example, regarding religious affiliation, and to the problem of defining who is a Muslim. Thus, it is not possible to say anything specific about Muslim attainment or achievement within the school system. However, as discussed below, people with a foreign cultural background are more likely to have poorer results in school as compared to native-born “Swedes” (Roald, 2002: 102). Diana Mulinari says the following:

In the year 2000 about 11 per cent of all 15-year-old students in Sweden had a foreign background. Although it cannot be demonstrated that children/youth with a foreign background actually failed in the public educational system at primary and secondary levels, there seem to be considerable discrepancies between their results and those of the average Swedish children. […] There are serious differences in performance and career choices between the natives and immigrants that cannot be reduced to class background (Mulinari, 2004: 6).

3.2 Muslims and educational attainment
No study has so far focused on the general educational level among Muslim immigrants or Muslims residing in Sweden. Some data on education results on a national level for so-called pupils with Swedish and foreign backgrounds can be retrieved from the Skolverket, but these data do not distinguish Muslims from other groups.

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27 Basic information about the Swedish education system (also in English) can be found on the website of Skolverket (the Swedish National Agency for Education) at www.skolverket.se (accessed 2 December 2006).
28 See Skolverket website (www.skolverket.se).
The Muslim community in Sweden is very heterogeneous, and first-generation immigrants included both highly educated individuals (especially Iranians who came to Sweden after the revolution in 1979, and Iraqis in the 1980s) and poorly educated persons (for example from East Africa, for which see Roald, 2002: 102). From more general studies and reports from the Board of Integration, it is evident that immigrants are often poorly educated in comparison to the general level of the Swedish population. People with a foreign background in Sweden also run the risk of lagging behind in the general education school system. However, it is necessary to be careful and distinguish between different ethnic groups, and between the second and third generations of Muslims who are born in Sweden.

For example, according to SCB figures, people of Iranian and Polish backgrounds had, in general, higher levels of education than the general population in Sweden:

Compared to people born in Sweden, foreign-born persons have a somewhat lower level of education. Regarding higher education, this difference is only slight, with 34 per cent of persons born in Sweden having post-upper secondary education compared to 32 per cent of foreign-born persons. However, foreign-born persons who have only compulsory school education outnumber Swedish-born persons at the same educational level. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences among the various immigrant groups, largely because the age structure and reasons for immigration vary among groups. Several large groups of immigrants have a considerably higher educational level than persons born in Sweden. Among persons born in Poland and Iran, two of the ten largest countries of birth in Sweden, 25 per cent of those aged 25–64 have at least three years of post-secondary education.

However, immigrants with qualifications from non-Western States have faced difficulties in securing employment commensurate with their educational status. They often face difficulties in having their diplomas evaluated and compared to Swedish diplomas (see Englund, 2003a: 3).

Sociologist Marie Carlson (2003) has studied the educational programmes for immigrants, in particular the Swedish Language Courses for Immigrants (Svenska för invandrare, SFI). One of her conclusions is as follows:

The analysis shows that SFI rests upon a “Swedish model of society” anchored in a top-down perspective on welfare and strong educational optimism. The speech of SFI educators and other employees, as well as texts in SFI documents, research and debate, presupposes “the Swedish” as the norm, even if not always consciously. They jointly sustain numerous “deficiency discourses” and the study shows that SFI participants are often subjected to corrective efforts and a partially fostering attitude. In addition, when SFI participants are hence positioned as “the others”, a preoccupation with “the Swedish” occurs, which can be understood as an ongoing construction and cultivation of the social majority's own ethnicity.

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30 The Board of Integration is a governmental body that operates on the national level. For further information, see section II.2.1.
32 Marie Carlson (2003), English summary of Doctoral Dissertation at the Department of Sociology, Göteborg University (in Swedish), *Swedish Language Courses for Immigrants (SFI) Bridge or Border? On Views of*
The study of intercultural pedagogics (often including questions related to the achievements of students with foreign cultural backgrounds as well as discrimination within Swedish schools) is a fairly new research area. Pedagogues such as Pirjo Lahdenperä (2004) and Kerstin von Brömssen (2003) have conducted research on intercultural pedagogics in Sweden.33

3.3 Religious education in schools
The study of religion is a compulsory subject in Swedish schools, and thus it is obligatory for all students to read about the world religions, as well as non-religious ethical principles and philosophies. However, this system is not a guarantee that pupils will obtain a more complex or a richer knowledge about Islam. The Board of Integration has noted that the level of knowledge about Islam is low in Sweden (see below).

There are studies on how Islam and Muslims have been analysed and presented in educational materials (especially within the school curriculum). The image of Islam and Muslims in educational materials has been studied by, for example, Jonas Otterbeck (1994; 1996; 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2000b; 2000c; 2001; 2004) and Kjell Härenstam (1983; 1984). Although the images of Islam and Muslims have been modified and improved during the last decade, many problems and stereotypical images are still today presented in schools. A general problem is that Islam is often presented as something different from other world religions. For example, gender equality is always debated when Islam is taught in schools, but the same is not the case for other religions, and this selection thus runs the risk of presenting Islam and Muslims as something different from other faiths and believers (see Otterbeck, 2004).

3.4 Independent Islamic schools
Several researchers have studied the history and rise of independent Islamic schools in Sweden (Gerle, 1997, 1999; Berglund, 2004, 2006; Brattlund, 2002; Francia, 1998a, 1998b; Gustavsson, 2000; Aretun, 2004).34 This research has mainly focused on the debate about Islamic independent schools and the tension between the public and independent school system (see Gerle and Francia above). This discussion is closely related to more general questions regarding the multicultural society and the transformation of Swedish society. However, Aretun, Berglund and Gustavsson are doing field research among Islamic independent schools and they have focused on questions that are related to gender issues, pedagogies and identity processes among young Muslims.

Since the juridical system was changed for the setting up of schools in 1992 it has become much easier to set up independent schools in Sweden, and the Swedish National Agency for Education has provided financial support to a rising number of independent schools. However, it is important to note that independent schools are restricted by the national...
guidelines for education (as these guidelines are shared by all schools in Sweden), and must work according to standards set out in these documents. Thus, teaching must support democracy, freedom of speech, equality between the sexes, human rights and fundamental “Swedish values” (i.e. the ethical and moral principles of Sweden, in Swedish called värdegrunden). The schools must teach children about all world religions (by following, as is necessary for all schools, the national curriculum for religious education), and should not be biased or judgemental against other faiths or worldviews; such education should be pluralistic and inclusive in its approach.35

According the figures provided by the Swedish National Agency for Education, independent schools can be divided into three categories: so-called religious schools (confessional schools), schools following the Rudolph Steiner pedagogical method, and general independent schools (this is a very broad category that includes mainly pedagogical varieties). The confessional schools include Christian, Muslim and Jewish schools.

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<th>Table 4. Independent schools in Sweden (2006)</th>
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<td>Confessional</td>
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<th>Table 5. Independent confessional schools in Sweden (2006)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compulsory</td>
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<td>Upper secondary</td>
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Source: Berglund and Larsson (forthcoming)

The development of Islamic independent schools is a heavily debated issue in the Swedish media and public discourse. It is a question that roughly divides society into two distinct camps (see the following: Gerle, 1997; 1999, Berglund, 2004; 2005, Brattlund, 2002; Francia, 1998a, 1998b; Gustavsson, 2000; Aretun, 2004). On the one hand, those who are supportive of independent Islamic schools focus on the importance of diversity and choice in educational provision. The critics believe that these schools are dividing society, by producing and upholding segregation and preventing integration, by isolating and separating Muslim and non-Muslim schoolchildren. This criticism could be of a general nature (i.e. against all forms of religious schools, and also non-confessional independent schools, since they all contribute to a segregation of society based on financial and living conditions), but it could also be directed specifically against Islamic schools. The so-called Islamic schools are often portrayed in the media as the typical model for a religious school (see Mulinar, 2004).

35 A comparative study of religious independent schools is being prepared by Jenny Berglund and Göran Larsson (forthcoming).
36 The large majority of these schools are located in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.
3.5 Education programmes for the training of imams

Another subject related to education is the training of imams (see, for example, Kielan, 2002). Although some Muslims have tried to start a programme for the education for Swedish imams, the results have so far been very poor (no imams have graduated from these education programmes).

This issue has been much debated, by Muslims as well as by politicians in Sweden. The head of the Board of Integration (up until the election of 2006), Jens Orback, supports the education of imams in Sweden. He believes that they will foster integration and curb interpretations of Islam that work against integration (Brinkemo, 2005). At the moment, it seems that the Swedish Government’s primary interest is in the question of integration. It is my impression that they have little insight into or interest in the theological debate and qualifications of an imam.

Amongst Muslims, there is a wide range of opinions about the creation of imam education programmes in Europe. Some seem to disapprove of this development, arguing that it is not possible to educate imams in Europe, and that they have to be educated in the Muslim world. Others argue that it is both possible and necessary to educate “European imams” — i.e., imams that know the language of the host country, as well as its cultural norms and values. If an imam has these skills, he should be in a position to help the Muslim community to become integrated without losing its Islamic identity. It is argued that such imams are needed to counter segregation and radicalisation in Europe (see Klausen, 2006).

In Sweden, the former Minister of Integration, Jens Orback, has even said in the media that he is supportive of the setting up of an education system for imams in Sweden. However, while the Swedish Government is mainly interested in supporting these kinds of educational institutions in order to be able to foster integration and democratisation, and curb radicalisation, the Muslim community is mainly interested in this training programme for theological reasons.

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37 See Per Brinkemo (2005), “Jag tror att en statlig imam utbildning vore bra” [“I believe that an imam education supported by the State would be good”], SvD 1/12 2005, at http://www.svd.se/dynamiskt/idag/did_11171458.asp.
39 See Brinkemo (2005).
4. Employment

4.1 Access to the labour market for people in Sweden born outside the EU

In the summary of the EUMC Raxen Country Report on Employment for Sweden it is clear that the labour market is “greatly segregated, not only regarding gender but also regarding ethnicity” and “even highly educated immigrants have difficulties getting jobs within their professions” (Englund, 2003a: 3). This problem is even more relevant for foreign-born people who hold a so-called foreign diploma, that is, a diploma earned outside Sweden, especially outside the EU. The report also outlines the fact that “the African-born and Asian-born immigrants are the groups most likely to be unemployed or subjected to discrimination in the Swedish labour market” (Englund, 2003a: 3).

From a Swedish point of view, access to the labour market and employment is the most commonly used tool for evaluating integration. In general, discrimination in the labour market, employment and occupation is one of the most common complaints within the EU (Sander, 2004: 288), and in Sweden it is a serious problem, which is often debated. The Raxen report states that ethnic harassment of and discrimination against job seekers (based on their ethnicity, skin colour, religious affiliation, and so on) are common problems in the labour market in Sweden. Although the media and several governmental bodies highlight the problem, it is clear that there is a “large amount of hidden statistics” (Englund, 2003a: 4).

Although Sweden has had its discussions on the question of the wearing of the hijab and employment discrimination, there is limited literature looking specifically at Muslims in the labour market (see, for example, Sander, 2004). This could be explained by the fact that it is prohibited to collect data on religious affiliation and that data based on ethnicity is difficult to evaluate, and hence it is very difficult to single out Muslims from other workforce groups.

In general, due to restrictions on data collection (see section 1.1), Swedish data on unemployment figures do not differentiate between different ethnic groups, but only between people born in Sweden and people born outside Sweden. Because of this policy, it is very difficult to estimate the unemployment figures for a specific ethnic or religious group.

All available figures indicate that people with a foreign background — and especially those who live in disadvantaged areas — are much more likely to be unemployed than the rest of the population (i.e. native-born Swedes) (Integrationsverket (Board of Intergation), Rapport integration 2005; Englund, 2003a). Muslims form an important section of the people who have a foreign background and who live in disadvantaged areas, and they are therefore likely to have high levels of unemployment (Englund, 2003a: 3).

According to the latest statistics (2005) given by the Board of Integration, 81 per cent of the population (age 20–64) born in Sweden were employed, whereas the equivalent figure for people born outside Sweden was 64 per cent (Integrationsverket, Rapport Integration 2005: 13). Since immigrants are more likely to be unemployed, or employed in sectors that do not match their education or training levels, it is clear that many people of a non-Swedish background are not integrated into Swedish society (Sander, 2004: 289).

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4.2 Discrimination in the labour market and other barriers to employment

Research indicates that many immigrants suffer from unemployment and discrimination in the labour market. To have a “black skin” or to be Muslim is clearly a negative factor in the Swedish labour market, and such people are more likely to be unemployed than are other groups in society, according to Sander (2004: 293). This is illustrated by two incidents from Summer 2006. The first legal case that was reported by the media was that of a young Muslim girl who was denied a job in an amusement park in Göteborg (Liseberg) because she was wearing a *hijab*. After a debate and some media coverage, the girl won the case and she was given the job despite the fact that she wore a *hijab*.

In the second case a young Muslim female convert was denied a job at a care centre for elderly people because she was wearing what she regarded as Muslim attire; this included both the *hijab* and a dress with long sleeves. She was denied the job because the management decided that it was not hygienic to wear a dress with long sleeves. At the time of writing this report this case is not settled, and the question is rather complex and complicated, since most hospitals in Sweden have a policy that prevents nurses and doctors from wearing clothes with long sleeves, on the grounds of health and hygiene. The case therefore has important implications for many Muslims (especially women) who work in the health sector. However, in the data provided by the Board of Integration, it is clear that public opinion on the headscarf is divided and complex, and that attitudes vary according to different situations. They write as follows:

The strongest support for wearing a headscarf is in public places (in the street), where almost a quarter are entirely or partly positive, whereas the weakest support applies to “ID cards”, where only 12 per cent on the whole are entirely or partly positive. A general tendency in 2004 and 2005 is that those who are against the wearing of scarves are in the majority. However, the numbers of those who are entirely positive and those who decline to express an opinion are on the increase.41

As mentioned in the previous section, for immigrants holding a degree or university diploma, if this comes from an institution outside the EU, this may not be a guarantee of securing a job (see Englund, 2003a). According to Sander, as well as being a very depressing situation for many well-educated immigrants, this will have a negative effect on the next generation:

One sees immigrants, in many cases a well-educated father and mother, getting their job applications constantly rejected. If they succeed in finding a job, it is most likely to be in an unskilled position in a factory, in a cleaning service or in the retail trade, something that is very demoralising for the study and work ethics of immigrant children. It is a situation that convinces many children of immigrants that for them education is not an advantage for getting a better life (Sander, 2004: 296).

If this observation is correct, Sweden is facing a serious problem that will have negative effects on society and its economy in the near future. Although few, if any, studies on the labour market and employment have focused on Muslims, the evidence so far indicates that it is likely that Muslims suffer from the problems concerning employment experienced by immigrants in general. However, we do not know the extent or nature of the problems that they are experiencing.

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41 Integrationsverket *Integrationsbarometer 2005*, p. 37.
An interview study with Muslim leaders and theologians (Sander, 2004) informs us that women who wear the *hijab*, Muslim males who grow a beard, or Muslims who try to observe the time for prayer often face serious problems in the labour market. To put it another way, the general problems that most immigrants have to overcome in the Swedish labour market are even more severe for Muslims. It is also clear that most Swedish employers are insensitive to Muslim demands, such as “a proper place to practise *salat* and time off work to do so, a few hours off work on Friday to go to the mosque for *salat al-Juma*, leave to celebrate Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, *halal* food in the canteen”, or are “insensitive to women wearing the *hijab* at work” (Sander, 2004: 297).

Many immigrants have tried to solve the problems that they face in the labour market by self-employment, and in 1999 “every fifth business was established by a person of foreign origin” (Englund, 2003a: 25). However, according to Sander’s analysis, supported by several other researchers, self-employment has a tendency to increase the segregation in society. According to some researchers, self-employment among immigrants is even viewed as a kind of “neo-slavery” (Sander, 2004: 301). Most self-employed businesses are small, and the main branches are “merchandise, restaurants, cleaning services and barbershops.” (Englund, 2003a: 255).

From 1999 a number of initiatives have been launched by the Swedish Government to combat racism and discrimination in society (including the labour market). In 2001, the Swedish Government launched a National Action plan against racism, xenophobia, homophobia and discrimination (see Englund, 2003: 27), and the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination and the Integration Board were told to focus on these problems in their work. Governmental bodies, as well as local businesses in Sweden, are encouraged to develop diversity plans in order to combat discrimination (Englund, 2003a: 4 and 27–28). It seems that to date, none of these initiatives has specifically focused on Muslims, and from the available data it is not possible to assess the impact of these initiatives on the situation of — specifically — Muslims in Sweden. However, it is likely that Muslims also have benefited from the initiatives to combat discrimination and work for equality in society.
5. Housing

5.1 The housing situation of Muslims in Sweden

Data provided by Sweden Statistics (SCB) for the year 2003 indicate that 56 per cent of the population in Sweden live in self-contained houses and 42 per cent live in apartment blocks. Approximately 36 per cent live in flats with the right of tenancy (i.e. tenancy rights) and approximately 16 per cent live in housing co-operatives (i.e. they are tenant owners).42

No research or report has specifically focused on the housing situation for Muslims. However, resembling the situation on employment, a number of studies have focused on housing, immigration and segregation in general (see, for example, Sernhede & Johansson, 2006, and Integrationsverket Rapport Integration 2005).

The high levels of unemployment among immigrants, including Muslims, also result in many living in so-called disadvantaged areas. Cecilia Englund holds the view that “the most disadvantaged groups regarding housing segregation are immigrants, in particular people with African and West Asian (i.e. Middle East) backgrounds. They are also generally the most disadvantaged groups in Swedish society as a whole, as their precarious situation in the labour market clearly shows” (Englund, 2003a: 3). People with foreign backgrounds are more likely to live in disadvantaged areas or in the suburban areas of the cities that are part of the so-called “Million Programme” Areas (mainly in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö).43

According to Åke Sander’s analysis, the Commission on Housing Policy (Bostadspolitiska utredningen) argues that a disadvantaged area is constituted by the following facts:

[…] a characteristically large proportion of residents lack socio-economic resources, are born abroad, and exhibit lower health standards than the average population as a whole. The areas concerned are for the most part those built during the time of the Miljonprogram [a housing programme designed to create a million new homes] and are almost exclusively under the management of municipal housing corporations… The large-scale aspect, anonymity, lack of security, low quality standards, lack of services and transit, etc., that are often a feature of these disadvantaged areas, contribute to further impairing the area’s living conditions and the opportunities available to its inhabitants. Harsh living conditions combined with a sense of inability to influence one’s own situation can lead to feelings of powerlessness and exclusion (SOU, 1996: 156, quoted in Sander, 2004: 307–308).

In analysing housing and segregation, it is essential to stress the point that segregation in this area has an ethnic/racialised, socio-economic dimension and a structural dimension (see Englund, 2003b). However, segregation and differences in living conditions, between native-

43 Cecilia Englund describes the “Million Programme” Areas (Miljonprogramsförorter) in the following way: “In 1965 the Government adopted a housing policy targeted to build a million dwellings. Interestingly, this programme was very successful, as Sweden thus counterbalanced the expected housing shortage. The newly built dwellings were also of a much higher standard in contrast to the standard of the already existing housing. The success of the “Million Programme” Areas was however rather short-lived. The areas were quickly subjected to a stigmatisation process, which today also has taken on an ethnic dimension. The public opinion has identified the problems of these areas with the residents, which in many ways is highlighted and exaggerated by the reporting in media”. See: Cecilia Englund (2003), National Analytical Study of Housing. Raxen Focal Point for Sweden, available at http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/RAXEN/4/house/SE_Housing.pdf (accessed 10 December 2006).
born Swedes and immigrants, have increased during the last decade. While many areas in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö (the three largest cities in Sweden) have become richer and more expensive, other areas (especially in the suburbs) have become more isolated and poorer every year (see, for example, Sernhede & Johansson, 2006, and Sander, 2004).

From the available statistical data, it is also clear that the number of immigrants has increased in most suburbs in Stockholm, Malmö and Göteborg, and this is an indication that the number of individuals born outside Sweden has been more concentrated in certain housing areas (Sander, 2004: 308–310; Roald, 2002).

As was found with regard to employment, it is clear that Muslims have also suffered from this development. However, from the existing literature it is not possible to give a more detailed or specific illustration of the housing situation for Muslims.

The Swedish Government has taken a number of initiatives to curb housing segregation. The most well-known is the Metropolitan Policy on Integration that was initiated in 1998. The aim of the Metropolitan Policy was to “end the social, ethnic and discriminatory segregation in the metropolitan areas and to work for equal and comparable living conditions for people living in the cities” (quotation taken from Englund, 2003b: 3–4). The Metropolitan Policy was presented in the Bill “Development and Justice — A Policy for the 21st Century” (Gov. Bill 1997/98: 165). Overcoming segregation and discrimination in the housing sector is also part of the general fight against discrimination and segregation that is supported by the Government. However, the Metropolitan Policy has also been criticised for not solving the actual problem, that is, the structural and economic segregation and discrimination that leads to a division between “Swedes” and people with foreign backgrounds (i.e. immigrants in general).46

44 On segregation and housing, see, for example, the following: Ulrika Hörgren (2000), Bostadssegregation. Göteborg: Chalmers Lindholmen; Kirsti Kuusela (1991), Att bo i invandrartäta områden. Etnisk bostadsegregation i Göteborg. Stockholm: Statens råd för byggnadsforskning [Living in areas with a lot of immigrants. Ethnic housing segregation in Göteborg]; Catharina Thörn (2006), Att bo eller inte bo. Om satsningen “bra boende” i statsdelen Bergsjön i Göteborg och om strategier för att motverka hemlöshet [To live there or not to live there. About the “good housing” venture in Göteborg’s Bergsjön district and about strategies for combating isolation]. Göteborg: FoU i Väst.

45 This information is taken from Englund (2003: 4).

46 This critique is for example discussed in Englund (2003: 4–5).
6. Health and social protection

6.1 The health status of Muslims

Some research has been carried out in Sweden on the health status of immigrants and people who live in disadvantaged areas (see section 5). Especially relevant are the studies conducted by the Socialstyrelsen (National Board of Health and Welfare — a governmental body that monitors, among many things, the health status of the population of Sweden), and the Folkhälsoinstitutet (Swedish National Institute for Public Health). From these studies it is clear that immigrants are more likely to suffer from poor health than are people born in Sweden.47

In these studies, however, the definition of the different groups is seldom made in religious terms — groups are usually defined on the grounds of social status, economic differences and gender (Sander, 2004: 311). Due to this situation, it is very difficult to find some specific information about the health status of Muslims living in Sweden. However, since they often live in disadvantaged areas and belong to groups that suffer from unemployment, it is very likely that Muslims are also likely to suffer disproportionately from poor health.

Some studies have focused on health care in a multicultural setting (especially Sachs, 1993), but they have not explicitly focused on Muslims or Islamic views on medicine. The researchers Jan Samuelsson (1999; 2001; 2002) and Åke Sander (2000) have published on Islam and Muslims in the Swedish health care system. These studies examine how Muslims experience health care in Sweden and the extent to which specific Muslim needs (that is, with regard to food, clothing and gender aspects) are satisfied in, for example, Swedish hospitals. These studies indicate that the awareness of Muslim needs has improved and that the situation has improved over the last decade. However, the demand for Muslim alternatives (for example food and prayer rooms) can sometimes cause administrative and practical problems. Samuels has also published a general book on Islam and medicine (2001).

Although these studies are pioneering work from a Swedish point of view, they could at best be described as handbooks and introduction books for medical students. This is not a criticism of Samuelsson’s or Sander’s work, but rather an illustration of the lack of knowledge in the Swedish health sector of the situation and needs of Muslims.

To meet their needs, some Muslims have also tried to fill the knowledge gap and have produced handbooks and small pamphlets on Islam, medicine and health care. The most ambitious project is the Swedish Islamic Medical Association (SWIMA), which is part of the international organisation the Federation of Islamic Medical Associations.48 Those involved in this initiative work as doctors in Swedish hospitals or health institutions, and try to find “Muslim” solutions to medical problems and issues of general health care.

Another Muslim initiative is the family counselling bureau Systerjouren Somaya.49 This body targets Muslim families, especially women who might suffer from discrimination or domestic violence or have questions concerning children and family values in Sweden. On the one hand

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49 See website of the Systerjouren Somaya at: http://www.somaya.nu/
they try to find Islamic solutions to so-called family problems, but on the other they also try to help Muslims to get help from other non-Muslim agencies and governmental bodies. From this point of view, they are working hard to bridge the gap between members of the Muslim community and the rest of Swedish society.

Although both SWIMA and Systerjouren Somaya could be seen as good initiatives that are trying to foster integration, they have generated little interest on the part of the Swedish State. Other similar initiatives reported by Sander (2004: 313–314) have also received little, if any, attention from the Swedish State. They have not only been neglected, but also viewed as “suspect”, looked upon as something strange that questions the Swedish system.

The National Board of Health and Welfare has also produced materials on death and dying according to a number of world religions (Islam included). This material is primarily published to help people who work in the health sector (especially non-Muslim Swedes who are not accustomed to the ways in which immigrants are expected to handle and live out death and dying).

Muslims have also faced problems in finding enough burial sites in Sweden, but the situation has improved during the last decade (see Sander, 2004: 346–250). After the division between the Church of Sweden and the State in 2000, the Church is still responsible for taking care of and for providing burial sites. This responsibility also includes provision for individuals who have a non-Christian faith.\textsuperscript{50} It may be that Muslims who do not live in Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö (the three main cities in Sweden) have greater problems finding solutions for practical problems that could be related to health and health care, but this conclusion needs to be substantiated with empirical data.

\textsuperscript{50} See website of the Church of Sweden at: http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/
7. Policing and security

7.1 Muslims’ experiences in the army
Both the Swedish police and the Swedish army have initiated work to recruit people who come from foreign backgrounds, that is, people who were not born in Sweden, or who are children of immigrants. For various reasons, however, this process has so far not paid off very well, and both the Swedish police force and the army are still today more or less homogeneously ethnically Swedish in their composition. Plans for increasing the number of people with foreign backgrounds within these jobs are also of a quite recent date (most of this work was initiated in the last decade) and the problem could also be related to the time factor.

According to Jörgen Karmendal (2000), the Swedish army suffers from a tendency to be discriminatory against people who are not perceived as Swedes. For example, if one’s last name is Muslim one is less likely to be drafted for the military service than if one’s name is Larsson or Svensson (two typical last names for Swedish males). This finding by Karmendal is based on official statistical data regarding the number of persons who have been drafted for military service. In theory Sweden has a compulsory military service, according to which all males in Sweden with the requisite physical and mental capacity could be drafted for military service. However, according to Karmendal’s research, only one in four males with a foreign background is drafted, as compared to one in two of the general relevant male population (this piece of data is taken from Sander, 2004: 322, but see also Karmendal, 2000: 38).

On the basis of Karmendal’s research, Sander’s conclusion is that “foreigners” have “difficulties finding their place in the social system and its structures” (Sander, 2004: 322). Like most data from Sweden, Karmendal’s research does not contain any data that specify the situation for Muslims in the military service. Although it should be emphasised that Karmendal’s research was carried out six years ago, the economic condition for the armed forces has not improved, and due to this fact the situation for people with foreign backgrounds is not likely to have improved over time.

7.2 Muslims’ experiences in relation to criminal justice and policing
Turning to the official records maintained by the police, it is also very difficult to find any data on Islamophobic incidents (that is, incidents driven by a fear or hatred of Islam and Muslims). However, from information provided by Muslims, it is clear that many perceive that they suffer from discrimination and Islamophobic behaviour in Sweden. In addition, many Muslims perceive that they have suffered from increased levels of discrimination and Islamophobia after 11 September 2001 (see Part II, Section 1.1 on public perceptions of Muslims).

The gap between the official and so-called unofficial records can partly be explained by the fact that the statistical data in Sweden do not pay specific attention to religious affiliation. Due to this bias, Islamophobic incidents are most likely to be recorded under the category of hate crimes (this category includes crimes that are based on or driven by racial motives (xenophobia), anti-semitism, homophobia and “white power” (neo-Nazism). Information on hate crimes is collected by the Swedish security police.51

However, it is also clear that many Muslims refrain from reporting that they have been victims of discrimination or Islamophobia (Larsson, 2005). For example, research shows that Muslim leaders in Göteborg report that they refrain from reporting Islamophobic incidents (such as threats, offensive letters and vandalism) to the police because they do not believe that a report would make any difference (Larsson, 2005b).

Muslim leaders and spokespersons cited in Larsson’s study (2005) indicate that Muslims refrain from reporting incidents for various reasons. People with foreign backgrounds could, for example, have difficulties with the Swedish language (i.e. it is difficult to explain what they have been suffering from). However, it seems also that a number of persons do not have any trust in the Swedish police force, and feel that there is no point in reporting Islamophobic incidents because they do not make any difference (i.e. they do not think that the police will act on such complaints). Whether this opinion is widespread and accepted is not clear from Larsson (2005).

Following the war on terrorism, several Muslims in Sweden have told me during interviews and at public meetings that they find themselves subject to greater monitoring and analysis by the police force (but there is no empirical research on how Muslims in Sweden have experienced the war on terrorism). No study has focused on the effect of the war on terrorism on the Swedish Muslim community. However, the Swedish Government has been criticised by Amnesty International (Year Report, 2006) for accepting and participating in the extradition of two Muslims to Egypt. Although the effect of this policy (as well as, in particular, this cited example) has not received much media or public attention, it is likely that many Muslims in Sweden see this development as a sign that the Swedish Government does not view Muslims as “real” Swedes. However, this is a topic that needs to be researched more thoroughly before we can reach a definitive conclusion.

From a democratic point of view, it is a serious problem that Muslims in Guantanamo are not treated according to international laws, such as the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war. Because of this development it is likely that many Muslims feel that they are not treated or viewed as equal or integrated citizens. Following the war on terrorism, the arrest of Mehdi Ghezali, a Swedish Muslim who was arrested in Afghanistan/Pakistan and thereafter placed in the Guantanamo prison in Cuba, has been reported and discussed in the media. However, the impact of the war on terrorism on the democratic and open society has not been heavily discussed within the Swedish media or in the public discourse according to the critics.

There do not seem to be any data on how Muslim employees experience work inside the prison and probation administration. However, the SverigesMuslimska Råd (Council of Swedish Muslims, SMR) has published a short information leaflet for personnel who work within the criminal justice system, Muslimer i kriminal vården (Muslims within corrective treatment) (1999). The leaflet is mainly a short presentation of Islam and the demands that Muslims could pose.

8. Participation and citizenship

8.1 Muslim participation in politics and policy-making

From the data provided by Lappalainen (2004) it is important to note that the majority of foreign-born people in Sweden are Swedish citizens (cf. Table 2; Lappalainen, 2004, p. 44).

In 1963, the Swedish Government granted citizenship to persons who had resided in Sweden for more than five years. In 1976, three years of residence gave the immigrants the right to vote and stand in local elections in Sweden. In the 1990s, the question of dual citizenship was also much debated (Roald, 2002: 103–104). Time and again, several voices have asked for stricter rules and harsher policies for gaining citizenship. Most of the time, immigrants have been criticised for not having enough knowledge of the Swedish language and Swedish norms and values (see also section 1).

The most important way of measuring participation and integration in Sweden is to look at access to the job market. From this point of view (as shown in section 6), it is clear that many people with foreign backgrounds are not able to fully participate in Swedish society. As is the case with most parts of this literature review, it is not possible to find any direct or specific research on the situation of Muslim communities with regard to participation or citizenship. However, it is clear that people with foreign backgrounds face greater difficulties in securing employment and are more likely to live in more disadvantaged areas. Due to these conditions they are also more likely to suffer from poor health and social problems (such as criminality, drug abuse, etc.). Children who are raised under these conditions are also less likely to be successful in the educational system. With this background it is clear that many people with foreign backgrounds are not able to fully participate in society, since they are not integrated or accepted in Swedish society.

Another way of measuring participation in society is to look at voting habits and political engagement. As compared to so-called native Swedes, immigrants as well as their children who are born in Sweden are less likely to vote in the political elections. In the first municipal elections, in 1976, in which foreign nationals who had stayed in Sweden for more than three years were given the right to vote, only 60 per cent of the eligible foreign nationals voted. This figure should be compared with 90 per cent for the whole population. Since this election the figures have dropped even more (Sander, 2004: 273–274).

Although it is very difficult to explain this development, it seems that many immigrants are reluctant to use their vote because of marginalisation and isolation. To curb this development, some Muslim organisations have tried to stimulate and support Muslim voters by raising specific demands. For example, Sveriges Muslimska Råd (the Council of Swedish Muslims) has written an open letter to all political parties in Sweden. They claim that many Muslims will give their vote to the party that promises to meet basic Islamic needs. By Muslim needs they refer to halal slaughter (which has been forbidden in Sweden by law since the 1940s, with some exceptions for professional hunters and the indigenous population, the Sami, in the northern parts of Sweden), the arrangement of Muslim burial sites, time off for prayers during work hours, and so on. However, no parties have tried to meet these demands. First, it

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54 According to information given on the homepage nine national Muslim organisations are members of SMR and they are working to unite Muslims in Sweden. On SMR, see http://www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se/

55 A detailed study of the halal slaughter in Sweden is given in Gunner (1999); see also Alwall (1998).
is unlikely that the Council of Swedish Muslims has the power to guarantee that their members will vote for a specific party. Second, it is also likely that the established parties in Sweden are reluctant to give specific promises to the Muslim community, as such promises could easily backfire and cause more harm than good for the party.

There are some examples of individuals with a Muslim background who have been elected to local city councils and to the national Parliament (see Roald, 2002: 117). However, precise statistics are not available.

After the election of 2006, the new Minister of Integration, Nyamko Sabuni (from the Liberal Party), comes from a Muslim cultural background, but she does not practise Islam. She has even been accused of holding Islamophobic tendencies. For example, she has argued that all Islamic independent schools should be closed and said that young women should have a gynaecological test to see whether they have been victims of female circumcision.56 Mehmet Kaplan from the Green Party is another example of a politician with a Muslim cultural background. In contrast to Sabuni, he practises Islam, and he has been a driving force within the SUM and the SMR.

Although the number of people with a Muslim cultural background within the political sphere is very important for society, no study has directly focused on politicians who have a Muslim background in Sweden (although this issue is partly discussed in Klausen, 2005).

Voting patterns are not the only indication of the fact that there is segregation between Muslims with a foreign background and ethnic “Swedes”. For example, in 2002, after the “honour killing” of Fadime Sahindal (a young Kurdish woman), several politicians in Sweden demanded that people with foreign backgrounds should take a test to prove that they accept and follow so-called Swedish norms and values. So far this idea has not been put into practice, but the idea is quite often mentioned in the debate and in the media. According to the critics (for example, Azar, 2006), the proposal of such a test is an indication of the fact that some politicians are creating and maintaining an imaginary boundary between “original” Swedes and people with foreign backgrounds. Instead of creating some kind of Swedish culture, this kind of action serves only to create a division between “us” and “them”. This division is also emphasised by the fact that the aforementioned test would only focus on people with a foreign background. If the test were general and mandatory for all people living in Sweden, would it be possible to withdraw a person’s citizenship if he or she failed in a test (no matter whether she or he has a foreign background or not)?

However, the debate about citizenship is not a new phenomenon. Every time that citizenship rights have been extended to immigrants, immigrants have been criticised for not having enough knowledge of the Swedish language and Swedish norms and values (see, for example, Roald, 2002).

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56 See, for example, “Baksi kritiserar utnämningen av Sabuni” [“Baksi criticises the election of Sabuni”], Nerkes Allehanda (2006-10-06), available at http://www.na.se/artikel.asp?intId=1054112. See also the online petition against Sabuni at http://www.islamguiden.com/protester/nyamko/nyamko.html.
PART II: POLICY CONTEXT

1. Perception of Muslims

1.1 The perception of Muslims by wider society and in political discourse

Several studies illustrate the fact that many Swedes hold negative and preconceived views of Islam and Muslims. In the Integration Barometer (Integrationsbarometer), published by Integrationsverket (Board of Integration), 2,557 respondents answered a large number of questions concerning attitudes towards integration, discrimination, equal rights, and Islam and Muslims living in Sweden. Although all questionnaires suffer from methodological problems, and the above named survey is no exception, the overall picture suggests that many Swedes perceive that there is a difference between “us” (non-Muslims) and “them” (Muslims).

Two thirds consider that Islamic values are not compatible with the fundamental values of Swedish society; 30 per cent are categorically negative and others answer that the values are “to a great extent” not compatible (Integration Barometer, 2004: 12).

From the above quotation, it is clear that it would be necessary to discuss and define what the respondents are referring to when they are talking about Muslim and Swedish values. Is it possible to make a sharp distinction between these two sets of values? This is a difficult question, and before analysing the results from the survey, one must take it into consideration that questions about values could easily be understood along many different lines. However, the results could be read as an indirect indication of the fact that many Swedes think that so-called Muslim values are different from Swedish values. It should also be stressed that many Muslim leaders argue that so-called Swedish values, such as honesty, truthfulness, kindness, and care for the weak are typical Islamic values too. From this point of view, problems in, for example, disadvantaged areas are not to be blamed on Islam or Muslim values. On the contrary, problems such as criminality, drug abuse and violence are the result of a lack of Islamic virtues and values. This way of putting the argument is, however, seldom perceived or noticed by Swedish critics of Islam and Muslim immigration.

Other results from the Integration Barometer show that many respondents do not want to see any similarities between so-called Swedish and Muslim/Islamic values.

Four out of ten answer positively to the assertion “Swedish Muslims are like Swedes generally”, although only 7 per cent agree completely. 54 per cent responded negatively to this assertion. Only one third wish to facilitate the exercise of Islam in Sweden at the same time as a majority of 65 per cent responded negatively. In a similar way, only 26 per cent agree (completely or partly) that the education of imams in Sweden should be supported at the same time as 71 per cent consider that one should not do so (Integration Barometer, 2004: 12).

The above quotation could partly be seen as an example showing that the Swedish public are confused about Islam and Muslims. For example, if one believes that Muslim and Islamic values are contrary to Swedish values, one might think that more respondents would have reacted positively to the idea that an institution for the education of imams be set up in Sweden. Such an institution would be a powerful instrument for making the Muslim community become more “Swedish”. However, the results from the Integration Barometer,
2004, demonstrate, indirectly, that the education of imams has a negative connotation for many Swedes.

Returning to the result from the *Integration Barometer*, 2004, and focusing on attitudes towards Muslim women wearing the hijab (or other forms of veils), it is also possible to show that most Swedes have a negative view of Islamic clothing.

Overall 35 per cent are against Muslim women wearing veils on the street, and only 24 per cent approved. A relatively high proportion (almost 40 per cent) answer that they do not have a position on this question. A majority of between 53 and 57 per cent are against the veils at workplaces, in schools and as public employees. The most negative attitudes are reported towards Muslim women wearing veils on ID cards; 66 per cent are against this while only 10 per cent are positive (*Integration Barometer*, 2004: 12).

All in all, the Board of Integration concludes that “the public in Sweden do not have any great acceptance for Muslim women wearing the veils” in public (*Integration Barometer*, 2004: 12).

This section has focused on data taken from a report published by the Board of Integration, but the results from this study correspond to the results in several other reports. For example, similar studies supporting these findings have been carried out by the SOM Institute at the University of Göteborg, Forum för Levande historia, and the European Wall Street Journal (Sander & Larsson, 2006, in print). Studies by Sander (2006) and Larsson (2003; 2005) also illustrate the fact that many Muslims perceived that they were suffering from discrimination and Islamophobia after 11 September 2001.

In Göteborg, more than 90 per cent of the respondents perceived that the media coverage of Islam and Muslims had become worse and less objective and more than 90 per cent said that they believed that the level of discrimination against Muslims had increased after the terror attacks in the United States (Larsson, 2003: 24–25). However, at the same time, several of the respondents said that the outbreak of terrorism in the name of Islam has had a positive effect on the internal discussions among Muslims (cf. Larsson, 2003:30-319. It gave the Muslims a new position within the public discourse. In sum, the terror attacks on 11 September created both discrimination and Islamophobia, but it also gave the Muslim community a new position in society that could be used for presenting an alternative and more peaceful interpretation of Islam (i.e. a “truer” image according to the informants).

In another study by the Board of Integration, Larsson (2005) shows that several Muslim leaders are experiencing Islamophobia as a part of the public discourse in Swedish society. Although it is very difficult to measure and count Islamophobic incidents — mainly because of the lack of a clear definition — it is clear that many Muslims perceive that they are viewed as a problem and something negative and un-Swedish by many Swedes. This finding could be seen as a warning and an illustration of the fact that Swedish society is divided along ethnic, social, economic and religious lines. This study (Larsson, 2005) also illustrates the fact that there is a gap between official reports on discrimination and Islamophobia and that many Muslims perceive that they are suffering from discrimination (because they have a foreign background and because they are Muslims). Based on the official records, it is often difficult to demonstrate that there is a problem with Islamophobia, but looking at information from Muslims, another picture emerges (see Ericson, 2005).
1.2 Muslims in the media
The aforementioned results from the Integration Barometer, 2004, may also be related to the negative media coverage of Islam and Muslims in the Swedish press (see, for example, Hvitfelt, 1998). After 11 September 2001 and the terror attacks on the USA, so-called Qur’anic schools were often associated and discussed in the Swedish press in relation to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. However, from the results presented by the Board of Integration it is not possible to identify the ways in which this kind of media coverage had an effect on the respondents. In general, if one compares the results from surveys such as the one conducted by the Board of Integration, there is a clear correspondence between the public perceptions of Muslims and media reportages on Islam and Muslims. This correlation is illustrated by Håkan Hvitfelt’s studies on Islam and Muslims in the Swedish television news.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of item</th>
<th>Share of coverage on Islam/Muslims (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent context</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct violence</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodily punishment/death threats</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace process during/after war</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of war</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent rituals</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not connected with violence</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of news reports</strong></td>
<td><strong>627</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Television channels covered: Aktuellt, TV 1; Rapport, TV 2; Nyhterna, TV 4)

Source: Hvitfelt, 1998: 80

Although it is difficult to compare media reportage with public attitudes, it is clear that many Swedes get their opinion and information from the media, especially television broadcasting, but also from popular media such as films and newspaper cartoons (Berg, 1998). The importance of the media as a source of information is likely to increase if cities become increasingly segregated and ethnically divided (see section I.6 on housing). During the last decade the interface between Muslims and non-Muslims has been shrinking because of segregation within the housing and labour markets (people with foreign backgrounds are living separated from ethnic Swedes, and people with foreign backgrounds have often problems finding jobs in the labour market). Because of this development, many immigrants (including Muslims) feel that they are not part of society. This feeling became especially prevalent after 11 September 2001 (see, for example, the following: Larsson, 2003; Larsson, 2005; Sander, 2006).
2. Integration policy

2.1 Initiatives and policies addressing issues of integration

In 1997, Sweden changed its political agenda from a so-called immigration policy to an integration policy. This change mirrored an important adjustment of the political agenda. Prior to 1997 — at least according to the critics — State policy only focused on the immigrants. This bias established a division between “us” and “them”, i.e. between persons born in Sweden and immigrants born outside Sweden. However, with the new integration policy the focus was changed and to achieve integration it was necessary to alter the attitudes of both “Swedes” and “immigrants”. From this point of time, integration is a dual process that should include both sides, i.e. “Swedes” and “immigrants”.

However, it is essential to stress the fact that the integration policy in Sweden might change in the near future because of the fact that the Social Democrats lost the election in 2006 to the Conservative Coalition (Den Borgerliga Aliansen). Inter alia, they have decided to shut down the Board of Integration (one of the pillars in the Social Democratic agenda for achieving integration). At the time of writing this report it is not possible to see how much the political change will affect the debate and policy on integration.

From 1997 up to today the Swedish State and its various bodies have published several reports that specifically focus on migration and integration, but also on discrimination and equalities/inequalities in Swedish society that have a negative effect on the integration process. Several of these reports (listed by the Board of Integration in the book Report Integration 2005: 12) deal indirectly with persons of a Muslim cultural background. However, it is not possible to find specific details on the integration of Muslims or specific policies that focus on the Muslim community or its members. Integration policy in Sweden is general and it does not make a separation or difference between various ethnic groups, gender or religious affiliation. Most initiatives that deal with integration have so far focused on the fact that certain ethnic groups have had problems finding jobs and unemployment is higher for people with foreign backgrounds.

If we also consider reports on discrimination, it is easier to find data that more clearly focus on how Muslims perceive their situation in Swedish society. For example, the Board of Integration, the police and Brottförebyggande rådet (the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, Brå) have today assignments to document, analyse and combat Islamophobia as a part of their work against discrimination and racism in society. All governmental bodies are today obliged to have a plan for diversity and equal treatment that includes gender, ethnicity and religious affiliation. This is an initiative that illustrates the fact that the Swedish Government pays attention to the problems that the Muslim community might experience and the negative image of Muslims residing in Sweden. This work is also emphasised in the Integration Barometer, which is published on a yearly basis.

The Forum for Living History (Forum för Levande Historia), which deals particularly with the memory of the Holocaust and neo-Nazism, also focuses on general discrimination, racism and Islamophobia. For example, they have published a survey report on intolerance and racist

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57 This section is primarily based on material from the Integration Report 2005 published by the Board of Migration (Rapport Integration 2005: Norrköping: Integrationsverket). This report can be downloaded from www.integrationsverket.se. See also: Regeringens proposition 1997/98:16, Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik.
attitudes among teenagers in Swedish schools. This report includes material on homophobia, anti-semitism and Islamophobia. Although some problems were identified in the Swedish school system, most respondents in this report were not intolerant.

The findings from the study indicate that the vast majority of young people profess a positive attitude towards the different minority groups. The young people included in this study tend for example to agree with statements that most Muslims (or Jews or homosexuals) are undoubtedly “good people”, whereas they tend to distance themselves from negatively charged statements.

Besides the political initiatives described above, the Committee against Islamophobia was started in 2005 (on this committee, see Larsson, 2005: 119). The Committee is a non-political and non-religious affiliation, which is constituted by persons who are concerned with Islamophobic tendencies in society and who want to put the question of intolerance and discrimination on the political agenda. The work of the Committee is comparable to the committee against anti-semitism that was started a couple of years prior to the Committee against Islamophobia. Some of the members in the last named committee are also active politicians who belong to various political parties, and the board includes Muslims, Christians and atheists.

To conclude, although the policy and agenda of the Swedish Government have changed during the last decade, it is clear that it is very difficult to find a specific policy that focuses on Muslims and Muslim affairs. Policies that have a specific relevance for Muslims are primarily found in the area of discrimination (especially the fight against Islamophobic tendencies in society). Most actions are driven by a more general integration policy, and this work does not specifically address Islam or Muslims.

The public debate on integration illustrates a tension between those who want to have a general integration policy and those who ask for a specified or targeted policy (for example, political actions that specifically address Muslim affairs). For the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, this is very much a political question, and as long as they stay in power integration policy will mainly rest on a general principle that should include all groups (in other words, a

58 “The study is based on a comprehensive questionnaire survey of secondary school students in years eight and nine (the final two years of compulsory secondary school), and in years one, two and three of further education (i.e. equivalent to British sixth-form level) programmes. A random sample was drawn from among all Swedish secondary school students in the relevant age groups. The sampling units comprised classes within the secondary school system and, at the further education level, further education 2 programmes distributed over colleges of further education. Each class included in the sample was given a set of questionnaires, which the students then completed during lesson time. The questionnaires were completed anonymously. Of a total of 672 classes included in the sample, completed questionnaires were received from 606. The final response frequency at the level of the individual lies at 76.2 per cent, when the students in those classes that did not participate in the study are included among the non-responses. Among the classes that did participate, the final response frequency at the individual level amounted to 82 per cent. The material finally comprised questionnaires from a total of 10,600 students.” See: The Living History Forum / Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, Intolerance Anti-Semitic, Homophobic, Islamophobic and Xenophobic tendencies among the young, 2004, Summary, in English, available at http://intolerans.levandehistoria.se/article/article_docs/engelska.pdf (accessed 12 December 2006).

principle that a single group should not be targeted alone to achieve integration). Due to this political discourse, it is not possible to find a specific integration policy for Muslims in Sweden.

However, according to the Board of Integration (see below), Swedish integration policy should strive for the following:

- Equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background;
- A community based on diversity;
- A society characterised by mutual respect and tolerance, in which everyone plays an active and responsible part, regardless of background.\(^{60}\)

2.2 Board of Integration
The Board of Integration (Integrationsverket) is a governmental body that operates on the national level. It was founded in 1998 and primarily addresses questions concerning integration diversity. It has the responsibility for

- [...] ensuring that the integration policy's objectives and approach have an impact on different areas of society and is to actively stimulate integration processes in society. Another important task is work to highlight the support needs of newly arrived immigrants and ensure that their need for special community information is provided for. The Board contributes to the settlement of refugees and others in need of protection in municipalities and follows up the introduction programmes that the municipalities offer them.\(^{61}\)

The main tasks of the Board of Integration are as follows:

- Monitoring the situation and progress of integration policy objectives within the various sectors of society;
- Promoting integration and preventing and counteracting ethnic discrimination, xenophobia and racism;
- Developing introductory procedures for new refugee arrivals.\(^{62}\)

However, at the time of writing this report, it is important to emphasise the fact that the new Swedish Government has dissolved the Board of Integration (from 1\(^{st}\) July 2007) and it is therefore difficult to predict if the “old” rules and regulations will be kept, or will soon be disbanded.

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\(^{60}\) This information is taken from the homepage of the Board of Integration, available in English at http://www.integrationsverket.se/Tpl/NormalPage____290.aspx (accessed 8 January 3007).


\(^{62}\) This information is taken from the homepage of the Board of Integration, available in English at http://www.integrationsverket.se/Tpl/NormalPage____290.aspx (accessed 8 January 3007).
3. Administrative structures

3.1 General administrative structures
Detailed general information about the Government and the Government offices (i.e. ministries) of Sweden is found on the homepage of the Government offices of Sweden (see http://www.sweden.gov.se/). Since most of the questions that are relevant for the OSI literature review are found under the headings of asylum, migration, integration and minorities on the homepage for the Swedish Government, this report has focused on these issues. However, the boundaries between the Government offices and their responsibilities often overlap and it is difficult to make a sharp distinction. For example, questions related to housing, employment and health could be addressed by several different Government offices and governmental bodies that deal with issues that could be related to integration, social welfare, the economy and the labour market.

In general, the Swedish State is founded on a shared responsibility between State, county councils and municipalities. The quotations below, which are related to health, are illustrative of this shared responsibility, and similar structures are also relevant for the educational system.

Health and medical care in the Swedish health care system is the shared responsibility of the State, county councils and municipalities. The State is responsible for overall health and medical care policy.\(^63\)

Furthermore:

Local governments (municipalities and county councils) are responsible for basic services in the form of schools, childcare, health care and elderly care. They mainly finance these services with revenue from municipal and county council income tax and through central government grants. The State (central government) is responsible for ensuring that an equivalent level of services is provided throughout the country.\(^64\)

The Health and Medical Services Act regulates the responsibilities of county councils and municipalities in health and medical care. The Act is designed to give county councils and municipalities considerable freedom with regard to how their health services are organised. There are 21 county councils in Sweden, with responsibilities that are common to large geographical areas and often requiring considerable resources. Their most important task is health and medical care. County councils are responsible for organising their services so that all citizens have access to adequate care. Municipalities are responsible for care of the elderly and support and service to those whose medical treatment has been completed and who have been discharged from hospital care. Municipalities are also responsible for housing, employment and support of people with psychiatric disabilities.\(^65\)

\(^{63}\) This information is taken from the homepage of the Government offices of Sweden http://www.sweden.gov.se/ (accessed 8 January 2007).

\(^{64}\) This information is taken from the homepage of the Government offices of Sweden http://www.sweden.gov.se/ (accessed 8 January 2007).

\(^{65}\) This information is taken from the homepage of the Government offices of Sweden http://www.sweden.gov.se/ (accessed 8 January 2007).
3.2 Main anti-discrimination bodies
The Swedish Integration Board primarily addresses questions concerning integration diversity (see section 2.2).

To ensure that the national and integration policy is implemented, the Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination also supports the Board of Integration. This body is responsible for addressing ethnic discrimination, including in working life.66

3.3 Key anti-discrimination legislation
The homepage of the Government offices of Sweden (see http://www.sweden.gov.se/) also lists a number of actions that aim to combat discrimination and racism in Swedish society. The following list is a collection of the most important documents and policies:

- On 1 July 2003 a new law prohibiting discrimination entered into force, extending protection against discrimination beyond working life and higher education to other areas of society.
- The Government communication entitled “A national action plan for human rights 2006–2009”, to be presented to the Riksdag (Parliament) in March 2006, will also be characterised by a clear focus on discrimination.

The entire struggle against all forms of structural discrimination is of high priority to the Government of Sweden.

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66 This information is taken from the homepage of the, available Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, available also in English at http://www.do.se (accessed 8 January 2007).
PART III: CITY SELECTION

This section reviews three Swedish cities — Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö — for possible inclusion in the upcoming new OSI city monitoring project, “Muslims in the EU”. Stockholm is the capital of Sweden and is located on the east coast. Göteborg is the second city of Sweden and is located on the west coast. Malmö is the third city in Sweden and is located in the south of the country.

This section provides a general overview of each city. As was illustrated previously in this literature review, at the city level it is difficult to find material on several of the questions that are relevant for the OSI research (for example concerning housing, health care and employment). The first problem is that Sweden lacks statistical data that specify and select Muslims (as all statistical data are of a general nature). The second problem (as discussed above in Part II) is that Sweden has applied a general model for integration and no specific actions have addressed Muslims as a religious or ethnic community. It is therefore very difficult, and methodologically problematic, to find data that select Muslims from the large group of immigrants.

1. Stockholm

The population of Stockholm city is estimated as being 771,038 (as of 31 December 2005), of which an estimated 26.2 per cent are people with a foreign background. Compared to Göteborg and Malmö, Stockholm is not a typical industrial city. Rather, it is the administrative, financial and intellectual centre of Sweden.

From a Muslim point of view, Stockholm is also the centre for the major part of the Muslim organisations that were set up in Sweden in the 1970s and the 1980s. Approximately 50 per cent of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm (Stenberg, 1999: 67), which is the intellectual and theological centre of Islam in Sweden. In 2000, the grand mosque was inaugurated and opened in the city centre of Stockholm, but according to the homepage Living Islam approximately 20 basement mosques are used as prayer houses in Stockholm. However, the purpose-built mosque in Björns trädgård is an important building, since it has a great symbolic value for the Muslim community in Sweden and it is a centre for conferences and meetings. It also functions as an important meeting point for non-Muslims, as well as Muslims. The restaurant located in the basement of the mosque is of great value for non-Muslim Swedes, few of whom have any opportunity to meet Muslims.

Besides the Muslim organisations that are located in Stockholm, the Christian section of the Social Democratic Party has also been very active in Stockholm. Several members of this group of Social Democrats have been active in the fight against Islamophobia. These

67 This information is taken from the website of the City of Stockholm, available (in Swedish) at http://www.usk.stockholm.se/tabellverktyg/tv.aspx?projekt=omradesfakta&omrade=0 (accessed 2 January 2007).
activities have also been set up by Sensus, an educational association (not affiliated with any university or college). *Inter alia*, Sensus has initiated a joint cooperation with Ibn Rushd, the first Muslim educational association in Sweden (and this work is also carried out in Göteborg).

Like most cities in Sweden, Stockholm is segregated, and Muslims (like people with foreign backgrounds in general), tend to live in the suburbs of the city. Although the grand mosque of Stockholm is located in the city centre, most Muslims live outside the city centre in the suburban areas of the city.

In Sweden, each municipality is divided into boroughs. Each has its own district council, which has the same responsibility and authority as the City’s other committees and boards, except that they work within their respective geographical areas and have the overall responsibility for their activities. They have overall responsibility for primary schools, social, leisure and cultural services within their borough. The City of Stockholm’s leadership still has the overriding responsibility for issues concerning the entire municipality, such as the municipal tax and the City’s common budget.

Metropolitan Stockholm (or Greater Stockholm, Storstockholm) is divided into three areas. Stockholm Municipality is divided into three areas—Stockholm City Centre (Innerstaden), South Stockholm (Söderort) and West Stockholm (Västerort)—which comprise in total 18 boroughs. The other two areas are the Northern Suburbs (Uppland) and the Southern Suburbs (Södermanland), which consist of 14 and 7 municipalities, respectively.

In Stockholm Municipality, areas with significant Muslim minorities include Rinkeby borough (West Stockholm). Between 40 and 50 percent of the pupils in Rikeby have a Muslim cultural background. In 2003 67 percent of the population of Rikeby had a foreign background, compared to an average of 20.8 percent for the whole of Stockholm.

In the Southern Suburbs, areas with significant Muslim minorities include the Municipality of Botkyrka—in particular, the boroughs of Alby, Fittja, Hallunda, Norsborg, Tullinge, Tumba and Grödinge. In the Municipality of Botkyrka, 15.3 percent of the population are foreign citizens and 33.4 percent were born outside Sweden.

Despite the fact that that Stockholm is the city with the highest number of Muslims, few academic reports that deal with the Muslim population in Stockholm are available. Compared to Göteborg and Malmö (see below) we have, for example, no detailed information about basement mosques and prayer houses, and too few scholars have focused on ethnic groups that have a predominantly Muslim cultural background.

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71 Stockholm City Centre (Katarina-Sofia, Kungsholmen, Maria-Gamla stan, Norrmalm and Östermalm) South Stockholm (Enskede-Årsta, Farsta, Hägersten, Liljeholmen, Skarpnäck, Skärholmen, Vantör and Älvsjö) and West Stockholm (Bromma, Hässelby-Vällingby, Kista Rinkeby and Spånga-Tensta).
2. Göteborg

The city of Göteborg has always been one of the most important industrial and port cities in Sweden. Due to its strategic position and closeness to the continent, Göteborg has also been a multicultural city for a long time. However, like many other cities in the world, Göteborg has been severely affected by globalisation, migration and the transformation of the ship and manufacturing industry in the post-1973 period (i.e. after the oil crisis). Compared to the period immediately following World War II, Göteborg has become more economically, socially and ethnically divided.

The population of Göteborg city is estimated at 484,993 (as of 31 December 2005), of which an estimated 20 per cent are people with a foreign background. According to the study Världsreligionerna i Göteborg: Islam — en guide till föreningarna (The World Religions in Göteborg: Islam — a guide to the congregations), approximately 10–15 per cent of the total Muslim population in Sweden live in Göteborg.

From this point of view, Göteborg is truly a multi-ethnic city. However, the “foreigners” reside mainly in the suburbs. They are mainly found in the Angered suburbs, to the north-east of the city (in particular in Hjällbo, Hammarkullen and Gårdsten boroughs), and on the island of Hisingen (which is part of Göteborg). Angered is a former municipality (40,000 inhabitants), comprising the boroughs of Hjällbo, Eriksbo, Hammarkullen, Gårdsten and Lövgärdet, which has now been divided into two municipalities — Gunnared Municipality in the North, and Lärjedalen in the south.

Göteborg is subdivided into 21 geographical areas (including Gunnared and Lärjedalen), each with its own District Committee. The City retains the general responsibility for education, town planning, family matters, public health, consumer guidance, culture and recreation, the environment, public transport, social services, licensing business, security and preparedness, and care of the elderly.

Many of the suburban areas have serious problems with unemployment and poverty. For example, it is estimated that 64 per cent of all children in Bergsjön live in poor conditions (Sernhede & Johansson, 2006: 12) — i.e. below the poverty line according to the estimates of the Swedish State. In this area, approximately 80 per cent of inhabitants are immigrants. Although these figures do not specify the number for Muslims, it is clear that a large number must be of Muslim origin. The statistical material illustrates the fact that the gap between the rich and poor is growing and that the number of interfaces between Muslims and non-Muslims have been shrinking during the last decade (Sernhede & Johansson, 2006).

All Muslim groups are more or less represented in Göteborg. However, the city has only one purpose-built mosque, the Ahmadiyya mosque built in 1976, and so far no Sunni or Shia

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75 The general and statistical data for Göteborg are taken from Sernhede & Johansson (2006).
76 This information is taken from the website of the City of Göteborg, available at http://www.goteborg.se/statistik (accessed 2 January 2007).
78 This information is taken from the website of the City of Göteborg, available at http://www10.goteborg.se/english/index_activities.htm (accessed 2 December 2006).
groups have been able to build a mosque of their own. In a local study from Göteborg, the
numbers of so-called basement mosques were estimated, and it appears that there are
approximately 15–20 mosques or prayer houses. Since the city lacks a great mosque that
could host Muslims from a variety of different backgrounds, the overall picture suggests that
the Muslim communities are ethnically divided. From this point of view, Göteborg differs
from Stockholm as well as Malmö, both of which have great mosques in the city centres.

Lately, a Muslim community in Göteborg has been accused of supporting terrorism and
violent interpretations of Islam that hinder the integration of the Muslim community. The
most important Muslim organisation in Göteborg is the local branch of the Islamic
Information Society (Islamisk informationsföreningen). This group organises both public
lectures and speeches in schools, publishes and translates Muslim literature into Swedish, and
is also active in services such as pastoral care (that is, in hospitals and prisons).

The Somali and Turkish communities are also of great relevance if one wants to understand
the complexity and heterogeneity of Islam in Göteborg. It is relevant to study the Turkish
community, or rather communities, since Turks made up the most influential Muslim group in
Göteborg up to the mid-1980s (Sander & Larsson, 2002).

From then on the Muslim community became more diversified because of immigration
patterns. Resembling the rest of Europe, Turks in Göteborg are divided between those who
follow imams trained by the Turkish State (the so-called Diyanet imams) and those who
follow imams or Muslim religious leaders who are either native or in opposition to the
Turkish State. The first group is often more likely to cling onto the Turkish language, and the
Diyanet imams have in general no or little contact with the other Muslim groups. It is also
relevant to study the Somali groups, since they have often suffered from discrimination
(especially in the labour market, for which see Englund, 2003a: 5) and lately some mosques
predominantly for Muslims of a Somali background have been accused of supporting
terrorism. Members of the Somali community have also played a vital role in the setting up of
an Islamic independent school in Göteborg, Röhmosseskolan.

79 See Stefan Lisinski, “Säpo utreder medhjälp till terrorbrott” [“Säpo investigates assistance of terrorism
crimes”], in Dagens-Nyheter 11 November 2006, available (in Swedish) at
Malmö

Malmö is located in the southern part of Sweden, close to Denmark, and resembles Göteborg in many ways. Like Göteborg, Malmö is also an industrial city with large percentages of immigrants with foreign backgrounds. Due to the economic transformation of the city in the 1970s (especially with the crisis in the shipyard industry), unemployment grew rapidly. With unemployment and a large number of immigrants, social problems, segregation, discrimination and social tensions grew fast. Between 1990 and 1994, the labour market was reduced by 25 per cent (Sernhede & Johansson, 2006: 35). During the 1990s more than 90 per cent of the people who moved to Malmö had a foreign background (Sernhede & Johansson, 2006: 35–36).

Today the population of Malmö is estimated as being 277,271 (as of 1 January 2006). The ten largest groups of foreign-born persons are people from Yugoslavia (approximately 9,000), Iraq (approximately 6,000), Denmark (almost 6,000), Poland (approximately 5,500), Bosnia-Herzegovina (approximately 5,500), Lebanon (approximately 3,000), Iran (approximately 3,000), Hungary (almost 2,000), Finland (almost 2,000) and Germany (almost 2,000).

Table 7: Foreign-born persons and foreign citizens in Malmö (as of 1 January 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Share of population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born persons</td>
<td>70,590</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign citizens</td>
<td>28,556</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Homepage of Malmö city (www.malmo.se)

In Malmö most immigrants live in the Rosengården area, and the city centre of Malmö. Rosengården is part of the so-called “Million Programme” that was initiated in the 1960s to provide modern housing for a growing population. Resembling the development in Göteborg and Stockholm, this area is nowadays dominated by people with foreign backgrounds. Unemployment, social problems, criminality, drugs and other problems are part and parcel of everyday life in Rosengården. According to the figures given by Sernhede and Johansson (2006: 12), 74 per cent of the children between zero and six years live under the so-called poverty line (i.e. they live in families that are classified as very poor by Swedish standards).

The Muslim community in Malmö has only been partially studied by academic scholars. Like most other places in Sweden, the Muslim community (or rather communities) is divided into a large number of different ethnic and theological branches. According to information provided by Malmö University College, 50,000 Muslims live in Malmö. However, only 5 per cent of them practise Islam, and the large majority are not more religious than other Swedes. Out of

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80 This information is taken from the website of the City of Malmö, available at http://www.malmo.se/faktaommalmpolitik/statistik/01befolkning/befolkningsforandringarfolkmangd.4.6cf7991610a68cc43bd800013386.html (accessed 8 January 2007).
81 This information is taken from the website of the City of Malmö (facts and figures), available at http://www.malmo.se (accessed 8 January 2007).
82 This information is taken from the website of the Malmö University, available at http://www.mah.se/templates/NewsPage_____38290.aspx (accessed 8 January 2007).
13 mosques, 10 are located in Rosengård or Sofielund. The mosques in Malmö have been presented and described in *Sydsvenska* (the local newspaper in Malmö).  

- Abu Bakr As-Sideeq-moskén — basement mosques with approximately 500 members;
- Afghanska kulturföreningen (Afghan cultural organisation) — approximately 100 members;
- Al-Nour islamiska församlingar (Al-Nour Islamic congregation) — basement mosque with an Islamic pre-school;
- Bosnjakiska islamiska församlingen (Bosnian Islamic congregation) — established in 1994, approximately 2,000 members (associated with Sveriges Muslimska Råd);
- Malmö islamiska församling (Malmö Islamic community) — established in 1993 (associated with Sveriges Muslimska Råd) — members mainly from Turkey and Macedonia;
- Hilal-moskén (Hilal mosque) — basement mosque, associated with the Turkish association;
- Imam al-Sadeq-församlingen (Imam al-Sadeq congregation) — a Shia Muslim mosque with approximately 200 members, mainly from Lebanon (associated with Svenska Shiatsamfundet);
- Imam Husseins moské (Imam Hussein mosque) — a Shia Muslim mosque with approximately 200 members, mainly from Iraq (associated with Svenska Shiatsamfundet);
- Islamic Center — the largest mosque in Malmö. Approximately 50,000 Muslims or more use this mosque;
- Islamiska föreningen i Malmö (Islamic congregation in Malmö) — basement mosque;
- Islamska kulturcenter i Malmö (Islamic Cultural centre in Malmö);
- Islamska kulturhuset — prayer house in Rosengård (associated with Sveriges Muslimska Råd);
- Islams Ahmadiyya Djamaat (Islamic Ahmadiyya Djamaat) — approximately 200 members, mainly from Pakistan;
- Muslimska församlingen (Muslim congregation) — established in 1949, approximately 1,300 members (also known as the Turkish mosque);
- Islamic Centre and Muslim Students — established in 1980 in Lund, approximately 400 members.

From the above, it is clear that the Muslims in Malmö are divided according to ethnicity and language, a picture resembling the situation in both Göteborg and Stockholm. From the figures given in the table above, approximately 55,550 members are associated with a mosque or prayer house. Although these figures should be analysed with great care, they provide an impression of the Muslim milieu in Malmö, especially if we consider the figures provided by Malmö university college above.  

The large number of Islamic and Muslim organisations in Sweden (in this case in Malmö) is illustrative of the theological, political and ethnic divisions within the Muslim community.

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84 See http://www.mah.se/templates/NewsPage___38290.aspx
For example, Muslims in Malmö are followers of Salafī interpretations, Muslim brothers, Sufis, and Muslims who advocate a so-called Euro-Islam.85 The Muslim community is also divided between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. In the development of Islamic institutions in Malmö, the Bosnian community has played an important role in the setting up of the Islamic cultural centre and the large mosque. For example, members of this ethnic group played an important and leading part in the construction of the Islamic centre in Malmö (see Stenberg, 1999: 67). Because of political and theological differences, the Muslim community in Malmö is split, and after the Muhammad cartoon crisis in Denmark the community has become even more divided. Some Muslim leaders have called for a more politicised and anti-American interpretation of Islam, while others have called for a more tolerant and open-minded interpretation of Islam. The tension within the Muslim community has been analysed and described in several newspaper articles.

85 See “Muslimer inte en enad grupp” [Muslims are not a unified group], at http://www.mah.se/templates/NewsPage____38290.aspx.

The major body of printed books and articles included in this bibliography is taken from *Islam och muslimer i Sverige: En kommenterad bibliografi* (Larsson, 2004) and Larsson (2006). In accordance with the report methodology, this bibliography only includes recent publications, dating from 1996 on. Therefore, a large number of interesting publications have been left out. Material published before 1996 that is discussed in Part I is similarly not included in the below bibliography, but full references are provided in the footnotes. However, more details and references are provided in the above-mentioned bibliography.

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**In French**

In Swedish (and other Scandinavian languages)


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