Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly-arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with challenges and opportunities. The crucial tests facing Europe’s commitment to open society will be how it treats minorities such as Muslims and ensures equal rights for all in a climate of rapidly expanding diversity.

The Open Society Foundations’ At Home in Europe project is working to address these issues through monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of Muslims and other minorities in Europe. One of the project’s key efforts is this series of reports on Muslim communities in the 11 EU cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Leicester, London, Marseille, Paris, Rotterdam, and Stockholm. The reports aim to increase understanding of the needs and aspirations of diverse Muslim communities by examining how public policies in selected cities have helped or hindered the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims.

By fostering new dialogue and policy initiatives between Muslim communities, local officials, and international policymakers, the At Home in Europe project seeks to improve the participation and inclusion of Muslims in the wider society while enabling them to preserve the cultural, linguistic, and religious practices that are important to their identities.
Muslims in Paris

At Home in Europe Project
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................. 5
Preface .................................................................................. 7
Muslims in Paris ................................................................. 9
  List of Abbreviations .................................................. 17
  Definitions and Terminology .................................... 21
  Executive Summary ...................................................... 24
1. Introduction ................................................................. 27
2. Population and Demographics ...................................... 40
3. City Policy ................................................................. 64
4. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Identity, Belonging and Interaction .................................................. 79
5. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Education .......... 106
6. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Employment ..... 134
7. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Housing .......... 159
8. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Health and Social Services .......................................................... 188
9. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Policing and Security ................................................................. 205
10. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Participation and Citizenship .................................................... 221
11. Experiences of Muslim Communities: The Role of the Media ............................................................... 240
12. Conclusions ............................................................... 246
13. Recommendations ........................................................ 248
Annex 1. Bibliography .......................................................... 256
Annex 2. Additional tables from Open Society Foundations research .......................................................... 281
©2012 Open Society Foundations
This publication is available as a pdf on the Open Society Foundations website under a Creative Commons license that allows copying and distributing the publication, only in its entirety, as long as it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations and used for noncommercial educational or public policy purposes. Photographs may not be used separately from the publication.

ISBN: 978-1-936133-17-8

Published by

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019
USA

For more information contact:

AT HOME IN EUROPE PROJECT
OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION

100 Cambridge Grove
W6 0LE London
UK

Website
http://www.soros.org/about/programs/at-home-in-europe-project

Cover Photograph by © William Daniels/Panos Pictures for the Open Society Foundations
Cover design by Ahlgrim Design Group
Layout by Q.E.D. Publishing
Printed in Hungary
Printed on CyclusOffset paper produced from 100% recycled fibres.
Open Society Foundations Mission Statement

The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities in more than 70 countries, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.
Acknowledgements

This city report was prepared as part of a series of monitoring reports titled “Muslims in EU cities”. The series focuses on eleven cities in the European Union (EU) with significant Muslim populations. Each report focuses on the following neighbourhoods within each city: Slotervaart, Amsterdam; Borgerhout, Antwerp; Kreuzberg, Berlin; Nørrebro, Copenhagen; Hamburg-Mitte, Hamburg; Evington, Spinney Hills, Stoneygate, Leicester; 3rd Arrondissement, Marseille; 18th Arrondissement, Paris; Feijenoord, Rotterdam; Järvaället, Stockholm; the London Borough of Waltham Forest, London.

The report has been prepared by the At Home in Europe project of the Open Society Foundations in cooperation with local/national experts. We would like to sincerely thank Valerie Amiraux who has been engaged with the research since 2007 and who is the author of this report. Isabelle Tanguay, Yasmina Dahim and Karine Ménard-Hogan worked as her assistants at different times and we would also like to thank them. We are also grateful to Sonia Tebbakh who was involved in the early part of this research.

Valerie Amiraux, Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, University of Montreal, Canada

The field research was led by Cagla Aykac. Under her supervision the interviews and focus groups were conducted by a team based in Paris. The team comprised of individuals based in Paris who offered a familiarity with the city, neighbourhoods, communities, cultures and languages.

In May 2010, the Open Society Foundations held a closed roundtable meeting in Paris inviting critique and commentary on the draft report. We are grateful to the many participants who generously offered their time and expertise. These include representatives of Paris district administrations, civil society organisations, minority grassroots initiatives, academic experts, community leaders, and other relevant experts. We would also like to thank the team at Génériques for organising and hosting the roundtable meeting. Particular thanks are offered to Driss El Yazami, Sarah Clément and Oriane Amalric. As the Advisory Board Member for the French set of reports in this series (Marseille, Paris) Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, Associate at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies and the Centre for European Studies, Harvard University, has been supportive throughout all stages of the report.

The Open Society Foundations would like to thank all the individuals, named and unnamed, who contributed to the report by being available for interviews, providing information, research, or reviewing and critiquing drafts of the report. A number of other individuals, based in Paris, also agreed to be interviewed by the Open Society Foundations Office of Communications team, to whom we offer thanks.

The At Home in Europe Project has final responsibility for the content of the report including any errors or misrepresentations.
Open Society Foundations Team

Nazia Hussain (At Home in Europe Project)  Director
Tufyal Choudhury (At Home in Europe Project)  Senior Policy Advisor
Klaus Dik Nielsen (At Home in Europe Project)  Advocacy Officer
Hélène Irving (At Home in Europe Project)  Programme Coordinator
Andrea Gurubi Watterson (At Home in Europe Project)  Programme Officer
Csilla Tóth (At Home in Europe Project)  Programme Assistant
Preface

A central belief of the Open Society Foundations (Foundations) is that all people in an open society count equally and should enjoy equal opportunities. The Foundations works to mitigate discrimination, in particular harm done to minorities through discriminatory treatment, and to ensure that access to equal opportunities for all is an integral part of social inclusion policies of governments.

The At Home in Europe project of the Open Society Foundations focuses on monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of minorities in a changing Europe. Through its research and engagement with policymakers and communities, the project explores issues involving the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims and other marginalized groups at the local, national, and European levels.

Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with one of its greatest challenges: how to ensure equal rights in an environment of rapidly expanding diversity. Europe is no longer – if it ever was – a mono-cultural and mono-faith continent; its emerging minority groups and their identities as Europeans are an essential part of the political agenda and discourse.

Through its reports on Muslims in EU cities, the At Home in Europe project examines city and municipal policies that have actively sought to understand Muslim communities and their specific needs. Furthermore, the project aims to capture the type and degree of engagement policymakers have initiated with their Muslim and minority constituents by highlighting best practices in select western European cities. An underlying theme is how Muslim communities have themselves actively participated in tackling discrimination and whether the needs of specific groups warrant individual policy approaches in order to overcome barriers to equal opportunities.

The city reports build upon Foundations’ earlier work on minority protection, in particular the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program reports on the situation of Muslims in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. All of these studies make it clear that further research is needed. The limited data currently available on Europe’s Muslim populations are extrapolated from ethnic and country of origin background. This lack of precise data limits the possibilities for creating nuanced, specific policies on the most relevant issues for Muslims, and developing sensitive and integrated social inclusion policies.

The At Home in Europe report series includes an overview and individual reports on 11 cities in seven European countries. The project selected the cities on the basis of literature reviews conducted in 2006, taking into account population size, diversity,
and the local political context. All 11 city reports were prepared by teams of local experts on the basis of the same methodology to allow for comparative analysis.

Each city report includes detailed recommendations for improving the opportunities for full participation and inclusion of Muslims in wider society while enabling them to preserve cultural, linguistic, religious, and other community characteristics important to their identities. These recommendations, directed primarily at specific local actors, will form the basis for the Foundations advocacy activities.
Muslims in Paris
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions and Terminology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Methodology</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Quantitative Phase: Questionnaires</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Qualitative Phase: Focus Groups</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 Key Stakeholder Interviews</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population and Demographics</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Demographic Dynamics</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Access to Citizenship and Naturalisation</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Patterns of Immigration and Settlement</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 The 18th Arrondissement</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. City Policy</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 City Administrative Structures</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Education</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Employment</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Housing</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Health and Social Care</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Police</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Immigration and Integration</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 Cultural Policies and Places of Worship</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1 Delanoë and Paris</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2 Places of worship</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Identity, Belonging and Interaction</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Islamophobia and Inequality: the Two Sides of Discrimination</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Feelings about the Neighbourhood</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Values</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Sense of Belonging</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Interacting or Neighbourliness?</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 A Cohesive Neighbourhood or an Isolated One?</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Education</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5 Choice of Areas to Live ........................................... 171
7.6 Local Renovation and Regeneration Policies .......... 172
7.7 Social Changes ..................................................... 175
7.8 Social Housing .................................................... 176
  7.8.1 Access to Social Housing .............................. 177
  7.8.2 Survey Results .............................................. 180
  7.8.3 Information, Advice and Support ................ 181
7.9 Discrimination in Access to Private Housing ........... 184
7.10 External Conditions .......................................... 185
7.11 Is Social Mixing Really a Policy? ....................... 186
7.12 Conclusion ...................................................... 187

8. Experiences of Muslim Communities:
  Health and Social Services ........................................ 188
  8.1 Health Services in the 18th Arrondissement .......... 191
    8.1.1 Atelier Santé Ville Paris 18 ......................... 191
    8.1.2 La Goutte d’Or Health Centre ..................... 192
    8.1.3 Health NGOs .............................................. 194
  8.2 The Health of Older Migrants ......................... 196
  8.3 Perception of Health Services’ Attention to
     Religious Needs ............................................ 197
  8.4 Satisfaction with Health Services ..................... 200
  8.5 Conclusion .................................................... 203

9. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Policing and
  Security .............................................................. 205
  9.1 Police Efforts to Fight Discrimination ............... 209
  9.2 The Fight Against Terrorism ............................ 211
  9.3 The Muslim Population and the Police ............... 211
  9.4 Conclusion .................................................... 219

10. Experiences of Muslim Communities: Participation
    and Citizenship ................................................... 221
    10.1 Participation in Elections and Political Activities ... 221
        10.1.1 Influencing Public Policies ....................... 224
    10.2 Activities with NGOs and other Civil Society
         Organisations ............................................... 227
    10.3 Initiatives to Increase Participation of Non-EU
         Citizens ...................................................... 231
    10.4 Opinions on Civic and Political Participation ...... 233
10.5 Political Representation of the Muslim Community in Paris ................................................ 235
   10.5.1 The Institute of Islamic Cultures (Institut des Cultures d’Islam–ICI) ............................ 235
   10.5.2 The CFCD  ............................................................................................................ 237
10.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 238
11. Experiences of Muslim Communities: The Role of the Media ........................................ 240
   11.1 Street Prayers ........................................................................................................... 240
   11.2 Imaginary Islam ...................................................................................................... 241
   11.3 Ethnic Media ........................................................................................................... 244
12. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 246
13. Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 248
   13.1 Identity, Belonging and Interaction ............................................................................ 248
   13.2 Education ................................................................................................................ 249
   13.3 Employment .............................................................................................................. 251
   13.4 Housing ..................................................................................................................... 251
   13.5 Health ........................................................................................................................ 253
   13.6 Policing and Security ................................................................................................. 254
   13.7 Participation and Citizenship ..................................................................................... 255
Annex 1. Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 256
Annex 2. Additional tables from Open Society Foundations research .................................... 281

Index of Tables

Table 1. Age of respondents to the Open Society Foundations’ questionnaire .... 36
Table 2. Gender composition of respondents ................................................................. 36
Table 3. Open Society Foundations’ sample by place of birth and nationality .... 37
Table 4. Language used during interviews ................................................................. 38
Table 5. Immigration to France by country, 1999 and 2006 ........................................ 42
Table 6. Foreign population by nationality in Paris, 2007 ........................................... 48
Table 7. Proportion of foreigners and immigrants in France, 2004–2005 ............ 51
Table 9. Naturalised citizens among foreign-origin population, 18th arrondissement, 1999 ................................................................. 53
Table 10. Place of residence within the 18th arrondissement of the Open Society
Foundation sample .................................................................................. 63
Table 11. Religious practice among respondents ........................................ 81
Table 12. Which of the following say something important about you? ......... 83
Table 13. Length of time residing in the neighbourhood ................................ 88
Table 14. Who are the people in your neighbourhood? ............................... 89
Table 15. Do you like your neighbourhood? .............................................. 90
Table 16. Reasons for moving to the neighbourhood ..................................... 91
Table 17. Do people in this neighbourhood share the same values? ............... 93
Table 18. Are people in this neighbourhood willing to help others? ............... 94
Table 19. How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area? ............... 95
Table 20. How strongly do you feel you belong to Paris? ............................ 95
Table 21. How strongly do you feel you belong to France? ......................... 96
Table 22. Do you see yourself as French? .................................................. 97
Table 23. Strength of feelings towards the neighbourhood ........................... 98
Table 24. Frequency of meetings with different ethnic groups ..................... 99
Table 25. Interaction with people from other ethnic groups ....................... 100
Table 26. Do the residents work together to improve the neighbourhood? .... 102
Table 27. Is this a close-knit neighbourhood? .......................................... 281
Table 28. Level of satisfaction with primary schools in the neighbourhood .... 124
Table 29. Level of satisfaction with secondary schools in the neighbourhood ... 282
Table 30. Frequency of meeting people from a different religion to yourself
(At school, at work) ............................................................................... 282
Table 31. To what extent do you think that schools respect the religious
customs of people belonging to different religions? ............................... 130
Table 32. Description of professional occupational category ...................... 140
Table 33. Breakdown of complaints by area, 2005–2009 ............................ 142
Table 34. In the last five years, have you been refused or turned down for a
job in this country? ............................................................................. 283
Table 35. Have you been refused a job on any of the following grounds? ....... 143
Table 36. In the past year, how often has interviewee met and spoken to a
person of a different ethnic group at school, work or college? ............... 144
Table 37. Background of employers and colleagues .................................... 146
Table 38. Level of employer respect for religious difference ....................... 147
Table 39. To what extent do you think that employers respect the religious
customs of people belonging to different religions? ............................. 148
Table 40. To what extent do you think that employers respect the religious
customs of people belonging to different religions, by religion
and gender? ....................................................................................... 149
Table 41. Employment by age on last birthday ........................................... 153
Table 42. Housing status by nationality in Paris, 1999 ................................ 164
Table 43. Housing status by nationality of the reference person in Paris ....... 166
Table 44. Level of satisfaction concerning social housing ................................. 180
Table 45. In the last 12 months, have you needed advice or information on housing? ........................................................................................................... 182
Table 46. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with street cleaning? .......... 186
Table 47. Frequency of interaction with people from different ethnic groups in the last year in the health centre and hospital .......................... 284
Table 48. Proportion of elderly non-EU immigrants (55 years and over, men and women) living in Paris, 2008 ................................................. 196
Table 49. Level of respect shown by hospitals and clinics ......................... 198
Table 50. In the last 12 months, have you needed advice or information on health care? ......................................................................................... 200
Table 51. In the last 12 months, have you sought information on health care (by birthplace) .................................................................................. 201
Table 52. Level of satisfaction with health services ........................................ 202
Table 53. Level of satisfaction with health services (by birthplace) .............. 203
Table 54. Have you had contact with the police (about any issue) in the last 12 months? ................................................................................... 212
Table 55. Have you been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months? .......... 284
Table 56. If you have been a victim of a crime, where did this happen? ...... 285
Table 57. Level of trust in the police force among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement ....................................................... 214
Table 58. Level of trust in the judiciary system among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement .................................................. 214
Table 59. Level of trust in the police force among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement (by birthplace) .............................. 215
Table 60. Level of trust in the judiciary system among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement (by birthplace) ...................... 215
Table 61. Level of satisfaction regarding the maintenance of law and order among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement ....... 216
Table 62. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with policing? ..................... 218
Table 63. Right to vote in national elections .................................................... 221
Table 64. Right to vote in national elections (by birthplace) ....................... 221
Table 65. Level of participation in the last national elections ..................... 223
Table 66. Level of participation in the last local elections ............................ 223
Table 67. Local vote eligibility ....................................................................... 223
Table 68. Have you signed a petition in the past 12 months? ..................... 224
Table 69. Have you attended a public meeting or demonstration in the past 12 months? .................................................................................. 224
Table 70. Ability to influence decisions affecting the city ............................ 225
Table 71. Ability to influence decisions in the 18th arrondissement (Muslims by birthplace) ................................................................................. 225
Table 72. Ability to influence decisions affecting the country ..................... 226
Table 73. Level of trust in the national Parliament ........................................ 226
Table 74. Level of trust in the national government ............................................ 227
Table 75. Level of trust in the national government (by birthplace) ................. 227
Table 76. Active involvement in civil society initiatives in the past 12 months .... 229
Table 77. In the past 12 months, has interviewee taken active part in running adult education activities (by gender)? ..................................................... 230

Index of Figures

Figure 1. Religious denominations (including no religion) by origin and link to migration ........................................................................................................... 44
Figure 2. Map showing settlement patterns of immigrants in the Ile-de-France region ................................................................................................. 49
Figure 3. Map showing foreign population of Paris, inner city and surrounding areas, 2007 .............................................................................................. 50
Figure 4. Difference in employment rates of third-country nationals and French nationals (less than 50 years old) ......................................................... 138
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRI</td>
<td>Agency for the Development of Intercultural Relations, <em>Agence pour le développement des relations interculturelles</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AME</td>
<td>State Medical Help, <em>Aide Médicale de l'État</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMO</td>
<td>Association of Muslims for Openness, <em>Association des musulmans de l'ouverture</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAEM</td>
<td>National Agency for Reception of Foreigners and Migrants, <em>Agence nationale d'accueil des étrangers et des migrants</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAH</td>
<td>National Agency for the Improvement of Housing, <em>Agence nationale pour l'amélioration de l'habitat</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPE</td>
<td>National Agency for Employment, <em>Agence nationale pour l'emploi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Acting for Competence, <em>Agir pour la compétence</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APUR</td>
<td>Parisian Urban Agency, <em>Agence Parisienne d'urbanisme</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEP</td>
<td>Degree for vocational training in secondary schools in the French educational system, <em>Brevet d'études professionnelles</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASNAV</td>
<td>Academic Centres for the Schooling of New Arrivals and Children of Travellers, <em>Centres académiques de scolarisation des nouveaux arrivants et des enfants des gens du voyage</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASVP</td>
<td>Centre for Social Action for the City of Paris, <em>Centre d'action sociale de la Ville de Paris</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIF</td>
<td>Collective Against Islamophobia in France, <em>Collectif contre l'Islamophobie en France</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCPNC</td>
<td>Citizenship Council/s of Non-EU Parisians, <em>Conseil/s de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens Non Communautaires</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFISEM</td>
<td>Centres for Training and Information on the Schooling of Children of Migrants, <em>Centres de formation et d'information sur la scolarité des enfants de migrants</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCM</td>
<td>French Council of Muslim Worship, <em>Conseil français du culte musulman</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Universal Care Coverage, <em>Couverture médicale universelle</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDS</td>
<td>National Commission for Security Ethics, <em>Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIL</td>
<td>National Commission for Data Processing and Freedom, <em>Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMEDD</td>
<td>Committee for the Measuring and Evaluation of Diversity and Discriminations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Republican Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUCS</td>
<td>Urban Contract of Social Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASES</td>
<td>Social Action, Childhood and Health Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDASS</td>
<td>Health and Social Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDEEES</td>
<td>Office for Economic Development, Employment and Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDTEFP</td>
<td>Regional Office for Work, Employment and Vocational Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFPE</td>
<td>Office for the Family and Early Childhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREES</td>
<td>Office for research, studies and evaluation of statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Priority education, education prioritaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASILD</td>
<td>Action and Support Fund for Integration and Fight against Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>EU Fundamental Rights Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALDE</td>
<td>High Authority for the Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCI</td>
<td>High Council for Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLM</td>
<td>Housing at Moderate Rents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Institute of Islamic Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INED</td>
<td>National Institute of Demographic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDH</td>
<td>League of Human Rights, Ligue des droits de l'homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOV</td>
<td>Law for City Orientation, Loi d’orientation pour la ville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiRE</td>
<td>Research Mission Directorate, Mission de la Recherche, Ministry of Work, Employment and Health, Ministère du Travail, de l’emploi et de la santé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between People, Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation, Organisation non-gouvernementale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFII</td>
<td>French Office for Immigration and Integration, Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMI</td>
<td>International Migrations Service, Office des Migrations Internationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAC</td>
<td>Public Office for Planning and Construction, Office public d’aménagement et de construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAH</td>
<td>Planned Operations for the Improvement of Housing, Opération programmée d’amélioration de l’habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPH</td>
<td>Paris Habitat Office, Office parisien de l’habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAD</td>
<td>Point of Access to Law, Point d’accès au droit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAE</td>
<td>Departmental Programme to Support Employment, Programme Départemental d’Aide à l’Emploi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>Departmental Programme of Inclusion, Programme départemental d’inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICRI</td>
<td>Partnerships Institutions Citizens for Research and Innovation, Partenariats Institutions Citoyens pour la recherche et l’innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIMMS</td>
<td>Information Mediation Multiservices Point, Point information médiation multiservices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLIE</td>
<td>Multi-Year Local Plan for Inclusion and Employment, Plan local pluriannuel pour l’insertion et l’emploi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td>Maternal and Child Welfare, Protection maternelle infantile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>Networks Ambition Success, Réseau ambition réussite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATP</td>
<td>Parisian Public Transport Office, Régie autonome des transports parisiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RERS</td>
<td>Indicators and Statistical References on Teaching, Training and Research, Repères et références statistiques sur l’enseignement, la formation et la recherche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI</td>
<td>Minimum social welfare benefits, Revenu minimum d’insertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Active solidarity benefits, Revenu de solidarité active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF</td>
<td>French National Railway Corporation, <em>Société nationale des chemins de fer français</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAM</td>
<td>Immigration Social Services, <em>Service Sociale d’aide aux migrants</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDP</td>
<td>General Department of Social Service, <em>Service social départemental polyvalent</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGTSF</td>
<td>General Union of Senegalese Workers in France, <em>Union générale des travailleurs sénégalais en France</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement, <em>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZEP</td>
<td>Priority Education Area, <em>Zone d’éducation prioritaire</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

**Discrimination**: The term “discrimination” is used throughout this report; it includes harassment and direct and indirect discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 of the EU Race Directive expressly prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs “where one person has been treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin”. According to the Directive, indirect discrimination occurs “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”.

**Ethnic or racial profiling**: Describes the use by law enforcement officers of race, ethnicity, religion or national origin rather than individual behaviour as the basis for making decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.

**Ethnicity**: Membership of a group which may share language, cultural practices, religion or common identity based on a shared history.

**EU-born**: In the context of this report, a distinction is made between foreign-born and EU-born respondents. The latter refers to participants in the Open Society Foundations’ research who were born in the country where the research was undertaken. Therefore, a participant in the research on Paris who was born in Poland would be identified as foreign-born.

**Foreigner**: This term is defined as an individual who does not have French citizenship for the purposes of this report.

**Harassment** is conduct which creates "an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment".

**Integration**: The definition used in this report is “a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” as stated in the Common Basic Principles (CBPs). In the Explanation to the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration 2004 (CBPs), “Integration is a dynamic long-term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities.”
Islamophobia: Irrational hostility, fear and hatred of Islam, Muslims and Islamic culture, and active discrimination towards this group as individuals or collectively.

Marginalised: Marginalised groups can be part of an ethnic or racial minority and a subcategory of minority groups. They can also be characterised and distinguished from other groups by suffering socio-economic disadvantage and a powerless position in society or in a group. This report defines marginalised groups as those who experience social exclusion, be they part of a minority or majority group in society.

Migrant: The United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) definition refers to a “person who has moved temporarily or permanently to a country where he or she was not born and has acquired significant social ties to this country”. This includes students, children and family dependants. A distinction is made in which this term does not include asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons. However, in some countries “migrant” also refers to those who are born in the country to which their parents migrated.

Minority: Under international law, there is no agreed definition of this term. Some countries define a minority as a person or group recognised as such by national laws. In this report, the term refers to ethnic and religious groups that are not the dominant group in society.

Muslim: This group is diverse and although there are a common belief system and possibly experiences as Muslims, this report relies on its Muslim respondents’ identification of themselves as Muslims. Furthermore, this term includes Muslims who view themselves in a cultural rather than a religious context.

Nationality: Country of citizenship.

Non-Muslim: For the purpose of this report, a non-Muslim is anyone who does not define himself or herself as belonging to the Islamic faith.

Race: The term “race” is used in the content of discrimination on the grounds of race, which occurs where people face discrimination because of their presumed membership of groups identified by physical features such as skin colour, hair or physical appearance. References to race in this report should not be taken to suggest that there are distinct human races.

Racism: Where used in this report, “racism” will be defined as “racial discrimination” which according to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social or cultural or any other field of public life”. Racial discrimination can also be based on markers of visible difference due to membership of a cultural group.
Social inclusion: The provision and promotion of equal rights and access in the fields of education, employment and decision-making. Overcoming discrimination is implicit throughout policies and practices whose aim is to make inclusion a reality.

Third-country national: An individual who is not a national of an EU Member State.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Muslims in France constitute a category widely used in various public discourses without being precise. An estimated 10 per cent of the population in France is Muslim; most have acquired French citizenship. Since the 1990s and well before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the presence of Islam and Muslims has raised political, social and cultural security issues. French society has been exposed to the complex challenge of considering equality and the Republican ideal of integration at the same time as the religious component of an individual’s identity. The public discussions on the question of Islam and the Muslims mostly centre on the way secularism as a principle must be reaffirmed as a core value of integration and a regulatory principle of social life, although until recently secularism has been presented as a pillar of French national identity. The discussion has also been shaped by the dilemma of France’s postcolonial past and the ideals of Republican France.

During the last decade, the French discourse on equality has been changing following the implementation of the European Union anti-discrimination provisions, which have necessitated recasting the vocabulary and the tools for assessing areas and levels of discrimination. It has also led to the entry of a wider circle of discussants in the debate on the legitimacy of and the need to further develop a system to gather ethnic data and ethnic categories. Further to the previous reports produced by the Open Society Foundations in 2003 and 2005 on France, the political context has dramatically changed. New agencies like the French Council of Muslim Worship (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM) or the High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité, HALDE), have found their place in the French institutional landscape, even if their utility and political role still need to be developed, particularly in the case of the HALDE which became part of the newly established Defender of Rights (Défenseur des droits) in May 2011.

This report concentrates on the 18th district (arrondissement) of Paris and more specifically on a tiny borough of this arrondissement called La Goutte d’Or. The arrondissement, which has about 200,000 residents and this very small borough (about 30,000 persons) were selected due to their ethnic diversity, the continuous flows of migrants in parts of the district and the strong concentration of Muslims in some of the areas. The 18th is in itself a very complex and heterogeneous arrondissement of Paris. Ethnic and religious diversity has become a key issue of local political discussions and is also linked to a strong network of associations engaged in different types of social activities in the neighbourhood. In 2004, the City of Paris administration launched an initiative directly related to the presence of Muslims and the visibility of Islam in France’s capital. The initiative, the Institute of Islamic Cultures (Institut des Cultures de l’Islam, ICI), is located in La Goutte d’Or. The 18th can therefore be considered as one of the most representative places for ethnic and religious diversity in Paris, as well as
being an important location for observing how local policies address Islam and its differences and the recognition of Muslim minorities.

This research reveals the complexity of the neighbourhoods in the 18th; multiculturalism, segregation and conviviality coexist as principles and practices, without always making interaction between inhabitants possible or easy. The residents of the 18th, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, expressed a strong feeling of belonging to their neighbourhood (rather than to the arrondissement). Generally, they declared their attachments to the neighbourhood and their happiness to live there. Yet they were unable to articulate a clear vision of what ethnic and cultural diversity may really consist of. They also complained about the absence of occasions for interacting socially with people from different backgrounds. Therefore, while the streets of the 18th may appear to non-residents as diverse, they offer its inhabitants limited opportunities for multicultural socialisation and interaction.

This study also shows the complex articulation between, on the one hand, the feelings of belonging to and identification with the neighbourhood, and, on the other hand, the issues of nationality and identity. The participants in the survey refused to label their neighbourhood a ghetto, with the negative associations with segregation and violence. At the same time, inhabitants’ perceptions oscillate between seeing it as protecting people and the wish to run away from it. In answering the questionnaires as well as during the focus groups, people expressed distance from the main national debates. In a way, France, the country, stays outside the neighbourhood.

The main conclusions of this study underline the fact that religion is not necessarily a variable that helps in understanding the experiences and feelings of social and economic deprivation, exclusion and discrimination. While ethnic diversity and social and economic difficulties are clearly identified by the participants as those which have the greater impact on their daily lives, religion remains marginal. It does not have any predictive value, at least for the Muslims, as a factor contributing to understanding the discrimination they may face and experience daily.

The lack of official data on religion has been a major and constant obstacle in conducting this research. Public policies do not distinguish officially between categories of the public (such as migrants or people with migrant backgrounds or Muslims or non-Muslims). Individual religious identification is not legal. The lack of data creates and maintains the illusion of an equal access of all to public services and rights. For instance, while public services do not target populations and users according to their origin or belonging, they recognise that some of their programmes should cater to the specific needs of certain population groups. This is particularly clear in the health-care system. Medical public services may take unofficial initiatives based on demographic specifics, but they are never explicitly stated nor are they supported by public authorities.

Islam and Muslims, as a group that raises social questions and has become an object of public discussion, are often described as migration-related. This study shows that the
situation of the migrants arriving in France affects the forms of discrimination and exclusion more than any inherent characteristics of Islam and Muslims.

When local authorities try to deal with problems of ethnic and national origin, their initiatives are often incomplete or can lack coherence. The City of Paris, for instance, has taken different measures aimed at maintaining the political participation of Muslims and foreigners. Citizenship Councils of non-EU Parisians were set up (Conseils de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens Non Communautaires, CCPNC) in some Paris arrondissements, including the 18th. The rules for establishing these advisory councils do not consider the racial or ethnic composition of the neighbourhood because these categories, which would help build a proper representation of the concrete diversity of an arrondissement, cannot legally be the basis of public action. In some cases, the consultative councils, as well as any other consultative structure aiming at the better participation of citizens, do not represent the actual diversity of the people.
1. **Introduction**

Muslims in France are estimated to represent 10 per cent of the population; most have acquired French citizenship. In the French context, the issue of Islam and Muslims raises simultaneously political, social and cultural questions. Muslims have become a category in various public discourses without precise definition. This report focuses on the specific problem of applying categories that may change depending on who is using them and what is referred to; the category of Muslim permeates all the public space and affects many people by association. This report’s use of this categorisation means also being aware of the limit of the category in doing justice to the multiple ways of life for a Muslim in Paris. Still, while the category remains unsatisfying, it has currency in the media.

Islam and Muslims have moved from being a social issue to a public problem that, since the 1990s – long before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 – has included security concerns. These related aspects have exposed French society to the complex challenge of thinking about equality and the Republican ideal of integration while also considering the religious component of an individual’s identity. Public discussions mostly centre on the way secularism as a principle must be reaffirmed as a core value and a regulatory principle, the ban on the burqa in public spaces being the most recent episode in this long French saga. The discussions have also been shaped by the dilemma of France’s postcolonial past and the ideals of Republican France: how to reconcile the conditions for equality and freedom among its citizens with the treatment of its subjects during the colonial period.

---

1 The ban on the burqa in public spaces in specific situations was voted on by the French National Assembly in early July 2010. The law was passed in October 2010 as Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face in public space (Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public). It came into effect on 11 April 2011.

2 Article 1 of the 1958 French constitution states: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis. Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to professional and social positions.” Article 3 (al. 5) adds: “The law favours equal access for men and women to electoral mandates and positions.”

In contrast to some other European countries, Islamophobia has made a recent entry into public discourse in France.\textsuperscript{4} The term Islamophobia is contested.\textsuperscript{5} The Runnymede Trust in the UK offered the first definition in its 1997 publication “Islamophobia: A challenge to us all”. It included the views that: (1) Islam is seen as separate and other. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them. (2) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a clash of civilisations. (3) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. (4) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal.\textsuperscript{6} However, the issue of religious discrimination as distinct from


\textsuperscript{6} These elements of definition can be found in Runnymede Trust, \textit{Islamophobia: A challenge for us all}, 1997. The Runnymede definition of Islamophobia through eight components has been widely accepted, in particular by public institutions such as the EUMC (called the Fundamental Rights Agency, FRA, since March 2007).
racial has been absent from the public arena in France, with little effort from stakeholders and Muslim leaders to address it seriously.\(^7\)

During the last decade, the French discourse on equality has been further complicated by EU anti-discrimination provisions, which have contributed to recasting the vocabulary and the tools needed to assess places and levels of discrimination.\(^8\) It has also enlarged the circle of participants in the debate on legitimacy and the need to develop a system to gather ethnic data.\(^9\) Following the earlier reports produced by the


Open Society Foundations on France, the political context dramatically changed. New agencies like the CFCM and the HALDE were created. The former has increasingly limited its public participation in any of the discussions on Muslims in France (reflecting its mandate, which is restricted to issues of worship), and the latter did not work per se on religious discrimination but covered religion as part of its mandate over domains where discrimination exists (housing, employment, health care, etc.). The existence of the HALDE as a separate institution has been discussed by the Senate since January 2011 in the framework of a project merging various institutions in the fields of the defence of rights and the promotion of equality into one institution named Defender of Rights (Défenseur des droits), finalised in May 2011.

France has long been depicted as a country of migration, where the process of integration is framed by two central principles: republicanism and secularism (laïcité). The picture of France as a model of integration has given rise to divergent readings of the French approach compared with the British or the German ones. The main distinction between France and its European neighbours lies in their different definitions of nationhood (in particular when comparing France and Germany) and with the development of a multicultural concept of politics, which articulates race and ethnicity as the central criteria for the implementation of justice, especially in the UK. In recent years – and in particular following the implementation of EU anti-discrimination provisions – the French political formula for integration has become less

---


11 More information can be found on the HALDE website, which provides an English presentation of its main activities and targets, at http://www.halde.fr (accessed February 2011).

12 Translating words such as laïcité into English and words such as race or ethnicity into French presents certain problems. Central to this report is the way categories are defined, selected and applied and understanding that these are not neutral processes. On the definition of laïcité, Jean Baubérot, French historian and specialist in the sociology of religions, was consulted and answered: “Laïcité is more and more used as referring to the separation between State and Church as a condition for freedom of conscience and equality of rights. ‘Secular state’ or ‘secularism’ are the translations of the Council of Europe and other international institutions, mostly the ones preferred by lawyers too. These are institutional uses of the word that do not encompass sociological perspectives on secularization processes for instance.” See Jean Baubérot, Les laïcités dans le monde (Secularisms in the world), PUF, Paris, 2007, pp. 19–20.

13 A prolific literature exists on this subject, mostly based on migration and ethnic studies, which sometimes refer to religious issues.

radical than other Europeans approaches.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, it has been described recently as converging upon other historically defined Anglo-Saxon traditions of the accommodation and recognition of ethnic diversity.\textsuperscript{16} The current French position can best be defined as a moment of reinvention, both in vocabulary to fit in with new European governance where discrimination is a central term in the development of a politics of difference, and in utilising political grammar to connect with a longer historical perspective.\textsuperscript{17} This evolution has taken place in a rather tense context since 2003–2004, which was marked by the law banning conspicuous religious signs from public schools (March 2004), and more recently, by public debate, parliamentary discussion and legislation prohibiting the full-face veil (niqab/burqa) in public spaces. Against this backdrop of tension and discrimination, unemployment and police action, there were, among many episodes, three weeks of urban riots across France (November 2005) and a wide discussion between experts and politicians on the legitimacy of adopting the collection of ethnic data in public statistics, not to mention the government’s imposition of a national debate dealing with French national identity or the recent discussion of restrictions on dual citizenship for French citizens.\textsuperscript{18} The list of public statements and political decisions aimed at designating Muslims and more generally migrants and people with foreign origins as targets of restrictive policies is long. The challenge for political leaders and public agencies seems to be two-sided, one underlining the evidence of the growing gap between historical narratives (France, a  

\textsuperscript{15} The French tradition (articulating integration through citizenship and Republicanism) runs opposite to the \textit{jus sanguinis} and ethnic model of integration (as for instance in Germany) and to the communitarian/multiculturalist model (such as in the UK or in the United States).  


\textsuperscript{18} Here are some of the public reports that have been published on controversial issues such as the possibility of having ethnic data in France: Report of the Committee considering the Constitution Preamble (\textit{Rapport du comité de réflexion sur le Préambule de la Constitution}), December 2008; Committee for the Measuring and Evaluation of Diversity and Discriminations (\textit{Comité pour la mesure et l’évaluation de la diversité et des discriminations}, COMEDDD), February 2010. For a synthesis of the discussion on the legitimacy of ethnic data in public statistics, see Patrick Simon, “Statistics, French social sciences and ethnic and racial relations”, \textit{Revue française de sociologie} (in English) (2010), pp. 159–174 (hereafter Simon, “Statistics, French social sciences”). See also the resources available on the website of the French-American Foundation at \url{http://equality.frenchamerican.org}, in particular the interviews given concerning the ethnic data topic by some of the members of the COMEDDD.
nation that welcomes foreigners and the Republican framework of integration for individuals) and practices (discrimination, public expressions of clear hostility towards certain groups of people), and the conflict between political principles (equality, neutrality of the state in religious matters) and practical implementation (more restrictions, with the state being particularly active on religious diversity).19

Four elements, inherited from the French Revolution, structure the Republican project and are central to understanding the French public’s opinions and the traditions of integration: first, the unmediated relationship between the citizen and the state (equality through belonging to a national political community); second, secular public education; third, the belief in France’s international mission; fourth, a strong activist state.20 These elements actively contribute to the conviction that the way France produces the conditions for equality among different citizens is exceptional.21 This conviction should be explored, starting with the contemporary challenges embodied in recent episodes and public discussions that have opened new avenues of thought about the Republican ability to govern a country based on ethnic and cultural pluralism, in particular when expressed in religious terms. Against this political and social context, the discrimination facing Muslims in France today is specific and largely undocumented. Things are, however, indeed changing, sometimes but not always for the better, as this report will illustrate. In the context of discrimination and the assessment of the impact of ethnic origin and migrant background on the conditions of access to goods, services and rights of people living in France, a 2008 Trajectories and Origins (Trajectoires et origines, hereafter TeO) survey conducted by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, INSEE) and the National Institute of Demographic Studies (Institut national des études démographiques, INED)22 enquired into discrimination by looking at the variations according to origin in employment, education, housing, health, etc. More specifically it looked at the impact of origins on living conditions and

19 For an update on discrimination see Amiraux and Guiraudon, “Discrimination in comparative perspective”.
social trajectories while including in the analysis other socio-demographic characteristics (social environment, neighbourhood, age, gender, educational level). TeO also analysed the way people express their discrimination as actual experience: incidents of discrimination were examined from the viewpoint of those exposed to it. TeO was based on a large-scale survey of various population groups (22,000 persons including immigrants, immigrants’ descendants born in France, people born in the overseas territories (DOM), their descendants born in metropolitan France and the French-born descendants of French-born nationals) in order to produce data to analyse direct and indirect institutional discrimination and the experience of racism in a national context where these data are largely absent. One of the main results emphasises the role of ethnic origin and the impact of religion on experiences of discrimination reported by individuals, in many situations and at various times.

1.1 Methodology

This report examines the situation of Muslims in Paris concentrating on the local level, more precisely on the 18th arrondissement and a tiny borough of this arrondissement called La Goutte d’Or. The arrondissement (about 200,000 people) and this tiny borough (about 30,000 people) were selected on the grounds of ethnic diversity, the continuous flows of migrants in some parts of the district and the high concentration of Muslims in some of its boroughs. The 18th is a very complex and heterogeneous arrondissement of Paris. Ethnic and religious diversity in the 18th arrondissement has become a big political issue in local discussions and is also linked to a strong network of associations involved with different types of social activities in the neighbourhood. In 2004, Paris City Hall launched an initiative directly related to the presence of Muslims and the visibility of Islam in France’s capital. Named the Institute of Islamic Cultures (Institut des Cultures de l’Islam, ICI), it is located in the 18th arrondissement in La Goutte d’Or. The 18th can therefore be considered one of the most representative places for ethnic and religious diversity in Paris as well as an important location for observing how local policies address Islam and the problems of difference and the recognition of Muslim minorities. Indeed, this report does not deal with Islam either as a religion or as a style of worship. While the distinction is not always clearly stated in France, the report limits its scope to the social and economic conditions of the people considered to be Muslims living in the 18th and in La Goutte d’Or.

This report will examine how both Muslims and non-Muslims living in the 18th arrondissement of Paris identify, name and detail their ordinary lives here. The report also studies the ways in which the municipal authorities address the challenges of integration; how they counter growing social, political and economic tensions and the extent to which they consider the needs of Muslims and consult and involve them in decision-making. This study also aims to explore where a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims may be relevant on specific topics such as education, housing and employment. It offers a number of concrete policy recommendations addressed to Paris
City Hall as well as to national policy leaders, in an attempt to support change where needed.

Three central and basic questions underpin the thought in this report:

- What makes Muslims a specific population to deal with in an arrondissement such as the 18th in Paris?

- To what extent do their ordinary experiences as Parisian citizens and residents differ from non-Muslims and affect their relationships with employment, health, education and housing?

- Can religion (lived and perceived) be said to have a predictive value for the way individuals relate to public services and are treated by public authorities? Is religion key to the way individuals relate to the urban settings they live in, identify with and belong to, and how does it affect the way public agencies treat them?

This report is based on a common research design for 11 EU cities that are part of the “At Home in Europe” Project of the Open Society Foundations. The research included a uniform questionnaire survey conducted with 100 Muslim and 100 non-Muslim residents of the 18th arrondissement, lasting on average between one hour and a half and two hours (face to face). Six focus groups with 8–10 Muslim participants, different from those who took part in the questionnaires, were also held in the 18th arrondissement with self-identifying Muslims. In addition, in-depth qualitative interviews were held with local officials, members of non-government organisations (NGOs) and experts on integration in Paris and the country at large.

The research and data in this report were collected between January 2008 and February 2010. The questionnaires and focus groups were conducted and facilitated from January to April 2008 with stakeholder interviews held over four months in 2008. Further interviews were conducted between February and June 2009.

The targets for the quota samples were extrapolated from available national population figures for Paris and the 18th arrondissement. Recognising that national statistics do not include data on ethnic or religious affiliation, the exact numbers of Muslims in Paris cannot be determined. Due to the small scale of the survey, the findings cannot be taken as an accurate reflection of the population in Paris, but rather as a snapshot of the diversity and opinions of the population living in the specific neighbourhood.
1.1.1 Quantitative Phase: Questionnaires

The quantitative phase relied on the completion of 100 questionnaires with Muslims and 100 questionnaires with non-Muslims living in the 18th arrondissement in Paris.  

A uniform template for interviews with both Muslims and non-Muslims included the following topics in the questionnaire: neighbourhood characteristics; identity and belonging; social interactions; experience of local services; discrimination and prejudice; demographics.

- The non-Muslim sample included foreigners and French citizens who declared a non-religious affiliation or a religious membership other than Islam. They were selected according to their nationality (French citizens and foreigners), their age and their occupational status.

- The Muslim sample included foreigners and French citizens who self-identified as belonging to the Muslim faith community. Interviewees were selected according to their ethnic group, age and gender. Occupational categories were not included.

A sample frame of demographics in Paris outlined the main employment categories of the city’s residents, enabling the research team to fit the interviewees across the wide range of occupations listed. Respondents were chosen through quota samples in the 18th arrondissement. Questionnaires were conducted in face-to-face situations in public spaces such as streets, metro stations, restaurants, libraries, schools and supermarkets of the arrondissement. The aim was to identify the most important concerns for the local Muslim and non-Muslim public, to explore issues of discrimination, individual experiences of public services and their perceptions regarding integration, identity and belonging.

Tables 1–4 provide the numbers and percentages pertaining to age, gender, birthplace and nationality, and language used during interviews of the respondents to the questionnaire.

---

23 In some of the tables, 199 respondents are listed because we did not include the Muslim person who declared her/himself as “transsexual”. It was not discriminatory or exclusive, but in order to avoid reformatting all the data.
### Table 1. Age of respondents to the Open Society Foundations’ questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age in years</th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

### Table 2. Gender composition of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

The sample used in this report differs from the average data on Paris and the 18th arrondissement in that the proportion of Muslims born abroad is higher than the average: 79 per cent of Muslims and 38 per cent of non-Muslims were born abroad, which is higher than the INSEE 1999 census results for the neighbourhood.
Table 3. Open Society Foundations’ sample by place of birth and nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Other EU countries</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Côte d’Ivoire</th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Other African countries</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Other Asian countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU countries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian countries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Empty cells denote nil

Source: Open Society Foundations

There were more women born in France than men, which is slightly different from the general situation both in the 18th arrondissement and La Goutte d’Or, where men are a bit more numerous than women.
Table 4. Language used during interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Muslims born in France</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic &amp; French</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambara</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berber &amp; French</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

1.1.2 Qualitative Phase: Focus Groups

The qualitative phase provided the opportunity for the participants to voice their grievances and complaints, and more generally to discuss their chief concerns with others. Six focus groups were held and each session had 8–10 participants, lasting approximately two hours each.

Three focus groups covered the following subjects in order to allow for more in-depth discussion and to attempt to provide explanations behind the quantitative data collected in the questionnaires.

- Policing, and civil and political participation (ages 16–45, men and women)
- Housing, health and social services (ages 16–45, men and women)
- Education (ages 16–45, men and women)

Three other sessions were based on age and gender and explored participants’ main concerns and priorities within the project’s key areas:

1. Young Muslim women, aged 18–28
2. Muslim men aged over 45 years
3. Older women: Muslim women aged over 40 years, a mix of North African and sub-Saharan origin
1.1.3 Key Stakeholder Interviews

Interviews were held with 15 key stakeholders in Paris, including community and NGO leaders, city officials, local media and journalists. These were completed at the same time as the questionnaires and became more nuanced as information from the surveys and focus groups were obtained. Further interviews were conducted after the completion of the field research with institutions, officials and civil society groups (2009).
2. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS

It is not the purpose of this section to draw an exhaustive picture of the migration patterns and practices and discourses on citizenship in France. Its aim is to identify potential key links between the history of migration, the various politics of integration (the so-called French model of integration), and the growing emphasis on the incompatibility between being a Muslim and being French and living as a French citizen. It is therefore rather schematic.

The “problem” of Islam and Muslims in France (as in most other EU countries) is considered to be a consequence of labour migration waves that lasted up to the end of the 1980s. As labour immigration decreased after the 1974 decision to limit it to family reunification and specific requests made by employers, the number of immigrants to France has been increasing, although the proportion in the overall French population has remained stable.24 In the 1990s there was a new profile of “foreigners”, namely refugees and asylum seekers, including a large number of Muslims.25 The impact of this immigration can be measured by the number of foreign nationals, that is, non-French nationals, in France as well as the number of immigrants in France. In 2007, there were 3,682,000 foreign nationals in France (5.8 per cent of the total population) and immigrants numbered 5,253,000 (8.3 per cent of the total population).26

The majority of Muslim worker immigrants to France came from former French colonies in North and sub-Saharan Africa and may be categorised as postcolonial (see Table 5). There is a historic trajectory of mistreatment of Islam as a form of worship by

---

24 The net migration is estimated to have stabilised in 2004–2005 at around 100,000 new migrants per year. It was 50,000 per year during the 1990s. See Isabelle Robert-Bobée, “Projections de population pour la France métropolitaine à l’horizon 2050” (Projection of population for Metropolitan France in 2050), INSEE Première 1089 (July 2006), available at http://www.insee.fr/fr/fic/ftp_web/ip1089/ip1089.pdf (accessed February 2011).


26 See INSEE, Les tableaux de l’économie française (French economy tables), INSEE, Paris, 2010, p. 40. Foreigners are people who live in France and do not have French nationality. They can have another nationality or have no nationality. French people holding another nationality are counted as French. Foreigners are not always migrants: they may be born in France. An immigrant is someone who was born a foreigner abroad and lives in France. For instance, French persons who were born abroad are not considered immigrants. Some immigrants may become French, and others may remain foreigners, so that foreign and immigrant populations are not identical. An immigrant may not be a foreigner, and a foreigner may not be an immigrant. Whereas immigrant status is unchangeable, one can stop being a foreigner by acquiring French nationality: the place of birth is the central variable for defining an immigrant.
The unequal institutional treatment of Islam compared with other religions went on after the independence of various North African countries and the implementation of the CFCM in 2003 drastically changed this historical trend by establishing for the first time an institution that would supervise equal conditions of practice for Muslims living on French territory.28

27 A great deal of work has been done by historians on this: first on the different juridical categories invented to cope with the variety of status in Muslim societies under French administration; second, to point out the non-application of the 1905 law on separation in part of the colonised territories, i.e. Algeria (a French department). On the postcolonial categorisation and its impact on housing policies, for instance, see Françoise de Barros, “Des ‘Français musulmans d’Algérie’ aux ‘immigrés’. L’importation de classifications coloniales dans les politiques de logement en France (1960–1970)” (From “French Muslims from Algeria” to “immigrants”. The importation of colonial classification in housing policies in France (1960–1970)), Actes de la Recherches en Sciences sociales 159 (September 2005), pp. 26–45. On Muslim policies, see Vincent Geisser and Aziz Zemouri, Marianne et Allah. Les politiques françaises face à la "question musulmane" (Marianne and Allah. French policies and the "Muslim question"), La Découverte, Paris, 2007 (hereafter Geisser and Zemouri, Marianne et Allah).

28 CFCM is the result of about 15 years of discussion, dialogue and negotiation between successive Ministers of the Interior and Muslim representatives from various trends. The process was reactivated after 9/11 under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was at the Ministry of the Interior at the time. The CFCM is an elected body working at two levels: a national one (CFCM) and a regional one (Conseil regional du culte musulman). It is in charge of all worship-related matters – chaplaincies, imam training, halal slaughtering and mosques, among others – and stands as the main partner for discussion with the French state on Islam. For more on the CFCM, see the official website at http://www.lecfcm.fr (accessed February 2011). See also Alain Billon (ed.), “Nouveaux regards sur l’Islam en France” (New looks at Islam in France), Les Cahiers de l’orient 76(10–12) (2004), pp. 3–164; Franck Frégosi, “L’Islam de France par les urnes” (The Islam of France through polls), L’Année du Maghreb (North Africa Year), II, CNRS Editions, (2005–2006), pp. 491–497.
Table 5. Immigration to France by country, 1999 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1999 No. of immigrants</th>
<th>As of 1 January 2006 No. of immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td>691,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>633,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>569,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>381,000</td>
<td>329,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>269,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>228,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>317,000</td>
<td>226,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>133,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>128,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>102,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>90,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>73,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>70,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>68,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>65,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>54,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>54,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>52,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>51,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>51,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,095,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5,040,367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n/a: data not available; Field: Mainland France (excluding overseas territories)

One in three French citizens has at least one foreign national among his or her ancestors; in Paris one in every seven inhabitants has one foreign national among his or
This highlights the historical diversity of the French population, with migration as part of the family history of one-third of the Parisian population.

There is limited knowledge in France of the religious identity (self-declared) of its population, foreign and national, Muslims and non-Muslims (see Figure 1). The collection of public statistics including information on religious practices and identification is forbidden as stated in article 8 of the 6 January 1978 Law. Knowledge of the origins and identities of the national population still remains based on proxies rather than data collected directly. There are generally estimated to be between 3 million and 7 million Muslims in France. A recent survey gives the figure of 2.1 million for the Muslim population living in France, stating it has become the first minority religion in France.

The data for Paris come from the Paris Urban Agency (Agence Parisienne d’urbanisme, APUR), La population étrangère à Paris (The foreign population of Paris) 7 January 2003, which is a synthesis of a larger survey conducted by APUR on behalf of the Paris City Hall, Office to the City and Integration Policy (Délégation à la politique de la Ville et à l’intégration), La population étrangère à Paris: Éléments de diagnostic socio-démographique à partir des données du recensement (The foreign population of Paris: elements of socio-demographic diagnosis based on the census data), Diagnostic local d’intégration de la Ville de Paris (Local diagnosis for integration by the City of Paris), October 2002 (hereafter APUR, La population étrangère à Paris). APUR was created in 1967 by the Paris Council. Its work is to analyse urban development and to participate in the definition of urban public policy in Paris and the Ile-de-France region.

Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (Law 78-17 of 6 January 1978 relating to data processing and freedom). The articles say in title 1 that “it is forbidden to collect or process personal data that make clear, directly or indirectly, the racial and ethnic origins, political, philosophical or religious opinions”. The last national census that included a religious question was in 1872. The collection of religious information for public statistics does not apply to surveys and polls. There are therefore only estimated statistics available on Christian Catholics and Protestants, Jews, Sikhs and Buddhists.

This uncertainty about numbers and statistics has been going on for years among scholars working on Islam and Muslims in France. For a recent update on Muslims in France (with numbers), see Bernard Godard and Sylvie Taussig, Les musulmans en France. Courants, institutions, communautés: un état des lieux (Muslims in France. Trends, institutions, communities: a state of the art), Robert Laffont, Paris, 2007.

The wide range of the estimated population figures reflects the uncertainty of mapping the real numbers of Muslims in France – and indeed of any group of believers. When trying to assess how many Muslims live in France, there are usually two approaches. The first uses ethnic criteria for determining the size of the Muslim population. The
ethnic criteria are often based on the parents’ or grandparents’ country of origin, that is, of the first generation that moved to France. The conclusions consider relevant individuals registered as members of this family and living on French soil as Muslims. This approach does not allow for the volatility of belonging, the individual relationships to the religious heritage and the multiplicity of identities that can lead a person to convert or to change religions in his or her life. What is viewed as significant is the migration trajectory stemming from the birthplace of the previous generations. The genealogical criterion does not properly reflect the migration dynamics and their impact on people’s lives.

In other surveys (excluding the national census), the criteria for identifying Muslims rely on what can be called an institutional perception of what defines a believer, that is, his or her relationship to practice and worship. The TeO survey mentioned above, the importance of religion (called by the authors the “religiosity” of the people, that is, the importance interviewees give to religion in their life), according to denomination, shows that religion has more importance for Jews (76 per cent) and Muslims (78 per cent) than for Catholics (24 per cent), Orthodox (48 per cent), Protestants (47 per cent) and Buddhists (52 per cent). Religiosity, says the report, varies more according to the ethnic origin of the believers than their denomination. Practice refers here to an institutional reading of religious belonging where religion is associated with collective rituals or prayer. Many illustrations, the most recent being the quantitative study


35 Among the most used proxies, regular praying and mosque attendance are usually the questions that are used to identify whether respondents can be considered Muslims or not. See Claude Dargent, “La population musulmane de France: de l’ombre à la lumière?” (The Muslim population in France: from shadow to light?), Revue française de sociologie 51(2) (2004–2005), pp. 219–246; Claude Dargent, Bruno Duriez and Raphaël Liogier (eds), Religions et valeurs en France et en Europe (Religions and values in France and in Europe), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2009. In other studies, the consumption of halal food and accepting an invitation to eat at a non-Muslim place are other proxies: Gilles Kepel and Rémy Leveau (eds), Les musulmans dans la société française (Muslims in French society), Presses de la FNSP, Paris, 1988. All these proxies remain unsatisfactory for different reasons. In the case of the places of worship proxy, the risk is to miss the part of the female population that may not go to the mosque if there is no space for them. As far as dietary provisions are concerned, studies have shown that the relation to food is not systemically an indicator of religious conviction but rather of socialisation.
published in 2005 by Brouard and Tiberj, ended up being vague on the definition of the categories used to make up the sample, and relied on an institutional definition of people’s belief (places of worship as indicators of practices) crossed with ethnic origins (names, country of origin of the parents, place of birth). Criticism of this approach has, for instance, been expressed, saying that one cannot bring together in one category, reduced to the so called “national origin” of the individuals, the situation of an Algerian that would have been naturalised this year with the situation of a person who was born in France from French parents, who have always lived in France, for whom three of the grandparents were French and only one of them a Muslim French Algerian or indigenous.

Categorisation of people is part of the larger problem dominating the field of study of religious diversity and in particular of Muslim minorities in France. When talking about Muslims, who is in the picture? Does it cover practising believers, Muslims by origin or cultural Muslims? Moreover, it raises questions about how to define a religion, a believer and the role that should be given to faith in understanding citizens’ social attitudes. Categorisation also has a political impact and may lead to misrepresentation or denial of the legitimacy of certain questions: “The Muslim population does not exist,” as a school affairs officer (chargée de mission aux affaires scolaires) stated.

2.1 Demographic Dynamics

INSEE data indicate that in 2004–2005 the number of immigrants had increased by 18 per cent since 1990 (the global population increased by 7 per cent). One out of five immigrants living in France arrived between 1 January 1999 and mid-2004 and 25 per cent of them came from an EU Member State.

36 Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque (French like the others? Survey on citizens of Maghrebi, African and Turkish origin), Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2005 (hereafter Brouard and Tiberj, Français comme les autres?).


39 Interview with a school affairs officer, March 2008.

According to these statistics, 14 per cent of foreign nationals are living in Paris and 19.1 per cent in the 18th. This amounts to 306,000 persons.

In national terms, Paris is the top French city in terms of the proportion of foreigners to national citizens; the ratio of non-EU citizens to EU citizens is similar to other big cities. Four out of ten immigrants live in Île-de-France (Paris plus surrounding departments). The city of Paris receives 34 per cent of the newcomers (96,900), while 14 per cent of this figure settle in the north or west of the city (Seine-Saint-Denis, Hauts-de-Seine). The country of origin is important for understanding the regional distribution of migrants in France. For instance, 60 per cent of the sub-Saharan migrants arriving in France settle in Île-de-France.

Africa is the first continent of origin of recent immigrants in Île-de-France (42 per cent), followed by Europe (30 per cent), Asia (18 per cent) and America (10 per cent). In 2006 seven out of ten immigrants arriving in Île-de-France lived with their families. Most of the immigrants are young adults (50 per cent are between 20 and 34). They are under-represented in the job market (59 per cent of those aged 15–64 are active). This is because a lot of them come for study or because the women are not working.

41 http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/Territoire/75118 (accessed 15 January 2011). “Foreigners” (étrangers) have to be distinguished from French people, either by birth, that is people who were born having French nationality by effect of the *jus sanguinis* or the *jus soli*, or who acquired French nationality through marriage or naturalisation.


44 The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.

---

The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.

---

The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.

---

The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.

---

The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.

---

The activity rate of women varies with the country of origin: 41 per cent of the women from Turkey stay at home, 27 per cent of North African women, 7 per cent of the Italian women and 9 per cent of Portuguese women. Source: Sagot, “Arrivés de l’étranger”.
Inside Ile-de-France, Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis are the two departments where most of the immigrants settle. The most recent newcomers prefer Paris, especially if they are students or have recently graduated. One-third of the newcomers to Ile-de-France go to Paris. The choice of a place of settlement depends upon the origin and aligns on the residential location of members of the same ethnic group. This is particularly true for people from Algeria and Morocco, but also from Japan and the United States. Figure 2 is a map which indicates the most favoured places of settlement of newcomers in Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1,863,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French by birth</td>
<td>1,675,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French by acquisition</td>
<td>188,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>329,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>12,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>13,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>29,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foreigners from EU</td>
<td>42,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europeans</td>
<td>14,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>21,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>29,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>15,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foreigners from Africa</td>
<td>52,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>4,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>92,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,193,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE, Population census, 2007
North African newcomers settle where their compatriots already live, that is mostly in the northern parts of Paris and the suburbs (Nanterre, Argenteuil). Most of the people originating from sub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire) go to northeastern Paris districts.

As of 1 January 2007, in France one foreigner out of six lived in Paris (329,055 foreigners in 2007 or 15 per cent of the city’s population) (see Figure 3). The number of immigrants living in Paris increased from 1999 by 12.4 per cent to 441,000 (people born abroad who took French nationality); in 2007, 20.1 per cent of Parisians were immigrants and 29 per cent of the people living in the urban planning neighbourhoods were immigrants (either French or foreigners). Paris’ migrant population is aging: in 2006, 80,000 migrants were 60 years old and over (+2.5 per cent per year since 1999).
2.2 Access to Citizenship and Naturalisation

A study carried out by the Paris Urban Agency (Agence Parisienne d’Urbanisme, APUR)\(^{45}\) in 2002 shows that the rate of naturalisation and the proportion of a group that is naturalised varied across different national groups in Paris (Tables 8 and 9). A majority of Tunisians living in Paris (51 per cent) had become French citizens, but the figure was lower for Moroccans (38 per cent) and significantly lower at 28 per cent for Algerians, people from other African countries and Turks.

In mid-2004, 3.5 million foreigners were estimated to be living in France. Of these, nearly 3 million (2,960,000) were born abroad and 550,000 in France (450,000 were under 18, born of foreign parents born abroad). (See Table 7.)

\(^{45}\) APUR, *La population étrangère à Paris.*
Table 7. Proportion of foreigners and immigrants in France, 2004–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>3,510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners born in France</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners born abroad</td>
<td>2,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>4,930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French by acquisition born abroad</td>
<td>1,970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners born abroad</td>
<td>2,960,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE, Population censuses, 2004 and 2005
Table 8. Recently naturalised French citizens, by country of origin, 1998–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>EU15</th>
<th>New Member States</th>
<th>Other Europe</th>
<th>CIS</th>
<th>CIS Europe</th>
<th>CIS Asia</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Other Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Other Africa</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Unknown nationality or stateless</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22,085</td>
<td>14,948</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>27,941</td>
<td>7,265</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>4,246</td>
<td>15,291</td>
<td>84,182</td>
<td>68,185</td>
<td>10,622</td>
<td>5,375</td>
<td>5,668</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8,882</td>
<td>150,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18,957</td>
<td>12,447</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>3,878</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>22,846</td>
<td>4,324</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>13,343</td>
<td>89,266</td>
<td>68,535</td>
<td>14,495</td>
<td>6,236</td>
<td>6,853</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>5,803</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>8,962</td>
<td>144,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14,753</td>
<td>8,866</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>2,108</td>
<td>4,454</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>19,494</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>3,660</td>
<td>11,737</td>
<td>85,144</td>
<td>56,024</td>
<td>22,214</td>
<td>6,906</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>135,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13,443</td>
<td>7,288</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>4,704</td>
<td>4,844</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>18,872</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>11,445</td>
<td>87,766</td>
<td>57,098</td>
<td>23,809</td>
<td>6,859</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>5,795</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11,303</td>
<td>143,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number | %

Europe: 13,443 9.40
EU15: 7,288 5.10
New Member States: 2,167 1.50
Other Europe: 3,988 2.80
CIS: 5,068 3.50
CIS Europe: 4,844 3.40
CIS Asia: 224 0.20
Asia: 18,872 13.20
Southeast Asia: 2,257 1.60
East Asia: 1,433 1.00
South Asia: 3,737 2.60
Other Asia: 11,445 8.00
Africa: 87,766 61.20
Maghreb: 57,098 39.90
Sub-Saharan Africa: 23,809 16.60
Other Africa: 6,859 4.80
America: 6,710 4.70
North America: 915 0.60
South America: 5,795 4.00
Oceania: 11,303 7.90
Unknown nationality or stateless: 4,962 3.40

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Overseas, Local Authorities and Immigration (Ministère de l’intérieur, de l’outre-mer, des collectivités territoriales et de l’immigration), August 2010

46 Quoted in Corinne Régnard (2010), “L’intégration ‘à la française’: Plus de 130.000 nouveaux Français chaque année” (French integration method: more than 130,000 new French every year), Info migrations, Department of statistics, studies and documentation (Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation), Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Sustainable Development (Ministère de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire), no. 6 (August 2010), p. 7.
Table 9. Naturalised citizens among foreign-origin population, 18th arrondissement, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population of foreign origin</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Naturalised citizens</th>
<th>% of naturalised citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6,819</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,291</td>
<td>3,369</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (ex-Zaïre)</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49,491</td>
<td>35,213</td>
<td>14,278</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE, Population census, 1999

The comparison between the overall data for Paris and information available for the 18th arrondissement shows that the proportion of naturalised citizens in this arrondissement is smaller than in the city as a whole (28.8 per cent compared with 33.7 per cent). The 18th appears to be a neighbourhood for newer arrivals in the country and where migrants do not stay for long.47

The north and northeast parts of the city are the districts where the highest proportions of foreigners are registered. They are mostly males between the ages of 20 and 59, but this has been changing slightly and in 2005–2006, more women than men were migrating to the region. The population of migrants that arrived and settled as workers up to the 1970s is ageing and newcomers are increasingly single women. Interestingly, statistics from the 1999 national census show more migrants with families of French ancestry.

Paris is a place of strong social and economic contrasts. Four Parisian arrondissements are among the top 10 communes in the Ile-de-France that have the lowest average

---

incomes.\textsuperscript{48} Inside the most populous \textit{arrondissements}, very strong social and economic discrepancies can be noticed, similar to those on the outskirts of Paris: Four Parisian districts (6\textsuperscript{th}, 7\textsuperscript{th}, 8\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th}) are part of the ten Ile-de-France communes which have the highest median incomes.\textsuperscript{49} In parallel, the 10\textsuperscript{th}, 18\textsuperscript{th}, 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} are among the communes with the lowest median incomes.\textsuperscript{50} With low incomes and strong discrepancies, the 10\textsuperscript{th}, 11\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} are very similar to the Seine-Saint-Denis Paris communes.\textsuperscript{51}

The divide between the poor and the rich neighbourhoods has been on the increase in the last two decades. Two tendencies are notable: seemingly homogeneous parts of the city are usually complex and diverse; and the extreme polarity between the affluent and the poor is growing. As a consequence, the stark contrast in differing socio-economic situations in Paris is accentuated. These stark contrasts are often a few metres apart.

2.3 Patterns of Immigration and Settlement

“Paris is strengthened by its 110 nationalities and hosts more than 300,000 foreigners, about three-quarters of whom were born outside the EU. They are, like other Parisians, citizens of Paris” says the introduction of the Citizenship and Integration section on the official website of the City of Paris.\textsuperscript{52}

Immigrants have settled mainly in the north and the centre-north of the capital. The majority, 70 per cent, are from outside Europe. Among non-European foreigners, 24 per cent are from North Africa, 2 per cent are Turkish and 13 per cent come from sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{53} As the capital of the country, Paris stands as a good illustration of the larger trends that define the ethnic and religious diversity profile of the country, with a long tradition of welcoming migrants, in particular throughout the 20th century.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{48} These are the 6\textsuperscript{th}, 7\textsuperscript{th}, 8\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} \textit{arrondissements}.

\textsuperscript{49} The declared income is the total of financial resources that taxpayers declare to the fiscal administration on the income tax declaration for 2001 (before deductions).

\textsuperscript{50} INSEE/APUR, “À Paris, les ménages les plus aisés voisins des plus modestes” (In Paris, the well-off households adjoin the most modest ones), \textit{Ile de France à la page} 240(2004), p. 2 (hereafter INSEE/APUR, “À Paris, les ménages les plus aisés voisins des plus modestes”).

\textsuperscript{51} INSEE/APUR, “À Paris, les ménages les plus aisés voisins des plus modestes”, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{52} See the website of the Paris Mayor’s office at http://www.paris.fr/portail/accueil/Portal.lut?page_id=7760 (accessed February 2011).

\textsuperscript{53} APUR, \textit{La population étrangère à Paris}, p. 21.
\end{flushleft}
Paris is also a city of internal migration. Workers from the North African territories began to settle in the city before the First World War, mostly in the eastern part of Paris, in particular in the 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements. During the First World War, Muslims from North Africa came to Paris as soldiers and factory workers. By the 1920s, thousands of workers from North Africa had settled in and around Paris, mainly in La Goutte d’Or neighbourhood. By the end of the 1930s, the municipality and Prefecture of Paris estimated there to be 70,000 North Africans settled in the city. Algerians were the first group. They were especially numerous in the central arrondissements of the city (13th, 15th, 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements) and on the immediate north and east periphery of Paris (Petite Couronne). After the independence of Algeria in 1962, migrant movement from Algeria continued. Immigration was authorised by the public authorities in order to meet the labour needs of the French economy.

This labour migration ended in 1974, when 700,000 Algerians, 250,000 Moroccans and 200,000 Tunisians were then estimated to be living in France. In Paris, settlement was concentrated in three different arrondissements, again largely in the north and east of the city, which were also the popular and crowded parts. The Algerians were concentrated in the Barbès neighbourhood (18th), the Tunisians in Belleville (19th) and the Moroccans around Porte de Clichy (17th).

---


55 Pascal Le Pautremat, La politique musulmane de la France au XXème siècle. De l’Hexagone aux terres d’Islam (Muslim politics in France during the 20th century. From the Hexagon to Islamic lands), Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 2010; Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire (2005), La fracture coloniale (The colonial fault line), La Découverte, Paris, 2005.


58 Blanchard et al., Le Paris arabe, p. 234.
migrants had difficulty finding accommodation at this time, leading to the common representation in the media of Paris as a city surrounded by shantytowns. These shantytowns were settled largely according to nationality. From 1950 till 1966 Algerian immigrants mainly settled in Nanterre or in Argenteuil north-east of the city. The shantytown of Nanterre was destroyed in 1975 and families received public housing in the city. Today, the Algerian families are largely concentrated in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, especially in Courneuve, Saint-Denis and Bobigny. Bagnolet, Villetaneuse, Saint-Ouen and Aulnay-sous-Bois also count a sizeable population of North African origin, in particular Moroccans. Sub-Saharan African populations are in Le Bourget, Rosny-sous-Bois and Montreuil, and Turkish groups are clustered in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil.

The Muslim population of Paris also increased as a result of migrants from former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s. Most of the African migrants joined small communities already established by migrants in the inter-war period. They settled in Saint-Denis, Aubervilliers, Saint-Ouen and Montreuil, and in the 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements of the capital. By 1975, there were 100,000 Africans working in France. In Paris they were employed as cleaners, street-sweepers or subway cleaning attendants. Sub-Saharan Africans lived in poor housing, like North African immigrants.

59 "The Muslim settlement constitutes from now on one of the most obvious elements of the unity of this whole that is usually called the Parisian crescent: with the highest percentages of unskilled workers and with the worse housing conditions", see Jean Despoix, "Les travailleurs algériens à Paris" (The Algerian workers in Paris), Les Annales de Géographie 69 (372) (1960), pp. 179–181.

60 The shantytowns (bidonvilles) numbered around 120 in the mid-1960s, the best known being those of Nanterre and Noisy-Le-Grand. The Debré law to eradicate the bidonvilles was passed in December 1964 but remained quite inefficient as no housing policies to find alternative accommodation for the families were enacted at the same time. From 1970 to 1985, people settled in shantytowns were moved to transit housing. Shantytowns around Paris in the 1950s have been better documented, in particular on the basis of pictures (Gérald Bloncourt, Jean Pottier), audio documents and biographical narratives: see Abdelmayak Sayad, Un Nanterre algérien, terre de bidonvilles (An Algerian Nanterre, place of shantytowns), Autrement, Paris, 2008. Azouz Begag, who was appointed Minister for the promotion of equal opportunities in the de Villepin government (June 2005–April 2007), wrote Le Gone du Châaba, Le Seuil, Paris, 1986, an autobiography of his childhood in one of the shantytowns near Lyon where his family settled after leaving Algeria.

61 In France, a department is the rough equivalent of an English district or a Scottish region. Each department is broken down into cantons, communes and arrondissements. For the purpose of this report, department will be used to signify administrative divisions. Communes do not have an equivalent in the UK and are in between a parish and a district. In Germany they are analogous to a gemeinden. A French commune varies in size and can be a city such as Paris or a small village of 200 people.

In 1974, the government suspended labour immigration, and allowed the families of the workers to join them in France on the grounds of family reunification. During that period, increasing numbers of women and children arrived to join their spouses and parents who were already settled in France. The migrants who entered France from this point did not always acquire legal status. Some of them managed to obtain residence permits, while others remained illegal.

During the 1990s, the socio-demographic profile of the African immigrant populations changed. Malian and Senegalese workers were the majority in the first waves of immigration, but from 1990s onwards more natives of Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana and the Congo-Brazzaville arrived. Unlike previous migration waves, these populations came from urban areas and were better educated. This could partly explain why the proportion of such groups in the professional category of occupations among foreigners of sub-Saharan origin has increased since the 1990s, and why the newer immigrants hold better occupations than the previous ones. These new arrivals strengthened the African presence in the city of Paris.

The 1980s saw increasing numbers of people arriving in France fleeing violence and war in their home countries and applying as asylum seekers and refugees. These include Sri Lankans and Pakistanis. Pakistanis were mostly migrants applying as refugees because of the recent conflicts. Since 2002, the Ministry of the Interior has received 2,000 applications from Sri Lankan nationals seeking political asylum. Approximately 80,000 Sri Lankan nationals live in France, of which 15,000 have political refugee status.

These changing patterns of migration have affected the configuration of the population in the 18th arrondissement. African communities first became more visible in La Goutte d’Or, then in the north part of the arrondissement (Château-Rouge) and gradually in the rest of the arrondissement. Parisians call this neighbourhood Little Africa and it has become a major supply centre for African products. The immigrants of sub-Saharan Africa have replaced the North African migrants in this arrondissement. Sri Lankan and Pakistani nationals are now also settling around Château-Rouge and in La Goutte d’Or area. The French perception of the South Asians differs from the one of North and

---

63 In the context of this governmental decision that was supposed to be provisional, but was never questioned, see Sylvain Laurens, “1974 et la fermeture des frontières. Analyse critique d’une décision érigée en turning-point” (1974 and the closing of the borders. Critical analysis of a decision considered to be a turning-point), *Politix* 82(2) (2008), pp. 67–92.


65 Roze, *La France arc-en-ciel*.


sub-Saharan Africans; they are said to be “invisible and a role model”.68 The majority are from Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

The profile of migrants who have arrived in Paris since that period has changed and become more mixed in ethnicity and nationality. It includes workers (continuously, but especially before 1974 for non-EU citizens), soldiers (in particular during the interwar period until the colonial wars during the 1950s and 1960s), students, political refugees and asylum seekers.

Foreign populations living in France but also French citizens with migration backgrounds are subjected to contrasting images and representations and find themselves at the core of intense publicity. The Sarkozy government has certainly contributed to the intensification of the targeting of some of the population as suspicious and undesirable in the country.69 This was institutionalised by the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Sustainable Development (Ministère de l’immigration, de l’intégration, de l’identité nationale et du développement solidaire), which was created in 2007 and dismantled in November 2010. Over the summer of 2010 (but actually already earlier), the Roma were especially ostracised, illustrating the general confusion of public opinion and political leaders over nationality, legal status and popular representation and also showing the increasing racism directed towards specific people and their way of life. Undocumented workers form another category in the population that has become central in public discourses on migration. The category is ambiguous as it associates the notion of illegality with the fact of migration. Undocumented persons include persons who had entered France illegally, that is with no document authorising them to stay, persons living in France with regular documents but who had failed, for various reasons, to renew them, or persons who had been asked to leave the country and did not do so. The number of irregular migrants remains mysterious and approximate; it is a mystery number, to cite the words of a journalist.70 The Sarkozy government has given priority to the implementation of effective measures to expel people without proper documents


from the country. The precise numbers of expulsions per year are processed and registered at the prefecture and public services are mobilised to achieve this statistical objective, for instance, through increasing ID checks in public places.\footnote{For a view of the governmental perspective on illegal immigration, see Secretariat General of the Interministerial Committee for the Control of Immigration (Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration), Les orientations de la politique de l’immigration (The orientations of immigration policy), 6th report, La Documentation française, Paris, 2010.}

The association of migrants and foreigners with delinquency is constant in collective representations, through the media or political discourses. This corresponds to a largely ethnicised – or even racialised – understanding of social problems in France\footnote{On the “racialisation” of social identities in France helping popular representations to connect ways of living/doing things with the origins of individuals, see Étienne Balibar, “Le retour de la race” (Race coming back), Mouvements, March 2007, available at www.mouvements.info/Le-retour-de-la-race.html (accessed 15 January 2011).} that was encouraged following the riots of November 2005.\footnote{A lot has been published on the 2005 riots in French cities. Here is a selection of some of the most relevant and serious publications: Sylvie Tissot (2005), “Les sociologues et la banlieue: la construction savante du problème des ‘quartiers sensibles’ (1985–1995)” (Sociologists and the suburb: the academic construction of the “sensitive neighbourhoods” problem), Genèses 60, pp. 57–75; Véronique Le Goaziou and Laurent Mucchielli (eds), Quand les banlieues brûlent. Retour sur les émeutes de novembre 2005 (When suburbs are burning. Back to the November 2005 riots), 2nd edn updated, La Découverte, Paris, 2007; Cyprien Avenel, Sociologie des quartiers sensibles (Sociology of sensitive neighbourhoods), 3rd edn, A. Colin, Paris, 2010.} Everyone with an ethnic-minority background is of course not being treated equally in this process of the racialisation of otherness. Social sciences and academia are not immune from this war of interpretations when analysing the ethnic dimension of social problems. Opposite camps can be identified when interpreting, for instance, the process of ghettoisation of France, the postcolonial dimension of diversity management politics, the equation between being and raised as a black (the cultural factor) and the over-representation of black youngsters in delinquency figures in France (compared with young people with North African backgrounds), not to mention the ethnic responsibility of downplaying the French black blanc beur talent for football.\footnote{Didier Lapeyronnie, Ghetto urbain. Ségrégation, violence, pauvreté en France aujourd’hui (Urban ghetto. Segregation, violence, poverty in France today), Robert Laffont, Paris, 2010 (hereafter Lapeyronnie, Ghetto urbain); Luc Bronner, La loi du ghetto. Enquête sur les banlieues françaises (Ghetto law. Survey of the French suburbs), Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 2010; Hugues Lagrange, Le déni des cultures (Culture denial), Le Seuil, Paris, 2010.}
2.4 The 18th Arrondissement

The research for this report was concentrated in one of the neighbourhoods of the 18th arrondissement, La Goutte d’Or.75 La Goutte d’Or is a network of small streets, described in 1990 as noisy and dirty, before large renovation programmes initiated by the city authorities began.76 With a reputation for crime and violence, the neighbourhood is also celebrated as an inter-ethnic and multicultural environment where different communities have a historical presence and continue to share space. Recently, segments of the neighbourhood have become gentrified with the move to parts of the 18th of a new type of inhabitant known as the “bobo.”77 Most of the respondents described the 18th as a village. La Goutte d’Or is a small, isolated and protected area that resists generalisation.

The population of the 18th was 192,056 people in 2009,78 up from 187,500 in 1999. According to the same census data, the density is 30,713 inhabitants per square kilometre which is higher than the average for Paris (20,164 inhabitants per square kilometre). The average size of the household, which is 1.83 persons, is close to the Paris average of 1.87 persons. The population of the 18th is slightly younger than the average age for the rest of Paris.79 The active employed population (102,707) represents 9.1 per cent of the Paris total, the unemployment rate being 17 per cent (compared with 12.0 per cent for all of Paris).

The 18th arrondissement is an area with significant social and economic disadvantages. A large proportion of families experience unemployment, social deprivation and poor housing. Statistics indicate a high number of unskilled workers and employees among the foreign population; a situation which according to research conducted on the national level does not change when foreign-born people become French citizens, in particular people of both sexes coming from sub-Saharan Africa and Morocco and women coming from Turkey and North Africa.80

75 It is composed of the following areas: Quartier Moskova-Porte de Montmartre-Porte de Clignancourt; Quartier Grandes Carrières-Clichy; Quartier Clignancourt-Jules Joffrin; Quartier Montmartre; Quartier Amiraux-Simplon-Poissonniers; Quartier Goutte d’Or-Château Rouge; Quartier Charles-Hermite Evangile; Quartier La Chapelle-Marx Dormoy.
76 Toubon and Messamah, Centralité immigrée.
77 “Bobo” is a contraction of bourgeois and bohème and is a socio-cultural category of people who combine a bourgeois socio-economic profile (salary, education) with a bohemian way of life and values.
78 INSEE, 2009, data released on 1 January 2006.
79 According to the 1999 census, the population aged between 0 and 19 years was 18.7 per cent of the whole in the 18th, compared with 18.3 per cent in Paris.
The defining feature of La Goutte d’Or is the high proportion of foreigners in comparison with the rest of the arrondissement. Again, this is a historical dimension and the resulting diversity is probably best expressed by the ethnic businesses and the multi-ethnic activities that can be seen in the small shops of the neighbourhood. The foreign population amounts to 32.7 per cent, while the average for Paris is 18.2 per cent. They originate largely from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Africa and Asia.

La Goutte d’Or became notorious through Emile Zola’s novel L’Assommoir, published in 1877, that described the life of newcomers to this part of Paris. Through the years, the population has remained largely composed of labourers and migrants, who for a time were connected with railway construction in the east and north of France; most of the migrants were from Belgium or Luxembourg. “The Goutte d’Or is not only defined by its history and its human characteristics but also by its urban ones.” During the war for independence in Algeria, the arrondissement hosted a large Algerian population and was perceived as an Algerian enclave. Nowadays, it is home to the highest number of foreigners in Paris (11.74 per cent of the households in 1962, 34.8 per cent in 1982, 32.75 cent in 2008), and contains a large component of workers (51 per cent of the active population in 1962, 49 per cent in 1982). Geographically, it appears as an urban enclave with specific demographic and social characteristics that have contributed to continuous and growing ethnic diversity. The immigrant population living in the south of the arrondissement (La Goutte d’Or) is mostly of North African origin, while the immigrant population living in the north (around the metropolitan station Château Rouge) comes from Sub-Saharan Africa. The settlement of these populations has happened in the larger context of significant initiatives of urban renovation and rehabilitation, particularly in the 1990s.

Large numbers of respondents interviewed for this report live in a specific section of La Goutte d’Or. The neighbourhood has a population of 22,017 inhabitants, which is 12 per cent of the entire population of the 18th. It is a young population: 24.6 per cent is 81 The African market for food (Château Rouge), and clothes and textiles (La Goutte d’Or).

82 Associations Coordination Toxicomanies, Salle Saint-Bruno, La Vie de quartier à la Goutte d’Or, Perceptions et représentations des habitants (Local life in La Goutte d’Or. Perceptions and representation by the inhabitants), Paris, November 2006. p. 16 (hereafter Associations, La Vie de quartier à la Goutte d’Or). This rich report was produced by a group of NGOs active in La Goutte d’Or, using data provided by Tableau de Bord de la Vie Sociale à la Goutte d’Or (Spreadsheet of social life in La Goutte d’Or), 7th edn, March 2005, published by the Observatoire de la vie locale du quartier de la Goutte d’Or.


84 Associations, La Vie de quartier à la Goutte d’Or, p. 10.


86 National census 1999.
less than 20 years old, in comparison with Paris overall, where 19 per cent are younger than 20. People over 60 years of age represent 13.8 per cent of the residents in the 18th, in comparison with 19.6 per cent for the total city of Paris. The male population is higher than the female one, in particular in the 30–49 age bracket.

Inside the arrondissement the population is very diverse from one area to another. For instance, La Goutte d’Or, where most of the respondents lived, presents more accentuated features: the population in La Goutte d’Or is younger, the families are larger and socio-economic differences are increasing. It is a rather poor neighbourhood, and in this respect it is deteriorating. The high unemployment rate is not the only social and economic indicator that guides an understanding of the poverty and exclusion of the inhabitants. The recipients of social welfare benefits (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, RMI) is growing, with 12.4 per cent of the households receiving RMI in 2004 compared with 5.4 per cent for Paris as a whole. The majority of people submitting tax returns falls below the tax threshold (53.2 per cent in 2002). In 2002–2003, 74.2 per cent of the pupils entering secondary schools (6ème, or 6th grade) received financial assistance compared with 22 per cent for Paris. The proportion of pupils with learning difficulties in primary schools was estimated to be 25.8 per cent (12.7 per cent for Paris).

Examining the 18th arrondissement – and in particular La Goutte d’Or and Muslims in these contexts – means focusing on marginalised people in a disadvantaged arrondissement that is suffering from the effects of the abysmal representation associated with both Muslims and the neighbourhood. It is a deprived and secluded neighbourhood inside Paris. Working and even talking with other residents in La Goutte d’Or is difficult because the neighbourhood lies at a crossroad of misunderstandings.

87 Most of the data in this description of La Goutte d’Or comes from the report by Associations, La Vie de quartier à la Goutte d’or.

88 On 30 March 2004, 2,577 people were registered with the National Agency for Employment (Agence nationale pour l’emploi, ANPE), which still existed at that date, i.e., twice the number registered in 1998 for a generally active population whose numbers did not change much: Associations, La Vie de quartier à la Goutte d’or, p. 13.

89 The south of La Goutte d’Or is where there are higher numbers of larger households. Older people are concentrated in the centre. The north is characterised by an active population and most of the single people.

90 Maurice Goldring, La Goutte d’Or, quartier de France. La mixité au quotidien (La Goutte d’Or, a French neighbourhood. Daily mixing), Autrement, Paris, 2006, p. 28 (hereafter Goldring, La Goutte d’or, quartier de France).
Table 10. Place of residence within the 18th arrondissment of the Open Society Foundations sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rue Marx Dormoy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Goutte d’Or</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Château-Rouge</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bld de la Chapelle</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcaudet/Rue des Poissonniers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rue des Poissonniers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbès/Rochechouart</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulevard Barbès</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandes Carrières</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rue de Clignancourt</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mairie du 18e/Jules Joffrin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porte de Saint-Ouen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montmartre</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalingrad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porte St Antoine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulevard Ney</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
3. **City Policy**

Paris is a city and a department, the capital of the country and an urban region. Like Lyon or Marseille, the city is divided into 20 municipal *arrondissements*, which are subdivided into four *quartiers*. The municipal *arrondissements* are ruled by an *arrondissement* mayor. They are not legal entities, meaning that, unlike the communes, they have no legal capacity. Since 1982, the General Council has worked with the mayor in administering the city. The Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, changed one aspect of Paris’s position in the political landscape in 2001 by strictly orienting administration towards local territories and local policies. *Arrondissements* have been encouraged to behave as quasi-communes, though without the legal capacity to act as one. This style of governance of the localities combines various elements, including the administration, urban society and other public agencies. The result is a multiplication of local voices.

3.1 **City Administrative Structures**

The city of Paris is run by a mayor and by a City Council (*Conseil de Paris*), which is composed of 163 members elected for six years. Paris is also a department managed by an assembly called the General Council (*Conseil Général* or *Conseil de Paris*). The mayor of Paris is the executive head of the General Council. The General Council is the decision-making organ of the department of Paris.

The General Council takes its authority from the mayor of Paris. Every *arrondissement* is run by an *arrondissement* council (*conseil d’arrondissement*, in place since 1982), which works as a City Council. These councils have consultative power on all projects in the area and run the municipal facilities such as nursery schools and public green spaces of less than 1 hectare. The General Council members are both members of the Council of Paris and members of the *arrondissement* council, while the *arrondissement* council members sit only on their council. For instance, in the 18th *arrondissement*, there are 14 Council of Paris members and 28 *arrondissement* council members.

---

91 Loi 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 relative à l’organisation administrative de Paris, Marseille, Lyon et des établissements publics de coopération intercommunale (Law 82-1169 of 31 December 1982 relating to the administrative organisation of Paris, Lyon, Marseille and the public offices of cooperation between communes).


94 The members of the Council of Paris and of the *arrondissement* are elected by direct universal suffrage during the municipal elections period. The elections are based on proportional representation and a list system with two rounds.
Following the municipal elections, the first public meeting of the Council of Paris holds an election for the position of the mayor of Paris. Arrondissement mayors are elected within each arrondissement council a few days after the election of the Mayor of Paris. The arrondissement mayor is elected by the Council of Paris members elected in the arrondissement, and holds the position for six years. The mayor of the arrondissement has deliberative power in national domains such as family situations, primary and secondary education, maintaining the electoral register, urban planning, and the management and occupancy of public land in the arrondissement.

Since the 2001 municipal elections, local politicians have actively sought the participation of young people, leading to the creation of a Youth Council in each arrondissement. Each arrondissement decides on the way the Youth Council is organised, but it is usually composed of volunteers aged between 13 and 25 who live in the arrondissement. The Youth Council is led by the elected representative responsible for youth issues in the arrondissement and a group leader (animateur) in charge of the youth and sports portfolio. For instance, the 18th arrondissement Youth Council submits its proposals to the council for the arrondissement. In 2003 a Paris Youth Council was set up to represent the whole city, composed of members from the 20 arrondissements.

The law of 27 February 200295 strengthened local democratic initiatives by enabling arrondissement councils to set up new consultative structures such as the neighbourhood council (le conseil de quartier). These councils can be consulted by the mayor and work to carry out the decisions of the arrondissement, in particular those concerning town planning policy (la politique de la ville).96

The 18th arrondissement has signed various successive city contracts. Created in 1989, these contracts replace the previous contracts for the social development of the quartiers97 and are aimed at addressing urban policies on segregation. The smaller scale (quartiers rather than the city) provides opportunities for inhabitants from the poorest parts of the arrondissement to access housing in better residential areas. These agreements are designed to engineer greater social interaction, particularly between the deprived and affluent neighbourhoods. The last of these contracts was called the Urban Contract of Social Cohesion (Contrat urbain de cohésion sociale, CUCS) and was for the

---

96 La politique de la ville means public actions developed for specific areas in a city (such as neighbourhoods with a high level of unemployment and people with social and economic problems).
97 Quartiers in this context means segregated areas.
period 2007–2010 (being continued in 2011). For this period, the CUCS identified seven groups of priorities: employment and economic integration; development of social relations, access to rights and citizenship; improvement of housing, life environment and urban renewal; education, and youth and sports; health; prevention of delinquency; and culture. Each has specific action programmes. Fourteen Parisian neighbourhoods were included in this last CUCS, four of which are located in the 18th: Porte Montmartre-Porte de Clignancourt, La Goutte d’Or, Amiraux-Simplon and La Chapelle.

The desire of the national government to devolve greater autonomy to local government is evident through the changes to local authority structures over the last 20 years. The role of the prefect has also changed, in that its executive powers over departments have been modified and greater power given to the chairman of the General Council, the mayor. The prefect of Paris represents the government in the department and is also the prefect of the Ile-de-France region. The prefect of Paris has authority over housing policies, funding, the building and distribution of social housing, and some other issues such as lead poisoning. Unlike the other prefectures in France, the prefect of Paris has no responsibility for the public services of traffic regulation and transport, which are run both by the city of Paris and by the Paris prefect of Police. The prefect of Paris is also in charge of the implementation of the rule of law and order and public freedom and coordinates governmental policies in the city. This implies managing state services in the employment sector and public housing and dealing with questions of solidarity, social exclusion and discrimination.

3.2 Education

The drive towards a more decentralised national educational system in France has resulted in changes in administration. The role of elected local authorities has expanded, with some responsibility for the educational system resting with each tier of


99 Lead poisoning affects the development of the nervous system and may cause permanent learning and behaviour disorders. It is particularly toxic to children exposed to lead paint on or in the walls of old houses. It became a major public concern in Paris in the 1990s: Anne Chantal Rousseau-Giral, Dominique Tricard and Georges Crepey (eds), Lutte contre le saturnisme infantile lié à l’habitat indigne. Analyse du dispositif dans trois départements d’Ile-de-France (Fight against childhood lead poisoning due to inadequate housing. Analysis of the policy implemented in three departments of Ile-de-France), La Documentation française, Paris, 2004. (See also Chapter 7, Housing.)

100 The Paris Prefect of Police has authority over identity cards, passports, driving licences and regulating road traffic and parking in the city.
local government under the authority of the Ministry of Education (full name Ministre de l’Éducation nationale, de la Jeunesse et de la Vie Associative). The city of Paris defines extra-curricular activities and provides equipment to schools and educational establishments. What is taught inside schools (including approving the programme and recruiting the teachers) remains a national policy decided by the Ministry of Education. The municipality is responsible for building facilities, managing school funds (la caisse des écoles), and planning educational, sports and cultural activities on school premises. The city of Paris provides funds to run more than 800 elementary, primary and secondary schools as well as some high schools, the last of which are legally the responsibility of the department. Moreover, the city builds, equips and maintains the facilities. The city also provides municipal courses for adults, such as French language classes for migrants. The duties of the arrondissement council in this area focus on registering pupils in elementary and primary schools. Registration in secondary and high schools depends on the National Education Services (l’Académie de Paris, a regional education authority).

3.3 Employment

The city of Paris manages several programmes on work, employment and vocational training. These programmes are available to people residing in an arrondissement, and include:

- The Departmental Programme to Support Employment (Programme Départemental d’Aide à l’Emploi, PDAE) which is aimed at Parisian job-seekers registered in a local employment agency or local offices. It provides funds to offer internships leading to a better qualification or a job and supporting language learning combined with professional training. Some of these offers are reserved for people receiving the Revenu de solidarité active (RSA, active solidarity income), which was set up in June 2009. The RSA is added to people’s earnings as a complement, allowing for the family situation and other financial resources. It is given to people who are in employment.

- The Departmental Programme of Inclusion (Programme départemental d’insertion, PDI) which deals with those receiving social welfare and unemployment benefits like the RSA (45,000 persons in 2009).

---

101 La caisse des écoles (school fund) funds educational activities and leisure activities (for instance Christmas festivities) for pupils in the elementary schools. The funds are the responsibility of the mayor of the arrondissement, the Department Inspector from the Ministry of Education, a member of the prefect’s office, two local council members and three elected representatives from parents’ organisations.

102 Conseil de Paris (Council of Paris), Programme départemental d’insertion: 9,000 retours à l’emploi des allocataires du RMI en 2009 (Departmental integration programme: 9,000 people on the RMI back to work in 2009), February 2009. The RMI has since been replaced by the RSA.
programme runs in the 18th arrondissement, and offers a number of social funds to help job-seekers find employment.

There is an Office for Economic Development, Employment and Higher Education (Direction du Développement Economique, de l’Emploi et de l’Enseignement Supérieur, DDEEES) in Paris City Hall, which directly manages the municipal and departmental initiatives in the field of economic development, employment and vocational training.

Some initiatives are launched by the Paris City Hall to be implemented at the arrondissement level. These may cover support in finding employment or training to people living in poor social conditions, RSA beneficiaries and young people or migrants. The employment support arises from the coordination of various actors at the European, national, departmental and local levels. At the local level, the Departmental Council for Integration through Economic Activity (Conseil départemental de l'insertion par l'activité économique, CDIAE) is responsible for establishing and implementing the Multi-Year Local Plan for Inclusion and Employment (Plan local pluriannuel pour l’insertion et l’emploi, PLIE). In the 18th, 19th and 20th arrondissements a new protocol, Paris-North-east PLIE, was signed for 2010–2013.103 The plan aims to coordinate all the public services involved in the employment sector, training bodies, the organisations and the firms. It offers individual job-seekers long-term support, which not only includes finding a job, but also considers the person’s overall situation, for up to 24 months. The beneficiaries are selected by a joint committee.104

For young people (aged 14–25 years old), the local task forces (missions locales)105 intervene at the municipal or inter-municipal level with the purpose of helping young people living in the arrondissement who have left school to get into employment or a training internship. It also supports them in finding a house, accessing health care and other relevant matters. These initiatives mostly rely on individual measures in order to help them towards integration.


104 In 2009, 1,959 persons living in the 18th and 19th arrondissements were part of these initiatives: 54 per cent of long-term job-seekers, 42 per cent of people living in the neighbourhoods covered by the Politique de la Ville, 37 per cent RSA beneficiaries (RSA replaced RMI in June 2009). On 31 December 2009, 235 positive outcomes/satisfied requests/answers were reported (that is, persons having signed full-time contracts of employment), quoted in Convention, 2010 DDEEES 127G. In September 2010, 1,829 participants were part of the PLIE. Between 1 January and 20 September 2010, 234 applications received a positive answer: data found in Convention, 2010 DDEEES 127G.

105 See the website of the 18th local task force at http://www.mlbelliard.fr (accessed February 2011).
The Information and Mediation Multi-services Points (Points d’information et de médiation Multiservices, PIMMS) complement the above services. Created in Paris to support the most fragile constituents (including job-seekers) in all their administrative procedures with public services, the PIMMS network has an office in the 18th arrondissement in the Bichat neighbourhood. The free services provided include helping people to make appointments with public offices, filling out public forms or writing letters.

In the Prefecture of the Ile-de-France, the Regional Office for Work, Employment and Vocational Training (Direction départementale du travail, de l’emploi et de la formation professionnelle, DDTEFP) has local economic partners in the fight against discrimination on the job market. These initiatives are designed in the framework of the employment houses (les maisons de l’emploi) which coordinate all national public services in the employment sector, such as Pôle Emploi (Employment Centre), a public administrative agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Employment (Ministre du Travail, de L’Emploi et de la Santé) that centralises job offers and job-seekers’ applications (among other functions) and in 2009 replaced the National Agency for Employment (Agence nationale pour l’emploi, ANPE) and other unemployment-related institutions.106 The employment houses are concerned with both employees and employers.

3.4 Housing

The implementation of local urban planning (Plan local d’urbanisme, PLU) encourages the construction of new social housing in Paris; for instance, in neighbourhoods that need social housing, private construction companies must dedicate 25 per cent of the new buildings to social housing.

In Paris, social housing is built, maintained and managed by building companies that are also the administrators of the units. In Paris they include the Paris Habitat Office (Office parisien de l’habitat, OPH), the Estate Office of the city of Paris (la Régie immobilière de la Ville de Paris, RIVP) and Estate Group 3F (le Groupe Immobilier 3F). These administrators sign agreements with relevant authorities such as the state, the region and the City of Paris, which contribute to funding the construction or rehabilitation of social housing. The involvement of these authorities enables them to secure a certain number of social housing units in the constructed or rehabilitated buildings. The state looks after 30 per cent of the housing in new construction or rehabilitation programmes; 25 per cent goes to low-income households and 5 per cent to civil servants.

In order to help the construction and/or the rehabilitation of social housing buildings, the Paris City Hall mediates between the administrators and the banks regarding the loans. If the administrators are unable to guarantee the reimbursement of loans, the

city of Paris acts as their guarantor. In return, the city of Paris gets 20 per cent of the
new flats. When the city of Paris owns the property, it can allow the administrators to
use the building for social housing. In such cases, it has the right to distribute some of
the flats to be rented.

On the basis of the proposal made by the designators (désignataires), that is, the
administration which supports the rehabilitation programme, the administrator decides
who to allocate the accommodation to. This decision is taken by an allocation
committee (Commission d’attribution), which is generally appointed by the mayor of
Paris, the mayor of the arrondissement in which the building is located, the prefect (at
his or her request) and tenants’ organisations. Once the commission has reached an
agreement, the social housing applicant can sign the rent contract and settle in the
property. The administrator checks that the applicant fulfils all requirements for
priority status. On average, the City Hall of the 18th arrondissement receives 30 flats a
year from the city of Paris, but this number is variable. The City Hall of the 18th
arrondissement has set up an independent allocation commission as well.

An initiative was launched in 2007 in Paris called Rent in Solidarity (Louez solidaire),
which is still active, to help families experiencing social difficulties, most of them living
in hostels, to find a decent place to live in. The idea was to mobilise private owners to
rent their properties. After the signature of a contract between the owner and a local
partner that has signed a convention with the city, the place can be rented to families
and individuals in particularly difficult situations. The lease is up to six years with a
minimum of three, with rental price controls, rehabilitation of the property and tax
refunds for the landlords. The city and its partners guarantee the payment of the rent
(including the added costs of heating, electricity and water). In 2008, it comprised only
50–60 housing units.

3.5 Health and Social Care

Both as a city and a department, Paris runs an important network of health-care
organisations. At the level of the city of Paris, the Social Action, Childhood and Health
Office (Direction de l’Action Sociale, de l’Enfance et de la Santé, DASES) has
responsibility in the department for social, medical and health affairs (except maternity

107 City of Paris, “Louez solidaire et sans risque”. Guide à destination des propriétaires (Rent in
solidarity and without risk. A guide for owners), Mairie de Paris, 2007. See also
108 The list of partners can be found at http://www.paris.fr/pratique/louezsolidaire/partenaires/p9403
(accessed November 2011).
regarding medical insurance). The department is an essential part of health policy and is
responsible for family and children’s health care. Since 2004, it has carried out public health and
vaccination campaigns to combat tuberculosis, leprosy, HIV/AIDS and STDs.
and early childhood care). This includes responsibility for care for the elderly, disabled and children as well as the implementation of general public health initiatives.

The DASES is in charge of the RSA, a monthly allowance for unemployed people with extremely low income, and of the personal allowance for autonomy (*Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie*, for disabled people requiring medical and social assistance in their daily life). It is also in charge of some health equipment and services, and authorises the creation of health centres. The DASES consists of four divisions corresponding to its main sectors of activity: family and educational policies; health; integration and solidarity; and social action for elderly persons and disabled persons.

The city of Paris also runs an Office for the Family and Early Childhood (*Direction des Familles et de la Petite Enfance*, DFPE), which has responsibility in the department for developing programmes for mother and child care with a focus on parental education. This municipal directorate analyses the families’ needs and monitors policies.

At the departmental level and under the authority of the prefect, the Health and Social Affairs Office (*Direction Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales*, DDASS) monitors and implements integration, inclusion, solidarity and social development policies. Its actions focus on promoting and improving public health by controlling the medical and social structures in the department. For immigration, the DDASS works in association with the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (*Agence de Cohésion Sociale et de l’Égalité des Chances*, ACSE), the Immigration Social Services (*Service Sociale d’aide aux migrants*, SSAM) and the International Migrations Service (*Office des Migrations Internationales*, OMI).

At the municipal level, the Centre for Social Action (*Centre d’Action Sociale de la Ville de Paris*, CASVP) is in charge of social and health-care policies. The CASVP defines policy for social development in the city, and works closely with the department and other public institutions such as the Health Insurance Fund (*Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie*, CPAM) and the Old Age Insurance Fund (*Caisse Nationale d’Assurance vieillesse*, CNAV). The CASVP’s policies primarily target the elderly, disabled people, families and socially marginalised people.

In order to support residents applying for help from the social care structures, the 18th arrondissement municipality has created the Department of Social Service (*Service Social Départemental Polyvalent*, SSDP). Established in 1997, the SSDP collects and forwards all social protection applications to the office which deals with them. The SSDP is divided into two divisions: one belongs to the DASES and is in charge of the western part of the arrondissement, and the other is managed by the CASVP and its actions are implemented in the 18th arrondissement. Their areas of action focus on the medical and social protection of future mothers, children and teenagers, and the support of evicted tenants.
3.6 Police

The prefect (Préfet) of police of Paris is responsible for the security of persons and goods, and for civil security for Paris and the surrounding departments (petite couronne).\textsuperscript{110} In Paris, the prefect combines responsibilities and prerogatives that in other cities belong to the mayor. Following the circular of 28 October 1997,\textsuperscript{111} the government implemented local security contracts designed to allow for greater cooperation and partnerships between different organisations on security. An agreement was signed on 6 June 2000 between the prefect of Police, the mayor of Paris and the general Prosecutor. Six priorities were defined:

- to develop police services which are closer to the inhabitants (such as community policing);
- to prevent youth criminal behaviour;
- to prevent and fight crime related to narcotics;
- to address the public’s feeling of insecurity;
- to increase support for victims of crime;
- to strengthen partnership and action between the different actors involved in public safety and crime.

The Parisian security contract was implemented in every arrondissement. The reform of the police services led to a directive dedicated to the organisation of urban local police with the aim of improving the presence of the police on the ground in connection with local needs. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} arrondissement, the implementation of the local security contract has been negotiated with the mairie d’arrondissement (town hall of the arrondissement). Every arrondissement in Paris has a central police station and officers carry out duties of maintaining public order and bringing people to justice. The Parisian security contract also works to improve crime prevention by setting up a service dedicated to the prevention of crime in every police station in the arrondissement. This service is run by the director of the Urban Police at the Prefecture of Police and a large part of its task consists of disseminating information on the work of the different police services.

The departments of justice were also included in the reforms carried out through the Parisian security contract. The Public Ministry (le Parquet de Paris or Ministère public)

\textsuperscript{110} Since September 2009, the authority of the prefect has been extended to the three surrounding departments by presidential decree 2009-898 of 24 July 2009. For a complete presentation of the specific tasks of the prefect of police in Paris, see http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/La-prefecture-de-police (accessed November 2011).

\textsuperscript{111} Circulaire du 28 October 1997 relative à la mise en œuvre des contrats locaux de sécurité (Circular of 28 October 1997, regarding the implementation of the local security contracts), Ministère de l’Intérieur (Ministry of the Interior) NOR: INTK9700174C
has been divided into three geographical areas: the northeast, the northwest and the south of the city. Developing a justice system closer to the people and their needs is one of the other objectives defined by the legal services of the city of Paris. All organisation and actions outlined in the security contract is placed under the supervision of the Paris Council of Security and Delinquency Prevention (Conseil parisien de sécurité prévention de la délinquance), whose duties are performed in every arrondissement by a security and crime prevention committee.

### 3.7 Immigration and Integration

Responsibility for the development and implementation of policies for immigration and integration is delegated across several structures. From 2004, public policies tackling discrimination and the integration of migrants were strengthened by the creation of the HALDE and the ACSE. Prior to the creation of these two structures, victims of discrimination were mainly assisted and supported by national NGOs such as SOS Racism, the League against Racism and Xenophobia, and the League of Human Rights (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, LDH), operating at the local level.

The adoption of the EU Race Directive in June 2000 led to the creation of the HALDE. As an independent authority, HALDE’s mission was to inform the public about discrimination, support the victims of discrimination and promote the fight against discrimination. It examined complaints and informed individuals of their rights. If necessary, it officially recognised the type of discrimination and had the competency to investigate. The office had been strengthened by real powers of investigation and could act on behalf of a victim to require all necessary documents from the person accused of discrimination; it could propose conciliation and mediation in order to solve disputes. HALDE then informed the public prosecutor of the notices of crimes or and offences it received. Starting in 2009, the government sought to merge all the institutions concerned with the fight against inequalities (including discrimination) under one umbrella institution called the Defender of Rights (Défenseur des droits). The Defender of Rights was established in March 2011 and Dominique Baudis was appointed as its head in June 2011.

The ACSE is a public body created by law on 31 March 2006. Its aim is to strengthen state policy in favour of neighbourhood residents, the politique de la ville

---

112 The HALDE was created by the Loi 2004-1486 du 30 décembre 2004 portant création de la haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité (Law 2004-1486 of 30 December 2004 on the creation of the High Authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equality). It was abrogated on 1 May 2011.


The National Agency for Reception of Foreigners and Migrants (Agence Nationale d’Accueil des Étrangers et des Migrants, ANAEM) was a public body created by the Law on Social Cohesion of 18 January 2005. The ANAEM was, for instance, in charge of the contracts of welcome and integration which have to be signed by all new legal migrants who enter the country.

ANAEM became the French agency in charge of migration and welcoming foreign people in 2009. OFII is State’s unique operator dealing with all migrants’ first five years of presence in France.

At the municipal level, in 2002 the Paris City Hall created a Department for Town Planning and Integration (Délégation à la politique de la ville et à l’intégration). It is responsible for the implementation of projects and strategies in the deprived arrondissements of the capital and works in collaboration with the central government, the region, the ACSÉ and certain NGOs. It seeks to promote an integration policy focusing on non-EU migrants who are in dire social and economic difficulties.

3.8 Cultural Policies and Places of Worship

3.8.1 Delanoë and Paris

The team led by Bertrand Delanoë as mayor of Paris in 2001 made a significant change in the government’s relationships with Muslims in Paris. The new administration undertook a complete reversal of approach compared with “the discrimination this
religion had been experiencing previously”.

The rupture is a political one. We had a previous policy that was quite colonial, in which Muslim worship was managed either as a security issue, or very similar to the way the French administration used to talk to the indigenous people. And we changed that.

The administration initiated a policy of giving more visibility to Muslims in the urban landscape (street names, inclusion of Muslim leaders at celebrations of any kind, Ramadan as a local Paris celebration) and of support during religious festivities (such as permitting sports halls to be used during the Ramadan Fridays and Eid celebrations).

The 18th arrondissement was one of the first Parisian arrondissements won by the Socialist Party in 1995. “The transformation of the district works as an urban laboratory for the Socialist Party, a place for experimentation and implementation of certain proposals.”

In 2001 the change of political colour resulted in a radical change of policies. The 18th is a part of Paris where the cultural policy of City Hall has been active in tandem with the local associations. Certain poorer areas have been rehabilitated in specific neighbourhoods by investing in cultural activities and policies, in order to expand the local economy.

These activities include cultural festivals and events, and building centres and amenities to attract entrepreneurs to invest in the area. The local inhabitants and visitors and tourists benefit from cultural policies being part of urban planning strategies. In the 18th, culture is high on the local political agenda, and cultural policies are seen as bringing together high expectations with local demands and needs. In this perspective the ICI serves as a new cultural tool. And indeed, it is listed on the website of the 18th municipality among other important cultural venues such as the Music Centre Barbara.

---

119 Interview with the assistant to the mayor of Paris for local democracy and associative life (adjoint au maire de Paris pour la démocratie locale et la vie associative), 21 January 2008.

120 Interview with the assistant to the mayor of Paris for local democracy and associative life (adjoint au maire de Paris pour la démocratie locale et la vie associative), 21 January 2008.


122 There can be a difference between what the municipality may plan and what the associations identify as a need. For instance, Vivant mentions the ZAC Pajol in the 18th, where associations were reluctant and even hostile to a sports hall but requested a new theatre to attract people to the neighbourhood: Vivant, “Sécurisation, pacification, animation”, p. 183.

3.8.2 Places of worship

Delanoë opened a discussion on funding a new mosque in Paris. Under French law, the government cannot directly sponsor the construction of new places of worship. However, this does not mean that public money cannot finance places of worship. In 2005, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was then minister of the interior, asked for a report from a commission run by Jean-Pierre Machelon to enquire into the legal relations between religions and the public authorities, which brought to light the necessity of reforming the 1905 law, in particular to allow municipalities to easily and directly sponsor the construction of new places of worship. During the presidential elections campaign in 2007, Sarkozy talked about the recommendations of the Machelon report and insisted on the necessity of adapting the law to offer more equality to religions such as Islam. He abandoned this suggestion after the campaign.

Pictures of Muslims praying in the streets of the 18th became the main campaign weapon of opposition parties to Delanoë during the last local campaign in January 2008. By the end of 2010, the declaration of Marine Le Pen on this “problem”, which she seemingly compared with the German occupation during the Second World War, emphasised this situation as an indicator of the potential risk of Islamisation of France.

As a multi-ethnic neighbourhood, the 18th and La Goutte d’Or have two different images. On the one hand, it is a visibly Islamic area (strongly identified with Salafism)

---


125 “We do not govern Muslim worship. We have relationships with it.” Interview with the assistant to the mayor of Paris for local democracy and associative life (adjoint au maire de Paris pour la démocratie locale et la vie associative), 21 January 2008.

126 The law concerning the separation of state and churches was adopted on 9 December 1905. By this law, the Republic guarantees freedom of religion but does not recognise or fund any religion. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État (Law of 9 December 1905 concerning the separation of church and state): see http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000508749 (accessed November 2011)


128 The declaration was made in Lyon on 10 December 2010, during a meeting of the Front national campaign for the election of the new leader. The word “Nazi” was not used by her, but the allusion to the timing of her comparison was explicit enough to anyone.
and on the other a vivid inter-ethnic environment. Research has been limited in this particular part of Paris. The religious mapping of the neighbourhood is similar to what can be found in any other big French city, but it is not well documented. There are clearly different perceptions and representations of what comprises Islam in the neighbourhood, and Muslims participating in the focus groups identified the lack of prayer space as a main concern:

The number of prayer rooms has increased in the migrant hostels since 2002, from 25 to 35. This illustrates the increasing demand by Muslim Parisians for collective worship places. There is for the time being only seven real mosques in Paris, three of them are located in the 10th arrondissement and the others in the 5th, 11th, 18th and 19th. The potential cutting back of these places seems to be conditioned by the implementation of alternative solutions, in particular by the creation of new places of worship. The 2002–2006 planning does not encourage their closure, if no alternative is offered. Public authorities are therefore thinking about better solutions. For instance they refer to the concession of rooms to Muslim-established associations. From that perspective, the common praying rooms should be reorganised such as to be accessible from the outside. These rooms would then be independent from the hostels.

This lengthy comment gives a concise picture of the situation, which is not special to Paris: lack of space, unofficial places for worship, the absence of clear distinctions between legal religious association and places for cultural activities such as cooking and meetings. The profile of the public visiting the praying rooms in the dormitories and mosques is similar to other local contexts in which mosques are places where older Muslims and recently arrived migrants, in particular from sub-Saharan countries, meet. Most of these places have physically deteriorated and their renovation has been a central issue in many of the recent election campaigns. The lack of space for Muslims has become the hallmark of the arrondissement, with the popular image of large numbers of people praying in the street and overwhelming the public space.

There are seven places where Muslims can pray in the 18th. The neighbouring 19th arrondissement is also attractive, as one of the leading mosques in Paris, the rue de

---

129 Salafism is a form of Islam whose followers advocate a literal interpretation of the Qur’an. Wahhabism, which was developed by the 18th century theologian Muhammed ibn Abd al Wahhab in modern Saudi Arabia, is one of the most well-known forms of Salafism. In the current context, followers of Salafism have been portrayed as anti-Western extremists.


131 The Association islamique pour la culture Khalid Ibn Walid, also known as the mosque of rue Myrrha, the Muslim association El Djamaa el Fath (rue Polonceau), the Association culturelle des musulmans (rue Philippe Girard), the Association DjMMt el fathi dawat alladine (rue Myrrha), Mosquée abbache (rue Cavé) and the Association culturelle et sociale (rue Doudeauville), plus one praying room inside a migrant hostel (rue Marc Seguin).
Tanger mosque, is in Stalingrad Paris metro area and is currently under reconstruction.\(^{132}\) Some are religious associations and others are cultural associations. The legal status of religious and cultural associations does not confer the same rights and prerogatives as the structures and this is precisely why ICI is attempting to articulate and contain both without excluding one or the other.

A study of the 18th conducted for ICI indicates that the place where people go to pray remains a major location for the exchange of information, and it coincides with the newcomer profile of a large part of the Muslim population.\(^{133}\) The study finds that discussion on Islam also takes place in specialised shops catering to ethnic groups and bookstores. In line with the neighbourhood being defined by its diversity, Islam and its interpretations and practices (places, resources and leadership) can be divided between the normative, the intercultural and the traditional. The regulatory perspective (how to be a good Muslim, rituals and readings) is probably the most obvious among Muslims in the 18th arrondissement, encompassing both practice and the perception of what a good Muslim should be.

The 18th and especially La Goutte d’Or are still perceived by the wider public as problematic places with all manner of social ills. Certainly, the image that has widely circulated showing Muslim prayer time on Friday afternoon continues to contribute to the stereotyping of the place. In August 2011 worshippers were temporary relocated to disused barracks following an agreement between the mosque and the local authorities.

---


\(^{133}\) Sébastien Fath (ed.), Plurielles et durables: les cultures musulmanes dans la capitale (Plural and durable: Muslim cultures in the capital), Rapport d’enquête pour l’ICI (Survey report to ICI), 2007 (unpublished) (hereafter Fath, Plurielles et durables). The findings refer to the contribution to this report by Nathalie Kapko and Simona Tersigni.
4. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: IDENTITY, BELONGING AND INTERACTION

This section explores how Muslims in the 18th arrondissement of Paris – and more specifically, those located in La Goutte d’Or – feel about their neighbourhood and their city. The neighbourhood is defined in this report as the streets immediately surrounding respondents’ homes. The research examines their sense of belonging and the positive and negative aspects they mentioned about their neighbourhood and city. It notes the places and spaces in which interactions take place with people from the same and different ethnic and religious groups as themselves. The overall findings are as mixed as the population; unequal relations inspire feelings of solidarity, interest and generosity, but they do not preclude ethnicised representations of others (ethnicisation understood as processes by which the attribution of ethnic characteristics adds meaning to people’s actions). Religion is somewhat marginal in these processes.

There has been a considerable amount of literature on Muslims since the 1980s. These studies have examined settlement patterns from a historical perspective, exploring the number of places of worship, the complex network of active associations and...

---


the extreme variety in profiles of Muslims.139 A large amount of research has been published since the 1990s on family gender relationships140 and the headscarf,141 of which two recent trends can be identified. The first one consists of the Muslim voices that have recently enriched knowledge about Muslims from an insider’s perspective, critical or not of Muslim communities in France. The literature by scholars and academics has been complemented by books written by Muslims or writers with a migrant background who do not identify themselves as Muslims.142 This authentic testimony literature, as in other European countries such as Germany or the Netherlands, has emerged following the intensification of the discussion on headscarves in public schools. It has contributed to a growing range of Islamic voices, mostly female, previously not heard on the public stage. These voices have emerged, they have defined the limits of a normative iconography of good and bad Muslims and a reliance on strong gender differentiation. The second trend is connected with the emergence of


Muslim NGOs that have published several reports dealing with stigmatisation and discrimination against Muslims in France.\(^{143}\)

Table 11 shows how “Muslims” and “non-Muslims” responded to survey questions on religious practice.\(^{144}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11. Religious practice among respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim %</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations data

As already noted, there is no public category or statistical tool in France that permits a distinction to be drawn between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the label “Muslim” circulates freely in public discourse, used by politicians, journalists and ordinary people. Thus, there are no reliable data for assessing the specific mistreatment of Muslims in France or in a specific part of the 18th (La Goutte d’Or). The distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims can be used to examine the level of satisfaction expressed by individuals regarding specific sectors of the public life, and provides a good starting point. But the dimension of identity that makes a significant difference to the way people live in La Goutte d’Or cannot be isolated or disconnected from the

\(^{143}\) Probably the more active on the front of religious discrimination and Islamophobia are Comité 24 mars et libertés (24 March and Freedoms Committee) and CCIF, for which see http://www.islamophobic.net (accessed February 2011).

\(^{144}\) Additional Open Society Foundations data can be found in Annex 2 of this report and are listed according to the chapters contained in this report.
migration pathways. Religion as a variable is often significant in correlation with other markers of difference (name, origin or colour), but is irrelevant to citizenship and political participation or integration into French society. Nationally, since the fight against discrimination moved up the political agenda at the end of the 1990s, controversies over the legitimacy of creating ethnic or racial categories intensified, but religion remains largely marginal in that context. This larger perspective is linked to religious affiliation and belonging: what ethnic/racial/religious category can encompass the variety of profiles that fall under the Muslim label? Self-identification has been used in the Foundations survey.

When asked what were the most important aspects to describe themselves with (see Table 13), family came out first for both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. A significant distinction appeared on the question of religion: for Muslim respondents this was second after family, although it represented a small number. For non-Muslims, by contrast, interests, age and life stage were chosen as the second and third most important aspects while religion received no mention. Among Muslim respondents, the number of people born abroad who rated religion as important was higher than the number of people born in France who did.

145 On these aspects, see Simon, “Statistics, French Social Sciences”; Amiraux and Simon, “There Are no Minorities Here”.
Table 12. Which of the following say something important about you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The kind of work you do</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your age and life stage</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your interests</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your level of education</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your nationality</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your gender</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your religion</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your social class</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your ethnic group or cultural background</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The colour of your skin</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

4.1 Islamophobia and Inequality: the Two Sides of Discrimination

The current period can be defined as a dynamic time of global securitisation of cultural issues. Islam, whether political Islam or religious Islam, has become a security issue, Muslims are perceived as a potential threat and the legislation to control private practices illustrates the two levels of governance all over Europe. At the first level Muslims are viewed as transnational actors and migrants who have to be controlled on an international scale. The second level limits the acceptance of Muslim ways of living, sometimes by domestic laws.\(^\text{146}\) This governance of the way Muslims behave privately

can be related to segregation processes that belong to the racist discourse and practices. This process has given rise to urban legends that are often European in scope. The 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States and their impact on the life of Muslims in EU member states belong to that category. After the 9/11 attack, “while the French press did not report incidents of verbal harassment and insults, a rise in everyday tension was identified. Incidents that received press coverage appeared to be low in number, ranging from physical attacks to instances of graffiti.”

Signs of suspicion were becoming more obvious towards Muslims and people of Arab descent, in particular North Africans, women wearing the hijab and bearded men. The outcomes of 9/11 have had various effects on Muslim communities and the differences between them are striking.

Islamophobia, the manifestation of hostility and hatred toward institutions and official representation of Islam as worship, by discourse or by way of direct actions against Islam and Muslims existed in France well before 2001. But the situation today is quite different for individuals being the target of Islamophobia. Again, numbers are difficult to find. The Collective Against Islamophobia in France (Collectif contre l’Isamophobie en France, CCIF) recorded 184 Islamophobic acts in 2009, 21 of which were against institutions and 163 against individuals. Violent assaults against Muslim individuals made up 25.15 per cent of the 184 Islamophobic acts in 2009, and such assaults continued to rise to 26 per cent in 2010.

The number of Islamophobic acts had increased 130 per cent since 2008, the 2009 CCIF report states. On 17 June 2010, the then interior minister, Brice Hortefeux, mentioned 1,026 acts of racist violence reported, of which 314 targeted Muslims, and on the same day he signed a


149 Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (CNCDH), La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie. Année 2009 (The fight against racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Year 2009), La Documentation française, Paris, 2009 (hereafter CNCDH, La lutte contre le racisme). The report identifies 44 racist and xenophobic threats that had a specific anti-Islamic tone and 75 Islamophobic websites, pp. 38 and 214.

150 See: http://www.islamophobie.net/sites/default/files/rapport-ccif-2010.pdf

framework convention with the CFCM for statistical and operational tracking of anti-Muslim acts.\textsuperscript{152}

Popular and radical anti-Muslim rhetoric, supported by inflammatory discourse in segments of the media but also by public figures, has started to become normal.\textsuperscript{153} More precisely, it seems that the public expression of hostility or unease over the presence of Muslims in France is gaining a worrying popular legitimacy. This has been facilitated by a twofold dynamic, on the one hand downplaying the reality of Islamophobia and discrimination experienced by Muslims (denying its existence or difference from ethnic discrimination), and on the other the explicitly racist statements by major political figures such as former interior minister, Brice Hortefeux, and TV personalities (such as Éric Zemmour), which contribute to making a racist discourse in the country common.\textsuperscript{154}

A relevant illustration in La Goutte d’Or, where praying in the streets has always been a major issue for local politicians (as in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and in Paris more generally), are the declarations of Marine Le Pen, daughter of the former National Front (\textit{Front national, FN}) leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and elected the new leader of the party in January 2011, when she compared the Muslims praying in the streets with the German occupation of France during the Second World War. The FN’s stance on the so-called Islamisation of France has become a rhetorical weapon over the last decade and there is nothing new per se with this kind of statement, but it bolstered the notion of \textit{laïcité} as one of the French national values to fight for and defend.

In the double context of the failure to acknowledge Islamophobia in France (“We cannot really talk of Islamophobic feelings in France, but rather of a certain worry

\textsuperscript{152} At the inauguration of the new mosque in Argenteuil on 28 June 2010, the prime minister, François Fillon, used the same numbers to condemn the violence against religious communities and populations: “Last year (2009), 30 per cent of racist acts of violence, threats in most of the cases, targeted Muslim people. Six Muslim places of worship have been targets of acts and, at the beginning of this year (2010) we have been affected by the profanation of Muslim tombs and mosques.”


\textsuperscript{154} Brice Hortefeux was condemned for racial insults in June 2010. Eric Zemmour, a TV host, was sentenced in February 2011 for incitement to racial hatred and discrimination.
regarding the will to integrate practising Muslims into French society”) and of the increasingly frequent public expressions of hostility against Muslims, a rhetoric that gained rapid visibility during the September 2009–January 2010 public discussion on national identity, no united front has emerged to address and challenge this issue. In December 2010, the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between People (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples, MRAP) and the LDH, joined by the CCIF, went to court to claim incitement to racial hatred in response to Marine Le Pen’s declaration. The MRAP also took a clear position against the organisation of explicit racist meetings such as the Conference on the Islamisation of Our Countries (Assises sur l’Islamisation de nos pays) organised in Paris on 18 December 2010. Although public incitement to hatred is forbidden by law in France, this event was not banned by the Ministry of the Interior or by the Paris Prefecture.

While the concept of discrimination (including that based on the religious group of the victim) became a central notion legally and politically in terms of the promotion of equality and respect of differences, it has remained largely ignored and absent from the discourse about Muslims and Islam in France. The TeO survey results mentioned earlier did, however, refer to the importance of religion in the discrimination experienced by “visible minorities”. It provided information about the impact of ethnic origin on the social life paths of migrants and the children of migrants, as well as

155 CNCDH, La lutte contre le racisme, p. 87. This contrasts with a European trend noted in 2009 by most of the European anti-racism and anti-discrimination agencies, as also stated in this report: “In their yearly 2009 reports, (they) denounce the always increasing number of racist and xenophobic acts and in particular of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic acts,” CNCDH, La lutte contre le racisme, p. 148. See for instance: “The negative perception of Muslims, often expressed in the context of debates about ‘values’, continues to affect large numbers of people in their everyday lives. The impact of Islamophobia has been traditionally felt in many fields, such as employment, law enforcement, town-planning, immigration and even education. A relatively new phenomenon is legal restrictions, introduced or proposed, specifically targeting Muslims – again an issue for political exploitation. Naturally, ECRI supports European governments’ initiatives aimed at encouraging tolerance of religious diversity in Europe by, for example, establishing fora for intercultural dialogue. However, additional efforts are clearly needed in this connection” (ECRI, “Annual Report 2009”, p. 8).

156 See the synthesis by Alain Gresh, “Marine Le Pen n’est pas le problème” (Marine Le Pen is not the issue), available at http://blog.monde diplo.net/2010-12-17-Marine-Le-Pen-n-est-pas-le-probleme (accessed February 2011).

157 The MRAP is one of the rare anti-racist associations that has a proper anti-Islamophobia section among its main activities; see http://www.mrap.fr/contre-le-racisme-sous-toutes-ses-formes/ (accessed February 2011).

158 The ambiguity of certain associations and movements such as Ni Pute Ni Soumise (NPNS, Neither Whores nor Submissives) in fostering incitement to hostility and distrust towards Muslim populations is clearly stated in some of the US embassy’s diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks. See “Analysing the civil unrest – The Islamic Factors” at http://213.251.145.96/cable/2005/11/05PARIS7835.html (accessed 28 January 2011).

159 All these data and the following information come from Beauchemin et al., “Trajectoires et origines”.
 data on the effects of colour or visible markers of diversity. Some of the results are striking: the incidence of discrimination is two and a half time higher for immigrants and children of immigrants than for the general population. Roughly 26 per cent of immigrants and 24 per cent of children of migrants say they have been victims of some form of discrimination over the past five years. All population groups are not equal in this: the most visible minorities are the most targeted (people of sub-Saharan origin and people from the Caribbean, North Africa, Turkey and southern Asia). In all groups, children of migrants report more discrimination than their parents; men and women over 35 declare less discrimination than younger people (this being particularly visible in the job market). Social position plays a nuanced role in this picture: having a job clearly enhances security and reduces the feeling of being discriminated against. The more educated one is, the more one is inclined to report discrimination. Even if ethnic origin remains the most determining variable for reporting discrimination, religious belief and belonging make a significant difference to the picture: whatever their ethnic origin, Muslims are more likely to report discrimination than Christians, Buddhists and Jews, or those with no religion (agnostics, atheists, non-believers).

Islam is a minority religion that has an institutional existence in France, and most of its followers are French by birth, marriage or acquisition. In France the secular principle requires individuals to relate directly as citizens with the state. Minorities and race have no place in this formula. The EU anti-discrimination provisions have dramatically altered this by including in them the experiences of other member states and their approaches to differences. In France ethnicity is coming slowly to the forefront of public debate, but religious distinctions as a potential source of unequal treatment and motive for direct and indirect discrimination are still a non-issue.

In this general context, three questions appear as significant. Is it about worship and religious institutions or is it about faith? Is it about being a citizen and still a believer? What is the legitimacy of the state in talking about religion if it is purely a private matter?

A 2008 decision by the French government illustrates this quandary. On 27 June 2008, the French Council of State (Conseil d’état) denied French nationality to a Moroccan woman living in France, who was married to a Frenchman, and mother of three children. The grounds for refusal were based on the consideration that her religious practices were radical and incompatible with the core values of the French community. For the first time, a qualification of the way an individual practises his or her religion was made by the judges (the practice was said to be radical) and this juridical move certainly paved the way to the recent conclusion of the burqa ban

discussion, with the passing of a law in October 2010.\textsuperscript{161} It came into effect on 11 April 2011.

4.2 Feelings about the Neighbourhood

Locally, as in Paris’s 18\textsuperscript{th} arrondissement, the national principles are implemented within a more pragmatic and accommodating perspective, but similar dilemmas still emerge.

Most of the interviewees consider the place of the 18\textsuperscript{th} arrondissement where they live (for instance, La Goutte d’Or) to be a village. The majority have lived in the area for between two and four years, which is not surprising considering the neighbourhood’s migration identity. There was no clear correlation between the length of stay in the area and the level of attachment to it (see Table 13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–20</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–30</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31+</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

The perception of the neighbourhood as diverse and multi-ethnic reveals a difference of opinion between Muslims and non-Muslims (see Table 14).

\textsuperscript{161} Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting concealing the face in public space). The text states (article 1) that no one can, in the public space, wear clothes or outfits that conceal the face. The articles following explain the specific conditions of exception to the law as well as the limit of the definition of the public space.
Table 14. Who are the people in your neighbourhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same ethnic and religious background</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same religion, different ethnic background</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same ethnicity, different religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different ethnicity and religion</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Most of the interviewees consider the neighbourhood to be composed of a “mixture of people”. Non-Muslims born in France perceived the area as containing “people from their own ethnic and religious background”, while the non-Muslims born abroad identified it with “mainly people from the same religion but other ethnic backgrounds”. Respondents aged 30–49 years and those who were French citizens considered that the neighbourhood hosted a population that “resembles them”, taken to mean people from their ethnic and religious background.

Overall, the respondents expressed a strong affection for both the arrondissement and the neighbourhood (see Table 15). Focus group respondents characterised the 18th as a pleasant area to live in, while further probing during the discussions ignited feelings of both fondness and dislike. As many interviewees pointed out, it is ugly and beautiful and attractive and repulsive at the same time.
Table 15. Do you like your neighbourhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Respondents’ reactions to the question about their motive for moving to the neighbourhood and its positive aspects were extremely diverse (see Table 16). On the whole, most felt attached to the neighbourhood because of its ethnic diversity and multicultural, social way of life. One focus group participant explained, “Two years ago, I left Sweden to settle here in this neighbourhood. I like it here because Stockholm, it’s like a museum, it is very clean. Here, the neighbourhood is lively and welcoming.” Dirt, noisiness, crime and drug-related criminal activity are present but an attachment to the place persists.
### Table 16. Reasons for moving to the neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not choose</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near work</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near family</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation of the area</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from the same ethnic group as you</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from the same religious group as you</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice area</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social housing was offered to me</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liked the house</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap affordable housing</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born here/always lived here</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived here before</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents’ house/decision</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage living with partner</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural area</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

Muslim respondents indicated that they had chosen the area because they had been offered social housing. Both Muslims and non-Muslims found that rents were affordable in the 18th arrondissement. Some of the non-Muslims connected a general appreciation of the area with the fact that they could afford to live there. To complement these answers, respondents had the opportunity to be more specific in the open comments.

Comments from respondents and focus group participants suggest that transport was viewed as one of the major positive aspects of the neighbourhood. The public transport
system, especially the metro, goes through the 18th arrondissement, connects with various other underground lines and facilitates daily life: “What I like in this neighbourhood is the transportation: there are many (buses, metro) and they are punctual.”

The proximity to family is another common reason for living in the area: “Living next to the family to feel safe and moreover to see populations from the same background as me.” Belonging to a community, which respondents expressed mainly in ethnic rather than religious terms, is essentially based on the local experience of social life. The 18th and also various areas of it offer all kinds of facilities for the community and family life:

We feel a bit in Africa here. … Products are not too expensive and we can find all we want (food, cosmetics and hairdressers). If we wish to celebrate a birth or a wedding, we find everything to organise the party.

The varied communities (Africans, North Africans and Asians) find that their daily needs are met, making the neighbourhood a more viable and attractive place to live:

You can eat as in Africa. We live as we used to live in our home country. We pay visits to each other, we say hi and I am lucky because I have family here. My nephew married a white woman and they have a daughter. He lives right here, rue Ordinary; another of my nieces has a restaurant in rue Marcadet; … the children get along together.

Among the reasons given for liking the atmosphere in the area was the possibility of conversing in their mother tongue with others and the neighbourhood’s resemblance to their countries of origin (“I feel like I am in Algeria”). There is strong feeling because the local way of life suits them and their close community ties, be they family, ethnic, linguistic or religious. The neighbourhood is also appreciated because it is lively and young, despite associated problems of noise; in fact, it was also described as peaceful and quiet, which somehow contradicts the stigma and fears which are commonly associated with it.

4.3 Values

Attempts have been made to formulate questions that can be used to measure levels of social cohesion in an area. Three possible indicators are whether people think others in their area share the same values, levels of trust in people in the neighbourhood, and whether people believe that their neighbours are willing to help each other.

The Goutte d’Or – but also the 18th more generally – is considered a place where respondents say people care for each other in full awareness of the area’s bad reputation. According to some respondents, the multi-ethnic nature of the population imbues the community with a sense of solidarity and respect for others and there is a natural appreciation of the neighbourhood for precisely this. During the focus group discussions, participants noted that the area’s migration history was a positive element
of the arrondissement for newcomers (the arrondissement includes 32.6 per cent foreigners, which is twice the amount for the city of Paris):

I love the neighbourhood because of its population: the atmosphere is good and people like each other. This helps inhabitants to be respectful and helpful to each other.

This neighbourhood has always been a neighbourhood of arrivals; ... people who come and are in need, trying to move into a more welcoming neighbourhood.

There is no polarised position on the issue of values (see Table 17). Muslims seemed to agree more than non-Muslims on the idea that shared values exist in the neighbourhood (45 per cent compared with 28 per cent). However, a large number of the respondents disagreed with the idea that people living in the 18th have values in common: “People are different. We don’t all like the same things.” Trust and common values were described as unequally distributed. On the one hand, the idea of common values and feelings of trust seem to be correlated with the fact that people like the neighbourhood because of its diversity and its multi-ethnicity. On the other hand, this diversity (of religion, languages and ethnic origins) is also causing the neighbourhood to fall apart. In the open-ended questions, people identified a general attitude which translates as the absence of any respect towards others. People should “be more polite, for instance”. Education, or rather the lack of it, was also noted as a main reason for the disrespect of others.

Table 17. Do people in this neighbourhood share the same values?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

However, these differences of values do not seem to contradict an overwhelming perception of the inhabitants as ready to help others (see Table 18).
### Table 18. Are people in this neighbourhood willing to help others?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

There was practically no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the large majority were optimistic about their expectations of solidarity from the neighbours.

Interestingly, respondents specified the concept of *bonne entente* (friendly relationship) and the idea of a reciprocal recognition rather than trust. A reciprocal recognition, in this instance, means that people have affection for the neighbourhood because people in it resemble them and reciprocally, they feel part of a neighbourhood that recognises and accepts them.

### 4.4 Sense of Belonging

Both Muslims and non-Muslims remarked that they had a strong sense of belonging at local and national levels. They often expressed a feeling of owning the neighbourhood: “It is me”, “It is mine”, “I grew up here”.

Non-Muslims who were born abroad seemed particularly attached to the place. Those who were born in France tended to feel they belong to it irrespective of being Muslims. Overall, a larger number of non-Muslims interviewed declared that they felt they belonged to their city (non-Muslims 62 per cent, Muslims 54 per cent) and country (non-Muslims 65 per cent, Muslims 40 per cent). (See Table 20–21.)
Table 19. How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strongly</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very strongly</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strongly</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

There were no discernible differences among the categories in the strength of their belonging to the local area. Both groups declared a sense of belonging in a moderate and contained way. The notable difference lay in the non-Muslims, born in France, who expressed a stronger attachment to their neighbourhood.

Table 20. How strongly do you feel you belong to Paris?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strongly</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very strongly</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strongly</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
The sense of belonging to Paris (Table 20) was expressed in moderate terms, rather than with conviction. Muslims as well as non-Muslims born outside France felt they belonged less to the city of Paris.

Among Muslim respondents, the perception of discrimination and unequal treatment were the foremost reasons provided for the lack of belonging to the larger city. Other reasons put forward were the primary identification with the family and the neighbourhood, a lack of interest and time to be involved in what was happening in the city and, finally, regardless of a feeling of goodwill, there was a general sense of distance which did not persuade people to have a stronger sense of belonging to Paris:

I always considered myself Parisian but I come from La Goutte d’Or and sometimes, when I go to the Rive Gauche (the other side of the Seine in Paris, south), I don’t feel in my place. But I like the urban outlook, the city, its anonymity.

Table 21. How strongly do you feel you belong to France?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strongly</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very strongly</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strongly</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Muslims born abroad have less of a sense of belonging to France (Table 21). There was a difference observed at the city and country levels that was not visible in the same way for the neighbourhood.
Muslims born in France were less likely to consider themselves French (compared with other people also born in France). If the fact of being born in France almost always relates to the feeling of being perceived as French, Muslims rarely have the benefit of this recognition even when they were born in France. The youngest (aged less than 30) and women were more often prone to be recognised as French by the population. There was no discernible religious distinction among respondents when asked if they wished to be considered French. Those who were born in France wished to become French.

Experience of discrimination was pinpointed when Muslim respondents were asked to specify why they did not want to be perceived as French:

I don’t think it is a secret that a lot of French are racist. Discrimination bothers me. So I cannot feel myself as fully belonging to Paris and neither to France.

Put a French person and an Arab together and you’ll find the following: the French person is the boss and the Arab is the worker. I don’t want to be considered French because it would mean hypocrisy.

I have been in France for 20 years and when I applied for naturalisation, they asked for a lot of documents. We cannot be considered French if the state itself does not have consideration for us.

The other reason stated was the desire to value their original national identity:

I can’t feel I belong to a country that discriminates against me. I love this neighbourhood and this city, but I don’t have any feelings for this country.

I am not French. Even if one day I get the documents, I cannot become white. I remain African.

Both Muslims and non-Muslims identified lack of proficiency in French as an obstacle. However, a far larger proportion of non-Muslims viewed this as a barrier and the explanation for not being recognised as French.
The research reveals that more than half of Muslims and non-Muslims expressed a strong attachment and affection towards their neighbourhood (see Table 23). A few did not feel any peculiar love for it (10.5 per cent), but only 43 per cent of those who did not love the neighbourhood declared they do not feel they belong to it.

The length of residence does not seem to modify the perception people have of the neighbourhood. Neither was there an apparent connection between belonging to the country and the feeling of being part of the neighbourhood.

Table 23. Strength of feelings towards the neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How strongly do you feel you belong to the neighbourhood?</th>
<th>Very strongly %</th>
<th>Fairly strongly %</th>
<th>Not very strongly %</th>
<th>Not at all strongly %</th>
<th>Don’t know %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number 33 69 69 27 2 200

Source: Open Society Foundations

4.5 Interacting or Neighbourliness?

Good neighbourliness can be defined as good manners, politeness, respect for other cultures and a general goodwill. The research respondents identified all the above as important to them. Typical urban neighbour problems such as noisiness and lack of care for communal surroundings were mentioned. However, the seduction and ease of a multicultural environment were marked by the infrequency of interaction repeatedly mentioned by many respondents (Table 24).

There is no significant difference between Muslims and non-Muslims over meeting people from other ethnic backgrounds, but gender makes a slight difference: women meet others from different ethnic backgrounds at least once week, men only once a month. Those born in France indicated less interaction with people from other ethnic groups, whereas those born abroad usually met people from other ethnic groups once a month.
Table 24. Frequency of meetings with different ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

When broken down further, responses highlighted the lack of interaction between different groups and scarcity of public meeting spaces, and that when interaction did occur it was purely casual and sporadic. Paths cross but there is no reciprocal knowledge. During the questionnaires and focus group discussions, many respondents complained about feeling isolated from an interactive social life. This was attributed as being partly due to work and family life but also partly due to reciprocal distrust and the difficulty of meeting other people (Table 25).

162 During the roundtable, an NGO respondent expressed her concern about the care of public spaces (squares, playgrounds, streets); they should invite the inhabitants of the neighbourhood to go out of their homes. It is also possible that the intensification of videosurveillance in the 18th and more specifically in La Goutte d’Or will negatively affect to the inhabitants’ feelings about the public space. See Chapter 9.
### Table 25. Interaction with people from other ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Integration is a key concern for many. They complained about the absence of mixing, understood as occasions to really interact with people who were not the same. Indeed, one of the most recurring complaints concerned the absence of a place for authentic intercultural crossing and interaction of individuals. It may seem particularly strange in a neighbourhood where public actors (the municipality) and local NGOs have deployed all sorts of initiatives publicising the multi-ethnic and diverse profile of the 18th (e.g., Barbès l’Africaine, La Goutte d’Or en fête). In certain local places, even inside the building where they lived, or streets, even the one they lived on, some of the respondents expressed their uneasiness living there and their perpetual fear of their immediate neighbours:

The problems we have, there are problems of dealers, drug addicts, prostitutes. There are also people who come and go inside the building. They trouble us. Sometimes, we can hardly sleep. Otherwise, the 18th is a great place.

The street is simultaneously part of a place where people live, a site for criminal activity and a space targeted for control and security by police forces. The street is also a space that some users pass through without really stopping (in the 18th arrondissement, tourists visiting Montmartre and people shopping in the local inexpensive markets). Where different uses of urban places coexist, public spaces tend often to become semi-private places. The tolerance for others in the neighbourhood is directly related to the

---

use they make of space. While the respondents liked the neighbourhood because of its good transport links in and out of the area, at the same time this attracts a wider public. Respondents denounced the misuse of the street and the bad and deviant behaviour they see happening in it, but still liked the neighbourhood, perhaps on the basis of civic inattention: they have become indifferent to what they see happening in the street.164

According to both Muslim and non-Muslims participants in the focus groups, local city councils could improve their neighbourhoods by meeting three main clusters of expectations:

- Cleaning, renovation, and environment: respondents referred to the need to improve the general outlook of the neighbourhood, by tearing down dilapidated houses, better and frequent municipal services delivery (street cleaning and garbage removal), eradicating vermin, improving and enlarging pedestrian walkways, increasing public spaces and renovating buildings in the area.

- Quality of the neighbourhood and community life: improving the quality of information about the life of the neighbourhood was one of the most important expectations expressed by the participants in focus groups. There was a demand for more organised activities for young people, as well as the rehabilitation of one of the old markets (Marché de Château-Rouge) and a wish for street peddlers for food products that would improve street social life and provide an alternative to groceries and supermarkets.

- Security: there was a feeling that improving security and responding to criminal incidents in La Goutte d’Or were not priorities for the police force. Respondents requested more police officers on the streets and better policing to keep public order in local streets.

Respondents pointed to two different things when asked about ways to increase interaction between residents: the necessity of better focused policies and community and civic ownership in raising and improving the area. Respondents wished to interact but they felt that the responsibility for change did not lie in the hands of the citizens and expected the public authorities to intervene. Respondents also requested policies based on consultation and including organised discussion between local policymakers and residents, directed towards the more excluded and the poorest, to encompass housing renovation and construction. Social policy for deprived areas should also require the local city council (conseil d’arrondissement) to initiate schemes supporting the entry of young people who were in dire need of help in to the labour market.

Table 26. Do the residents work together to improve the neighbourhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

There was also a general impression that the population of the 18th does not collectively make the commitment to work for change (see Table 26). There was some disagreement, in similar proportions among both Muslims and non-Muslims. For those who agreed, the main distinction lay between Muslims born abroad and non-Muslims born abroad, and Muslims born in France and non-Muslims born in France. Respondents identified a need for community and policy interventions based on consultative community gatherings and activities. These are already taking place in the neighbourhood. People also complained about the lack of appropriate places to meet, which would satisfy a need for conviviality and create opportunities to meet people from different backgrounds. The most recurring suggestions highlighted religious pluralism and cultural diversity as ways of discussing the neighbourhood: these included organising common celebrations of specific holidays, excursions or tours with mixed communities and activities through which people could present their traditional customs and habits. Neighbourhood celebrations (fêtes de quartier) were the most popular response from respondents. It should be noted that many of these types of intercultural activities already seem to exist. Finally, participants and respondents expected a wider availability of information on different cultures, such as through conferences and meetings.

However, some respondents from the non-Muslim part of the sample frequently underlined the limits of intercultural activism:

One can encourage people to get along together, but it remains an individual will. One can help people to get to know each other (who is who), to do things together like for instance gardening. I really liked the grape festival in the 18th. It
is good. It is not an activity aiming at one ethnic group, it is something which belongs to the neighbourhood. It relates to the neighbourhood inhabitants.

4.6 A Cohesive Neighbourhood or an Isolated One?

The negative associations and stereotypes associated with La Goutte d’Or have labelled it as a ghetto since the 1970s. But one source said: “If the neighbourhood still stands, it is precisely because it is not a ghetto and is inhabited through social and ethnic mixing.” The respondents to the Open Society Foundations’ research often used the word “ghetto” in responding to specific questions about social and ethnic interaction, especially about education and belonging. The word is, of course, loaded and although it circulates in various contexts, it remains ill defined as an analytical concept. The ghetto may be conceived of as a closed urban space, a web of institutions tying together a community or a cultural and cognitive constellation implying the isolation of a stigmatized population, deprived of access to services and chances. A ghetto could be considered as a set of social conducts, attitudes or behaviours held by a socially, economically and racially segregated population. In a work on a specific area of Bordeaux, Lapeyronnie explained how a population “makes a ghetto” by producing a counter-society, a community that is an obstacle for personal achievement. The ghetto as described by Clark is both a cage and a cocoon preventing its inhabitants from gaining access to the outside (employment, good education); on the edge is the ethnic and socio-economic border and thus the ghetto is also a protective place. This duality about La Goutte d’Or was present in the comments of the respondents and participants, for instance in their continuous ambivalence about loving the neighbourhood and desiring to move away but not quite doing so, or when they express a strong hostility towards public institutions while continuing to have high expectations of the same institutions.

The overall findings in this section emphasise the feeling that respondents and participants were locally disconnected from the national perspective. Respondents, while criticising the neighbourhood as alienating them from direct and authentic interactions, demonstrated strong personal knowledge of what the neighbourhood was made of, positively and negatively.

People talked about the 18th as a stage they identified with and in which they were observers rather than participants. While they liked what they saw, they also

---

165 Bacqué and Fijalkow, “En attendant la gentrification”.
166 Goldring, La Goutte d’Or, quartier de France, pp. 23, 98.
168 Lapeyronnie, Ghetto urbain.
complained about specific troubles caused by a multi-ethnic environment. Some expressed their feelings of not being really part of it: occasions of interaction were scarce.

We tend to get polarised because we don’t live in mixed communities. As a result, one group hold some prejudices about the other. And then, these prejudices are stretched so as to define the whole nation or religion that that particular group belongs to.

Zukin discusses the social and urban parallel evolutions of city landscapes as a stage for a competition between social groups fighting for the means of access to the most favoured places of the neighbourhood they live in.170 The absence of interaction brings back into the discourse the issues of prejudice and discrimination, not as something exclusively related to a majority–minority relationship or to a consequence of living in France, but as a direct effect of a multi-ethnic neighbourhood.

The ties binding people to a neighbourhood articulate the way they live, the way they work and the way they consume. Only a tiny part of the population undertakes all three activities in the same neighbourhood.171 Indeed, the interviewees specified and to some extent criticised those who did not buy food in the neighbourhood and just came to sleep in the 18th, while their habits still linked them with the outside, although the social polarisation resulting from the ongoing gentrification is not yet palpable. This explains for some of them the fragility of the neighbourhood, the diffused feeling of not being considered the same as other parts of Paris, for instance more prestigious arrondissements. For example, consumption habits can break people apart.172 This is also mentioned by Marie Raynal:

Beyond daily life, meetings happen between people belonging to the same cultural group or originating from the same country. These statements are not specific to the La Goutte d’Or neighbourhood. The concentration of shops for food, clothing, and cosmetics held by people with foreign origin accentuates these types of encounter in the neighbourhood and drives those who have other ways of life and food habits outside the neighbourhood.173

From inside the 18th arrondissement, the symbols of deviance are individuals involved in criminal and immoral activity in which crime, drugs, prostitution all contribute to the historical narrative and legend of the neighbourhood. Drug abuse is a central

172 Goldring, La Goutte d’Or, quartier de France, mentions that there are no “good” bakeries and no “good” cheese shops. But there is a now famous charcuterie (Le Cohon d’Or, the Golden Pig) since the exhibition of pictures by Martin Parr organised by ICI, 6 April–2 July 2011).
173 Marie Raynal in Fath, Plurielles et durables, p. 45.
problem in the neighbourhood. Radical Islam may be grounds for national fears and the preoccupation of national security but at the neighbourhood level, drugs, socio-economic difficulties, segregation and discrimination are the main everyday problems. As shown by various authors, delinquency is not the natural outcome of ethnic diversification but belongs to a larger historical trajectory. Migrants have in a way inherited this local pathology and deviation from previous periods. From outside, the popular media-driven stigmatisation of the neighbourhood incorporates a discourse on radical movements and maintains the ambiguity of the discourse on imported radical Islam that fits into the larger picture of a migrant neighbourhood.

The 18th and La Goutte d’Or demonstrate at the local level the tension symptomatic of the current period in France. There is extreme tension between abstract principles, ideals, historical narratives and ordinary practices. People claim to move to a certain part of the city because they feel empathetic towards migration and keen to interact and be a part of a diverse community. There are accusations about the side-effects of differing cultural practices but a continuing attachment to the place. This theme will be further tackled in the section on education.

To sum up, residents like the ethnic and religious diversity, the way of life that to some extent goes with the negative aspects of it, but the populations coexist rather than co-produce the neighbourhood. Relating to the neighbourhood cannot be broken down by religious groupings. The distinguishing factor is whether the respondents were recent arrivals to France or born in the country.

174 Toubon and Messamah, *Centralité immigrée*. 
5. **Experiences of Muslim Communities: Education**

The concentration of social difficulties in housing will also necessarily be found in the schools of the neighbourhood. We know that children with foreign origins do not have bad scores at school if their learning is helped by contact with other children. ... It is for instance necessary to start the challenging work of changing the way French is taught to foreign children as instead of being taught as literature, French should taught as a foreign language. ... The excessive concentration of children with problems and foreign children in the same classes and in the same schools should be avoided.

(Brice Hortefeux, speech made at celebration of European Year of Equal Opportunities for All, 17 December 2007, translated)

5.1 Statistics

In France, the educational system provides free schooling. Education is compulsory for children aged 6–16, and the right to education starts at the age of three. Education provided by public schools is one of the most important pillars of integration, partly because it provides individuals with the skills and qualifications for participation in the labour market. It also plays a formative role in the socialisation of young people. For young Muslims it is often the first public institution with which they have contact. The ways in which schools respond to and respect the needs of Muslim pupils is therefore likely to shape their feelings of acceptance and belonging to the wider French society. Schools also contribute to integration by providing opportunities for interaction between pupils and parents of different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Official statistics about education do not contain information on religious affiliation, although there is some unofficial information about the distribution of food in certain schools. A precise assessment of discrimination and segregation in schools is not possible because limited qualitative approaches or indicators based on different variables (nationality) or deliberately created (often combining the name, the place of residence and place of birth) are used. This is very different from the UK where

---

**References**

175 The right to education is described in article L131-1- of the Code of Education. Article L131-2 specifies that compulsory education can be given in public or private schools, or at home.


discrimination in education (which might reveal the connection between the ethnic or religious origin of individuals and their educational achievement) is quite well documented.\textsuperscript{178} The only field in which the Ministry of Education provides more precise data on the religious affiliation of pupils is the headscarf issue before and after the application of the March 2004 law.\textsuperscript{179}

The official reference to the variety and diversity of the school population is the nationality of the pupils. Official statistics often distinguish between pupils on the basis of citizenship and nationality. “Foreign pupils” is used as a category and refers to children born abroad or born in France but who do not have French nationality. This categorisation omits one cluster of people, those who have become naturalised French. It also does not permit the analysis of the impact of ethnicity or other variables related to cultural identity, or to assess the impact of immigration on the way public education institutions treat diversity in practice.\textsuperscript{180}

The Ministry of Education possesses data on the number of non-French nationals in schools in France, but these are generally not available as public information.\textsuperscript{181} Some schools request that children fill in forms at the beginning of the academic year. However, the documents are never made public and are kept by the regional educational authority which records the information through its statistics office. According to a member of the regional education authority in the 18th arrondissement, the existing data are sometimes highly inaccurate because the pupils often confuse their own nationality with the one of their parents (which may not be the same). He declined to share the data.\textsuperscript{182} In the 2009 Indicators and Statistical References on Teaching, Training and Research (Repères et références statistiques sur l’enseignement, la formation et la recherche (RERS) report, the Ministry of Education detailed the difficulties of collecting information on the nationality of students in compulsory education: children who had recently acquired French nationality may still be counted


\textsuperscript{179} Loi 2004-228 de 15 mars 2004, encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics (Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, framing, by application of the principle of laicity, the wearing of signs or garments showing a religious affiliation in public primary, lower and upper secondary schools) (Journal Officiel, 17 March 2004).

\textsuperscript{180} The place of birth and the nationality of the parents are not available.

\textsuperscript{181} Some surveys do include information about children with migrant background or origin: Ministry of Education, Enquête auprès des familles (Family survey), 1998; Ministry of Education, Enquête jeunes (Youngsters survey), 2002.

\textsuperscript{182} Exactly the same reasoning can be found in the RERS yearly report for 2007 (p. 83).
MUSLIMS IN PARIS

as foreigners, and there may be confusion between the parents’ or guardians’ nationality and that of the children.

In 1999–2000, the population of primary schools included 372,300 foreign pupils, that is 5.9 per cent of the total population; 16.1 per cent of the foreign population hailed from the EU, among them 37,081 from Portugal; 83.9 per cent were from outside the EU (85,868 or 23 per cent from Morocco, 54,054 or 14.5 per cent from Algeria and 48,100 or 12.9 per cent from Tunisia). A 2004 report, Migrants, minorities and education from the European Union Monitoring Centre (EUMC), indicated that the number of foreign pupils had been decreasing since the mid-1980s and amounted to about 5–6 per cent of those in compulsory schooling; most of these were Moroccans, Algerians, Turks and Portuguese. Data for secondary schools (including both public and private sectors) provided by the RERS 2007 report gave the number of 201,100 foreign students. In 2009, the RERS annual publication stated there were 163,900 foreign students for the academic year 2008/2009; numbers for the elementary grades were not available in this report; and the proportion of foreign-origin students remains higher in the public school sector (5.4 per cent) compared with the private school sector (1.7 per cent).

Another category that the Ministry files is “non-French-speaking newcomer children”. This category includes all new students who arrived less than one year ago and whose knowledge of French is not sufficient to allow them to go directly into the general system of education. Nevertheless, they are entitled to the same right to education as other children more fluent in French. This category numbered 34,700 for both primary and secondary sectors in 2008–2009, representing 3.7 per cent of the entire school population.

Given the restriction on ethnic data collection on educational issues and on pupils’ minority background, little can be said about the specific achievements of ethnic- and

---

183 The EUMC has been known as the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) since 2007.
185 Schooling starts with primary education: nursery school, from ages three to five years and primary school from 6 to 11. Secondary education includes the lower-level collège, from 11 to 15, with a final certificate as first diploma and higher level; lycée from ages 15 to 18, with the baccalauréat as the final certificate needed to follow higher education, for instance university. Parallel to this general or comprehensive track, secondary education can also be pursued in a pure vocational schooling system, leading to technical certificates (certificat d’aptitude professionnelle, for training in a specific vocational skill, and brevet d’études professionnelles for the completion of adequate training within a range of technical skills in a particular trade, industrial, commercial or social field). An exhaustive presentation of the French educational system can be found in Ministry of Education, "School education in France", 2010, available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article_imprim.php3?id_article=8387 (accessed June 2011).
religion-minority groups. APUR noted a huge difference between degrees and achievement in education: 25 per cent of non-EU foreigners had a degree obtained after the *baccalauréat*, less than half that of the French by birth. 188

The 2004 EUMC report provides data about enrolment. Of the EU member states, France has a very low rate of enrolment of pupils with foreign citizenship in the five years of primary school, at 5.9 per cent. Moreover, pupils with foreign citizenship more often attend adapted teaching classes for children with severe learning or cognitive difficulties at the secondary level than French nationals, and the proportion of these pupils in vocational secondary schooling is much higher than on the general and technological track. The proportion of pupils with foreign citizenship in the second cycle of the vocational track of secondary schooling is much higher (6.2 per cent) than on the general and technological track (3.6 per cent). Also, pupils with foreign citizenship are over-represented in establishments for adapted teaching for children with severe learning or cognitive difficulties (7.4 per cent in 2001–2002). 189

5.2 Policies

There is no specific anti-discrimination legislation in education in France. Several higher education institutions (Sciences Po Paris, the Paris Institute of Political Studies and ESSEC Business School) have introduced affirmative action programmes. 190 The educational system continues to be characterised by the founding principles set out in 1881 and 1882 regarding the provision of secular, compulsory and free education for all children residing in France. The promotion of equality according to each person’s ability and merit is still the hallmark of Republican integration. 191 This has specific implications for the schooling of migrants and children of migrants and for tackling

---

188 APUR, *La population étrangère à Paris*, p. 3.
discrimination in education. In particular, it affects the way individuals invest in the education of their children and, as parents, trust the value of the degrees and certificates obtained as key to success in life. Comparative studies have shown that school does not automatically reduce social inequalities.

School hierarchies can be as rigid as social hierarchies and they are probably not fairer, even if they may look more legitimate. … It has not yet been demonstrated that ex ante a relatively open and fair school produces a more mobile and fairer society.

It is important to consider how society and school connect to each other, in particular how they produce integration (with reference to the status and position of individuals and the spectrum of inequalities in society) and cohesion in terms of values, cultural traditions and political histories of societies, and help to build trust and social capital. What is the relationship between the individual and his or her educational institution? For instance, how does the degree obtained at school affect access to employment?

The educational system in France comprises public and private schools. The state controls education and the local administration takes care of educational activities (péri-scolaire) and extra-curricular activities (extra-scolaire). The municipality has a shared competence over the education of children and a full competence for the schools’ geographical sectors (secteurs scolaires).

And you find categories such as housing of wealthy families or housing of poor families. In our school sectors, when we have the choice to include this or that street in a wealthier sector, we do it. School sectors are inadequately labelled on the school map. For the primary schools, it is a municipal prerogative: the local administration defines the sector that is the group of streets whose kids will be sent to this or that school. We have 67 schools, that is 67 school sectors. It is a

---


195 Dubet et al., *Les sociétés et leurs écoles*.

196 French compulsory education is based on a network of public and private schools. The latter category includes private schools under partnership contracts with the state that in return for funding requires they adhere to various requirements and public service obligations; and private schools with simple contracts that are less binding as the public subsidies are also smaller.

197 Interview with a local school affairs officer.
tool for managing numbers rather than a political tool. Plus we had a huge baby boom in the 18th.\textsuperscript{198}

This tool for linking the population to schools is a central concern for the parents. But Muslims as a population category do not have any administrative significance at this level.

In France,

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
\item every child is entitled to a school education that, alongside the families' actions, contribute to his instruction. ... To sustain equal opportunity, appropriate provisions make access to the various types or levels of training possible for everyone, depending upon his abilities and particular needs.\textsuperscript{199}
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

Other measures have been taken in the larger framework of promoting equality. For instance, a framework convention to promote school success and equal opportunity for young migrants or youngsters with migrant backgrounds was signed on 27 December 2007. This convention highlighted six priorities: creating a single database with all information relating to the school careers of these children, improving the information and the structure welcoming new pupils who do not speak French; better assessment of diversity at school; fighting against discrimination and promoting equal opportunities; providing support to the parents; and improving support to help children outside school.\textsuperscript{200}

\subsection*{5.3 Measures to Help Non-national Students}

Newly arrived non-national students are initially assessed in French language and mathematics proficiency. They are later transferred into special classes in primary and secondary schools. In the elementary grades (the first five years of schooling), initiation classes (\textit{classes d'initiation}, CLIN) running parallel to ordinary classes are offered where French is taught as a foreign language to non-French-speaking pupils and Francophone learners with insufficient reading and writing skills. Remedial courses (\textit{cours de rattrapage intégrés}, CRI) can also be offered to children who are already registered in the mainstream programme to attend French classes during the week.

In lower secondary classes (the next four years of schooling) adaptation classes, called welcome classes (\textit{classes d'accueil}, CLA), teach French as a foreign language to older children who are following mainstream schooling in parallel. In upper secondary classes (three years up to the \textit{baccalauréat}, the general certificate of secondary education), it is up to the head of each school to offer solutions adapted to the needs of these students.

\textsuperscript{198} Interview with a local school affairs officer.
\textsuperscript{199} Article L111-2 of Code of Education.
\textsuperscript{200} The institutions that signed this convention were: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Housing and the City, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Sustainable Development, ACSE and OFII.
In order to facilitate the access of migrants’ children to public schools and help teachers address their needs, the Centres for Training and Information on the Schooling of Children of Migrants (Centres de formation et d’information sur la scolarité des enfants de migrants, CEFISEM) were set up in 1976 to equip educational professionals with the knowledge and pedagogical tools to respond to the specific challenges of schooling the children of migrants. The Academic Centres for the Schooling of New Arrivals and Travelling Children (Centres académiques de scolarisation des nouveaux arrivants et des enfants des gens du voyage, CASNAV) replaced the CEFISEM in 2002. The CASNAV were created to help target children in real need of help in terms of both the language (insufficient proficiency in French) and general knowledge. Unlike the CEFISEM, which addressed various categories of migrants, the targets here are the newly arrived non-Francophone children (enfants nouveaux arrivants non-francophones, ENAF) who do not speak fluent French. They may be French citizens. CASNAV provides advice and guidance on developing pedagogical material for native-language teaching or for teaching cultures of origin. The staff of CASNAV intervene as mediators between families and public institutions.

This system of parallel classes is rather inconsistent. The labels fluctuate from one school to another, and school staff are not always aware of the existence of these structures and may choose to stream the children in sections that are for instance for children with learning difficulties where the places available are limited and the waiting list is often long. The teaching programmes do not always match the needs of the students. For instance, there is reportedly little attention paid to the various levels of language in classrooms in which some pupils of immigrant parents do not speak fluent French, some were born abroad and come from school systems different from France, and others who speak French fluently as a result of arriving from Francophone countries. The emphasis on linguistic skills neglects other important disciplines such as history and mathematics, and this further hinders pupils who are supposed to join the traditional general system.\textsuperscript{201}

In the Open Society Foundations’ sample, 41 out of 200 respondents (18 non-Muslims and 23 Muslims) stated that not speaking the language was the first obstacle to integration. The policy emphasis on language that has been increasingly publicised since 2007–2008 contrasts with the fact that poor knowledge of French did not seem until recently to be a problem among migrants, nor a main concern for politicians. It may have slightly changed during the last decade as migrant patterns have diversified and the countries of origin are no longer exclusively former colonies where French was spoken and taught. In 2004–2005, the non-French-speaking groups of newcomers counted for 0.4 per cent of the total population registered in the public schools (both

\textsuperscript{201} Claire Schiff, “Les obstacles institutionnels à la scolarisation des primo-arrivants” (The institutional obstacles to schooling of newly arrived migrants), paper presented at conference at the CASNAV in Paris, 8 June 2004.
elementary and secondary).\textsuperscript{202} Officially, the only language spoken at school is French. In one of the focus groups conducted for this report, the issue of language came out indirectly when discussing the incapacity of parents to help their children with homework and to follow up at home if they have misunderstood something during the school day. In the questionnaires, some of the interviewees who expressed negative views about local schools mentioned a local secondary schoolteacher’s lack of enthusiasm for teaching mother-tongue languages as foreign languages.\textsuperscript{203}

### 5.3.1 Priority Education

Since 1981 the Ministry of Education has also set up specific programmes for the needs of pupils with serious social and economic difficulties living in poor arrondissements, by creating priority zones (zones prioritaires), later designated as priority education areas (zones d’éducation prioritaire, ZEP) and since 2006 as priority education (éducation prioritaire, EP).\textsuperscript{204} This policy illustrates a growing gap in France between wealthy regions, cities and departments and poor and isolated ones.\textsuperscript{205} The main tool for implementing this policy has been financial support. Almost 30 years later, the policy, although based on social, economic and geographical criteria, has become associated with the ethnic segregation of specific populations.\textsuperscript{206} The policy of priority education was reorganised in 2006 around new means of action, such as the creation of networks called Networks Ambition Success (Réseaux Ambition Réussite, RAR). Contracts signed between the schools and the regional education authority provided for these networks to supply certain schools (pre-schools, elementary and secondary) with financial support, remedial course programmes and a better follow-up of the pupils’ progress. The core concept of this educational policy reform in priority areas is the network. The


\textsuperscript{203} Since 1975, the Teaching of Languages and Civilisations of Origin (Enseignement des Langues et Civilisations d’Origine, ELCO) has been carried out: courses in the languages and cultures of origin of migrant populations are given in public schools, often taught by teachers from the countries in question, under contract to the French national educational system. They have been criticised by NGO activists, teachers and politicians for keeping the children in an implicit project of return to the country of origin, rather than promoting their integration in France.

\textsuperscript{204} Anne Armand and Béatrice Gilles, La contribution de l’éducation prioritaire à l’égalité des chances (The contribution of priority education to equal opportunities), Rapport pour le Ministère de l’éducation nationale (Report for the Ministry of Education), Ministry of Education, Paris, 2006.

\textsuperscript{205} Other urban policies belong to this initiative: “Habitat et vie sociale” (Housing and social life), “Développement social des quartiers” (Social development of segregated areas, DSQ), “Développement social urbain” (Social urban development, DSU), “Politique de la ville” (Urban policy). “La réussite éducative” (“Educational success”) policy was part of the CUCS. Educational success for children or adolescents refers to the combination of school achievement, social integration and self-fulfilment. See APUR, Évaluation du contrat urbain de cohésion sociale, p. 46.

lower secondary school (collège) is the central unit coordinating the other members of the networks. The RAR also supports pupils’ careers during mandatory education, in which ambition should be encouraged as a key to success at school. In 2007, the secondary schools in priority education areas also set up courses to help pupils to do their homework, sports activities or artistic activities for the first year at secondary level (form 6). There are also support courses in elementary schools for six-year-old pupils or mathematics and French courses for ten-year-olds.

With no monitoring of ethnic discrimination and no tracing of the religious/ethnic affiliation of the pupils, it is not possible to reliably assess discrimination as experienced by migrant pupils and ethnic minorities. Probably more than in any other institutions, ethnicity is not a legitimate variable in the assessment of scholastic performances or inequalities at school.

It is very difficult to identify “low-performers” by “ethnic” group in the French educational system. Nevertheless, pupils in EP schools, which are likely to have high numbers of migrant pupils, are more likely to repeat school years, drop out and attend vocational secondary schools. The extent to which EP schools are really a good proxy for ethnic-minority and immigrant students is unclear, as these schools also contain higher proportions of others at risk and poorly performing students. A notable feature of the French system, however, is that there are particularly high levels of drop-out for particular minority groups. Overall, the PISA tests suggest that the system works to create higher educational inequalities between immigrant and “native” students than in the Dutch system but lower than in the German system.

5.4 Achievements: Segregation

The factors that probably most influence the school success of children of migrants (including the measure of school achievement, the length of schooling, location in mainstream instead of vocational training programmes) consist of the socio-economic status of the parents and their level of education, but also the length of the establishment of the migrant group in the country. This is not specific to education

207 EUMC quotes an “exemplary individual case of discrimination reported by the NFP concerned a ten-year-old child, who was regularly insulted with ‘racial’ slurs by his peers because of the colour of his skin. He was not supported by teachers, who refused to punish his colleagues. In addition, he encountered problems with the school canteen personnel. His mother’s attempts to appeal to the school principal and teachers was unsuccessful in that they usually turned things around to focus on her child’s schooling deficits and behavioural problems. She eventually removed her child from the school.” French National Focal Point (2003), quoted in EUMC, Migrants, minorities and education, p.48.

and can also be said about access to other services (health, employment). Still, the ethnic factor remains socially significant, at least in the way “parents think of a school’s ‘ethnic’ composition as an indicator of the quality of education provided there”.209 It is also implicitly relevant to the categorisation of specific neighbourhoods as EP. Children belonging to long-established migrant groups also seem to have a better chance of succeeding at school than children of newcomers or even their French-origin peers.210 Studies have also demonstrated the role of schools in further segregating ethnic-minority pupils from their French-origin peers.

A research team in Bordeaux created an indicator to assess the relation between urban segregation and school segregation. This indicator combined the first name (as tied to religion and culture of origin) and nationality of the pupils attending lower secondary schools in Bordeaux.211 Nationality per se does not help to define segregation processes that imply origin and the racial dimension of identity. First names stood as a proxy for the cultural origin of the pupils and enabled the researchers to create a means of distinguishing between natives and non-natives and therefore access information that would be dismissed in a context where there were few pupils of foreign nationality but many with migrant backgrounds. It was possible to study the distribution of pupils among lower secondary schools by cultural origin. Correlations appeared to be strong between the number of non-native pupils and the rate of scholastically late pupils, the higher family size (over four children per family) and a disadvantaged social background: “The most sharply segregated middle schools in cultural terms are also the most sharply segregated socially and scholastically.”212

Schools may be seen as the exact opposite of the ideal of promoting equality in the historical Republican narrative. Still, for public policies, schools are probably one of the last tools for regulating the existing divisive social trends, and for users it stands as the

---


last chance before further social isolation and rejection. However, they reflect and even reinforce urban segregation and the socio-economic differentiation associated with it. How do ghetto schools come into existence? For most specialists, the explanation is in the first place linked to the strong interaction between urban segregation and school selection: schools are qualified or disqualified in their neighbourhood because of their good or bad reputation. In this context, Felouzis draws attention to the role of family strategies in escaping from geographical assignment to any specific school. These strategies (that should be analysed school by school) increase the ethnic segregation in the lower secondary schools by 10 per cent and they have an impact on some highly stigmatized schools. Parents opt out from the geographical assignment to specific schools by sending their children to a private school or to another public school. In the 18th, this process plays out most intensively in the primary and lower secondary schools, since children have to go outside the arrondissement for the upper secondary schools.

Schools have recently been increasingly designated as the main place illustrating the so-called failure of integration in France. As in the headscarf controversies, public schools are considered to be in danger of over-exposure to ethnic divisions and their related effects. In that sense, schools are sites for systemic discrimination; that is, they are stages where one can observe the construction of a disadvantage that results from the entire educational system, but is not only the result of individual practices (direct discrimination). During one of the focus groups, a participant illustrated a decision made by an educational orientation officer:

The orientation adviser pretty much reflects how the entire society sees us. ... She limits you to a very tiny perspective: she leads you to something where you can make your way more easily rather than suggesting that you try something more demanding that could bring you further on.

The issue of educational tracking towards vocational schools is central in assessing the situation of ethnic minorities and the impact of segregation in French public schools. It does not particularly touch upon Muslims compared with non-Muslims, but it does point to the ethnic and national origins of students and the resulting practices. There is an articulation between the wishes of the family and children and the assessment criteria and orientation policies of schools. Felouzis’s study provides counter-intuitive results in terms of the objective scholastic level (scoring, exams, marks):

213 Felouzis, “Ethnic Segregation and its Effects”.
215 Felouzis, “De l’école à la ville”.

116 OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 2012
At the same scholastic level (in the most sharply segregated schools) pupils are at a real advantage when it comes to being passed up to high school. In other words, they learn less but are more likely to start high school.\footnote{Felouzis, “Ethnic Segregation and its Effects”, pp. 30–31.}

But when it comes to inter-subjective experiences (of pupils, parents, administrative staff and teachers), practices and discourses on practices take another turn. As one focus group participant put it,

> At the end of form 3, we all get to meet the orientation adviser. She does not look at your file. She looks at your face and suggests, if you are black: “Which kind of BEP would you like to apply to?” For those who are not good at school, there is no option but the BEP. And if you happen to be black, you immediately go for the BEP.\footnote{BEP stands for brevet d’études professionnelles, the degree for vocational training in secondary schools in the French educational system. Since 2008, the BEP are being phased out and replaced by the Baccalauréat professionnel (Bacc Pro).}

Educational tracking often contradicts the wishes of the child and the parents: 26 per cent of French parents refuse the orientation proposal, as do 33 per cent of Portuguese and 39 per cent of North African parents.\footnote{Yaël Birnbaum and Annick Kieffer, “D’une génération à l’autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: ambition et persévérance” (From one generation to the other, the educational expectations of immigrant families: ambition and perseverance), Education et Formations 72 (September 2005), pp. 53–75.} The picture is further obscured in so-called segregated areas benefiting from the politique de la ville (as part of the schools of the \textsuperscript{18})\textsuperscript{th}, which tend to be places where difficulties are cumulative and complicate the picture of discrimination. At the same time, priority education areas have not proved to be spaces in which innovative pedagogical practices are encouraged, but rather where disciplinary action is deployed to excess.

### 5.4.1 Local Initiatives

In the \textsuperscript{18}th, several initiatives have been implemented to bring foreign families together with the neighbourhood network association in order to prepare their children to enter school. Local education policies also aim to include parents in school-related activities. These projects, as explained by the principal officer for town planning in the following quotes, are centred on children who do not speak French.\footnote{These quotes are from an interview with the principal officer for town planning (Chef de projet Politique de la ville), Porte de la Chapelle, March 2008.} The first type is called the papothèques\footnote{Papothèques plays on the French word papoter, meaning to chat.} there is one for each ethnic community (North African, Tamil, Chinese, African ...). They work as places where people can meet and talk to each other (speech group) as parents, meet representatives of the educational
system, with the help of a mediator and a translator if necessary. These initiatives aim at helping reciprocal understanding between school and family, to facilitate their relationship.

The *papothèques* were not invented in La Goutte d’Or, but in another part of the 18th (La Chapelle). A second type of initiative consists of ethno-psychiatric consultations that exist in the *arrondissement*, in particular for kids with behavioural problems. Specific work can be conducted in similar cases with an ethno-psychiatrist, an ethno-psychologist, a mediator and a translator who are always members of the same ethnic group as the family. In that case it is always a collective work because some solutions to specific problems can be more easily found through the collective than exclusively from the individual perspective.

Another initiative focuses on the preparation of young children for entry into preschooling classes.

The child who does not yet speak French and has not yet entered collective socialisation should be prepared to be at his best to succeed in his entrance into the school system. When the enrolment to local schools starts, the families meet the director of the local school and if it appears the family and/or child does not have sufficient mastery of French, the proposal is made that the child comes from time to time between January and June in a kind of “bridge class” that works as a kind of preparation for the separation from the mother, to life with others at school and to the practice of French. If necessary, when school properly starts the following September, it is possible to consider having someone to help the child with translation during some weeks.

Many different local observers in the fields of education and early childhood (NGOS and public institutions) have noted the emergence of a parallel process of ethnicisation and pathologisation of difficulties encountered by some children. A roundtable participant explained the situation as follows:

> An ethno-psychologisation of the problem is taking place if a child with migrant background would be force be associated with traumas stemming from the migration of the parents or grandparents when there are some difficulties at school. … I think it is quite dangerous to stick to this perspective as it then makes the “origin” of the child the central key for reading the problems he or she is facing at school. Social workers and other actors involved in the educational sector then feel entitled to mention the “origin” of the kids or

---

221 Unité de réflexion et d’action des communautés africaines (Unity of Reflection and Action of the African Communities, URACA) is a significant local association that has developed an ethno-cultural approach to local social problems, in particular in the health sector (see below). They set up conferences entitled “L’arbre à palabres” (The tree of endless discussion) that ran regularly on different topics.
parents as something naturally creating problems. I have often met heads of schools or pre-schooling units speaking about newcomer mothers as not accompanying the children to school or hurrying to get back home because they would be hit by their husbands. The initial projects were certainly aiming at doing good things but turned out to be quite negative. And public money is being involved in that. We should seriously think about that.

This comment acknowledges an increasing and more general disparity inside the educational system, between the official discourse recognizing only abstract citizens with no community ties, and "the reality of the most sharply segregated middle schools, where cultural origin and ethnicity have become the main criteria for identifying self and others". While the ethnic factor is invisible officially, it seems to be over-invested with loaded meanings on the ground.

5.5 Wearing the Headscarf in State Schools

Over the last two decades, the headscarf has been a topic of recurrent discussion about the way Muslim girls behave in state schools, ushering in the law banning visible signs of religion in March 2004. The literature is extremely rich, covering many factors of the episodes of the conflict that took place primarily in schools. The public obsession with the headscarf results from the convergence of different dynamics, from the political to the legal aspects of the debates. Reading the headscarf controversies as an account of the relationship between citizenship and identity, the 2003–2004 consensus to ban the headscarf (and other signs) from state schools emerged over a shared conviction that the headscarf is a polluting element, harmful both for the Republic and for the individuals who wear it. It is seen as contravening principles such as equality and neutrality and as an indicator of private convictions in the public sphere.

The advocates of the March 2004 law claim that wearing the headscarf, being a clear symbol of distinction, destroys equality among pupils in state schools. It therefore creates obstacles to the civic mission of schools and brings religious authorities back

---


223 This is the case in Europe generally: "the ‘visual identifiers’ of Islam and Muslims appeared to explain why certain groups and individuals became targets for hostility more so than others. Such visual identifiers included Muslim women wearing the hijab, turbans, Islamic buildings and property, and general physical appearance, including those who ‘look’ rather than actually are Muslim. Concerns about asylum seekers and the issue of immigration also increasingly overlapped with issues relating to 11 September, providing an explanation for a rise in an albeit sometimes pre-existent hostility towards such groups." (EUMC, “Summary Report on Islamophobia”).

224 Amiraux, “L’affaire du foulard”; Bowen, Why the French don’t like headscarves; Lorcerie, La politisation du foulard.
into the educational system and into competition with teachers. Last but not least, the Islamic headscarf contravenes the religious freedom of other children.225

The law has come in for criticism, of which Laborde distinguishes two forms. First, culture-blind universalism is blamed for perpetuating the structure of postcolonial domination. Second, culture should be understood as an integral part of individual identity that cannot just be put on one aside when discussing political participation or entering public life. This second criticism of the French Republican tradition refers to a more multicultural Republicanism, where the recognition of cultural elements of distinction is considered to be part of an egalitarian public sphere. For the defenders of the Republican ideal, the headscarf embodies a threat to public order. The governance of private manners and of modesty is not a new tradition of Republicanism. Iacub in her examination of the secularisation of civil law illustrates how the erection of a “wall of modesty/decenty” between private and public spaces in 19th-century France led state authorities to exert authority over previously purely private issues of sexuality and modesty. This tension has been exacerbated with the passing of the March 2004 law on religious symbols in public schools.226

The March 2004 law, even if the intention of the legislation was not to exclude one single group of persons more than another, has certainly contributed to intensifying the social stigmatisation of Muslims (that is, of Muslim women wearing the headscarf). The 2009–2010 discussion on the ban of the burqa in public spaces is a sort of extension of this anti-Muslim rhetoric that is becoming normal in public discourse. It connects easily with other discussions in Europe (not only the EU), for instance in Switzerland over minarets. Here are symbolic creations of ethnic and cultural boundaries in Europe, in which illegitimacy is associated with certain behaviour.

There is a strong contrast between the passion of the discussion on this topic and its virtual absence in both the answers to the open questions of the questionnaire and in the focus groups. This may be explained by the interview schedule and questionnaire: the Open Society Foundations’ study took place at a moment of silence on this issue after the first application of the March 2004 law and before the beginning of the discussions on the French national identity and the burqa. What seems to matter most to Muslims and non-Muslims living in the 18th is the quality of public schools compared with private schools and the actual diversity children may experience in their education.


5.6 The Local Situation

In the 18th arrondissement there are 36 primary schools (30 state schools and 6 private schools), 13 lower-secondary schools (10 state schools and 3 private schools) and 6 upper-secondary schools. Seven of the secondary schools belong to a priority education area and therefore receive more public funds because of their location in a deprived area.\footnote{The upper-secondary schools in this programme are: Collège Daniel Mayer, Collège Marie Curie, Collège Marx Dormoy, Collège Gérard Philipe, Collège Maurice Utrillo and Collège Georges Clémenceau.}

An overview of some academic performance indicators for public schools may provide a better context for understanding local schools’ achievement.\footnote{General Inspection of National Education and Research (Inspection générale de l’administration de l’éducation nationale et de la recherche), L’évaluation de l’enseignement dans l’académie de Paris (The evaluation of the school system in Paris), Ministry of Education, Paris, September 2004, p. 87 (hereafter General Inspection of National Education and Research, L’évaluation).} The percentage of pupils receiving their baccalauréat in state schools in the 18th arrondissement (65 per cent), alongside those of schools in the 13th and 14th, is significantly below the regional average (83.5 per cent). One factor that affects the results of state schools in the 18th arrondissement is the large number of parents who send their children to private schools.\footnote{General Inspection of National Education and Research, L’évaluation, p. 85.} Interviews with educational stakeholders confirmed that the transfer of students from state to private schools is a significant issue in the 18th arrondissement. They reported that families increasingly choose private schools to avoid sending their children to state schools in priority areas where a high proportion of foreign children are enrolled. The situation is more complex than that and during the focus groups and in the comments written in the questionnaires, several parents indicated that they sent their children to private schools in order to offer them better opportunities but also to create opportunities for interaction with other groups. Participants in the focus group on school saw it as the prime local priority for policymakers: “Everyone is escaping the public school and the waiting list is growing at the private ones.”

In 2004, the General Inspection of the National Education Administration (Inspection générale de l’administration de l’éducation nationale) published an evaluation of the educational system in the Paris area. The report featured a typology of Parisian secondary schools by cross-referencing data such as the social and occupational groups of the pupils’ parents, the proportion of foreign pupils and school failure. There were five categories of schools, from the most privileged to the least. The most socially privileged schools are to be found mainly in the 5th, 6th, 16th and 17th arrondissements of Paris, while the least are located mostly in the northern and eastern arrondissements of the city (11th and 13th, and especially 18th, 19th and 20th).

During the Foundations roundtable and the focus groups, many comments were made about the failure to recognise the advantage of being raised in a bilingual milieu...
(French and the mother tongue of the migrant parents). Trying to connect this to the larger map of ethnic variables at school, it seems to rely on the assumption that some languages may be more valued than others because of their market value and because of their cultural assessment. Mother tongues, whatever they are, are valued and used in much associative work (e.g. the *papothèques* mentioned earlier). Nevertheless, when it comes to schooling and the courses offered to children in another language, discourses and practices value languages differently, depending upon the area. Again, lower-secondary schools are central in this picture as they are the places where foreign languages are more intensively taught.

In 2006, four RAR were created in the Paris Academy. Three were in the 18th *arrondissement*: RAR Clémenceau, RAR Utrillo and RAR Gérard Philippe (RAR Rouault was in the 19th). In the 18th *arrondissement*, the term of the contract is 2006–2010 and focuses on several objectives: to strengthen the learning of French, to improve the pupils’ understanding of the school codes, to promote mathematics and science learning, to strengthen the study of foreign languages, and to improve access to the culture and to the values of citizenship. Thus, the spectrum of educational policies stretches from fighting inequalities to promoting success. The regional administration which is responsible for the creation and implementation of this policy is in the process of evaluating it in various Parisian networks and little information is currently available.

A new lower-secondary school was inaugurated in December 2010 by Bertrand Delanoë (mayor of Paris) and Daniel Vaillant (mayor of the 18th). With a capacity of 600 pupils from the children of the 18th, 19th and 10th *arrondissements*, settled in a 1920 customs building that has been entirely renovated, it was named after Aimé Césaire. This symbolic association of a leading figure of Martinique literature and politics was praised during the roundtable as an important gesture giving concrete indication of a diverse France.

There are numerous Qur’anic and Arabic schools in the 18th *arrondissement*. The Madrassah Arabic organises the most courses on Arabic and religion in the *arrondissement*. It was created at the end of 1986 by Yves Leseur, a French convert to Islam. The first building opened by the organisation was situated on rue Affre in 1987. Since then, the organisation has expanded to five buildings in the neighbourhood. The Madrassah Arabic offers Arabic and Qur’an courses. According to the president of the organisation, 15 nationalities are members and 1,000 students (children and adults) follow the courses in the Madrassah. The courses are given during the weekend and on Wednesdays, in French, but the books used for the courses are in Arabic. The programmes emphasise the understanding of texts, and reading and writing more than learning the spoken language. It is mostly sponsored by members’ donations. The

---

231 For the complete list of public schools that belong to RAR, see http://carep2.scola.ac-paris.fr/spip.php?article4885 (accessed June 2011).
organisation owns three of the buildings and the two others are the property of local Muslim shopkeepers who allow the organisation to use them without paying any rent. In an interview Yves Leseur noted that no funds come from abroad. Furthermore, his organisation does not receive public funds, as it is a religious organisation and French law forbids the state to fund any religion. The president of the organisation declared himself unable to precisely assess the number of Muslim schools in the 18th. According to him, most of the other organisations neither offer an efficient programme for the study of Arabic and the Qur’an nor good follow-up of the students.

5.7 Findings from the Open Society Foundations’ Research

Three main issues were identified in both the Muslim and non-Muslim respondents’ answers to questionnaires: the public and private school problem and the carte scolaire; mixing at school; and religion as an official non-issue but subjectively significant. Muslims revealed a combination of types of discrimination arising from a general lack of recognition of values and differences and socio-institutional discrimination at school, mirroring the common expectations about education, that social groups have different patterns of success at school, depending on the social and cultural capital of the parents and the geographical allocation of school places. Thus spatial segregation intersects with social inequalities in an analysis of how some children are successful in school and others not. But the striking result was the systematic connection respondents made with the local educational situation, rather than the fact that schools fail to address inequalities and discrimination. The educational experiences that were discussed were locally situated, locally tested and locally explained, but they did not cause specific complaints about discrimination at school, even over religious accommodation. For instance, housing and living conditions had an impact on the educational achievement of children, according to a focus group participant:

Following the urban renovation plans and its impact on the population settled in social housing, primary schoolteachers working in the rue de la Goutte d’Or saw kids coming to school who were able to sleep at night because the norm for social housing is two kids per room. This means these teachers saw the change between the kids who were used to living in overcrowded housing, unable to sleep and study, and those who did not have much space but enough to be able to sleep and study at home: the populations are the same but conditions change everything.

Respondents were overall fairly satisfied with (62 per cent) or neutral towards (37 per cent) primary schools (see Table 28).

### Table 28. Level of satisfaction with primary schools in the neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dissatisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

The research indicates that people born abroad (both Muslims and non-Muslims) had a somewhat more positive opinion than people born in France (both Muslims and non-Muslims). There were more individuals born abroad than in France, which may be related to the recent migration to the country.

The high proportion of non-Muslims who indicated that they did not know is a population that has recently arrived in the neighbourhood (less than three years ago) and is mostly composed of people 20–39 years old, probably not yet parents with experience of these institutions.

### 5.8 Private and Public Schools and the *Carte Scolaire*

The first issue that came up in the answers to the open questions and in the focus group discussions concerned two intertwined problems: the choice between private and public school and the *carte scolaire* (school map) and its impact on equal access to education in equal conditions. The *carte scolaire* is the national educational map of schools that assigns children to the public school closest to the parents’ residence. It was a polarising issue during the 2006–2007 presidential campaign, and Nicolas Sarkozy and the minister for education placed it high on the agenda following Sarkozy’s election. Since 2007 the assignment system has been changed so that more

parents are able to choose where to send their children to school, and the rules have been made clearer and more transparent.

These two problems provide significant insights on the state of the school market. The existence of a private educational sector is perceived as a resource for mostly affluent and educated parents wanting to avoid the problems encountered in state schools (as was made clear in the roundtable discussion). But private schools are also an option for more deprived parents concerned with the education of their children as a key to social integration. This market results from the democratisation of family strategies in choosing the schools for their children: “they do not accept ... sending their kids to the school next door any more. From that point of view, they behave as school actors exactly as middle and upper classes do.”234 Lower social classes may also have high expectations for the education of their children.235 While public-sector schooling depends on geographical factors, the private sector does not follow this logic. Furthermore, the EUMC study shows that permission for school transfers are granted more frequently when requested by French parents than by their immigrant counterparts.236

The carte scolaire has long been considered the direct cause of the homogeneity of schools,237 touching Muslims and non-Muslims, ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. It affects people who do not choose because they do not know how to avoid doing so, and those who do. Parents who wish to bypass the school map (dérogation) must request the mayor’s permission to send their children to a school outside the sector they live in.

Bypassing the school sectors is a mayoral competence. … Out of 1,400 children in the elementary level schools, we have around 400 requests of derogation, which is weak. … Parents present their request to the mayor who has to ask for the opinion of the head of the sector school, then of the area inspector. Parents’ association representatives also attend the discussion. … Derogations are granted for health problems, when family situations are complicated. Out of 400 requests, we grant 200. But we know which schools are being avoided, like those in La Goutte d’Or because of the number of non-French speaking kids and in relation to the social and economic situation of the requesting parents.”238

235 Oberti, “Différenciation sociale et scolaire du territoire”.
236 EUMC, Migrants, minorities and education.
238 Interview with a local school affairs officer, March 2008.
5.9 Social Mixing

Comments from research participants suggest that social mixing is only found in private schools in the 18th, and specifically in La Goutte d’Or. Private schools are not necessarily perceived as having better facilities. But many parents consider the private system is the only locale where children will have the opportunity to interact in a diversified context. People seem to associate private schools with the real experience of a mixed population: “In the private schools, you find mixing that is no longer possible in the public system where people play with the carte scolaire” (Foundations focus group).

Parents participating in the focus group referred mostly to the ethnic and religious diversity of one local private school rather than its socio-economic diversity, which had an impact on parental involvement in the school. An NGO representative expressed some concerns during the roundtable, alluding to the “parents’ strategies” for the educational achievement of their children. Diversity sounds like an “excuse, an alibi to put your kid in the private system. But they have in mind socio-economic mixing, not ethnic”. Van Zanten showed that segregation in the educational system was a complex dynamic where different actors played a role (students, administrative staff, national education agents, teachers, parents), and emphasised two dimensions that research for this report confirmed: the first was the role of the parents and the impact of their strategy of choice of the best local school for their child (according to the carte scolaire); and second, the inability of the local actors to intervene in these processes of segregation, so that the notion of the école de périphérie (school of the periphery) does not only refer to the suburban situation but also to the situation in schools that share similar characteristics in the centre of the capital. As a focus group participant put it, “In the 18th, if someone had the political courage, one could have the children better distributed (circulating) between the different schools.” The positive aspects of diversity in school seem to contradict the national perception of ethnic diversity as a source of problems affecting the quality of teaching and of education.

---

239 “Paradoxalement, c’est l’école privée, l’école Saint Bernard, qui reflète le mieux la diversité de la population.” (Paradoxically, it is the private school that best reflects the diversity of the population) (Goldring, La Goutte d’or, quartier de France, p. 67).


This is what I would complain about in public schools: they stopped organising the classes following a voluntary policy. A child that is in extreme difficulty at school, you should put him/her in the best of schools. This is where he/she would be best because of the stimulation and emulation. You will then see the final outcome: he/she can follow the best students because he/she is in a situation to consider that he/she is able to do so.

Social mixing at school is rudely challenged at both extremes of the school ranking; there are few children from low socio-economic groups in the most wanted schools; children from middle and higher socio-economic groups have disappeared from the avoided schools.243

According to focus group participants, the social inequalities among parents produce inequalities of access to education: “Those who know the ranking of schools and who are able to make the case for their child will do it. And then, there will be family strategies.” And if the carte scolaire disappears, the risk is that those parents who know the educational system thoroughly and have ambitions for their children will leave the public sector and “there will only be people who cannot afford the private sector and this will become a real problem”.

Recent studies show that hope244 and dignity rather than strategy are the main qualities necessary for parents considering their children’s school careers, in a family discourse where school is not only defined as the key to social upward mobility but as a place of joy and pleasure.245 In their study on school achievement and affirmative action policy in the city of Lyon, Buisson-Fenet and Landrier state as follows:

Contrary to the middle-class parents who look for strategies to boost the school trajectory of their children, those parents respect the sector dynamic and do not tactically choose what would be the best of choice for their kids, in a highly complex school offer.246

Local socialisation matters very much to the children and their parents, as a focus group participant said:

I have personally made a statement that I am committed to having my son stay at school where he is. I used to be a parent representative and we have been

243 Van Zanten and Obin, La carte scolaire.
244 Felouzis, “Ethnic Segregation and its Effects” and “De l’école à la ville”. Some authors suggest that hope in the French context is synonymous with “last chance”. See Dubet et al., Les sociétés et leurs écoles.
trying to support teachers. But even when you have good teachers, and all the material support, when 80 per cent of the kids who do not make it have learning difficulties, social problems, I don’t see what can be done.

Bilingual socialisation seems to be a double-edged problem. One the one hand, it is considered to be an asset when looked at theoretically: early bilingual education is positive. But for a non-European mother-tongue, the asset is seen as a problem: bilingual is bad when it comes from migrants. Language and the inequality stemming from insufficient mastery of French by children with migrant backgrounds came out as a problem across the entire educational system.

Greater focus on pre-school education was highlighted as something that would help the early acquisition of French skills and a better integration into the school system later. Participants felt that there were not enough pre-school places and the situation appears to have become worse: some years ago, there were not enough places in pre-school for four-year-olds; now they are insufficient for three-year-olds, according to a roundtable participant.

Parents have been involved in the 18th in getting more places in public schools, and they have also opposed the creation of an upper-secondary school (lycée) in the neighbourhood, in order to give the children of the 18th the possibility of going to another neighbourhood instead of staying in the same zone for their whole school career.

Recurring themes can be identified from respondents’ answers expressing dissatisfaction. The pupils are not really motivated to be at school and this affects the general conditions of learning for everyone. As one focus group participant observed,

> The level of education isn’t high enough. There isn’t any discipline in the classes. Most of the students make too much noise, and they aren’t interested in lessons. Even the ones who are really interested in subject matters can’t learn anything because of others.

The focus group participants emphasised how schools suffer from a lack of discipline and absence of committed teachers who are slowly losing their authority. For most, things are getting worse as the local schools become notorious and parents do not want their children to be associated with them, or exposed to “bad friendships” that would bring the bad aspects of the neighbourhood into the family. Local schools are like a ghetto, an analogy made by some people in the focus group on education who pointed out that local public schools were isolated from the local neighbourhood.

The parents who participated in the education focus group expressed worries over the lack of social and ethnic mixing in state schools. They expressed the opinion that state schools in the arrondissement had become ethnic and social ghettos because the pupils come mainly from the migrant population and have social and school difficulties. Two result sets from the questionnaire seem, however, to indicate that people primarily associate occasions of meeting and talking to people from different ethnic and religious
backgrounds with school and the workplace. However, as the answers to the open questions and comments during the focus groups illustrate, the expectations of school equating with diversity and mixing are very often unsatisfied.

Answering the question and relating to daily experience in schools produced different definitions of a mixed environment.

My name is X, I have been living in the 18th for 14 years. My daughter is 13. She was going to the public school where she experienced exclusion by the other children: first, when she was younger, she was rejected by the others because she was good at school, then because she was white, then because she was not a Muslim... all the problems children with migrant background experience usually [experience] from the other side. It went away and comes back from time to time. Last year it was bullying but my main experience is that all over these stories, it is mostly due to the fact that individually, people do not talk to each other.

It can be discussed in parallel to the way educational professionals themselves have divergent views on the way they should relate to diversity inside public schools. It seems to be a shared preoccupation of the public officers at the local city hall.

We have to work actively on mixing, even if there are doubts that we will reach it some day. We have classes in La Goutte d’Or where 80 per cent have migrant parents. So at the end it is 95 per cent blacks and Arabs. But there will be a need for a lot of neighbourhood development to reach real diversity.247

5.10 Religion at School: A Local Non-issue

Since the 1990s, a number of public reports have highlighted what the Ministry of Education has deemed to be the key areas of concern in the education of Muslims.248 They include unjustified absences, requests for exemptions from certain lessons (sport and biology), challenges to the content of certain curricula (mostly biology and history) and the wearing of religious symbols.

247 Interview with a council member in charge of school affairs in the 18th arrondissement, 24 January 2008.
Muslims interviewed for this report were largely concerned about the absence of recognition of the meaning they give to religion (as practice, culture and religion) but made no specific claims about religious practices being particularly restricted inside schools. As mentioned earlier, this may reflect the fact that the fieldwork took place during a period of time when there were few Islam-related controversies and little public discussion. Research participants were quite happy with the respect given to their requirements in the local schools: 43.5 per cent of all respondents said that schools respected the religious traditions of different communities "about right". However, Muslims were more negative: 40 per cent of Muslim respondents considered the respect given by schools to different religions to be too, while 57 per cent of the non-Muslims considered it to be "about right". To a certain extent, the "do not know" category was the most stable one among Muslims and non-Muslims. This category is mostly composed of people who have been living in the arrondissement for a maximum of three years and may not have yet had direct experience with these institutions.

A small minority of the sample felt that schools paid too much attention to religious traditions (2 per cent for Muslims and 3.2 per cent for non-Muslims).

Table 31 shows how Muslims and non-Muslims perceive the accommodation of the religious needs of people belonging to different religions.

### Table 31. To what extent do you think that schools respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

One possible surprise for people examining the French educational system may be the teaching of religion for one hour per week. For respondents this seems to contradict their expectation of a secular system of education and the place that is left to religion in the curriculum. Some respondents welcome this, as religion is of cultural importance: “There is one hour of religious culture per week: we accept that. After all, one thinks it can be good to know who is Jesus and who is Allah”. But for others this undermines the French secular system: “It is called ‘secular school’ (école laïque) on paper but on
the document we receive, it is clearly written: ‘faith education’ one hour per week.”

The discussion about teaching knowledge of religion in public schools is as old as the existence of public schools in France. Since 2002 and the publication of the Debray report, teaching religious facts (le fait religieux) has been brought back as a central element in the competences and skills that a child is supposed to learn at school.\textsuperscript{249} Basic knowledge of different religious traditions and civilisations (including studying holy texts such as the Bible and the Qur’an) has been included in the history programme.

5.10.1 Religious Practice at School

Religion at school and experiences of discrimination revolve mostly round the practice of religion at school as it is carried out at home, food and clothing being the main items of discussion. The issue of dietary requirements, and in particular the issue of pork, has become a recurring episode in most schools locally. Some observers (local NGO activists, parents) regret the impact the question of pork consumption has on Muslim children, who may feel ostracised when they have to answer this question publicly. “It does not stand at the core of the religious principles, but it is becoming a central issue which you have to answer when your children are signed up for the meal services at school.”

Locally, public institutions (centres de loisirs and schools) have sought to avoid further problems by always including an alternative meal with no pork.

The issue of the provision of halal food in La Goutte d’Or schools arose in 2006 and the local mayor invoked the principle of secularism. According to the City Hall official in charge of schools, this had not been raised by parents but by the schoolchildren: “No family ever properly asked anything about that. Some Muslim kids started to refuse eating meat at school. They started convincing their friends to do the same.”\textsuperscript{250} Daniel Vaillant, the mayor of the 18\textsuperscript{th}, sent a letter in February 2007 to all the local school directors stating that there would be sufficient alternative meals to provide children who chose not to eat meat with the caloric needs (proteins) for the day. Adhering to secular principle required an alternative to pork, but would not provide a specific halal menu.\textsuperscript{251} This seemed to be sufficient for the time being, according to a focus group participant: “Halal is too much. We have enough problems.”


\textsuperscript{250} Interview with school affairs officer, March 2008.

\textsuperscript{251} Interview with school affairs officer, March 2008.
Thus, the most discussed concrete religious issue is not the headscarf but food restrictions and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of raising claims related to these inside public schools.\textsuperscript{252}

5.11 Conclusion

As one of the focus group participants said, education is not a field where things seem to be improving but rather where they are unchanged. Experiences of discrimination merge into a school career based on performance, categorisation as a bad or good pupil and orientation opportunities that individuals can hardly escape. The negative comments about schools made in the answers to the questionnaires referred to the educational structure rather than to the specifics of a population with migrant backgrounds: poverty, lack of motivation of teachers and administration, insufficient consideration for the personalities of children, lack of monitoring and poor geographical distribution of schools. Of course, schools are also sites where inequalities due to socio-economic disadvantaged positions are reproduced. A link is made between the bad results of children at school and the parents’ unemployment, for example, as a permanent factor influencing the way children relate to school and education generally and how much parents are committed to supporting children in their homework. Many other inequalities intervene to favour further educational malaise and contribute to enlarging the gap between those who achieve at school and those who do not:

According to participants, what happens after school is as significant because it affects the local environment. Some interviewees who held negative views about school also mentioned the impact this has in fostering mistrust of education in young people. Parents and local NGOs have been active in addressing this through the CUCS.\textsuperscript{253}

Most of the time, in African families, we have many brothers, sisters. Sometimes, you just want to catch up with your mother and you get home and she is cooking, clearing or already taking care of someone. Then, you don’t want to be home.

In the 18\textsuperscript{th}, education has been one of the sectors where local associations are most active. The role and place of the parents have always been considered essential. It seems clear to all actors (public officers, NGO activists, parents) that work in the educational sector goes far beyond the schools and involves diverse activities which include the parents.\textsuperscript{254}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{252} Another anecdotal problem is the use of medical certificates for exemption from gym classes, as some parents raised during the focus group.
\textsuperscript{253} For a first evaluation and quantitative data on this, see APUR, \textit{Les chiffres du logement social}, in particular pp. 46–47.
\textsuperscript{254} The first charter on school help (\textit{Charte sur l’accompagnement scolaire}) was signed in the 1980s in the 18\textsuperscript{th}.
\end{flushright}
The discussion on religious and ethnic diversity is confused. On the one hand, schools work as social units that reproduce and reflect what is happening outside them. On the other hand, they convey specific messages and rules that relate to their public mission of educating citizens. Programmes acknowledge diversity as a value and the questionnaires show good levels of satisfaction about the respect for religious diversity. But the *halal* discussion opens up new problems. First, it seems to be coming from the children rather than the parents. Second, while the headscarf problem seems to have been laid to rest, as expressed during the Foundations’ roundtable, other demands for rights at school are being expressed and there are no clear guidelines to help the government and teachers to answer. Secularism is a guiding principle but concrete recommendations tend to be made on the spot.

The connection of urban and education policies is striking and the notion of mixing lies at its core. Urban and school segregation go hand in hand. In parallel, education is probably one of the public sectors in which the impact of individual decisions (thinking about schools’ performance and deciding to send the children to this or that school to avoid the bad influence of neighbourhood children for instance) have the strongest effect on the constitution of segregated neighbourhoods and schools. 

"Between the dramas of migrant children dropping out of school and the over-emphasis on their success, there should be space for more nuances."

Parents who are in a good socio-economic position trust the value of the university degree, but their trust is placed primarily in the private sector. Parents sending their children to private schools may seem to care more about their children’s education. The destinies of young people are linked to their success at school.

---

255 Oberti, “Différenciation sociale et scolaire du territoire”.
257 Buisson-Fenet and Landrier, “Être ou pas?”, p. 69.
258 Dubet et al., *Les sociétés et leurs écoles*, p. 27.
6. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: EMPLOYMENT

6.1 Employment and Disadvantage

Participation in the labour market remains at the heart of economic and social integration. Economic integration requires not only the opportunity to find a job but also employment in the mainstream labour market and in jobs that are commensurate to an individual’s skills and qualifications. Discrimination against Muslims appears to be cumulative, starting during education and continuing during the search for employment, being recruited and being paid less than the majority population. It is also sectoral, reflecting the interaction of different variables such as gender, age, ethnicity and religion.

Following 9/11, various public reports on the impact of the attacks on the treatment of Muslim populations made clear that employment was one of the arenas where stigmatisation and discrimination (mostly in the form of harassment) of Muslims were latent. There have been a series of public incidents, for example concerning the access of veiled women to employment since 2004 and airport security in 2006. Since the 1990s labour market discrimination has been an important arena for research, policy and activism, in some cases with the collaboration of private firms, as

---


260 On both issues, see the CCIF’s list of all conflicting cases.
in the Averroès project. It is thus highly documented, at least in terms of racial and ethnic discrimination, not to mention gender. As in other social sectors, the religious dimension that would here require isolating Muslims as a category or a specific target is not possible because of national fundamental principles, combined with the secularist paradigm that has become a national ideology over the last five years.

The employment situation of people with foreign origins is well documented:


Not only do they suffer more often from unemployment than the rest of the French population, but they also encounter more difficulties finding a long-term and full-time job. They are under-represented in executive positions, but are twice as likely to work in a factory, compared with the general population.265

Studies have looked at the impact of ethnicity and origin factors and show the part played in discrimination by the name and place of residence, and this particularly affects access to jobs. The basis of these studies is usually the comparison of a specific ethnic group with the general population, although it is not possible to understand the role played by religion and it is hard to disentangle religion from origin and the ethnic and racial dimension. As elsewhere in this report, the absence of data on ethnicity or religion makes it difficult to locate the position of Muslims on the labour market.

A 2010 study conducted in the Lyon region, incorporating qualitative and quantitative data (on curriculum testing), produced some preliminary conclusions on the relevance of treating religion as a distinct criterion.266 It involved sending two comparable CVs to employers to assess the applicants’ chances of securing an interview. The study used people with Senegalese background, looking at the rates of answers to job applications by various comparable applicants, and the difference of income between Christian and Muslim migrant populations of Senegalese origin. The conclusions were striking: the CV testing revealed that Muslims had 2.5 times lower probability of being offered an interview than Christians, and the income of the Muslims in the sample was €400 (£345) less than Christians. This may in part be explained by discrimination against Muslims in the access to jobs.

In 2007, 8.6 per cent of the economically active population in France were immigrants. The rate of unemployment for immigrants was double that of non-immigrants (15.2 per cent compared with 7.3 per cent). Within this immigrant population, there were significant variations between different immigrant groups (in particular, European and non-European immigrants),267 and also across age and gender. Unemployment among the 25 per cent of economically active immigrants who had completed higher education was three times higher than among non-immigrants with a similar education; the difference in employment rates between immigrants and non-immigrants with no education was much narrower.268 Three immigrants out of

266 This is the case at least in the research design of new studies: see Adida et al., Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays?
267 More than 35 per cent of the migrants originating from Africa and aged 30–39 are unemployed, and 11 per cent of those coming from the EU are unemployed, with nationality, racial attributes and education playing a role. Observatoire des inégalités, Le taux de chômage selon la nationalité (The unemployment rate according to nationality), November 2008, available at www.inegalites.fr (accessed July 2011) (hereafter Observatoire des inégalités, Le taux de chômage).
268 Observatoire des inégalités, Le taux de chômage.
ten had an unskilled job. Most of them were workers or employees in companies providing security, cleaning and other domestic services.\textsuperscript{269}

In 2009, the unemployment rate of foreigners from non-EU countries was three times higher than that for French people (24 per cent compared with 8 per cent).\textsuperscript{270} The situation of naturalised French citizens was in between.\textsuperscript{271} Higher education seems to have a positive impact on the unemployment rate, but the gap between French and foreigners remains, with children of migrants from non-EU countries with no education being in the worst situation, facing an unemployment rate of 43 per cent. Work inequalities continue to be affected by the origin of the individuals. Three years after they complete their education, 77 per cent of young people find a job, but closer examination reveals that 79 per cent of them find a job when both parents were born in France, and only 66 per cent when both parents were born abroad. Again, national and ethnic origins play a role, with strong differences from one nationality to another. When both parents were born in North Africa, 61 per cent of those aged 15–29 have found a job, but the figure was 59 per cent for those of the same age when both parents were born in sub-Saharan Africa. These differences continue to apply to employment stability (long-term contract, part-time job).\textsuperscript{272}

Using longitudinal data, a study has shown that acquiring French nationality has a positive impact on migrants’ access to employment.\textsuperscript{273} What has been termed the naturalisation premium seems to be especially relevant for migrants who experience greater difficulties accessing the labour market (sub-Saharan African and Moroccan men, North African and Turkish women). Indeed, the employment rate and income of French citizens with one migrant parent from North Africa are less than those of French citizens with two French-born parents.\textsuperscript{274} The results suggest that holding French nationality does not have a significant impact on improvement in the professional situation, but that


\textsuperscript{270} Department of Statistics, Studies and Documentation, Ministry of the Interior (Département des statistiques, des études et de la documentation Ministère de l’intérieur), Tableau de bord de l’intégration (Integration indicators spreadsheet), December 2010.

\textsuperscript{271} As explained earlier, the category of French by “acquisition” includes French people who acquire French citizenship by marriage, naturalisation or in accordance with the \textit{jus soli} law.


social perceptions, representations of the “other” and so on still very much affect the way naturalised persons access employment. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4. Difference in employment rates of third-country nationals and French nationals (less than 50 years old)


Locally this disadvantage seems to persist across social and occupational groups, in particular including education and qualifications. Moroccans, Turks and people from sub-Saharan Africa are the main groups among artisans and shopkeepers who experience unemployment. In the early 2000s, in the office workers category, unemployment was particularly prominent for North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans. In the manual workers category, Turks and Algerians came first among foreigners seeking employment in this type of activity.275

The unemployment situation of the children of migrants is generally worse than that of migrants. This trend has been stable since the 1980s, indicating a tendency towards segmented assimilation, a significant and persistent socio-economic inferiority that accompanies an otherwise strong linguistic and cultural assimilation (see TeO’s section on employment and access to the job market, which focuses on the population between the ages of 18 and 50).276 The lowest employment rate for men in France is among children of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (53 per cent), Southeast Asia (60 per cent), Morocco and Tunisia (61 per cent), Turkey (67 per cent) and Algeria (69

275 All data come from APUR, La population étrangère à Paris, pp. 79–90.
276 Beauchemin et al., “Trajectoires et origines”.

138 OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 2012
The notion of segmented assimilation reflects the complexity of the articulation between contexts, structures, history and individual attitudes: on the one hand, the socio-economic situation may still be one in which migrants or their children continue to experience discrimination on the job market, while on the other hand this same population may either be culturally assimilated or not. This idea of a discrimination that is inherited matches the situation of Muslims in France quite well, as a parallel to the situation of black people in the United States.

Another problem that may affect the situation of young Muslims on the job market is the unequal marketability of their education certificates. As researchers have shown, holding the same degree does not mean it has the same value on the job market, because it depends on the origin of the holder. This affects young people with North African migration backgrounds more specifically, whose rate of employment is lower than that of the majority population. Moreover, this ethnic penalty persists and continues to affect younger generations, together with continued feelings of hostility towards others in the larger society.

Some aspects of one’s career may affect one’s position on the job market: whether or not a person studied in France, for instance, or whether or not a parent did. Silberman and Fournier note that general economic improvement does not diminish the impact of the ethnic penalty, in particular for North African boys and girls who are less qualified in terms of their education certificates than the majority of the population.

6.1.1 The Local Situation

A certain number of companies are concentrated in the north and in the north-east of the 18th, which also hosts a major Parisian hospital, the Bichat-Claude Bernard hospital, some offices of the Parisian public transport office (RATP, Régie autonome des transports parisiens), the national mail company (La Poste), and major mail, freight and distribution companies. There are also many small stores and busy shopping centres in the arrondissement among the approximately 4,700 retailers are some well known by all Parisians, including the Barbès arrondissement market with the Tati store, the Saint Pierre market at the bottom of La Butte Montmartre, the Château-Rouge neighbourhood and avenue Clichy. The Jules Joffrin arrondissement near the town hall also has an important commercial role and can be considered the centre of economic activities in the arrondissement.

---

In the Open Society Foundations’ sample, leaving aside the gender dimension, Muslims often declared themselves to have jobs with fewer responsibilities than non-Muslims. Moreover, Muslim women stayed at home or worked part-time more often, while female believers from other religious groups had a full-time job more frequently (49 per cent). No Muslim women declared themselves retired even when they would be the right age to do so (over 65) and did not work officially any more. (See Table 41.) There was no difference in employment for the category of those born outside France, although Muslims born in France in the sample more frequently worked for people of other origins and different religions. Only the Muslim 20–29 age group declared they worked more often in firms run by people of other origins and other religions. One possible reason for that could be a difference in education and higher qualifications, as suggested by other analyses.279 (See Table 32 for details.)

| Table 32. Description of professional occupational category |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Secondary category              | Muslim male %   | Muslim female % | Non-Muslim male % | Non-Muslim female % | Total % |
| Not working or did not answer   | 0.0             | 10.2            | 2.0              | 2.0              | 3.5         |
| Modern professional occupations | 5.9             | 16.3            | 34.0             | 38.0             | 23.5        |
| Clerical and intermediate occupations | 3.9           | 22.4            | 6.0              | 18.0             | 12.5        |
| Senior managers or administrators | 2.0             | 2.0             | 4.0              | 8.0              | 4.0         |
| Technical and craft occupations | 13.7            | 4.1             | 10.0             | 2.0              | 7.5         |
| Semi-routine manual and service occupations | 27.5          | 16.3            | 16.0             | 8.0              | 17.0        |
| Routine manual and service occupations | 27.5          | 24.5            | 14.0             | 10.0             | 19.0        |
| Middle or junior managers       | 15.7            | 4.1             | 8.0              | 6.0              | 8.5         |
| Traditional professional occupations | 3.9             | 0.0             | 6.0              | 8.0              | 4.5         |
| Total                           | 100.0           | 100.0           | 100.0            | 100.0            | 100.0       |
| Number                          | 51              | 49              | 50               | 50               | 200         |

Source: Open Society Foundations

6.2 Discrimination Experiences of Muslims in Employment

According to the annual report published in May 2006 by the HALDE, 1,410 complaints were registered in 2005, 38 per cent of which concerned discrimination on the basis of origin. In 2006, there were 4,058 registered complaints, of which 35 per cent were related to origin. Employment remains the most significant field of complaints (42 per cent). In 2009, 10,545 complaints were registered, a 21 per cent increase compared with 2008. Of these complaints, 48.5 per cent were related to employment, which is the main domain where discrimination is alleged. In its 2009 report, the HALDE confirmed the central role of origin in discrimination: 28.5 per cent of the 2009 complaints mentioned origin, while in only 3 per cent did religion play a part. Ethnic origin remained the principal criterion for discrimination, at least in the cases brought to the HALDE. Examples include explicit job offers mentioning the preferred origin of the applicant or selection processes that have deliberately excluded an applicant, but also indirect discrimination, for instance by requiring certain degrees or specific training that *de facto* excludes parts of the population. These numbers only relate to the HALDE work, which means they are not comprehensive or exhaustive. (See Table 33.)
Table 33. Breakdown of complaints by area, 2005–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered complaints by area</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private employment, recruitment</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private employment, career progression</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employment, recruitment</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employment, career progression</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service functions</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and private services</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public housing</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private housing</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, primary</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, university</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, various training</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4058</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Other refers to all claims not within the competence of HALDE
Source: HALDE, Rapport annuel 2009, p. 16.
Reports, studies and advocacy projects have highlighted the persistence of racial discrimination in the French labour market. In 2006, the ILO carried out discrimination tests in different countries. In France, it tested 2,440 situations in six French cities. The tests, using applications from candidates with the same qualifications but names suggesting different ethnic origins, were carried out across a range of labour market sectors. The results showed that applicants with a French name were preferred to applicants with a name suggesting North or black African origin in four cases out of five.

The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in job refusals is not striking (see Table 35) and the percentage of yes answers is important in both categories. There is no significant difference in the motives for discrimination; ethnic or religious grounds do not appear more frequently.

Table 35. Have you been refused a job on any of the following grounds?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your gender</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your age</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your ethnicity</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your religion</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your colour</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations


Just as in education, employment is an opportunity to meet, if not interact with, people from other origins and backgrounds (see Table 36). So it is mostly perceived as a place where diversity is lived and experienced, in particular for the 20–39-year-old category. However, when respondents were asked what mattered the most to them, the answer was that employment only mattered for 1 per cent of Muslims and 8 per cent of non-Muslims (family represented 73 per cent for Muslims and 54 per cent for non-Muslims). Working is an economic necessity, but not a matter of identity. Indeed, in the open comments, respondents made the priorities clear:

It would not come into my mind to pray at my place of work. I pray in the evening when I am back home.

In my opinion, work must be separated from religion. We must pray five times a day, so you do one in the morning, one after the lunch break and then three after work is over. Then it’s ok. We should not complicate things: it is possible to live like that.

We should pray five times a day and it is not always possible. It is better to keep work.

I don’t show off my religion when I am at work.

Basically, it is not the employer’s business: what matters to the employer is that work is well done. The rest is not his business.

Table 36. In the past year, how often has interviewee met and spoken to a person of a different ethnic group at school, work or college?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Did not answer %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20 %</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29 %</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39 %</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49 %</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59 %</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ %</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
The discussions that took place in the Open Society Foundations focus groups indicated that racial and religious discrimination in the workplace were perceived by the participants as real. Several participants spoke about their personal experiences and mentioned how their foreign origin and/or their religious membership had caused professional difficulties. A woman of Algerian origin working as a caregiver to the elderly explained that she preferred to be silent about being Muslim because she was afraid of being dismissed. Some of the participants also acknowledged that discretion about foreign and religious identities was necessary to avoid discrimination or racism. Being discreet relates to the practice of one’s religion (no break, no praying at work). Praying seems to be potentially a particularly transgressive practice. Others decide to hide but still continue to pray, and in many comments prayer seems to be the most challenging practice at work: “I think employers allow their employees to follow their religious duties, except for prayer.”

The open comments were quite heterogeneous; some were extremely negative and relate direct experience of racism at work (“You are not in Algeria here!”). Others expressed smoother experiences and said there was “no problem” at work about religious needs: “In my case it went well. We are given holidays for the religious celebrations.”

Secularism is an ambiguous cornerstone at the workplace: it may be the reason why everything is going well (employers do not care about the religion of their employees, and this is reciprocal, as in “When I go to work, I don’t go in for religion. And if I am fasting, it’s my choice, not my employer’s”)., or it may provoke precisely the opposite reaction, that is, that because of secularism, people claim they are denied fundamental rights that they feel entitled to (see Table 37). Being self-employed or working for a member of the Muslim communities is always identified with facilitating daily religious life, beyond ethnic categorisation and identification:

They let those who pray take a break if they wish to. It may not be the case everywhere. My boss is Moroccan, he understands.

I don’t have any problem with my boss. He is a Muslim too.

In general, in the confection and construction businesses, Turkish people work for the Turkish. So, I don’t know if the French respect or not.

During the roundtable, one of the participants said that wearing a headscarf was in some cases described as a way to stop looking for a job you will never get with dignity, by putting the blame on the way the structure works and not feeling directly guilty about it.

---

282 This has been highlighted in many contexts in the EU. See, for instance, Nadia Fadil, “Performing the salâat at work, a legitimate claim? Secular and pious Muslims negotiating the contours of ‘secular public’ in Belgium”, in Giulia Calvi and Nadia Fadil (eds), Politics of diversity. Sexual and religious self-fashioning in contemporary and historical contexts, European University Institute Working Paper, HEC 2011/01, EUI, Florence (Italy), 2011, pp. 53–69.
Table 37. Background of employers and colleagues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same religious and ethnic background as you</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same religious but not same ethnic background</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same ethnic but different religious background</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different ethnic and religious background</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

Workplaces that have a space for performing religious obligations are said to be rare. Several participants in the focus groups also recognised that it was often difficult for them to be given days off to celebrate religious holidays. In one of the focus groups comprising women, participants denounced the fact that firms still did not recognise their right to get days off for Eid: the only acknowledged holidays remained the Christian ones. One of the participants expressed the fact that, facing this difficulty, she tried to get some help and support from the union and her colleagues but she did not get any. Indeed, she stressed that her Muslim colleagues accepted not practising their religion in the workplace and had given up claiming any accommodation from the company. Other comments often dealt with the following:

When you ask for a day off, you can get it if it’s for Christmas. But if it’s a Muslim holiday of sacrifice, you can’t get it.

During Ramadan, applications for adjustments to working schedules are not offered. In some cases, people say they have to take religious holidays from their annual leave allowance (which is obviously not the case for Christmas, Easter or Assumption).
There are, however, ways out: you can take a 15-minute break or work non-stop over lunchtime. Only a few Muslims said they made a request directly to their bosses and managers; most of them were afraid of the direct consequences of such demands and of being further stigmatised. Some of the respondents associated the denial of the right to practise religious duties at work with individual attitudes, assuming that racism was mostly individual:

From my work experience, it is clear that it depends upon particular individuals. For instance, I work as a cleaner in a bank and my boss does not want me to wear the headscarf. He has worked here since last year. Before that, my headscarf was not a problem. And the hierarchy has no problem with it. But my line manager disagrees.

The contrast between the feeling of experiencing discrimination as expressed in the focus groups on the one hand, and the analysis of the quantitative data from the questionnaires on the other hand, is striking. Individually and in the focus groups Muslims provided a lot of precise and documented narratives dealing with their experiences or those of relatives and friends, but the 200 respondents to the questionnaires expressed satisfaction with the way employers recognised and respected religious practices:

Table 38. Level of employer respect for religious difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

283 In a web discussion recently set up by Le Monde following the publication of a biographical narrative of one of its journalists from a migrant background (M. Kessous), many people made comments. While many non-Muslims do not take a proper break for lunch and prefer to stay in their office eating a sandwich, Muslims who stay at work during lunch time while fasting are requested to justify their presence and even to ask for authorisation to do so.
Non-Muslims were more satisfied than Muslims in how employers showed respect for religious differences, in particular when they were born abroad (see Table 38). Many respondents chose not to express their opinion: 34.5 per cent chose “Don’t know”. The “Don’t know” category may have multiple interpretations. As mentioned during the focus groups and also in the open comments, employment is considered a neutral place where religious and other identity markers should not matter. For these respondents, the debate does not even exist and the employers do not want to take it into account.

However, the data from Table 39 suggest that there is a significant difference in the views and perceptions expressed by Muslims and non-Muslims, with twice as many Muslims thinking that employers do too little compared with what non-Muslims think about this topic.

Table 39. To what extent do you think that employers respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

A similar gap between individual experiences mentioned in the focus groups and quantitative analysis of the 200 questionnaires emerges when questions about respect for religious differences at work are broken down by gender (Table 40).
Table 40. To what extent do you think that employers respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions, by religion and gender?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim male %</th>
<th>Muslim female %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim male %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim female %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Table 40 shows some of the difference between men and women. When examining the open comments or at the focus group discussions, female respondents and participants were keen to recount their lived experiences of ordinary discrimination.

6.3 The Headscarf and Employment

The employment situation is difficult for Muslim women wearing the headscarf. Precise illustrations of cases were given during the focus groups. For instance, a young woman convert to Islam explained that she had been dismissed ten times from her position as a social worker because of her veil. Since her conversion in 2007, she could not find a suitable position and was currently suing her last employer. According to her, Islamophobia is very strong in France and the workplace is a space of religious discrimination because most of the veiled women do not manage to find work or to keep their jobs. A roundtable participant gave the opinion that the current French context pushes us to tell Muslim women that the headscarf may be a handicap to finding a job. With the exception of jobs in public services, it should not be discriminatory but de facto it is. I myself feel I am encouraging the perpetuation of this discrimination by saying so.

Several other testimonies revealed the same situation and showed that the reconciliation of religious practice and professional activity is extremely difficult for veiled women. Some observed that the only jobs they managed to get are jobs with Muslim employers. A mother told how her daughter managed to find work as a cashier in a local Muslim butcher’s shop.

There are places where the Muslim girls can work. It is in Pakistani stores which open … fast food. There, we accept that the girls keep their veil to work. But
these places are rare in Paris. My daughter worked in a *halal* butcher’s shop as a cashier. It is the only place for her.²⁸⁴

Another participant expressed her worries about the growing public and social intolerance towards the headscarf which, according to her, exists in France but not in other countries:

> I travelled a lot in New York, in London … the veiled women, they work. In banks, they have their veil, they are policewomen, they are in the administration. They are veiled.²⁸⁵

### 6.4 Employment Policies

#### 6.4.1 Programmes of Inclusion and Urban Policy

The city of Paris through its Department for Urban Policy and Integration (*Délégation à la politique de la ville et à l’intégration*) is actively engaged in the integration of its foreign population and French citizens of foreign origin, including access to employment. Employment policies remain a shared responsibility of the central government and local authorities (*collectivités territoriales*).

One of the aims of the department is to strengthen solidarity with Parisians of foreign origin who are facing social difficulties. It also fights against discrimination and racism, although this is achieved mainly through training and raising awareness among civil servants, rather than directly supporting the discriminated population. The documents of the department’s finances for the period 2007/2008 list all the actions led and/or funded by the city of Paris (either as the municipality or as the department). The details about integration policies for employment listed by the department remain rather vague. For instance, the PDI’s budget specifies that “the actions in favour of the integration process within the PDI remained stable in 2007 and cost € 216,000” (£ 188,134.00).

The department acknowledges that the PDI’s actions are not strictly limited to people of foreign origin, but does not explain its assessment of the municipality’s financial participation. It is true that, along with other employment programmes and the actions of numerous NGOs funded by the city of Paris, the PDI is not used specifically for foreigners, because these are not considered a specific target for public policies but rather as a part of the whole population benefiting from social initiatives. So, these estimates concerning employment policies for people of foreign origin are not reliable, as they include funding for programmes available to all and not specifically targeting people of foreign origin, although they may be programmes that actually benefit them disproportionately. Thus, the integration and inclusion of people of foreign origin is a

²⁸⁴ Foundations focus group with older women.

²⁸⁵ Foundations focus group with younger women.
priority for City Hall, but policies are not directed at them as an explicit target population group.

6.4.2 The CUCS

Four neighbourhoods in the 18th arrondissement – La Goutte d’Or, Chapelle-Porte d’Aubervilliers, Porte de Montmartre-Porte de Clignancourt and Amiraux-Simplon – have been identified as quartiers politiques de la ville (neighbourhoods that fall under the town planning policy plans). Action within these arrondissements has to be taken within the wider urban policy framework. The CUCS was adopted in 2007, and is a contract between City Hall and the central government. For employment, the CUCS requires action that is tailored to the specific needs of the local population. In other words, the idea is to develop initiatives complementary to the support which is already in place provided by Pôle Emploi. But these public services do not always manage to reach all job-seekers and people with serious social difficulties often do not rely on the traditional employment networks and services. In order to provide help to all those seeking employment, the CUCS aims to develop specific initiatives for young people and women and provides them with assistance in the job search, special training and advice from professional recruiters or economic partners. For instance, young people who have dropped out of school can follow training courses to acquire a professional qualification. The CUCS emphasises the need for nurseries for children to be opened for those women who are looking for work and need time for getting specific training to be able to find a job. Other initiatives are taken into consideration: encouraging migrant women to use public transportation and travel alone in the city, accompanying them in their use of the public services and administration. The project promotes a global solution to help the women rather than offering them isolated actions. Job-seekers are given long-term support through different actions: language courses, training courses and a follow-up of their professional entry to the labour market. However, while immigrant populations can benefit from French language courses and other training facilities, the initiatives do not reach out to the neediest populations because targeted individuals and communities are defined too narrowly.

286 Pôle Emploi (Employment Pole) was created by Law 2008-126 of 13 February 2008 concerning reform of the public service organisation for employment (Loi 2008-126 relative à la réforme de l’organisation du service public de l’emploi). From January 2009, the previous structures (ANPE, the National Agency for Employment, and ASSEDIC for employment in industry and business) merged into Pôle Emploi.


288 Several NGOs provide French courses for migrants. According to the contract of reception and integration, created by the January 2005 law on social cohesion, it is compulsory for all new immigrants to take a language course if they do not speak French fluently. But the NGO courses all welcome migrants settled in France for a long time.
6.4.3 Helping People Get Work

Information is one of the essential parts of the job-hunting process. Several respondents to the questionnaire indicated that the greatest need was for information about the methods and strategies for job-hunting: how to identify appropriate job announcements, how to improve applications, which training courses are available and so on. Roundtable participants reiterated this point:

In La Goutte d’Or, there are a lot of rural and illiterate people with no experience at all as employees. Looking for a job for them is something they hardly understand. People at Pôle Emploi do not know how to cope with them: looking for a job in public services, drafting your curriculum. They don’t know what it is.

For those who rely on the best known official structures, like the Pôle Emploi, to answer their questions the reaction was: “There, they give you a number and you have to look by yourselves through the offers. To me it does not work because I feel lost. I need someone to help me find a real job.”

Another focus group participant explained: “I applied to Pôle Emploi. They orient us, but in many cases the employers prefer French citizens, or sometimes I’m not qualified enough for the job they find for me.” The table below offers information, by age, of the employment status of the Open Society Foundations Muslims sample.
### Table 41. Employment by age on last birthday

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>&lt;20 %</th>
<th>20–29 %</th>
<th>30–39 %</th>
<th>40–49 %</th>
<th>50–59 %</th>
<th>60+ %</th>
<th>Did not answer %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full-time employee</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, part-time employee</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, self-employed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, working unpaid in family business</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, retired</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, on government employment or training programme</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, unemployed and looking for work</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, student</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, looking after home or family</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations

Most of those in the 20–39 age group in the survey respondents needed information and advice about employment. This correlates with other statistics indicating that those aged 20–35 are the most exposed to discrimination when looking for employment and also represent the most important group among job-seekers and are accordingly more at risk of unemployment. As one roundtable participant stressed, migration paths certainly do matter to the way individuals may find a job or not, but the generation factor also plays its part. When asked how respondents who work for people of
different backgrounds had found their jobs, Muslims mentioned social networks (relatives, friends, contacts) as the main way to get a job.

The City Hall regularly organizes forums gathering employers and young graduates of all backgrounds to allow young people of foreign origin and/or living in the poor suburbs to meet employers and to find a job. A department of the municipality dealing with the promotion of diversity works with companies to help them to prevent discrimination and to favor diversity as part of recruitment policies. Several organizations work in collaboration with the city of Paris; for example the IMS, founded in 1986, aims to promote non-discrimination in French companies and to encourage them to recruit people of diverse ethnic backgrounds, women, disabled persons and so on. The IMS has organized several recruitment forums for young people of migrant origin, including the April 2008 forum in the Paris suburb of Aulnay-sous-Bois dedicated to the recruitment of applicants for summer jobs, short-term contracts and training courses. In June 2008, a second forum was dedicated to young graduates. These examples suggest that efficient initiatives developed against discrimination involve both job-seekers and employers.

The respondents to the questionnaires said that the application procedure (applying for a job, sending a CV, obtaining an interview) was a long and painful process. During the focus group with Muslim women, one participant related her experience of seeking to overcome the disadvantage she felt she had from having a foreign-sounding name. She decided not to send applications by mail but to go directly to the companies and try to meet the managers and convince them. This suggests that recruitment forums which engineer face-to-face meetings between job-seekers and employers are a useful initiative.

6.4.4 The PAD

Stakeholders interviewed by the Open Society Foundations and involved in employment policies generally criticized the current approach towards discrimination in employment for its failure to properly address issues of racial discrimination in the labour market. There have been some measures designed to address racial discrimination, however. The city of Paris has created Points of Access to Rights (Point d’accès au droit, PAD), which have been set up in various Paris arrondissements to offer free information and legal advice. Although the 18th arrondissement PAD was created in November 2003, a special service dedicated to the victims of discrimination was only created in January 2006. The council member of the 18th arrondissement responsible for the PAD acknowledged that there had been difficulties attracting people to the service. Furthermore, people who come to the service with evidence and allegations of discrimination rarely want to bring legal proceedings in court. In 2006, only 20 people asked the PAD for information, advice or help about discrimination.

According to the director of the PAD in the 18th arrondissement, the very small number of requests is the result of various factors, the first of which is that many inhabitants of
the 18th arrondissement are not aware of the special service, especially because it was not created when the PAD was launched in 2003 but only three years later, so it was not possible to assess its success yet. Second, individuals are not always able to identify the discrimination they have faced and therefore hesitate to go public with it. Finally, even when they are aware that they have been discriminated against, they are afraid to start legal proceedings because they are badly informed about their rights and think that they will not be successful.

One of the potential ways forward could be the implementation of a more systematic policy of helping potential victims of discrimination more actively, in particular for obtaining justice. Producing the evidence of discrimination, for instance, could be locally supported by a better public involvement in the process. This would have to start with the creation of a climate of trust and confidence based on clear public statements by prominent politicians condemning any ambiguous discourse. The PAD publicises its different services with leaflets explaining its activities, but this appears to be far from sufficient. Better publicity should be developed for the service, emphasising its involvement with discrimination issues. But more could be done to raise awareness. For instance, the PAD could work in collaboration with the other services acting against discrimination, to create several actions with various partners such as the police, NGOs fighting against discrimination and lawyers. The objective would be to offer victims complete support and coordinate the efforts of every structure. The police of the arrondissement could put the victims of discrimination in contact with the PAD to encourage them to start legal proceedings.

6.4.5 Learning French

The situation is clearer in the policies for immigrants: there are official programmes for learning French. Indeed, the governmental Contract of Reception and Integration (Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration), created by the January 2005 law on social cohesion, makes it compulsory for all new immigrants to take a language course if they do not speak French fluently. This contract has been compulsory since 1 January 2007. Moreover, its implementation has contributed to reorganising policies on French courses for migrants, since these state subsidies benefited the newcomers at the expense of immigrants who had been living in France for several years despite their limited grasp of French. Officials have expressed concern that language courses for older migrants are threatened by the new contract.

For example, all the state-funded French courses are reserved for new migrants according to the reception and integration contract. No more courses are available for old migrants who have lived here for 20 years. We would have to develop many more initiatives for these older migrants, and because the question of French courses for migrants is a responsibility of the state, if the state decides
to go in a specific direction, it is likely that a high number of migrants will be excluded from the public policies.289

A representative of an NGO290 in the 18th arrondissement emphasised that the offer of French courses is not sufficient and he also repeated that the new contract of reception and integration, which gives priority to new migrants to attend French courses, disadvantages the older migrants who also need such courses.

6.4.6 Local missions

Among anti-racism activities, local missions ("missions locales"), public services working with jobseekers, train civil servants to work with migrant- and foreign-origin populations. Very often, these are local associations who suggest concrete initiatives for young people of foreign origin, irrespective of their level of education. Without going as far as to create specific public service policies for the population of foreign origin, public local authorities have made recommendations for training structures and information about discrimination in access to employment. This can be useful for the civil servants of public services as well as for job-seekers. Acting for Competence (Agir pour la compétence, APC) is one of these associations. It was created in April 2005 by Karim Zéribi291 and is managed by Saïd Hammouche. First established in the 18th arrondissement,292 the APC also works in poor and discriminated arrondissements of the Ile-de-France region and has offices in Lyon and Montpellier. It is the first recruitment agency specialising in the promotion of ethnic minorities. Its objective is to give advice to the members of ethnic minorities and/or the inhabitants of the poor suburbs about looking for a job. The agency also offers its advice to the employers who are recruiting the applicants. The APC assists them in finding some applicants among the ethnic minorities who correspond to their expectations. The agency also helps the job applicants to create a one-minute video CV to send to possible recruiters. It opposed

289 Interview with a council member in charge of social affairs in the 18th arrondissement, 24 February 2008.
290 The NGO is called Accueil Laghouat.
291 Karim Zéribi was adviser on equality issues for the minister of the interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, from 1999 to 2000.
292 APC recrutement, 2 rue Eugène Fournière, 75018 Paris.
the anonymous CV proposed by the government of Dominique de Villepin,\(^\text{293}\) and sought to suggest solutions to fight against the ethnic discrimination by giving members of ethnic minorities the means not to hide their foreign origins but to use them in an effective way to convince employers. The agency recommends participating in workshops for creating a video CV for persons seeking employment. Coaching workshops enable job-seekers to learn how to prepare for their interview, to gain self-confidence and to know how to persuade employers to hire them. The ambition of the agency is to help to transform applicants’ weaknesses (the fact of being of foreign origin, of living in a poor suburb which can have a bad reputation, coming from a discriminated social environment) into real assets. According to the agency, job-seekers of foreign origin have to learn to face discrimination and especially to improve their methods of job-hunting so as to better defend their profile.

6.4.7 Undocumented Foreign Workers

Public employment policies rarely touch on the question of undocumented foreign workers, among them people coming from Muslim countries. It is difficult to give reliable figures on the number of undocumented immigrant workers in France. According to Claude-Valentin Marie, out of ten hours of illegal work done in France, five hours are undertaken by immigrant workers and five by undocumented workers, mostly in restaurants, civil engineering firms and the textile industry. These undocumented workers are often isolated and do not know their rights. Several demonstrations of undocumented workers took place in Paris in 2008, denouncing the fact that they pay taxes without gaining rights such as health coverage. The PAD of the 18\(^\text{th}\) arrondissement could collect some information material for illegal workers in its priority objectives. It could also help them to start legal proceedings if their employers do not respect the law. Finally, the PAD could assist undocumented workers in their applications for work permits in France.

\(^{293}\) The anonymous CV was enacted through Law 2006-396 of 31 March 2006 for equal opportunities (Loi 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances). All information relating to personal life is taken off the CV (birthday, gender, age, nationality, name, first name and address). According to article 24, the anonymous CV must be used by companies with more than 50 members of staff. But the methods of application of this article were supposed to be defined by a decree which was never adopted. The spokesman of the government, Jean-François Copé, announced in June 2006 that the government was giving up adopting the anonymous CV, but some steps would be taken in certain professional sectors to test it against discrimination accusations. An evaluation report on behalf of Pôle Emploi released in March 2011 pointed to the impact of the anonymous CV when used by some private firms for recruitment. It shows that the anonymous CV has an impact on the request for interview and on final recruitment. It is not a universal remedy against discrimination, but it certainly helps in some ways. The full report can be found at http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/actualites/evaluation-cv-anonyme-rapport (accessed in April 2011).


6.5 Conclusion

Origin and colour are the main issues people mention when asked about their experience of discrimination. In discrimination on the grounds of religion the impact of stereotypes and prejudice are strong, though difficult to assess with precision. The data for the research suggest that the interaction between origin and religion seems to be relevant (and can be related to the TeO results). Indeed, neighbourhood and clothing, accent or family situation are subsidiary, but may become significant in situations involving people of certain origins. There can be a concentration and focus in the motives of discrimination. The TeO survey also documented the fact that discrimination motivated by religion is mentioned more by children of migrants than by migrants themselves. Here historic relations of domination (especially the postcolonial frame of reference) do not work on their own, but rather amplify and interact with other mechanisms of stigmatisation. The roundtable participants confirmed that origin and colour play a more significant role in discrimination in employment than religion: “This discrimination should not be ‘Islamised’,” said one of the roundtable participants. Being a Muslim (and identified as such) adds to a socio-economic situation in which being a Muslim is just another negative element, but not the principal one.

Housing is a crucial sector for understanding social cohesion, as it is a place where different dimensions of social inequalities intersect. Homelessness and precarious housing, whether living on the streets or in temporary accommodation (hostels, hotels), are barrier to social inclusion. Moreover, since 2008 the global economic crisis has aggravated the situation of vulnerable populations in the housing sector. Poor housing conditions can also exacerbate factors that undermine social inclusion – for example, by causing or aggravating ill health – and overcrowded housing can impede the educational attainment of children (less space to study, complete housework or revise for exams) and thus affect subsequent employability. Teenagers are more likely to seek diversions outside the house. The lack of privacy and space in overcrowded housing increases stress and affects mental health and family relationships. Vulnerable populations become more vulnerable if housing conditions are not satisfactory.

This section faces a double challenge: on the one hand, it illustrates the direct role of public institutions in the development and implementation of mechanisms and practices against ethnic discrimination; on the other hand, it aims to show how the perception of housing conditions affects the broader representation people have of their position in French society. The feeling of social declassification and social marginality

---

According to their 2009 annual statistical report on the condition of the poor in France, the international charity Secours Catholique/Caritas France encountered 637,000 families living in situations of poverty (94 per cent of whom were living below the poverty line), representing 798,000 adults and 682,000 children totalling 1,480,000 people (up from 1,400,000 in 2008). Among these vulnerable populations both documented and undocumented migrants are very much affected, which can be explained by both an increased number of asylum claims and the reluctance of French authorities to grant residence permits to undocumented migrants. Three quarters of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants live in precarious housing (reception centres, hostels, with friends or on the streets) as access to standard social housing is unavailable to them. See Secours Catholique/Caritas France, *Ressources crise et pauvreté. Statistiques d’accueil 2009*, available at http://www.secours-catholique.org/IMG/pdf/Statistiques-accueil-2009-rapport_1.pdf (accessed May 2012).
can be accentuated by living conditions. Moreover, in France social and racial issues appear to overlap extensively.

In their comments, the respondents and the participants in the focus groups distinguished three categories of salient problems: first, unequal access to housing (public or private), that is, "the right to housing" (*le droit au logement*, enacted by the Besson law in May 1990); second, the conditions of housing and the local environment (hygiene, noise, regeneration); and third, the issue of social (as a proxy for ethnic) integration and interaction in the neighbourhood where a person is housed.

### 7.1 National Policy

In France housing is one of the specific policies aimed at ensuring all citizens experience equal treatment and equality in access to goods and services. This is achieved through "colour-blind" housing policies that do not officially differentiate between ethnic groups. The main principle that sums up the last four decades of urban policies could be said to be the implementation of a socially integrated population sharing social housing (breaking up the ghettos by dispersing people), without referring

---

297 Régis Bigot and Sandra Hoibian, “La crise du logement entretient le sentiment de déclassement” (The crisis of housing nourishes the feeling of decline), Centre de recherche pour l’étude et l’observation des conditions de vie (CREDOC), *Consommation et modes de vie* 226, February 2010, p. 2 (hereafter Bigot and Hoibian, “La crise du logement entretient le sentiment de déclassement”).


to the racial and ethnic identity of the populations but rather to their socio-economic situation.

However, as most studies have shown, social housing is probably the sector where proxies for ethnicity were invented and applied early on. Social housing has been studied as one of the fields where persistent, locally specific ethnic discrimination can be observed, in particular in access to social housing. However, there are no specific ethnic data for drawing a precise picture of the current situation. The categories of “immigrants” or “foreigners” are often the only available reference to assess the ethnic composition of a neighbourhood. The analysis of the ethnic concentration of certain populations (North Africans, sub-Saharan Africans and Asians) in urban settings is therefore mostly based on qualitative studies.

Urban and social diversity are directly anchored in legislation on social housing. The first was the 1991 Law on City Orientation (Loi d’Orientation pour la Ville, LOV). In the decade after it was passed it was the central pillar of French urban policies, fixing quotas for social diversity in social housing: in towns with more than 3,550 inhabitants, with less than 20 per cent of social housing, the LOV required housing to be constructed. In 2000, a new and stronger Law on Solidarity and Urban Renewal (Loi de solidarité et renouvellement urbains, SRU) was passed, which reinforced the prefect’s authority.

The 2007 law on the enforceable right to housing (Droit au logement opposable, DALO) was a major achievement in the housing sector for the most vulnerable. Between January 2008, when it came into force, and September 2010, 194,700 claims

---


302 For the updated state of the art on this question in the social housing sector, see Kirszbaum, La mixité résidentielle, Kirszbaum, Mixité sociale.

303 Loi d’orientation pour la Ville, 31 July 1991.
were submitted.\textsuperscript{304} The law permits people unable to access or retain accommodation by his or her own means to assert their right to decent housing, either by asking a mediation commission to help them, or by going to the administrative court if the appeal to the commission is unsuccessful. These rights can be exercised by six categories of people: those who do not have a place to live; those at risk of eviction; those in temporary housing; those living in places that are substandard or not registered for residential use; those who live in overcrowded accommodation if they have one child or are responsible for a person with disabilities or are themselves disabled; and others eligible for social housing whose housing requests/demands have been left unanswered for an abnormally long period of time.\textsuperscript{305} DALO furthermore helped publicise the reality of the French housing situation to a larger audience, in a context in which the government was regularly defending and promoting access to home ownership.\textsuperscript{306}

Another important development in housing policy is the emergence of the concept of habitat indigne (unfit housing). This concept gained legal value when it was inserted into article 4 of the Besson law (31 May 1990).\textsuperscript{307} Unfit housing is defined as “places or installations used for housing and by nature unfit for this purpose. It also covers housing whose state, or the state of the building in which they are located, exposes the inhabitants to explicit risks to their health or physical safety.”\textsuperscript{308} This has led to the creation of the National Centre for Combatting Unfit Housing (Pôle national de lutte contre l’habitat indigne).


\textsuperscript{305} Loi 2007-290 du 5 mars 2007 instituant le droit au logement opposable et portant diverses mesures en faveur de la cohésion sociale (Law 2007-290 of 5 March 2007 creating the enforcement of the right to housing and containing various measures in favour of social cohesion).

\textsuperscript{306} Former president, Nicolas Sarkozy raised the issue of home ownership during his 2007 presidential campaign and subsequent leadership. According to Sarkozy, access to home ownership is a guarantee against life’s uncertainties and a protection in case of economic difficulties. Furthermore, it encourages responsibility and cohesion. “It is a guarantee of civic-mindedness, pacific relations with neighbours, of responsible residents. It is even a guarantee of a certain integration.” Speech at the City Hall of Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, 11 December 2007, available at http://www.cnle.gouv.fr/Discours-de-Nicolas-Sarkozy-sur-le.html (accessed May 2012).


7.2 Housing in Paris

In comparison with other Parisian arrondissements, the 18th has a large social housing stock. In 2007 there were 18,372 social housing units in the 18th out of a total of 176,023 in the city of Paris. Despite this large housing stock there remains significant demand for more social housing. The website of the 18th arrondissement administration, under the housing section, explains that there are about 12,000 people living in the 18th who are seeking housing. This is the highest number in Paris and is likely to increase. The 18th arrondissement’s deputy mayor in charge of housing reported that an average of 40 social housing units is allocated to families each year. In order to increase social housing stock and public facilities, the Law on Solidarity and Urban Renewal gives municipalities’ local priority over other buyers on real estate sold in Paris. The city of Paris indicated that, on average, 3,000 people on average are living in hotels paid for by the municipal budget.

Low-income households that are not granted social housing must turn to the private sector where accommodation is cheaper, but often in a much worse condition, as it is less regulated. The mobility rate of people within the social housing sector is in general very low (below 10 per cent). The larger the city, the higher the difference between the prices in the social housing sector and the private rental market. In a city with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, the difference is about 32 per cent. In Paris and its environs, this rate reaches 120 per cent, limiting the number of people who can leave the social housing sector and contributing to the scarcity of social housing. Paris is well known for its high rental prices. The 18th arrondissement is one of the cheaper Parisian arrondissements and so rents remain reasonable. According to INSEE’s statistical profile of the 18th, there are 118,517 residences in the arrondissement, 33.2 per cent of which are owned by their occupants. (See Table 42 for more information.)

---

Table 42. Housing status by nationality in Paris, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French by birth %</th>
<th>French by naturalisation (from EU countries) %</th>
<th>French by naturalisation (from non-EU countries) %</th>
<th>EU foreigners %</th>
<th>Non EU foreigners %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free accommodation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant in furnished room or in hotel room</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant in council house</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant in private sector</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


7.3 The Experiences of Migrant and Muslim Groups

La Goutte d’Or has been directly exposed to the implementation of the 1948 law.\(^{314}\)

The district developed as the place where North African newcomers could easily find accommodation, in particular with the development of specific types of housing such as the “meublés” (hostels). Furthermore, larger flats have been divided to increase the number of individual rooms, with two results: the diffusion of implicit and informal rules about rent and improvement in the prices for renting older properties.

Upon arrival in France immigrants used to find temporary accommodation, which often became long-term. In the 1950s and 1960s, migrant workers were largely single men without their families and lived in hotel rooms. Seeking private accommodation was difficult for workers earning low salaries in an expensive city like Paris. During the 1970s, some of the African migrants living in Paris took part in protest movements: for instance in 1973, migrant workers around Paris (Porte des Lilas and Porte Pouchet) protested against their poor housing conditions. The General Union of Senegalese Workers in France (*L’Union générale des travailleurs sénégalais en France*, UGTSF) was one of the first organisations to protest against landlords (known in France as *marchands de sommeil*, sleep peddlers) profiting from immigrants by renting them very expensive rooms. In response to the housing problems of African immigrants, the

\(^{314}\) Law 48-1360 of 1 September 1948 for the medication and codification of legislation concerning the relationship between landlords and occupants and the creation of housing allocations (*Loi 48-1360 du 1er septembre 1948 portant modification et codification de la législation relative aux rapports des bailleurs et locataires ou occupants de locaux d’habitation ou à usage professionnel et instituant des allocations de logement*): Bacqué and Fijalkow, “En attendant la gentrification”; Toubon and Messamah, *Centralité immigrée*. 

164 OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 2012
UGTSF asked the French authorities to build special houses for them, which formed a large part of the housing accommodation of African immigrants from the 1980s to the arrival of their families in the 1990s. In these buildings, migrant workers recreated the living conditions of their country of origin by setting up informal shops selling food and traditional clothes, and also prayer rooms.315

The city also offered only a limited amount of social housing, which was often of bad quality and not always a suitable size for immigrant families. Therefore, many families looked for accommodation in the private sector, although their low incomes barely allowed them to rent small flats which were not big enough to accommodate the size of their families. They lived therefore in small apartments, in poor conditions and in the poorest arrondissements of Paris in the north-east. Today, the situation has not radically changed and new migrants face the same problems.

Table 43. Housing status by nationality of the reference person in Paris

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Paris</th>
<th>Total by birth</th>
<th>Total foreigners</th>
<th>Total EU citizens</th>
<th>Total Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>Total non-EU</th>
<th>Total Americans, Oceanians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,110,602</td>
<td>878,727</td>
<td>150,663</td>
<td>48,858</td>
<td>101,805</td>
<td>10,822</td>
<td>10,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner %</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant in private sector %</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant council house %</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furnished room or hotel room %</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free accommodation %</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** APUR, *La population étrangère à Paris*, October 2002, p. 95.

Over the years, the process of finding a place to live for newcomers has not changed much: foreigners arriving in Paris and looking for housing rent from private owners or go to a cheap hostel (meublés). As one respondent said, they often prefer to stay there, especially considering the difficulty of getting a suitable house through the social housing system:

---

316 The nationality is that of the “reference person” who is the head of the family (by definition the oldest man with a professional occupation).

317 Rent-free accommodation, provided principally in exchange for caretaking services.
It will be almost 20 years that I live in a hostel. I don’t have my family here. That is why I stay in the hostel. But I know people (African families) that have been waiting for more than ten years for social housing. Do you find this normal?

A higher proportion of non-EU nationals live in hotel rooms or furnished or temporary accommodation than French and EU nationals. Among the tenants of furnished rooms are many immigrants who arrived in Paris in the 1950s and 1960s as workers in the industrial sector. According to APUR, 15.9 per cent of Algerians were living in furnished rooms in 1999. Many sub-Saharan Africans live in furnished rooms or hotel rooms (11.5 per cent).

Rates of home ownership among non-EU nationals in Paris are low. According to data from APUR, only 12.2 per cent of non-EU foreign nationals own their homes in Paris. By contrast, home ownership rates are much higher for non-EU nationals who become French by naturalisation, at 30 per cent. This is similar to the home ownership rates of people who are French by birth, at 32.1 per cent. Among the foreign population, the proportion of owners is much lower than in the suburbs (30 per cent) or in the provinces (34 per cent). The low rates of home ownership among non-EU nationals can be attributed to the challenges of saving enough money to buy property and the high cost of housing in Paris. Furthermore, foreigners who have lived in France for several years may be unwilling to buy accommodation in a country in which they do not want to stay for the rest of their lives. This may be another reason why there is a very high number of tenants among non-EU nationals.

There are many North Africans in social housing. The proportion of Turks renting in the private sector is the highest in the foreign population (71.1 per cent), whereas Algerians and Tunisians are more numerous among homeowners (respectively 12.1 per cent and 12.4 per cent). Over 50 per cent of non-EU nationals live in private sector accommodation, and only 17 per cent live in social housing (a proportion equivalent to that of those who are French by birth). This predominance in the private rented sector is not necessarily from choice but rather a result of the lack of social housing stock. As a local city councillor stated during the Open Society Foundations roundtable, the social housing problem is a simple equation that is impossible to solve: “There are 12,000 yearly demands for social housing, and there will be more next year. We don’t have them. How do we solve that equation?”

---

318 APUR, La population étrangère à Paris.
319 APUR, La population étrangère à Paris.
321 APUR, La population étrangère à Paris.
7.3.1 Poor Housing Conditions

The condition of housing in the private rental market can be extremely poor, small and uncomfortable. The lack of appropriate housing stock means that sub-Saharan Africans with large families are at particular risk of living in overcrowded accommodation. Indeed, a quarter of the African households and a quarter of the Tunisian and Turkish households live in overcrowded accommodation. A high proportion of Algerians live in furnished rooms or hotel rooms, which often lack basic amenities such as a shower and/or a toilet.

Acquisition of French citizenship does not mean any significant improvement in the housing situation. Citing APUR again, 8.9 per cent of naturalised Algerians live in extremely poor accommodation (without a bathroom or toilet) and 17.7 per cent of naturalised sub-Saharan Africans live in overcrowded accommodation. These rates are higher than those for other naturalised citizens coming from non-EU countries: 9.5 per cent live in unfit accommodation and 8.7 per cent live in cramped housing.

In the public debate on the housing crisis in Paris, immigrant families are rarely mentioned, but when they are, it is often in connection with lead poisoning. Michel Neyreneuf, the 18th arrondissement’s deputy mayor in charge of housing, explained that the first case of lead poisoning was in La Goutte d’Or and contributed to the popular belief that this disease was connected with sub-Saharan populations:

Some fantasies started to spread about that, some 20 years ago. I remember long discussions I had with the director of building policy and housing who was convinced that, because all the cases were involving sub-Saharan families, the pregnant women were eating mould from their places of origin or who knows what else. He was convinced that this made the children become sick, without being able to see that African families often mean large families living in a confined space, resulting in over-occupation. That over-occupation leads to unhealthy conditions because of all the breathing and humidity because of people cooking in the same area they sleep, because of the 12–13 people sleeping in a small space, etc. Then wall paint starts to deteriorate and the kids are there, all day. And they inhale and sometimes ingest the paint. Thus, it had nothing to do with them being sub-Saharan Africans, but the fantasy was nevertheless there.

It is clear nowadays that this is more related to the conditions of housing than with the origin of the families.324

---


323 APUR, La population étrangère à Paris.

324 Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable issues, 23 January 2008.
Lead poisoning has consequences that vary according to the quantity of lead ingested by the child and the duration of the poisoning. Deaths are extremely rare. Nevertheless, it has led to cases of anaemia, digestive problems and behavioural disorders. City officials suggest that in reality these issues only affect a small proportion of immigrant families.

Other illnesses are caused by squalid housing conditions, often due to damp in the housing units. This may cause asthma, skin infections and respiratory disease. A recent public report states that the presence of damp and mould inside a house increases the risk of respiratory problems by 1.5–3.5 times. The report considers these collateral damages of unfit housing, but ones that do not constitute a priority either for public health research or the political agenda.

Families that do not succeed in finding social housing or accommodation in the private sector are sometimes forced to rent rooms in hotels, some of which take advantage of their situation to charge high prices. However, the creation of the Observatory of Furnished Hotels (Observatoire des hôtels meublés) with the support of the Police Prefecture and City Hall led to a series of administrative closures and injunctions ordering work to be done in designated housing.

7.4 Migrant Workers’ Hostels

There are 46 migrant workers’ hostels (a total of 8,700 beds) in Paris; three of them are in the 18th arrondissement (Kracher: 25 beds; Marc Séguin: 277 beds; Caillé-Chapelle: 35 beds).

The hostels, which were originally built for young workers and temporary residents, are now homes to retired migrants. Many of the old immigrants will not return to their country of origin permanently, even if they still travel back and forth between France and their country of origin. Older migrants from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa are a majority in these hostels. According to 2006 APUR data, 60 per cent of the residents are sub-Saharan Africans, 19 per cent are of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian nationality, 16 per cent are French citizens and 5 per cent are natives of other countries.

Renovating these hostels causes problems because it reduces the number of rooms and beds available. On the one hand, it improves comfort by fitting each room with a toilet and shower; on the other hand, accommodation has to be provided during the

---

renovation period. Such accommodation is very difficult to find, which explains why renovation programmes are often delayed.

However, some renovations are going forward in a programme of the Paris City Hall. \(^{328}\) Several hostels will be transformed into dormitory-style living, following the decreasing number of workers among the residents and increasing numbers of older people with particular and different needs. Hostel residents are on average older, many of them being over 60. According to the APUR survey, 6 per cent of the residents were over 60 years old in 1991, compared with 22 per cent in 2005. \(^{329}\) The changing demographics raise a number of questions because the buildings were not designed to meet the needs of older people. \(^{330}\) For example, they should have lifts, proper showers and toilets.

The renovation programme aims to adapt the hostels to the needs of the residents. However, one important issue for many Muslim residents that is not being addressed by the programme is the lack of prayer facilities, although in some buildings a separate room is already reserved for prayer, and Muslim people in the neighbourhood go there to pray on Fridays. \(^{331}\) These rooms are not large enough to accommodate all those who come to pray and who then wind up using the corridors and halls. Administrators of the migrant workers’ hostels tolerate this situation, but no solution has been suggested in the renovation programme, because public renovation funds are not meant to be used to build religious premises, including mosques.

Although the residents themselves could have appointed representatives in charge of managing religious issues in the hostels – organising worship in the renovated hostels, acting as interlocutors with their administrators and be responsible for setting up the necessary conditions for religious practices – in 2005 the city of Paris organised the election of residents’ representatives. The administrators are urged to consider the provision of rooms large enough for the residents who come to pray. \(^{332}\) These rooms must be available only to the residents, even though the lack of places of worship in Paris (and in France generally) has obliged Muslims living elsewhere in the neighbourhood to attend Friday prayers in the migrant workers’ hostels. As these

\(^{328}\) The renovation programme started in 2005. Migrant workers’ hostels are not all renovated at the same time. The budget for the first group of renovated hostels was adopted in 2005, but the programme is still in progress.

\(^{329}\) APUR, *Les interventions sociales, sanitaires et culturelles.*

\(^{330}\) In the Caillié-Chapelle hostel, located in the 18th district, 51 per cent of the population is over 60.

\(^{331}\) Interview with an ex-council member in charge of integration and non-EU foreigners, municipality of Paris, 23 January 2008.

\(^{332}\) The administrators are generally private companies or organisations. It is important to say that they are able to provide premises for Muslim worship and that they do not have to conform to the law of secularism which makes it impossible for the state to recognise, employ or fund any religion. However, certain administrators who do obtain funding from public coffers for the functioning of the hostels need to be aware that state funds do not finance prayer rooms.
buildings are generally open and anyone may come and go freely, neighbours may enter with no difficulty, which raises serious safety and security issues that must be solved. One way to resolve the problem of insufficient space for prayer would be to enable residents to attend worship in a Parisian mosque (for instance the Great Mosque of Paris in the 5th arrondissement) by providing public transport to take the residents there and back.

7.5 Choice of Areas to Live

Foreign nationals are concentrated in certain arrondissements of the city and neighbourhoods within certain arrondissements, accounting for over 18 per cent of the population in the 18th arrondissement, and they form 19 per cent of the population of the neighbourhoods of La Goutte d’Or and La Chapelle. North Africans are settled in particular in the eastern part, in the sectors of Porte de Clichy, La Goutte d’Or and La Chapelle (and Curial-Cambrai in the 19th arrondissement, and Porte de Pantin in the suburb of the 13th and 20th arrondissements). Africans live mostly in the northeast part of Paris, in particular in the north of la Butte Montmartre. A concentration of foreign populations also exists in certain neighbourhoods in the most deprived arrondissements, where rents are very cheap. Immigrants live predominantly in the oldest social housing buildings, where they form the majority in certain streets and buildings. This is not only a result of their marginal economic position but also the consequences of policies implemented by social housing administrators and institutions in charge of allocating social housing.

Such institutions often offer immigrants accommodation in neighbourhoods where the proportion of foreigners is already very high. Michel Neyreneuf, deputy mayor in charge of housing, indicated that the policy of social integration does not make ethnic origin a valid variable in housing policy decision-making. Neyreneuf explained that he has always given priority to the social conditions of people rather than to their ethnic or racial origins.

When you place people in a building, you are free to decide who you want to put inside. You can give a specific look to the building, either make it explosive or make it a nice place to live in. So there is the three tiers rule. One third of relocated people, one third of people selected by the commission because they suffer a lot of emergency situations, and one third of what I call “social mix”. We pick employees from the city, people working in hospitals and people who have an interesting role in the community. Those are integrated people that can create social ties, like creating a tenant association for instance. It is a recent rule that we have implemented in Château-Rouge, and the buildings where we have applied it work better than others where the rule is not applied. Château-Rouge
is not an easy neighbourhood to live in: there is a lot of crack dealing and if you only settle misfits, it won’t work.333

However, the administrators of social housing and the municipality do not intervene in the distribution of accommodation in the private sector, in which the ethnic concentration is very strong both for economic reasons and because of the discriminatory practices of the owners.

During the Foundations’ focus group on housing, a member of an NGO working in this field declared that applicants for social housing in the 18th arrondissement were often opposed to the idea of accepting accommodation in the suburbs. According to him, the Parisian suburbs have a bad reputation for serious problems of crime and violence. But the situation is changing: as the City of Paris is unable to meet the demand for social housing, more and more people are agreeing to settle in the suburbs to increase their chances of accessing social housing.

7.6 Local Renovation and Regeneration Policies

Like most deprived Parisian neighbourhoods, the 18th has been undergoing large-scale urban renovation projects through initiatives carried out by the municipal authorities. Around half of the population in the 18th arrondissement is of migrant background, although the population always moved away from the neighbourhood, at least till the 1980s.334 The renovation of La Goutte d’Or started in the 1980s, as the neighbourhood was becoming poorer and its population density was increasing. The municipality launched a renovation and refurbishment project to construct new social housing and renovate a group of private rented houses in the north of the larger arrondissement (Château-Rouge).335 The renovations affected the cultural life in the area as well as the composition of the inhabitants’ social profiles. Urban policies since the 1970s have also taken into account the preservation of streets as a social place of interaction.336

Between 1990 and 1999, rentable social housing (HLM) increased from 5 per cent to 13 per cent of the total stock as a result of this programme, mostly in the south of the

333 Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.
334 Toubon and Messamah, Centralité immigre.
336 A focus on street culture and the street as a place where people meet and where urban culture is produced, was a change in urban policies in the 1970s and enhanced both social and urban links: Éric Charmes, “Le retour à la rue comme support de la gentrification” (The return to the streets as support to gentrification), Éspaces et sociétés 3 (2005), pp. 115–135 (hereafter Charmes, “Le retour à la rue”).
arrondissement. Other more limited urban projects were also carried out in the northern part. The renovation component of the programme, the Programme of Operations for Improvement of Housing (Opération Programmée d’Amélioration de l’Habitat, OPAH) in the northern part of the 18th, covers a range of initiatives. These include structural works and consolidation of certain buildings (half-rented, half-owned), but with some important and visible changes. Thus the housing available in the 18th has been significantly improving over the last decades, with more social housing units, including the relocation of families living in unfit housing. Besides these grander policies, the traditional housing composed of smaller old apartments have also been renovated or replaced (in 1962, 50 per cent had no indoor toilets).

In interviews local actors explained how the neighbourhood is now split between the newly renovated and unrenovated parts, with rue La Goutte d’Or forming the dividing line. After 2001 the council, led by the Socialist party, began operations aimed at radically transforming the neighbourhood. The housing policy involved a programme of transitional rentals (PLI) targeting the middle classes and including programmes that were not always only relying on social housing. They have not been implemented in La Goutte d’Or. According to the discussion at the Foundations’ roundtable, distribution of social housing became more carefully monitored: the City Hall reserves one-third of the units for applications that conform to the social criteria and come from people working for public institutions (for instance, public health staff, association workers or City Hall workers).

These projects have tackled housing issues such as construction, clearance and renovation. City Hall developed the OPAH as well as the National Agency for Housing Improvement (Agence nationale d’amélioration de l’habitat, ANAH). The programme covered both the old sectors and those parts of the arrondissement targeted by the government’s urban planning programme (politique de la ville), which included La Goutte d’Or, La Chapelle and Porte de Montmartre-Porte de Clignancourt. The City of Paris Housing Corporation (Société Immobilière d’Économie Mixte de la Ville de Paris, SIEMP) has been responsible for the renovation or demolition of 162 properties. Of all the Parisian arrondissements, the 18th has the highest number of

---

337 This is the case for rental housing programme supported by certain employers such as the Land Housing Association (Association foncière logement).
338 The ANAH grants public funds to owners of private accommodation to help them rebuild or renovate their properties.
339 “La Chapelle is a heterogeneous neighbourhood with 30 per cent social housing and 70 per cent private-sector housing. Most of the dilapidated housing is in the latter category. In the south of this sector, there is a hostel for older migrants with 60 beds and another in the centre that is for the sub-Saharan population (with 300 beds) that is filled three times over its capacity. These two hostels are very different in terms of population and organisation.” Interview with the principal officer for the urban planning programme, Porte de la Chapelle, January 2008.
340 This company’s capital was raised from both public and private sources; its board is also composed of both public authorities and private shareholder representatives.
renovations and demolitions due to poor sanitary conditions. These cleaning and rehabilitation initiatives are being conducted in parallel with the creation of new buildings, including social housing (for instance in the 18th on the old sites of the SNCF at 122 Poissonniers, Chapelle International and Paris Nord Est), that remains a top priority on the political agenda.

Most of the plots that were defined by the city as unworthy ... were in our arrondissement. The most serious cases of squalid housings have been solved, not with the construction of new buildings but thanks to the settlement of families in to housing fit for purpose. Once the people are relocated elsewhere, we have to either renovate the buildings, or destroy them. It depends upon their condition. In the 18th, we did not create new buildings because when you reduce the amount of squalid housing, you also reduce the number of available flats. Because when you have a building with eight studios and a two-room flat, you rather rebuild a building with four-room flats according to current standards.

City officials, however, acknowledge that the focus on renovation of existing properties has been at the cost of investment in new housing construction, but this is now improving.

Most of the renovation projects were made possible by local officers in charge of the housing policies using the right of pre-emption.

As soon as I see something on the market, I use the right of pre-emption. Even if we want France to be a country of home-owners, we should not want that to happen in Paris. First of all, we should encourage mobility. Second, if we want families to stay in Paris, we need to have a substantial social renting sector. Even the law that obliges a city to have 20 per cent of social housing is a minimum and we should go further. In the 18th, we moved from 15 per cent to 18 per cent, 19 per cent of social housing. We would like to be able to continue up to 25 per cent.

This voluntary political position is crucial in regulating the real-estate market to prevent the “vente à la découpe” phenomenon, where landlords try to sell a building that has been bought as a whole from an institution unit by unit to the tenants. This

341 Most of the lead problems, for instance, have been addressed.
342 Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.
343 Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.
344 Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.
was not always properly controlled but since the 2006 law\(^\text{345}\) was enacted, every time a property is to be sold, the owners must inform the district administration, which can pre-empt it in the next two months. Neyreneuf explained that the right of pre-emption primarily serves the interest of social housing policies and integration: pre-empting allows for moderate rents and higher or lower ones in the same building. When it comes to determining the size of the social housing units, according to Neyreneuf, he pushed for more large flats in new social housing projects.

With the renovation of the oldest social housing, the area for living rooms is getting smaller, especially if we build facilities like bathrooms.\(^\text{346}\)

The renovation had a positive impact on the housing market. The 18\(^{\text{th}}\) is among the Parisian arrondissements where the increase of real-estate prices has been one of the strongest during the last five years, in relation to the national state of the housing market in Paris and also because of the social and economic evolution of the arrondissement. A report published by notaries in December 2010 showed that the average threshold of € 7,000 (£ 5,985) per square metre has been passed in Paris in the real-estate market, reaching 20 per cent more in Paris and 10 per cent more in the suburbs (and in several French cities, notably Rennes, Nantes, Bordeaux, Lyon and Marseille).\(^\text{347}\) The proportion of income spent on rent has also increased.\(^\text{348}\)

### 7.7 Social Changes

Desegregating specific areas became systematic in housing public policies in the 1970s. The aim was to help the poorest families (mostly with migrant backgrounds) and better distribute the poor across the housing sector, so as to ensure social diversity.\(^\text{349}\)

Social changes, in particular the arrival of a “white population”, have taken place mostly in the private housing market.\(^\text{350}\) The process of gentrification is often restricted

---

\(^{345}\) A law was passed in June 2006 that regulates this speculative phenomenon, very frequent in Paris in the 1990s: Law 2006-685 of 13 June 2006 concerning the right of pre-emption and the protection of the tenants in case of the selling of a building (Loi 2006-685 du 13 juin 2006 relative au droit de préemption et à la protection des locataires en cas de vente d’un immeuble).

\(^{346}\) Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.


\(^{348}\) Departmental Housing Information Agency for Paris (Agence Départementale d’Information sur le Logement de Paris, ADIL 75), Enquête sur la charge financière des loyers dans le budget des ménages parisiens (Survey of the financial burden represented by rents in Parisian households’ budgets), ADIL, Paris, February 2009.


\(^{350}\) See the synthesis comparing US and French social housing public policies by Thomas Kirszbaum in La mixité résidentielle.
to two causes: the real-estate market being made affordable to people who could not get access to housing in other parts of the city; and the cultural and political interests of the middle classes in association with specific urban settings (popular, historical, ethnically diverse), as expressed by this focus group participant:

Before selling wine, I worked in various domains. I am one of the many freelance artists living in the neighbourhood. There is not a single building without an actor, or an art technician. It is a neighbourhood we always used to love. We did not have any preconceived ideas of it. We did not have much money. And even when we had money, we were unable to get a loan as we did not have regular incomes. Then, I came here, a little bit by accident, and I bought a very tiny flat in the rue Myrrha. In the end, I became very attached to neighbourhood.

The 18th is experiencing light gentrification in certain parts such as Saint Bruno. For most of the interviewees, this is a rather superficial, “marginal gentrification,” limited to the return of the middle classes to working class neighbourhoods of Paris, mostly because of the affordable real-estate markets. What happens in the 18th is very similar to what has been observed in Belleville (19th), a neighbourhood that “looks like a mosaic where preserved and gentrified streets coexist with renovated sectors with a high concentration of social housing.” Saint Bruno, right in the centre of La Goutte d’Or, is perhaps the place that is the nearest to what could be called a gentrification process: a private school, an increase of highly qualified and professional people, a decrease in the proportion of foreigners, the presence of single people and couples with no children and a significant increase in the numbers of people with a better education. This population with a higher social status is in itself a migrant population, either coming to Paris from the provinces, or leaving the suburbs to go back to Paris intra muros.

7.8 Social Housing

Social housing includes 4.3 million housing units in France, 43 per cent of the rental stock and 19 per cent of the total housing numbers (rented and owned). Almost one main residence out of five is social housing. One-quarter of social rented housing is


located in the Ile-de-France. In Paris, the total number of social housing units in 2010 was estimated to be 185,600 in 2010.\textsuperscript{354}

The main provider of social housing in France is the Housing at Moderate Rents (\textit{Habitation à loyer modéré}, HLM) system. The social housing system is particularly complex since it involves various partners or institutions and covers three categories: the PLAI (\textit{Prêt locatif aidé d'intégration}, subsidised loan for low-rental housing for the integration of low income households) for families suffering both economic and social difficulties (the price for the rent cannot exceed \(€ 5.65\) (£ 4.83) per square metre); the PLUS (\textit{Prêt locatif à usage social}, subsidised loan for building rental housing), the most numerous, where the rent cannot exceed \(€ 6.34\) per square metre; and the PLS (\textit{Prêt locatif social}, subsidised loan for low-income rental housing) for intermediate-income families in places where the renting market is limited, where the rent cannot exceed \(€ 12.38\) per square metre.\textsuperscript{355} A housing unit becomes social housing once a convention is signed between the owner of the houses and the state, which gives the tenant access to the social rent support system. Social housing includes new buildings, rehabilitated ones and housing that does not need to be rehabilitated but will enter the convention system.

7.8.1 Access to Social Housing

In 1995 the Paris City Hall set up a commission to consider applications for local social housing. Its members include three housing NGOs, two national organisations, the National Confederation of Housing (\textit{Confédération nationale du logement}) and the General Confederation of Housing (\textit{Confédération générale du logement}), and one local organisation (Paris La Goutte d’Or), as well as three members of social services. The 18\textsuperscript{th} is the only arrondissement of Paris where the commission has no representative from the municipal administration.\textsuperscript{356} The commission selects six applicants for housing from a list of 30 submitted by the municipal council. A city official explained that each year in the 18\textsuperscript{th}, 40 housing units are allocated, with priority given to the families forced to move because their building is being renovated.\textsuperscript{357} All applications are anonymous and centralised using only a number (\textit{numéro unique}\textsuperscript{358}) as a reference. The commission has clear criteria that do not include ethnic origin. According to the arrondissement’s adviser on housing,


\textsuperscript{355} APUR, \textit{Les chiffres du logement social}.

\textsuperscript{356} Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.

\textsuperscript{357} Open Society Foundations roundtable, April 2010.

\textsuperscript{358} Since 2001, a single number is allocated to any individual request for social housing at the department. It has simplified the procedure and also helps to assess how long the application has been pending.
We determine the criteria. Over-crowding, the creation date of the application, and also health problems related to housing or the existence of a procedure launched by the landlord against the tenants: all these are priority criteria. The applications are ordered according to these priorities. This is the least unfair system. In all socialist arrondissements, Bertrand Delanoë managed to set up allocation commissions … but they work differently from one arrondissement to the other.359

However, the match between dwellings and candidates is not always a success, as described by one respondent to the Foundations questionnaire:

I don’t have a decent house (one 9 square metre room for four people) and this is poisoning my life. I asked you to come to my place for this questionnaire so that you could see for yourself. With a four-room flat I would be the happiest man in town.

The central problem of social housing is access, that is, the length of the procedure and a general feeling of discrimination expressed by people identifying as members of ethnic minorities. The respondents expressed their perceptions of unequal distribution in housing and how it made them feel less French than others:

I think there are problems of racism in the allocation of social housing. I made a request for social housing more than ten years ago and I never received an offer, while a French woman that I know did the same after me and had an offer. I had the same experience with day-care enrolment: I went there at the very beginning of my pregnancy and never got a place.

Ethnic and racial origins play a role in the way individuals understand the logic of the social housing system (and this could be extended to other sectors, such as education). This perception of discrimination is nurtured by the belief that there are no clearly written rules, though the officials in charge of housing in the 18th rebut this claim. 360 Participants often claimed that groups other than their own are privileged.

I don’t trust the social housing system any more. We’ve been on the waiting list for 14 years. In all this time, we were offered an apartment only once. And even then they didn’t let us move there, because they said our income wasn’t sufficient even though my husband was working. And now they keep saying that there are too many people in need of social housing. It’s really unfair that when you are in a low income bracket, you can’t have social housing while people with sufficient income can have it. I mean, those people can find an apartment anywhere they want with that income. And also, there are some families who

359 Cases of compulsory relocation (relogement obligatoire), for example, when a building is to be demolished, are not examined by the commission. Lead poisoning also leads to compulsory relocation. These houses are taken from the general stock of the city of Paris.
were offered social housing after waiting for only two or three years. And families that have been waiting for 14 years get nothing. It’s not just. We should have priority over the others.

In that case, the priority given to others may have been related to the fact that the families concerned had their homes expropriated as part of the renewal process and City Hall has an obligation to resettle them. But this brings back the lack of transparency as one of the main characteristics of the social housing distribution procedure, which is a long-term issue in the anti-discrimination fight.\textsuperscript{361}

In her study of social housing in Marseille, V. Sala Pala suggested that ethnic discrimination is a blind spot in the local housing scheme.\textsuperscript{362} According to her, municipal actors even deny it by playing it down: ethnic minorities’ access to social housing is caused by

socio-economic obstacles and not ethnic discrimination; ethnic inequalities in access to social housing would have structural causes (such as the lack of big dwellings for big families); ethnic minorities would “naturally” wish to concentrate themselves in the urban space.\textsuperscript{363}

Other authors have demonstrated how social integration could move even further towards discrimination because of the impact of the increasing number of institutions dealing with access to social housing.\textsuperscript{364} Discrimination would not so much be the result of a conscious individual practice by public officers, but would rather result from the cumulative effect of different sources of discrimination.\textsuperscript{365} Indeed, stakeholders interviewed about housing mentioned social exclusion, people being defined by their economic and social situations rather than exposure to discrimination (ethnic or religious). One of the participants in the focus group on housing recognised that certain owners can be racist, describing it as an individual act rather than as a product of institutional racism.

\textsuperscript{361} Kirszbaum, \textit{La mixité résidentielle}.

\textsuperscript{362} Valérie Sala Pala, “Le racisme institutionnel dans la politique du logement social” (Institutional racism in social housing policy), \textit{Sciences de la société} 65 (May 2005), pp. 87–102; Valérie Sala Pala, “La politique du logement social au risque du client? Attributions de logements sociaux, construction sociale des clients et discriminations ethniques en France et en Grande-Bretagne” (Housing policy at the risk of the client? Allocations of social housing, social construction of the clients and ethnic discrimination in France and in Great Britain), \textit{Politiques et management public} 24(3) (September 2006), pp. 77–92.


\textsuperscript{364} Kirszbaum and Simon, “Les discriminations raciales et ethniques”.

7.8.2 Survey Results

In the Foundations survey, the inhabitants of the 18th arrondissement gave their opinions on social housing. Among the respondents, 28 per cent had no opinion on the subject, which is an important proportion of the sample. This result is surprising, as social housing is a significant concern in the arrondissement. Just 19 per cent of the respondents declared themselves fairly satisfied on this question while 34 per cent expressed a negative opinion. Muslims expressed slightly more dissatisfaction than non-Muslims. Among Muslims, 36 per cent declared themselves to be fairly or very dissatisfied, while 31 per cent of the non-Muslims shared this opinion. Their dissatisfaction arises essentially from the lack of social housing and the fact that applicants must wait a long time to receive accommodation. The respondents also seemed be ill-informed about the rules for social housing. As a result, respondents reported little trust in the social housing system and expressed some doubts about its fairness. These findings echo those of other public reports and surveys. Indeed, the psychological condition of people seeking social housing is a grave concern, as the poor prospects of improvement further diminish trust in social institutions. This was a subject of intense discussion during the Foundations roundtable. Housing is not only a place to live, it serves as a social marker that provides others with information about the family situation, signalling a certain social accomplishment; living in a squalid flat has a negative impact on self-representation. (See Table 44.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of satisfaction concerning social housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Pessimism was the dominant feeling of respondents and focus group participants when discussing social housing. They expressed their uneasiness over various aspects. The main experience was feeling discriminated against throughout the process of accessing social housing. Other feelings were associated with the problems of cohabitation in a

---

366 Bigot and Hoibian, “La crise du logement entretient le sentiment de déclassement.”
multi-ethnic part of the city. The poor housing conditions and general logistics in the
neighbourhood were denounced as further aggravating structurally bad conditions
(dirty streets, a noisy environment).

Overall, Muslims in general seem to be more satisfied with social housing than non-
Muslims. Non-Muslims may be less familiar with social housing, may be less informed,
or know less about the housing situation.

Dissatisfied Muslims voiced concerns about social housing being located in insecure
and volatile areas; fluctuating and increasing rent prices; the state and squalor of
available housing; and the quality of the services provided by the housing associations.
The Foundations’ research did not reveal a direct correlation between levels of
satisfaction with housing and the religious or ethnic identity of respondents.

7.8.3 Information, Advice and Support

The Housing and Habitat Office (Direction du Logement et de l’Habitat, DLH) has an
information office at the 18th’s City Hall, which collects applications for social
housing. All information relating to the application for social housing (including
forms) can be found on the website of the city hall’s home page. 367 However, housing
problems are many, complex and often intermingled with other social difficulties.
Beyond gaining access to public housing, which is the responsibility of the
arrondissement housing office, tenants are faced with a variety of housing issues: the
condition of the property and exploitation by landlords and threats of eviction. In
addition, the hostel market remains a huge problem, mostly because of the absence of
regulation.

Housing affairs are dealt with by different public authorities; even the prefecture is
responsible for specific matters related to the safety of some buildings. For example, the
Housing Technical Service deals with unfit housing, but the Prefecture of Paris deals
with lead poisoning cases; evictions are in the remit of DASES; and the CASVP is in
charge of temporary replacement accommodation.

The multiplicity of services and offices 368 makes it difficult for people to know where
to direct their queries and which institution will meet their needs. This was highlighted
during the Foundations roundtable. Focus group respondents raised the issue of the
lack of sufficient information (in terms of the rights and possibilities of getting social
housing) and of the need for better collaboration between the local associations and the
local authorities. The City Hall is perceived as weak in its care for residents in their

367 See http://www.mairie18.paris.fr/mairie18/jsp/site/Portal.jsp?page_id=78 (accessed 15 September
2011).

368 Public evaluations refer to the “dilution of responsibilities”. See École nationale d’administration
(ENA), La mixité sociale dans le logement (Social mixing in housing), Seminar on Housing
(Séminaire relatif au Logement), Groupe 9, Promotion Simone Veil 2004–2006, 2005, quoted in
Kirszbaum, Mixité sociale, p. 133.
search for suitable housing, compared with civic associations. Focus group participants unanimously denounced what they felt was a lack of municipal support, although the 18th local municipality has implemented the *Louez solidaire* (Rent Solidarity) project, which helps families living in furnished hotels, most of whom are from migrant backgrounds, to find a more stable location to live in. The municipality organises favourable conditions for contracts between tenants and landlords, by negotiating low prices and guaranteeing payment of the rent, as well as some related expenses. The many local stakeholders in the social housing allocation procedures may also lead to unequal treatment.369 (See Table 45.)

| Table 45. In the last 12 months, have you needed advice or information on housing? |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | Muslims %       | Non-Muslims %   | Total %         |
| Yes                             | 27.0            | 27.0            | 27.0            |
| No                              | 73.0            | 72.0            | 72.5            |
| Did not answer                  | 0.0             | 1.0             | 0.5             |
| Total                           |                 |                 | 100.0           |
| Number                          | 100             | 100             | 200             |

Source: Open Society Foundations

There is evidently demand for information about housing issues, as shown in the Foundations’ survey, where a quarter of respondents had sought advice in the previous 12 months.

The municipality is the main institution, but it was perceived as not being particularly concerned with clients:

We have been renewing our social housing application for eight years. They always send us the same negative letter.

An important distinction was made between people without documents and those with, in regard to access to information. The former do not obtain either recognition or support:

Housing? I don’t have any right or can’t get help as I don’t have documents.

NGOs and other associations are key actors:

We get some assistance from the ELELE association for our housing problem and for the troubles we’re having with our landlord.

369 Kirszbaum and Simon, “Les discriminations raciales et ethniques”.
Assistance is mostly needed to complete the application (which documents are needed, how to obtain them) and for suggestions for finding legal and financial help. The municipal services, the local associations such as Accueil Goutte d’Or, friends, and private actors including banks and lawyers and social workers, may help here.

I have contacted a social worker to get help to find a house. She helped me to write to the prefecture and I appreciated her help.

In the domain of health (i.e. filling out some social security documents) or that of law, we have difficulties because we don’t speak French very well. Besides we’re not aware of our legal rights. So, for these types of issues, we get assistance from people at the ELELE association.

Participants in the focus group on housing emphasised the administrative difficulties they had faced. First of all, the administrative documents required by the authority are numerous and the applications are difficult to fill in. Because of the limited social housing stock, the application must be carefully completed. Many inhabitants thus asked for some help from the housing services of the municipality of the 18th arrondissement and from the NGOs specialising in housing. Administrative procedures are also very long because the applicants have to renew their application every year. Furthermore, because of the shortage of social housing, applicants are obliged to renew their application over several years before obtaining accommodation. It is not unusual for housing requests to be renewed every year for ten years before the applicants get an answer. A clear need for a service which offers support for tenants was articulated. This service could offer translation services indispensable for new migrants, and offer advice on how to deal with experiences of discrimination in the housing sector through potential partnerships with well-respected NGOs such as MRAP. The purpose of such a service would not be to co-opt the work already done by existing structures but to provide those structures with better visibility by hosting information offices.

NGOs are essential for undocumented migrants looking for accommodation. Without residence permits, these people generally hesitate to approach the authorities or the municipality to request accommodation, and may prefer to ask for information and support from NGOs. A focus group participant recalled that he lived several years in

---

370 The majority of participants in the focus group on housing underlined the role of NGOs in helping people to apply for social housing and to secure accommodation. So, the usefulness of these organisations seems to be well recognised by the inhabitants of the 18th.

371 MRAP was created in 1949 and is one of the best known NGOs working on racism and discrimination issues. The deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development explained that he invited MRAP to examine the work of the allocation commission in the 18th, to demonstrate that discrimination was not taking place in the way it worked. Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.

372 The housing coordination service could also propose specific help to people without documents who have difficulties getting support from the municipal services, which generally ask for them to be legally settled in the country. In the focus group on housing, several people described their difficulties getting help from official structures because of their irregular status in France.
Paris without a residence permit, so he had never applied for social housing, since the City Hall refuses to help undocumented migrants:

Me at this period, I was unable to go to the City Hall because when you go to the City Hall, they ask you for identity documents. If you are undocumented, they do not even consider you. If you don’t have [the documents], you have no help.

7.9 Discrimination in Access to Private Housing

Discrimination in housing is experienced in various ways. Reports suggest that some real-estate agents are instructed by owners to refuse foreign clients. Certain real-estate agencies have been accused of discriminatory behaviour in refusing to select tenants of foreign origin and may reject them on the grounds that the place is already rented. One property owner who participated in the Foundations focus group on housing claimed that certain owners can be racist. He acknowledged that all owners are generally afraid of renting to people who do not provide sufficient financial guarantees. To guarantee that their tenant will pay the rent, landlords tend to ask foreigners for larger financial guarantees and higher rents even if the property is small. Owners are also reluctant to rent to large families, fearing they will cause damage. This makes it particularly difficult for a large family with a low income to rent accommodation in Paris.

Growing concerns about discrimination in the public and private housing sectors led the HALDE to launch an information campaign. It published material for landlords and real-estate agencies providing recommendations on how to avoid discriminatory practices. A first brochure was created with professional organisations in the sector to help real-estate agency employees respect the principle of non-discrimination in their daily practice. A second brochure was proposed to inform the owners of rental accommodation about anti-discrimination legislation. In December 2005 HALDE signed an agreement with the National Federation of Real Estate Agents (Fédération Nationale de l'Immobilier (FNAIM)), one of the most powerful trade unions in this sector in France. The agreement aimed to implement good practices to efficiently combat discrimination in the real-estate sector. In 2007 HALDE made housing a priority domain.

In 2007 the OPH (formerly known as the Public Office for Planning and Construction, Office Public d’Aménagement et de Construction, OPAC) allocated 4,900


houses in Paris: 3,494 from public housing stock and 1,406 from intermediary housing (private). For the 18th arrondissement there were 463 (less than in the 19th and 20th respectively at 622 and 714). One-third of OPAC tenants owed more than two months’ rent in 2003.

The High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l’intégration, HCI) used to give advice on the housing of immigrants using the notion of systemic discrimination (discrimination due to the administrative and social structure of an organisation or institution): “Everything contributes to directing immigrant households towards certain types of housing and in sensitive neighbourhoods, which makes it more difficult for them.”

7.10 External Conditions

Many respondents associated the interior conditions of their housing (too small, uncomfortable) with the larger poorer conditions of the neighbourhood (noisy, dirty), as if both private and public environments constitute elements of the way the country’s institutions, politicians and citizens mistreat them. Politicians were described as people who do not care about housing as they should and who do not take responsibility for the way people misuse the public space. “Working-class Paris is dirty,” said one of the respondents. Indeed, the responsibility for the clean neighbourhood is not exclusively the municipal services’, but is also connected to people’s behaviour.

There is no discernible difference between Muslims and non-Muslims on the need for cleaner streets. But one of the strongest criticisms from the Muslim respondents was the dirtiness of the neighbourhood. Inhabitants themselves are considered responsible – “there is a need to educate the population on civic behaviour, not to throw rubbish everywhere” – rather than the city hall:

- Certain streets are really dirty. But it is not the exclusive fault of the city hall.
- Sometimes, people throw away everything and you find litter everywhere. It is behaviour that is difficult to understand.
- It cannot be said that cleaning is not done here. The problem is that once the cleaning truck has left, people start throwing things in the street again or peeing everywhere. Indeed I’am OK with saying that there is a problem of education.

However, it was generally felt that the streets should be cleaned more often. The behavior of certain inhabitants (homeless people and young people engaging in delinquency) were seen as reflecting the ‘laisser-aller’ attitude of the public services towards the neighbourhood. (see Table 46).
Table 46. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with street cleaning?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Respondents identified a certain ‘cultural inadequacy’ in certain people, for instance specific habits (concerning family life in particular, from polygamy to having numerous children, letting the children play outside late in the evening creating noise and disruption) directly linked to an inability to keep accommodation clean and adding to the difficulties of living in the neighbourhood. The social housing buildings are left in bad condition, with no repairs to elevators, no renovation of the oldest buildings and parts, dirty communal areas, no security, problems with infestation of vermin. Respondents named specific areas (Clignancourt, rue Simplon, the metro all over the arrondissement, the market places after hours) as dirtier than others.

7.11 Is Social Mixing Really a Policy?

In public policies the notion of social integration is rather vague and undefined. Some authors have tried to come up with a synthetic definition, such as the organisation of coexistence between different social classes in one urban unit (neighbourhood, arrondissement, city). The notion remains a core concept used by...

---


politicians and as a public policy category. Respondents used it as a way to describe what they wish to access and achieve in the local neighbourhood. Social mixing, as pointed out by Kirszbaum, has to be read in the Republican context, framing the dynamic of integration and political participation, as the ideal solution to all the problems of the community and ghettoisation. It connects with other ideal Republican principles in other sectors (education, for instance) in order to achieve a coherent society. The way respondents and participants in the focus groups referred to it does not always overlap with public officials’ articulations. For the latter, social mixing means selecting groups in order to avoid the concentration of certain populations in specific areas, thus creating segregated zones. For the former, social mixing includes the sense of dynamism and a positive self-perception in a diversified neighbourhood:

You don’t have to justify yourself for living in a working-class neighbourhood if you are working-class. But it’s the opposite if you belong to another social class (an upper one) that does not make you naturally belong to the neighbourhood: why have you decided to live here?

The motives for middle class settling in working class neighbourhood are associated with convivialité (friendliness), social solidarity, social integration, daily experiences with otherness and differences. These are all characteristics that came out in the interviews and the questionnaires. “This neighbourhood is cosmopolitan. There are a lot of nationalities. It is pleasant to live here.”

7.12 Conclusion

The findings from this report do not suggest that Muslims and non-Muslims are being treated differently as a result of their religious affiliation.

It should be underlined that the elected representatives and administrative teams of the 18th arrondissement have developed a very pragmatic approach to tackling the problems of social housing, namely too many demands for too little housing. Overall, the 18th can offer a number of encouraging best practices, including: independent allocation committees (in which elected officials do not vote); the “Louez Solidaire” initiative; continuous and systematic renovation and refurbishment policies to maximize available space; and mobilizing the right to pre-erection.


379 The integrative effects of social mixing are in general related to “the educational virtues of cohabitation with better integrated families, the benefits of a renewed policy of mixity at school, the possibility of seeing friendship and solidarity networks emerging, a renewed offer of services thanks to clients that can afford to spend, etc.” (Kirszbaum, “Discours et pratiques”).

8. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES:
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES

Access to health care is important for social inclusion and various reports have shown it to be a key element for social inclusion policy.\(^{381}\) As in other sectors, there are no data that enable identification of the specific treatment of Muslims. Much like access to other public services and goods, the main distinctions made when assessing a health condition or the way people get access to health-care services are between French nationals and foreign nationals (nationality as indicator), immigrants and natives (place of birth as indicator). But in assessing the impact of origin on the health of individuals, the difference between French and foreigners or immigrants and natives is often socio-economic.\(^{382}\) If the interaction between socio-economic variables and the health condition is real and reciprocal (for instance, illness affects people’s opportunities for economic and social participation, reducing employment opportunities and income, which in turn affect people’s opportunities for social and leisure activities), it is not always negative. Ethnic origin can be protective as well as damaging for the health of individuals with migrant backgrounds.\(^{383}\)

The literature on discrimination in access to health services studies the phenomena partially, that is, principally by looking at it on the basis of people’s origin.\(^{384}\) It focuses on three aspects: the unequal access to health services, the normative and moral conflicts,\(^{385}\) and the specific vulnerabilities of particular socio-economic groups which

---


\(^{382}\) Estelle Carde, “De l’origine à la santé, quand l’ethnique et la race croisent la classe” (From origin to health: when ethnicity and race cross social class), Revue européenne des migrations internationales (forthcoming, 2012) (hereafter Carde, “De l’origine à la santé”).

\(^{383}\) Particular cultural habits (diet, for instance) can also have positive aspects on the health of certain groups compared with others. Carde, “De l’origine à la santé”.


\(^{385}\) Simona Tersigni, “‘Pour quelques gouttes de sang’. Conflits de normes et déontologie médicale face à la circoncision et à l’hymenorrhaphie” (Conflicts of norms and medical deontology regarding circumcision and hymenorrhaphy), Revue des Sciences Sociales 39 (2008), pp. 104–113.
includes migrants. \(^{386}\) HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and sickle-cell anaemia also disproportionately affect foreigners, and older migrants suffer from premature ageing and from bad health. \(^{387}\) The absence of ethnic data in statistics related to health care may have led to an over-emphasis on the ethnic dimension over the socio-economic factors in explaining the higher number of patients of African origin, thus increasing their stigmatisation. \(^{388}\)

Because ethnic differences are not formally recognised in policy, discriminatory treatment on this basis cannot be assessed. Despite the difficulties foreign nationals face in gaining access to health care, public health services are still undecided as to what approach to take in terms of prevention or treatment policies. The lack of epidemiological research regarding the foreign population adds to the uncertainty and lack of knowledge of the situation. Public services in the health sector, reflecting the wider public culture, prefer to avoid speaking about specific beneficiaries that would be associated with cultural or racial distinction. Instead, the proxy category of “beneficiaries with social difficulties” has been employed to avoid bringing ethnic origin into the debate. Ignoring the specific populations contributes to the illusion of equal access to the health system and prevents any effective solutions being developed and implemented. \(^{389}\) It does not allow an exploration of what is a more significant factor in unequal treatment or unequal access: the objective indicators of a specific origin (place of birth, nationality) and their impact on the way recently arrived migrants relate to the new services, or on the subjective perception of origin by others.

Socio-economic factors are mixed with ethnic and racial origins in the determination of health conditions and access to health care, for instance the stress of being part of a

---

\(^{386}\) For example, lead poisoning largely affects children from sub-Saharan Africa: a review of lead poisoning cases between 1995 and 2002 showed that 43.9 per cent of cases concern children from sub-Saharan Africa and 22.7 per cent from North Africa or the Middle East: Elodie Aïna Stanojevich et Arnaud Veïsse, “Repères sur la santé des migrants” (Key data on migrants’ health), *La santé de l’homme* 392 (November–December 2007), citing evidence from the Institut de veille sanitaire (Institute for Public Health Surveillance), *Dépistage du saturnisme de l’enfant en France de 1995 à 2002* (Screening for Lead Poisoning in Children in France, 1995 to 2002), INSV, Saint Maurice, 2006, p. 24 (hereafter Stanojevich and Veïsse, “Repères sur la santé des migrants”).

\(^{387}\) Stanojevich and Veïsse, “Repères sur la santé des migrants”.


community that is the target of racism and racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{390} This is one of the priority areas of action of Atelier Santé Ville 18, a local coordination body working in four neighbourhoods of the 18\textsuperscript{th}.

Of all the domains covered by the Open Society Foundations’ study, health was by far the one most positively assessed, both through the questionnaire and the focus group discussions, but also in discussion with some stakeholders. It seems that one of the major concerns throughout the 18\textsuperscript{th}, and in La Goutte d’Or in particular, is the development of a community-based approach to health care (santé communautaire). Research has shown that once a person experiences discrimination in accessing health care, they may avoid visiting the doctor. Access and attitudes to health care can be affected by urban segregation and housing conditions (as well as education and employment).

As in education or housing, health services reflect the visibility of the ethnic and religious diversity of people living in France. Health centres and hospitals are places where different ethnic groups have contact. During the Foundations roundtable, the work of the local public hospitals (Bichat-Claude Bernard) in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and Lariboisière in the 10th for the local population was praised, especially the renovation of the reception areas, better consideration for the patient as a person and new training for the medical and administrative staff.

Sometimes Muslims have become the focus of public debates on health care, for instance in connection to publicity surrounding particular incidents at the local or even national level, and are often framed as evidence of a “threat” to public health services. These stories are mostly related to the refusal of some female Muslim patients’ to receive care from male doctors. In the media coverage of this issue, the influence of men (husbands, fathers, brothers) was specifically highlighted.\textsuperscript{391} Most of the media emphasised a gender issue intertwined with religious and cultural perspectives, emphasising the cultural sensitivity of certain health services (gynaecology, obstetrics).

Drug addiction has been a major field of intervention in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and La Goutte d’Or. It is a matter of concern for the inhabitants, although during the focus group discussion it did not emerge as something that touched the participants directly. It was perceived as belonging to the neighbourhood but not to their daily life. Some of the participants expressed surprise that drug addiction did not come out as a significant topic to talk about during the focus groups.

\textsuperscript{390} Carde, “De l’origine à la santé”.

\textsuperscript{391} The public discussion in the media started as a follow-up of the publication of the Stasi Commission report that mentioned tensions in the application of secularism in different public services, including hospitals, where there was “refusal, by husbands or fathers, for religious motives, to see their wives or daughters cured or delivered by male doctors”: Stasi, \textit{L’application du principe de laïcité}, p. 42, quotation translated by V. Amiraux.
8.1 Health Services in the 18th Arrondissement

Health policy is mostly a departmental and communal affair. The absence of ethnic, racial and religious categories is strong in the health sector and public health officials insisted that there was no ethnic or religious reference in their mandate. One public health policy official interviewed said the following:

I am violently opposed to the idea of a policy in favour of Muslim populations. That people are Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, that is all the same to me, it is their private life. So I shall always be opposed to policies in favour of religious communities because it would be the abandonment of the equality principle between people regardless of their religion.392

The municipal health services do not undertake actions targeting particular ethnic populations, but they do try to adapt to the needs of patients. In an interview with Dominique Demangel (deputy mayor in charge of health, Adjointe au Maire chargée de la santé), it was stressed that the dermatology consultations or information services concerning sickle-cell anaemia393 were specially developed in the arrondissements with large African populations such as La Goutte d’Or. In collaboration with African associations and in particular with the Unity of Reflection and Action of the African Communities (Unité de réflexion et d’action des communautés africaines, URACA), an awareness campaign and initiatives related to the dangers of lightening darker skin have been carried out over the last few years. Health-care structures have adapted as much as possible according to the customs of the arrondissement’s population. While in general medical centres offer consultations by appointment rather than walk-ins, in the 18th arrondissement there was recognition by policymakers that foreign people prefer to go to medical consultations without arranging an appointment beforehand; as a consequence officials in the 18th arrondissement are working towards offering consultations without appointments (including in private practices).

8.1.1 Atelier Santé Ville Paris 18

The Ateliers Santé Ville (AVS), which exist everywhere that comes under the politique de la ville mandate, were created as the operational element of the CUCS for 2007–2010.394 They consist of official collective local initiatives for public health, and aim to reach the most vulnerable. They are coordination projects mobilising, helping and training local health professionals and arrondissement personnel in the neighbourhoods.

392 Interview with a council member in charge of public health, City Council of 18th district, March 2008.
393 This disease affects the red corpuscles of the blood and is found most frequently in people (or their descendants) from sub-Saharan Africa.
394 There is a long list of legal texts that can trace the history of the implementation of the AVS. They can be found at http://www.lacse.fr/dispatch.do?sid=site/politique_de_la_ville/objectifs_1/sante (accessed November 2011).
There are four main priorities: nutrition, access to health-care services, psychosocial health conditions and women’s health. With the participation of various actors, the Atelier aims to reach more inhabitants by implementing various activities (such as meetings, its website and a newsletter) to make public health information available to a larger audience: Paris 18 is the local branch.

Public policy officials, while emphasising that religious criteria are illegal, admit that municipal services are developing to reflect the specific needs of migrant populations and are at least aware of this dimension in establishing health diagnoses, for instance in the 18th. In a May 2010 report released by the Atelier Santé Ville Paris 18, the section on drug and alcohol abuse notes: “On the contrary, addiction to alcohol is strangely absent. It is possible that, due to the significant proportion of Muslim population in these neighbourhoods, this issue would be less important than in other areas.”

8.1.2 La Goutte d’Or Health Centre

La Goutte d’Or health centre (Pôle Santé Goutte d’Or) has developed several specialist services in response to the needs of the local community. The centre was created as a district initiative in 1985 in a neighbourhood where medical services were scarce, and was set up especially for children over six years old. At the time, few general practitioners and specialists were practising in the neighbourhood and the main medical establishments for young people were mainly for infants (such as Maternal and Child Welfare, Protection Maternelle Infantile, PMI). “At that time, no one wanted to come and work as a doctor here in La Goutte d’Or,” said a general practitioner who started working there 40 years ago. During the 1980s, she explained, there were very few general practitioners and specialists in the neighbourhood; indeed, there was only one general practitioner where today there are 20. The centre began to offer services and also a unit for young children with emotional problems or learning difficulties at school, the Centre for Psycho-pedagogical Adaptation (Centre d’adaptation psychopédagogique, CAPP). The Goutte d’Or health centre also has an information and advice centre for women, couples and families, to provide advice and care on sexuality, gynaecology and contraception. The unit for medical and social prevention welcomes families for medical, dermatological or psychological consultations, and also provides information on social and legal issues. The consultations and the services are available free, and people who do not have health care documentation can rely on them. People without social insurance or legal status can use the services, as identity documents need not be provided by the beneficiaries (who are registered under their surname).


396 Interview with a general practitioner, 15 July 2009.
Roundtable participants confirmed a general feeling in the arrondissement that most of the doctors accept people who do not have documents or the Universal Care Coverage (Couverture médicale universelle, CMU)\(^{397}\) and state medical help (aide médicale de l’État, AME).\(^{398}\) Each beneficiary has a medical file to facilitate following up the medical treatment.

Due to its central location in La Goutte d’Or arrondissement many migrants and people of foreign origin use this health centre. While some come across the centre themselves, many are referred to it by local NGOs since the centre works in collaboration with organisations involved with the immigrant population and people of foreign origin, particularly young adults under 18 who arrive in France as asylum seekers without their family. The centre also organises health information sessions about health with illiterate women learning French (among which are some from Muslim countries).

The centre acknowledges adapting its methods and its language in order to be accessible and to provide effective information. “It is evident that with a group of illiterate women, we are not going to use written documents, we are going to take into account the fact that they are often migrant women.”\(^{399}\) The centre also offers information sessions with interpreters for people who do not speak French. Diagnosis orientation meetings are available to adults with social problems, and the health centre sometimes uses interpreters to facilitate dialogue with foreign patients. If the centre finds out during the consultation that the patient does not speak French, translation can be arranged by telephone. If the centre has been informed early that the patient requires the help of an interpreter, the interpreter can attend the consultations in person. The various services do not have full-time interpreters, since it is recognised that there are too many languages or dialects to deal with.

The centre also relies on the ethnic and cultural diversity of its staff.\(^{400}\) Medical appointments offered to African clients requiring the presence of an interpreter are arranged for days when staff speaking the relevant languages are working. Although members of staff were not recruited because of their origin or their linguistic abilities, their help and their usefulness are recognised and appreciated. However, the absence of a permanent translation service appears to be a general problem in the health service that has not been adequately addressed. Ad hoc and spontaneous solutions are preferred to taking on official translators within the structure.

----

\(^{397}\) This is a French welfare programme that came into force in 2000 and reimburses medical expenses through social security to all people who legally live in France for more than three months. It provides those who do not otherwise have health insurance with access to health care whatever their circumstances.

\(^{398}\) AME aims to allow access to health care to illegal aliens living in France for a continuous period of three months.

\(^{399}\) Interview with a health centre manager, March 2008.

\(^{400}\) Interview with a health centre manager, March 2008.
8.1.3 Health NGOs

Proxies are used to refer to what is euphemistically known as “the specific situation of migrants and foreigners”. Thus, the ethnic origin of patients is not completely ignored and even gives rise to specific NGO initiatives. URACA is a good illustration of that in the health sector. Created in 1985 by African migrants, it deals with various health topics (HIV/AIDS campaign, support to HIV-positive people, ethno-medicine, mediation, lead poisoning, sickle-cell anaemia) from an intercultural perspective. The association presents itself as a hybrid space (lieu métis), a place for reconciliation where people can be themselves. URACA is known as an association where establishing the link between African and French cultures is made by incorporating cultures of origin and traditional methods of conflict resolution.

URACA’s knowledge of the African populations has enabled their mediators to offer training courses to doctors who have African patients. Mamadou Diarra works with medical and nurses’ schools to teach future practitioners how to establish a relationship with African patients and provide appropriate services. In hospitals, the support provided to African patients facilitates the dialogue between doctors and patients. URACA’s work emphasises the need to recognise cultural traditions, religious faiths and the specific practices of patients. URACA has a good reputation in the health-care services of the arrondissement and the department because of its useful and efficient work at the municipal level. Furthermore, it is almost the only organisation in the arrondissement providing health solutions dedicated to African communities. This could be a model for expanding such initiatives to other foreign national communities in the arrondissement. Analysis by the Atelier Santé suggests similar concern for a more comprehensive approach to health that incorporates a larger range of social determinants in understanding the health conditions of the most vulnerable populations. During the Foundations roundtable it was made clear that, for example, the non-scientific understanding of disease and illness that may be relevant for certain communities of people should be taken seriously by many health-care workers.

Although public authorities do not recognise religious and ethnic identity in health-care policymaking, NGOs’ work in the 18th arrondissement has identified its importance. The director of an NGO working with drug addicts and providing a day reception service and clinic considers that information on ethnic and religious identity enables health-care providers to know their patients better and to adapt their actions and programmes to the precise needs of the patients. For example, many of their clients

---

401 The health support provided by NGOs sometimes takes into account the religious practices of the beneficiaries (the Ramadan fast for instance).

402 See www.uraca.fr.

403 Childbirth seems to be one of the main sources through which consideration by medical staff for the ethnic and cultural origin of women should be studied in order to assess whether or not certain women are treated differently than others and how this unequal treatment may affect the future of the child and of the mother.
of North African and sub-Saharan African background are Muslims. For some in this group their religious obligations affect their dietary requirements, in particular the prohibition on eating pork. Medical treatment may also need to be adapted to their religious practices. In the treatment for diabetes, certain medications have to be replaced as they contain pork insulin.404 Another illustration is the fact that during the fasting period of Ramadan, some drug addicts decide to stop taking drugs during the day and so ask the doctors of the centre to help them withdraw during the month of Ramadan. The NGO endeavours to meet these demands: there is no pork in the meals offered by the centre and the centre provides medical treatment to help those who do not wish to use drugs during the month of Ramadan. They also adapt the distribution of meals during Ramadan to take into account fasting times by providing take-away meals, because the centre is generally closed when the fast is broken. These individual and internal solutions in this health-care centre are unofficial and the organisation does not provide a specific service to foreigners or Muslim populations. Nevertheless, on the ground, practical adaptations are being implemented by NGOs working with immigrant populations, Muslims and people of foreign origin. This unofficial approach can cause some inconvenience because whilst the organisations meet some specific requests, they cannot arrange for durable and official solutions.

I find that it is fundamental to have persons of foreign origin on our teams. Without them, it does not work. They are cultural mediators, they help us understand the patients better. When a person talks to you in your language, it is the factor which helps calm people down and you should not underestimate it.405

Nevertheless, these mediators work informally and have no official role as ethnic or religious representatives of a specific population.

The authorities’ refusal to acknowledge ethnic and religious identity in their health policies has direct implications on the NGOs funded by the City of Paris or the region. One example involves an NGO that a few years ago tried to list its beneficiaries according to their ethnic origin. As a consequence the NGO had to answer concerns raised by the National Commission for Data Processing and Freedom (Commission nationale informatique et liberté, CNIL) that statistical identification based on ethnic and religious origins is sensitive data and, moreover, illegal. As a consequence of the objections from the CNIL, the organisation stopped publishing these sorts of statistics in its official documents.

404 Interview with a general practitioner.
405 Interview with the head of Espoir Goutte d’Or, March 2008. Espoir Goutte d’Or (EGO) is an association created in 1987 that provides intervention and support to drugs addicts (http://www.ego.asso.fr/).
8.2 The Health of Older Migrants

In 2008, there were 82,151 non-EU migrants over the age of 55 living in Paris (see Table 48). For many years the care of older migrants has not been high on the political agenda. Local NGOs have started to develop initiatives to reach out to this population, particularly those who are isolated. Social coffee shops (cafés sociaux; Ayyem Zamen is the association created in 2000) opened for them in Paris, one in the 20th arrondissement (Belleville) and the other in the 18th (Château-Rouge). While they are secular and open to everyone irrespective of nationality or gender, they nevertheless “allow the elders to be in peace, at a time when for all of them, ageing is brutal.”

Launched in 2000, they are supported by the local municipality and Paris City Hall and are conceived as places where older migrants can escape their isolation and meet different people (social workers, cultural mediators among others). Religion is not per se something that features at the café sociaux as it is conceived first as a “secular place.” Activities are organised, such as games and cultural events, and information is provided about nutrition and health care, or helping to fill in the application for pension payments. The café sociaux are also cooperating in a social home project with the local municipality.

### Table 48. Proportion of elderly non-EU immigrants (55 years and over, men and women) living in Paris, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>No. of immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>14,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>12,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>11,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (except EU)</td>
<td>8,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>23,196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** INSEE RP 2008, “Les immigrés par sexe, âge et pays de naissance” (Immigrants by sex, age and country of birth)

Data on migrants in Paris aged 50–69 indicate that they have a higher mortality rate than French citizens of the same age. There are higher rates for some illnesses such as

---


407 Interview with the director of the café social, Belleville, June 2009.

408 Interview with the director of the café social, Belleville, June 2009.

tuberculosis, diabetes and HIV/AIDS in this population. Those who live in migrant workers’ hostels are at increased risk of exposure to disease. The ageing of the migrant population has of course led to the emergence of new health problems. These populations are targeted by most of the local health initiatives.\textsuperscript{410} Type I diabetes for instance, often due to intermarriage, is increasing, while for the younger population the diseases are HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B or tuberculosis.\textsuperscript{411} Among the people diagnosed with tuberculosis in 2004 in Paris, 15 per cent were over 60 years old and a third of those diagnosed were Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans and sub-Saharan Africans. The poor living conditions and precarious existence of many African migrants make complex treatments such as those for HIV/AIDS more difficult.\textsuperscript{412} Diabetes is a particular problem among pensioners from the Maghreb who generally do not receive sufficient medical coverage. Interventions are led by organisations or service providers and are funded by regional bodies such as the Health Insurance Fund of the Ile-de-France Region (\textit{Caisse régionale d’assurance-maladie Ile-de-France}, CRAMIF), the Regional Health and Social Affairs Office (\textit{Direction régionale des affaires sanitaires et sociales d’Ile-de-France}, DRASSIF) and ACSE. They mostly work in the field of prevention, and offer information and advice but rarely medical consultations. Financial constraints, a lack of understanding of the health-care system and their social rights, accommodation and having family in the home country all mean that health care is not given sufficient priority.

There is now a programme of free TB screening once a year in 40 migrant workers’ hostels in Paris. A medical team organises the medical tests with mobile radiography machines. Out of the three workers’ hostels in the 18\textsuperscript{th} arrondissement (Kracher, Marc Séguin and Caillé-Chapelle), TB screenings are only available in two of them (Marc Séguin and Caillé-Chapelle) and social interventions by outside organisations are rare. Only the Caillé-Chapelle hostel receives financial support, provided by an NGO called Migration Health (Migration Santé), which offers to inform residents about their health and social rights twice a month.

8.3 Perception of Health Services’ Attention to Religious Needs

The answers to the Foundations’ questionnaire show no major difference between Muslims and non-Muslims on the assessment and perception of respect for religious customs in hospitals. A majority of both Muslims (53 per cent) and non-Muslims (55 per cent) feels that hospitals and clinics showed the right level of respect for the customs of different religious groups. (See Table 49)

\textsuperscript{410} Atelier Santé Ville Paris 18, \textit{Diagnostic Santé}.
\textsuperscript{411} Interview with a general practitioner.
\textsuperscript{412} Institut de veille sanitaire, “Parcours sociomédical des personnes originaires d’Afrique subsaharienne atteintes par le VIH prises en charge dans les hôpitaux d’Ile-de-France” (Socio-medical trajectory of HIV-positive people from sub-Saharan Africa and cured in Ile-de-France hospitals), \textit{Bulletin Epidémiologique Hebdomadaire} 5 (27 January 2002).
Moreover, in the open comments, individuals stressed the equal treatment inside the public health institutions. “Everybody is treated equally by the hospital and clinic staff.” A parallel was often drawn with schools; neutrality is expected to be the norm of public services and religion in hospitals should not be taken into consideration more than in other places.

I don’t think there is discrimination in hospital services. The hospital staff doesn’t refuse to take care of some patients because they are Muslims or because they come from different religious backgrounds. Could that be possible? I mean, that never happens here.

This is especially striking when compared with the situation in education:

Whereas at school, they are kind of old-fashioned, in the hospital, medical staff accepts everything that contributes to the health and care of the patient.

Only 10 per cent of Muslim respondents felt that insufficient account was taken of the religious customs of people of different religions:

In the texts dealing with ethics, this question is taken into consideration: the questionnaire that we have to fill in for admission includes information about rituals, death rites, culinary habits. As much as possible, these elements are taken into account according to the needs of the people, except when it is an emergency where there is not time to do so.

For the large majority of respondents, treatment was the priority and religion was a secondary issue in health care.

Respondents underlined the staff’s dedication to the patients.

They respect women wearing the headscarf. I don’t feel discriminated against.

---

### Table 49. Level of respect shown by hospitals and clinics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations
However, equal treatment experienced in healthcare was seen by respondents as a consequence of an indifference to religion and professional ethics (equal treatment of the patient as part of the medical ethos, which means that “doctors and nurses have a professional duty to respect people’s personal choices”, rather than a concern for equality in a medical context where “religion does not have a place where science has priority”).

A strong distinction was made by respondents between public hospitals and private clinics: “For private clinics, it is different. The persons in charge have to manage their institution depending upon whom they want to attract, and this is also true the other way around: as people pay for treatment, they can determine what they want.” In contrast, it was felt that public hospitals do not have to deal with these religious issues as they are public services treating people equally, irrespective of their nationality or religion.

Respondents emphasised the equal treatment provided to patients, as well as the attention given to the need to respect religious traditions particularly for funerals and hospital meals. Muslim respondents, who had experienced hospital care, either directly or through relatives, gave examples of how this attention to religious traditions is paid. Comments emphasised the good will of health-care staff and their attention to specific needs connected with the religious traditions for death.

When my brother died [in hospital], we were asked if we wanted to pray. We then could perform the rites as said in the Qur’an.

When my child died, they washed the body according to the Muslim funerary rites as the father of my child is Muslim.

Meeting patients’ meal requirements is less of an issue as there are alternative meal options at hospitals. Pragmatism and a case-by-case approach seem to be the markers of the way the hospital staff relate to different patients.

Respondents expressed their concern about the linguistic difficulties they faced in getting information from the doctors and precise answers to their worries. Language seems to be adding to the difficulty of explaining their condition and symptoms correctly. Some respondents had specific examples:

Sometimes doctors make us undress even if it’s not absolutely necessary. Because I can’t speak their language I can’t explain my concerns. For instance, I had to see a male doctor for an examination for breast cancer. And then, my husband told me something he had heard at the mosque. A doctor didn’t want to operate on a Muslim man because of his beard. He said, “What’s with this beard?” Then, that doctor was given a leave of absence, and another doctor operated on that man. I mean, they decide by looking at a man’s appearance and beard.

Religious needs and requests are perceived by public opinion as sources of trouble in connection with gendered health matters: pregnancy, birth, access to gynaecologists, requests to be treated by a female doctor by the woman or by the man...
accompanies her. Occasionally, some female respondents were told to take off their headscarves while entering a public hospital. The gendered religious argument here reminds us that religious discrimination is difficult to bring to the forefront mostly because it is an intersectional problem on which gender, race, ethnicity and socioeconomic factors converge. Respondents’ comments suggest that health-care professionals are used to religious diversity nowadays.

Similar features as in the headscarf debates pop up when discussing the rights of Muslim women to get access to a female doctor rather than a male one: for some Muslims and non-Muslims it is a matter of choice and for others it is a matter of equality and the ethics of public services. This was further highlighted by roundtable participants. For some respondents responses to Muslim women’s requests in the hospital were an indicator of the border that should not be crossed: “It should be clearly distinguished between fanatics and believers.” In other words, the attention given to the level of religious practice and code of conduct should be dependent on the perception of the nature of the religious commitment of the patients. Is the husband constraining his wife? Are they radical practitioners or ordinary believers? This distinction remains impossible to draw.

8.4 Satisfaction with Health Services

Table 50. In the last 12 months, have you needed advice or information on health care?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
Table 51. In the last 12 months, have you sought information on health (by birthplace)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

The responses to the question about seeking advice about health care in the past 12 months (see Tables 50 and 51) showed that there was no major difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. Just over 25 per cent of the respondents had been in need of advice or information about the health system in relation to different matters (operations, medications, dietary provisions, contraception). Most of the respondents who answered positively about the need for more information declared it was for personal health matters and explained they first went to the local pharmacy before going to the hospital or a local doctor. For children’s issues the local PMI is the main institution of reference for mothers. The family doctor remains a central figure in getting access to the wider health-care system. The internet is another provider of information about precise questions, for instance, related to gynaecology (such as contraception) and children’s vaccination’s as direct contact with the hospital by phone was said to be too imprecise and too long:

I have been looking for information on the various types of health subsidies available for my friend who is a freelance artist. It was hard to get the information. When I look for information on the web, it spares me losing time with incompetent or overworked people.

Focus group participants perceived undocumented people as the group facing the most difficulties: no document means no access to regular health checks, for instance.\(^\text{413}\)

Indeed, as the Médecins du Monde report confirms, the introduction of the three-

\(^{413}\) This is confirmed by numbers. The conditions of stay for foreign migrants in France have become extremely difficult and uncertain. The proportion of undocumented people going to a public health centre for free services has been increasing, for instance in the Centre of Welcome, Care and Orientation (Centre d’accueil, de soins, et d’orientation, CASO, of the NGO Médecins du Monde, Doctors of the World): in 2000, 49 per cent of the people visiting their establishments had no documents. The figure was 73.8 per cent in 2008 and 71.2 per cent in 2009, most of them coming because they had no social protection: Médecins du Monde, *Rapport 2008 de l’observatoire de l’accès aux soins de la Mission France de Médecins du Monde* (2008 Report of the Observatory on Access to Health Care Provided by the French Mission of Doctors of the World), Paris, 2009, p. 145.
month stay rule for getting access to the AME has reinforced a double standard treatment of individuals in precarious situations, with undocumented newcomers being the most vulnerable population vis-a-vis access to health care. In La Goutte d’Or, this kind of problem is rare as most doctors will see anyone needing health care or treatment, irrespective of whether they have appropriate documents. This was highlighted in both the focus groups and during the roundtable, as well as by stakeholders in interviews. It is clearly something specific to the neighbourhood and to the individual commitment of persons who consider health to be a right that should not be limited to those who have the proper documents. This individual and collective commitment has some direct effects in specific sectors, such as health or education, which cannot be generalised to other parts of Paris.414

Table 52. Level of satisfaction with health services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

414 Coordination France Mission, “‘Je ne m’occupe pas de ces patients.’ Testing sur les refus de soins des médecins généralistes pour les bénéficiaires de la Couverture Maladie Universelle ou de l’Aide Médicale Etat dans 10 villes de France (‘I don’t take care of these patients’. Testing on the denial of care by general practitioners for the beneficiaries of the CMU and AME in 10 cities of France), Médecins du Monde, Paris, 2006.
Table 53. Level of satisfaction with health services
(by birthplace)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

In Table 53, the only difference lies between those who were born outside France, independently from their religious origin. They seemed more optimistic and generally satisfied than those born in France. In the open comments, very few Muslims voiced specific dissatisfaction about nurses and doctors not caring about Muslims specifically. The only negative comments alluded to the “mechanical” attitude of doctors and nurses who were described as “insensitive. They act like robots.”

8.5 Conclusion

Recognition of ethnic and religious identity is currently only a concern for the NGOs working on the ground and having to deal with governmental intervention from time to time. It seems that these organisations adapt their actions on the spot, but in a marginal and unofficial way. Indeed, organisations are strongly dependent on funds from the public authorities such as the municipality and cannot go against the positions taken by city officials without risking a loss or reduction of their funds. In other words, organisations are very discreet with these arrangements. In the same way, the few organisations that work with specific national and/or cultural communities do their best to combine their actions on behalf of ethnic or religious communities with actions dedicated to a wider group of users.

Altogether, the health sector has a good image among the population and can certainly be considered as a success for local actors. It is performing efficiently in many ways: information, campaigning and reaching out to targeted populations. The many
initiatives involving the local authorities, NGOs and inhabitants, mean that the situation is perceived as satisfactory overall.
9. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: POLICING AND SECURITY

Policing and security has increasingly become the object of government attention over the last 15 years. The Paris police prefecture (Préfecture de Police de Paris) is under the authority of the prefect of police, who is nominated by the Council of Ministers (Conseil des ministres) and stands outside the police hierarchy. He is in charge of maintaining order in Paris. Within Paris, he is the highest-ranking police officer and commands around 18,000 people. There is one police station in every Paris arrondissement.

Crime is a significant problem for residents in the north-east of Paris in the 18th, 11th, 19th and 20th arrondissements. Half of the letters sent to the Paris prefect of police expressing concern about crime come from these arrondissements. In the 18th, 19th and 20th, narcotics-related crimes have a particular importance. Robberies, destruction of public facilities, aggression, vandalism and neighbourhood conflicts were all considered the main problems by respondents. Despite this, for respondents in the Foundations' research the 18th is not a no-go area (zone de non-droit, an area where the law is suspended and police officers' individual decisions rule).

Police intervene to enforce the law following their superiors' orders, or calls from the public; but they also act on their own initiative, checking identity documents, for example. They also act as evaluators of specific situations. In a study on police and democracy, Fabien Jobard explained:

Whether inhabitants of a neighbourhood determine together with the police if a situation requires calling for them or, to take concrete examples, whether or not self-injection of drugs in stairwells call for police intervention, whether or not minors must (as the law has required since at least 1945) be taken to the police


416 The various reforms to merge the various services into one that have been implemented since 1999 are not covered here, nor is the impact on the Paris Prefecture. For further information see Olivier Renaudié, La préfecture de police (Police prefecture), Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 2008.


station to be brought back to their teachers or parents, whether or not graffiti are “incivilities” and “incivilities” are crimes, if gathering on staircases is disturbing the peace, or the slaughtering in of sheep at bathtub, whether or not drug trafficking can be accepted if it guarantees a certain tranquility. Those can only be “democratic decisions” if we are able to forget about the far too simplistic equation “democracy equals proximity” and if we would rather look at a concrete setting that enables the participation of everyone, to quote the Declaration of Human Rights, in the chosen local solutions.420

In public opinion the image of the police is frequently associated with discrimination against foreigners. However, this research cannot draw conclusions about the existence of a racist culture in the police or validate the existence of global and systematic discrimination practices in this institution, as a 2009 Open Society Justice Initiative report illustrates:

The study confirmed that police stops and identity checks in Paris are principally based on the appearance of the person stopped, rather than on their behaviour or actions. Persons perceived to be ethnic minorities were disproportionately stopped by the police. The results show that persons perceived to be “Black” (of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin) and “Arab” (of North African or Maghrebi origin) were stopped at proportionally much higher rates than persons perceived to be “White” (of Western European origin). … The study revealed a strong relationship between the ethnicity of the person stopped, the style of clothing they were wearing, and their propensity to be stopped by police; fully two-thirds of the individuals dressed in youth culture clothing were also classified as belonging to an ethnic-minority group. It is likely that police consider both belonging to an ethnic-minority group and wearing youth clothing to be closely tied to a propensity to commit crimes or infractions.421

A report from the National Commission for Security Ethics (Commission nationale de la déontologie de la sécurité, CNDS422) in 2004 shows that between 2001 and 2004, out of 99 cases in which a violation of ethics by the police forces was found, 36 cases involved racial discrimination. The cases showed that the local police were mainly

420 Negotiations between police forces and the targeted population can also take place in the course of the interaction, especially when drugs are at stake. Fabien Jobard, “Démocratie et force publique?” (Democracy and public force), Mouvements 18 (2001), pp. 68–72.
422 The Commission is an independent authority created by the Law of 6 June 2000 establishing a National Commission on Security Ethics (Loi n°2000-494 du 6 juin 2000 portant création d’une Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité). It can be contacted by anyone who considers himself or herself a victim or witness of police acts violating professional ethics.
responsible for such violations; one possible explanation is the lack of experience of the police officers, as those police officers accused of discrimination were often very young.423

The absence of data collection makes it again difficult to systematically identify whether there is institutional racism in the police force. Nevertheless, strong personal evidence of racism has emerged in 2007 though the publication of a book by a former member of the Republican Security Forces (Compagnies républicaines de sécurité, CRS) corps, Jamel Boussetta, a French citizen of North African origin.424 He gave precise details of practices such as instructions being given to police officers to concentrate traffic enquiries on the black and North African populations. Boussetta nevertheless maintains that racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic practices are committed by a minority of police officers. The sociologist René Lévy also suggests that being of North African origin influences the police to bring charges against them.425

Tensions between the police and young people from migrant backgrounds ignited the riots that took place in Paris in 2005. March 2007 was marked by another large-scale incident, at the Gare du Nord train station. A Congolese man without a ticket was stopped by RATP426 agents, and when he refusing to be checked, was arrested by the police. A riot lasting over three hours started after young people and the travellers who witnessed the event at the station tried to intervene.

A report by sociologists Christian Mouhanna and Dominique Monjardet suggests that the deterioration of the relationship between police and young people and the training given to police officers incline them to suppress and care less about the quality of the service they provide and about understanding people’s situations.427 There is no mutual understanding between the police and young people.428 Members of the police rarely know the backgrounds of the young people they police and are not familiar with their own areas of duty.429 This can be seen as one of the indirect effects of the recruitment policy in France: police recruitment is national, but needs are different

---

426 Public Corporation for Parisian Transport (Régie autonome des transports parisiens, in charge of buses and subways).
429 Marlrière, “Les jeunes de cité et la police”.

---
from one place to the other; Paris and the region of Ile-de-France are high-demand areas for police forces (90–95 per cent of the positions offered after completing police school are located in Ile-de-France430).

As a result, most of the new young police officers come from different regions and are unfamiliar with Paris. They usually look forward to being sent back to their place of origin and therefore stay briefly (3–4 years) in Paris, keeping the turnover of under-motivated police officers high.431 They also face pressure from higher ranks to provide good results (“scoring”, to fit in with the official expectations in terms of number of arrests and offence reporting), to show no tolerance towards delinquents and enforce the law without thinking.432 More generally, this may be related to the changing relationship between young police officers and their job. While for the older generation the choice was mostly motivated by a vocation, today’s incentives for passing the recruitment exams are mostly based on pragmatic considerations: getting a job after finishing school, a failure to advance to continued education and high unemployment rates.433 The generational conflict is therefore integrated into the various styles of behaviour that coexist inside a police station.434 This is also true for the anti-Algerian culture inherited from the war of independence, which continues even though young police officers, who did not serve in Algeria, are not directly the products of this historical experience.

The position of security assistants (adjoints de sécurité) was created in 1997 and implemented in 2000.435 One of the reasons for creating this position was the need for more diverse recruitment to the police. These uniformed officers are recruited at the departmental level on a five-year contract that cannot be renewed. Discrimination in

---


433 See the comments on that point in Zagrodski, “Réformes policières et police de proximité”.

434 Zagrodski mentions various quotes from interviews conducted with older police members expressing the difficulties they have in working with the youngest ones, who don’t the procedures, are aggressive and provoke clashes and conflict. Zagrodski, “Réformes policières et police de proximité”, p. 253.

these processes of recruitment seems to be highly variable from one case to the other.\textsuperscript{436} Initially these security assistants were sent to do the difficult work, and were over-exposed to direct confrontations with the people they were supposed to be representing.\textsuperscript{437}

The 2006 report of the CNDS\textsuperscript{438} underlined the fact that more and more people appeal to the commission to complain about oppressive practices among the police. Individual complaints increased by 25 per cent from 2005 to 2006. Out of 140 reports received, over two-thirds concerned the national police, but it cannot be determined if the increase of complaints is related to an increase in illegal acts or to the commission’s increasing popularity. The most common cases involved unlawful violence and oppressive use of handcuffs on persons taken in for questioning. The commission also noted frequent appeals by police staff concerning insults. It reveals both an excessively broad concept of an insult and the fact that the police officers feel more and more frequently assaulted.\textsuperscript{439}

9.1 Police Efforts to Fight Discrimination

The Ministry of the Interior focuses on promoting equality of opportunity in its recruitment procedures and the professional practices of the police forces. The recruitment of persons of foreign origin and/or living in deprived areas has been encouraged since 2000. Security assistant positions have been offered to young people with foreign backgrounds and living in the poor suburbs of the cities. These security assistants help the police officers in their work, welcoming people coming to the police stations and giving them information they are seeking. Although they wear a uniform, the security assistants are not considered to be civil servants and only receive a short-term contract with the Ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{440} According to the data of the equal opportunities report written by the former delegate minister for equal opportunities Azouz Begag (June 2005–April 2007), in December 2004, among 11,000 security


\textsuperscript{438} The CNDS is an independent administrative body created in 2000 that is in charge of controlling the ethics of all persons working in police services. See www.cnds.fr.


\textsuperscript{440} Their status was defined by Decree 2000-800.
assistants in the police forces, only 5–15 per cent had a North African or black African background, representing less than 1 per cent of the police superintendents. So it is necessary to encourage the police and the Gendarmerie (a military unit) to commit to employing more people of foreign origin in the police services.

The presence of persons of foreign origin in the police and gendarmerie forces is clearly not sufficient. The Ministry of the Interior has also set up forums in the national police schools to promote equal opportunities in the access to jobs in the police forces. These forums inform young people about the positions available in the police and help those who want to apply to prepare their professional applications. These forums are called “security and citizenship” and were created in 2005, in collaboration with a temporary employment agency (Vediorbis). Finally, an exam preparation course for superintendent jobs was established in 2007 and is dedicated first and foremost to young graduates from low-income families.

The training of police forces on discrimination has been considered so poor that in December 2006 the national police force worked with HALDE to produce a practical guide about anti-discrimination laws and practice to be used by police services. This provides police officers with information on racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobia, and it gives information to the police officers on the procedures in case of complaints of discrimination. It also provides them with concrete information to record the offences, to collect evidence and to arrest those responsible in order to start legal proceedings in court quickly. Finally, it gives advice to the police officers on how to support victims of discrimination and to register their complaints. This is a crucial point, as police stations are the first public place where victims have to go to bring a case.

In December 2007, HALDE also signed a three-year partnership agreement with the head office of the national Gendarmerie to further develop practices for fighting discrimination within the Gendarmerie. HALDE helped the Gendarmerie staff to be more aware of discrimination issues and to be better prepared to solve discrimination offences.

Recent initiatives need to be extended to all gendarmerie and police stations. Furthermore, these agreements only deal with the fight against discrimination by the public, but it is imperative to develop similar training courses to address discrimination within the police force by police officers.


442 The discriminations defined in the guide refer to discriminations on the basis of membership or non-membership, real or supposed, of an ethnic group, race, religion.

443 The National Gendarmerie is a military unit maintaining security and public order.

444 This partnership agreement defines discrimination according to article 225-1 of the Penal Code, which includes religion in the categories in which discrimination can be made.
9.2 The Fight Against Terrorism

Lack of data remains the key obstacle in identifying the impact of counterterrorism laws on Muslims and in monitoring hate crimes directed at Muslims.\textsuperscript{445} Policies to counter terrorism were implemented mostly after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 1985–1986. The Vigipirate plan (plan Vigipirate) aimed at mobilising and coordinating police forces and the gendarmerie across France to prevent terrorist attacks. It is being updated to respond to the relevant level of alert.\textsuperscript{446} After the 2004 Madrid attacks, the general intelligence services strengthened the coordination of all the services involved in the fight against terrorism by setting up a regional office against radical Islam, coordinating the actions of general intelligence departments. There was increased surveillance of mosques and Muslim prayer rooms. The security services regularly attended sermons of the imams and police headquarters were informed of any anti-Semitic comments or appeals to violence.\textsuperscript{447} In 2005, the Paris prefect of police said that they target “places or institutions which gather populations considered as the most vulnerable: prisons, which constitute a recruitment place for radical Islamic movements, universities for the same reason, and Paris hospitals, where some staff are actively involved in proselytism.”\textsuperscript{448} Identity checks by police forces have since then been intensified and are now made in public places at large.

9.3 The Muslim Population and the Police

The Goutte d’Or neighbourhood presents an urban context in which its challenges are not defined through religious (Muslim) or ethnic (Arab) identification, but rather its present day socio-economic realities, including safety and security.

The visible police presence around mosques during Friday prayers where, due to a lack of prayer space, people were praying on the streets, is an instance which raised public discussion about Islam and Muslims’ relationship with the police. As of September 2011, praying on streets was banned and temporary space, in the form of disused barracks, were found for the worshippers (3000 EUR per month for 2000 m\textsuperscript{2} to be

payed by the AMO\textsuperscript{449}). Prior to the allocation of space in 2011 and during the research phase for this report, tensions with police were heightened during Ramadan (fasting). Reactions to this issue were very mixed, from the explicit hostility of some of the mosques’ closest neighbours (shopkeepers and residents living in the adjacent streets), to the statement by officials during the roundtable that the relationship between the police and the local Muslim leaders were good (although “the relationships are good as they are non-existent”, one official remarked during the roundtable). For most of the local officials, the presence of the police during the prayers remained anachronistic and irrelevant. Local elected representatives said it was illegitimate, even though it could be explained by the fact that in the past the prayers taking place in the streets were blocking traffic.\textsuperscript{450} According to the roundtable participants, the mosque representatives were satisfied with the way the police handled this local problem of street prayer. Further probing revealed a change of tone: local municipal officers expressed their worry about the risk of provocation, looking at the way certain Muslim activists manipulated these situations to look for problems (microphones, cameras, provoking police forces). The prefect’s reaction was to shift responsibility to the city level.

Police are very visible locally. Police officers, both men and women stand in the middle of the street, at the main entrances and exit gates of the metro station, patrolling intensively. While in other studies people interviewed were explicit and talkative about their direct experience of police activities, the Foundations survey indicates that direct experiences of interaction are not as high in comparison (see Table 54).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations


\textsuperscript{450} Open Society Foundations roundtable, Paris, April 2010.
While most respondents had not had direct contact with the police or the judiciary, they often expressed a feeling of mistrust rather than trust towards the police (see Table 57). Among Muslims, 40 per cent said that the police could be very much or fairly trusted, while 59 per cent said either that they did not trust the police very much or not at all. The almost 20 point difference between trust and mistrust is significant. Less of a divide existed among the non-Muslim population, where 46 per cent said that the police were very much or fairly trusted, against 53 per cent who said that they did not trust the police. One explanation proposed by the inhabitants to justify their mistrust was the lack of professional experience of the majority of police officers working in neighbourhoods where there are serious security problems. Racism is also a key reason for distrust. The participants in the men’s focus group insisted that the police force is generally made up of officers who recently started their career and have no experience. At the same time, the Muslim population underlined the importance of hiring more people of foreign origin, but were not sure whether this would improve the relations between the Muslim population and the police without a complete transformation of police practices (and addressing issues of discrimination).

The open comments revealed that suspicion of racism is one of the main reasons for the lack of trust in the police. As one respondent said, “I do not trust the police at all: they arrest youngsters with no reason and harass them to get their ID documents. Police officers are often racist”. Another said this was combined with racist attitudes to youngsters (racisme anti-jeunes). The impact of police mistreatment on families and its impact on children is a significant factor: can they have respect for an institution that mistreated their parents?

---

451 Open Society Foundations focus group.
452 Open Society Foundations focus group.
453 Open Society Foundations roundtable, Paris, April 2010
The difference between those who trust the judicial system and those who express distrust is more striking. The French judicial system is reliable, according to 55 per cent of Muslims (who thought that justice can be very or fairly trusted) (see Table 58). Only 29 per cent of Muslims had reservations about the judicial system and 6 per cent considered that they could not trust them at all (35 per cent unfavourable opinions). The distribution was almost identical in the non-Muslim group because 7 per cent of them declared they trusted the judicial system a lot (5 points more than the Muslim group).

Table 57. Level of trust in the police force among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Tables 57 and 58 are more explicable when the sample is disaggregated by birthplace: see Tables 59 and 60.
### Table 59. Level of trust in the police force among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement (by birthplace)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A lot</strong></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A fair amount</strong></td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not very much</strong></td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not at all</strong></td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don’t know</strong></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

### Table 60. Level of trust in the judiciary system among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement (by birthplace)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A lot</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A fair amount</strong></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not very much</strong></td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not at all</strong></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don’t know</strong></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
### Table 61. Level of satisfaction regarding the maintenance of law and order among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 18th arrondissement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

In response to questions about satisfaction with the maintenance of law and order by the police, no significant difference was discernible between the responses of Muslims and non-Muslims. In general, people expressed overall satisfaction or indifference (neither satisfied nor dissatisfied) (see Table 61). Among the unsatisfied Muslims, the open comments reiterated the fact that as Muslims they did not feel secure in the neighbourhood (“Police officers I was just passing in the street made Islamophobic insults because of my headscarf”). This feeling of insecurity also results from other causes. For some of the Muslim respondents, the police that patrol in La Goutte d’Or, while being present and visible, are not positioned in the right places and do not work efficiently: “Police officers? You never meet them, except when you shouldn’t. They do too much repression and not enough prevention!”

For others, the way police officers relate to individuals is inappropriate, violent and aggressive. The interaction people described in their open comments referred to the violence of the police forces and their indifference to the problems of drug dealing. Disproportionate intervention was also noted:

I got into a fight with a police officer because of a parking place. The police attacked me, and they sprayed pepper spray over my family. They humiliated me in front of my family and friends. They brought me to a corner where there wasn’t a CCTV and beat me up. This scar on [my] head here is from that incident.

The aggressive nature of the police initiatives was described as targeting youngsters in particular rather than ethnic or racial minorities, although this category does include youth of ethnic minority background (see also the conclusions of the Open Society Foundations’ Justice Initiative report).
Muslim respondents also emphasised the contextual and historical changes.

I am very unhappy with the work of the police officers in the neighbourhood. They are too aggressive. Earlier on, it was different. Cops used to talk to you gently: Good morning, your ID card please. Like that. Now, police officers immediately shout at you and are themselves very nervous.

The neighbourhood’s reputation explains this profile of a young inexperienced officer:

Young police officers with no experience are parachuted into city neighbourhoods where trust in the police has long been broken. They lack [an understanding of] psychology. They do not have dialogue or communication with the residents.

Laurent Muchielli has identified five different processes in French society at present: a global process of pacification of society, a political and legal process of criminalisation, a process of bringing the courts into the conflicts of everyday life, a socio-economic process of competition for consumer goods, and a process of economic and spatial segregation. When using the words “insecurity” or “violence” people did not always refer to the same situations and experiences, which vary in scale and intensity. Thus, security concerns are strengthened by the public’s interest, reinforced by the media as a collective preoccupation of French society since the beginning of the 1990s. National statistics show that physical violence against individuals is not on the rise. Since the end of the 1990s and until 2005, the proportion of people (over 15 years old) declaring themselves to have been the victim of violence during the preceding two years remained stable at 7 per cent of the sample. However, verbal assaults are increasing. More than a change in the nature of violence, it is really a modification of the way in which society as a whole considers violence legitimate or not that explains this shift.

Verbal abuse was the most often referred to in the Open Society Foundations’ sample. It touches upon personal dignity – respondents mentioned respect or lack thereof – rather than the body. Muchielli looked at the increasing reports of verbal assaults as evolving with feelings of insecurity, which have also been on the rise since the end of the 1990s.

The stigmatisation of youngsters and their association with the insecurity felt by the respondents are important. Data about the youngsters’ rate of criminality show an
increase, especially of petty crimes (*petite délinquance*), and a vilification of youngsters who commit such crimes.

The problem of violence and insecurity has also entered schools. Dubet analyses it less as an historical evolution that would mean that violence is more present today than it used to be, but rather as a growing social distance between teachers, administration and pupils that makes each group of actors incapable of decoding the meaning of certain forms of violence that are ‘ordinary’ in the socialisation of certain classes of youngsters in specific urban settings. 457 Schools are extensions of what happens in the street, but violence at school was not touched upon by the respondents when talking about their perception of and satisfaction with school services. It rather came out in the discourse about the neighbourhood and the young police officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 62. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with policing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims born in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Many of the people interviewed in the 18th *arrondissement* about policing, expressed satisfaction, both in the Muslim and non-Muslim samples (see Table 62). Among the Muslims, 3 per cent were very satisfied and 27 per cent were fairly satisfied with the policing in the *arrondissement*. While the level of satisfaction between Muslims and non-Muslims was similar, there was a suggestion of a significant difference between the two groups’ dissatisfaction, indicating that religious differences are not the most important for assessing the representations of public institutions like the police.

The causes of dissatisfaction are related to the brutality of the police force, which was described by Muslims and non-Muslims as not conforming to a precise discipline or code of conduct and lacking practice grounded on a clear ethic. Police forces are not respectful of people: “When they wear the uniform, they think they can do what they want.” In the open comments a contrast was particularly drawn with medical staff: police officers do not behave professionally, while doctors and nurses do.

9.4 Conclusion

The relationship between youngsters and the police has been contributing to generating a spiral of ghettoisation, particularly in the sensitive neighbourhoods of exclusion and marginalisation. This is, however, not the case here and does not emerge as a representative comment that would be made by the participants in this study. As in the other public services, common popular representations did not correspond to local practical realities. The 18th and in particular the mosques have constantly been at the centre of media attention, but the relationship between the police and the Muslim communities has not been the object of any particular focus. It remains common to associate police work in sensitive urban areas with a neocolonial culture particularly present within the police force.

The neighbourhood policing described by the respondents seems to be quite accommodating for the residents (rare ticketing for car parking, for instance). But the 18th police forces are also busy, according to the respondents, with all types of local illegal activities (street hawking, prostitution, drug dealing and forgery) that are more particularly concentrated in certain sectors of the 18th.

Recently, the trend in La Goutte d’Or has been to close down the public spaces in such a way that public squares and streets are not perceived as places where certain populations (youngsters in particular) would be welcome, as observed by some participants. Examples are restricted opening times in public playgrounds, and public benches which never face each other so that people would not be encouraged to stay for a long time, and as if authorities are afraid of seeing people stay outside on the street. A system of video surveillance is starting to be used in some areas, and in 2011, about 90 video cameras were to be installed in the 18th, 20 or so of which were in the


459 One of the participants at the roundtable mentioned his surprise when reviewing the section on the police and alluded to what he called the Algerian inheritance. This refers to the fact that some of the young soldiers sent to Algeria during the independence war were reintegrated into national police forces once back and therefore reproduced their conduct in Algeria within the institution. But it also alludes to the violent repression by the Paris police (and in other French cities) of demonstrations in favour of the independence of Algeria in France in the 1960s.
Goutte d’Or neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{460} This initiative is part of a larger Paris video surveillance plan (\textit{Plan de vidéosurveillance}) that is supported by the UMP. In September 2010, the plan was the source of a clash between the Green-Socialist elected councillors (who denounced it) and the UMP councillors (who defended it in the name of protection of Parisians), in line with Sarkozy’s position on this issue.\textsuperscript{461}

\textsuperscript{460} The map of the cameras to be installed in the 18\textsuperscript{th} can be identified on the map available at http://www.dixhuitinfo.com/politique/article/ou-seront-les-90-cameras-de-video (accessed April 2011).

\textsuperscript{461} Participant at the Foundations’ roundtable in June 2010.
10. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: PARTICIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP

For Muslims the right to vote in France depends on their citizenship, as all French nationals have the right to vote. In addition to this, citizens of EU member states have the right to vote in municipal elections in the EU member state in which they are living.

In the Open Society Foundation’s questionnaire, several questions were dedicated to political and civil participation. Respondents gave information about their participation in elections and about their activities with NGOs and other civil society organisations. The questions also tried to identify whether or not the respondents believed they were able to influence and change political events.

10.1 Participation in Elections and Political Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is interviewee eligible to vote in national elections?</th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is interviewee eligible to vote in national elections?</th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside of France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside of France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*
Out of the 21 Muslim respondents born in France, almost all said they had the right to vote in national elections; all 62 of the French-born non-Muslims said they were eligible to vote.

As indicated in Table 63, only 41 per cent of Muslims had the right to vote in contrast with 70 per cent of non-Muslims, however it is also worth underlining that the majority of Muslim respondents were born outside of France – 59 per cent as compared with 30 per cent of non-Muslim respondents. Of these non-French-born respondents, a slightly greater proportion of Muslim (26.6 per cent) than non-Muslim (21.1 per cent) respondents said they had the right to vote in national elections, as indicated in Table 64.

Among the 41 Muslim respondents who had the right to vote, 20 were born in France and 21 were born elsewhere.

The response to the question about the level of participation in national elections must be understood within the context of the significant difference of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in voting eligibility (see Table 63). The majority of Muslim respondents (59 per cent) were not eligible to vote, whereas the majority of non-Muslim respondents were. With this in mind the response from the questionnaire indicates that where Muslims and non-Muslims had the right to vote they exercised that right in national elections. However, respondents eligible to vote were less likely to vote in local elections compared with national elections (Tables 65 and 66).
### Table 65. Level of participation in the last national elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National vote eligibility</th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligible voter</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible non-voter</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not eligible to vote</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

### Table 66. Level of participation in the last local elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local vote eligibility</th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligible voter</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible non-voter</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-eligible to vote</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

### Table 67. Local vote eligibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did interviewee vote in the last local council election?</th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Country of birth also appears to make a difference. Among those who were eligible to vote Muslims born in France were more likely to vote in national elections than those born abroad.
The questionnaire asked respondents about the types of political activity in which they had taken part in the past 12 months; 38 per cent of Muslims and 49 per cent of non-Muslims indicated they had signed a petition in that period, the highest rate of participation among the activities listed (Table 68).

Table 68. Have you signed a petition in the past 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Participation in a public meeting or a demonstration was equally distributed between Muslims and non-Muslims, at one-third of both samples. While signing a petition is a political activity which does not require a strong commitment in comparison with many other political activities, nevertheless, respondents born in France were more likely to sign than people born abroad (two-thirds compared with one-third). Only 2 per cent of Muslims and 18 per cent of non-Muslims indicated they had attended a meeting about problems in the arrondissement during the last 12 months.

Table 69. Have you attended a public meeting or demonstration in the past 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

10.1.1 Influencing Public Policies

As seen in Table 70, in the general sample, a majority of non-Muslims (58 per cent) felt that they could influence decisions affecting the city. By contrast, a majority of Muslim respondents (51 per cent) felt that they could not influence decisions affecting
the city. Such low confidence in their electoral power may be a reason so few respondents take part in political activities and local elections.

**Table 70. Ability to influence decisions affecting the city**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely agree</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely disagree</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Country of birth also appears to be significant here. Those born outside France showed less optimism about their influence on local policies; Muslims, in particular if born abroad, were more negative about their potential influence. (See also Table 71.)

**Table 71. Ability to influence decisions affecting city (Muslims by birthplace)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Born in France %</th>
<th>Born outside of France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely agree</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely disagree</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Respondents felt less able to influence decisions affecting the country compared with the city (see Table 72). A similar majority of both Muslims (59 per cent) and non-Muslims (58 per cent) said that they could not influence decisions affecting France. This suggests that the respondents believed that it is easier to have some influence at
the local political level than the national. Muslim respondents were more sceptical than non-Muslims about their ability to influence political decisions at the local level.

Table 72. Ability to influence decisions affecting the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely agree</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely disagree</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Alongside a lack of belief that they could influence decisions at the national level was a significant lack of trust in national political institutions. Indeed, 50 per cent of Muslims and 45 per cent of non-Muslims said they did not trust the national parliament.

Table 73. Level of trust in the national Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Distrust of the government was even greater among respondents, at more than 73 per cent in the Muslim sample and 70 per cent among the non-Muslim group. (See Table 74.) Independent of being a Muslim or not, people born in France distrusted national political institutions more than persons born abroad (See Table 75). In questions about
local policies and trust in local actors, the distinction disappeared and there was no difference: all respondents felt they could express an opinion.

**Table 74. Level of trust in the national government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*

**Table 75. Level of trust in the national government (by birthplace)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside of France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside of France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*

10.2 Activities with NGOs and other Civil Society Organisations

The NGO networks in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and in particular in La Goutte d’Or are quite impressive, visible and diversified. The 18\textsuperscript{th} in general and La Goutte d’Or neighbourhood particularly have been sites of intense civil society activism in citizenship and political participation. As one participant at the roundtable said, the
role of migrant associations was significant in the history of the 18th. Immigrant associations have been active in fighting for the rights of immigrants, through demonstrations, hunger strikes and the like. The activities of political and civic associative networks are visible in the area around Square Léon at the centre of La Goutte d’Or. According to one roundtable participant, since the 1990s cultural associations (teaching Arabic, for instance) have made their entry into politics.

Respondents were asked about levels of civic participation in NGOs. Only a few respondents, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, were active in NGOs. The groups working with adults, religious affairs, in charity organisations and tenants’ groups were the categories of NGOs in which people were most involved. Muslims were less involved in civic participation than non-Muslims. (See Table 76.)
### Table 76. Active involvement in civil society initiatives in the past 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
<th>Non-Muslim %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children’s education/schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult education activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social welfare activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community organisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal justice activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human rights activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade union activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MUSLIMS IN PARIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing/neighbourhood group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation, sports or hobbies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, music, cultural organisation activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Fewer Muslim respondents compared with non-Muslim respondents said they were involved in civil society initiatives in education (3 compared with 17) or youths activities (2 compared with 9). Muslim women were more active in NGOs than men. The age group 40–59 appeared to be more active than younger respondents in participating in local meetings about local problems.

Table 77. In the past 12 months, has interviewee taken active part in running adult education activities (by gender)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, in a mixed organisation</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Participation in political movements and parties was very low, equally for Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, there was no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in their involvement in a religious organisation (10 per cent for both groups). This participation included teaching (Table 76) or regular participation in initiatives such as
for holidays and ceremonies. Among Muslims and non-Muslims, 10 per cent were involved in charities (associations caritatives) and work with older and disabled people.

As for local involvement (work in the neighbourhood), a slight difference could be noticed again on the basis of place of birth, those being born in France being more active than those born abroad, independently from the religious identification. As for activities related to the fight against racism and human rights activism, participation was higher among those born in France and non-Muslim respondents, particularly among 50–59-year-olds.

10.3 Initiatives to Increase Participation of Non-EU Citizens

The restriction on the right to participate in municipal elections to EU nationals is a particular challenge in areas like the 18th arrondissement with its large population of non-EU nationals. Bertrand Delanoë, Paris mayor, has stated that political participation is a necessary condition for integration. To give space for the voices and views of non-EU nationals living and working in Paris, who are not otherwise eligible to vote, the Citizenship Council of non-EU Parisians (Conseil de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens Non Communautaires, CCPNC) were created in November 2001 by the City Hall and set up in January 2002. It is an advisory committee, initially composed of 45 women and 45 men from 36 different nationalities, and is chaired by the mayor of Paris; associations and professionals (in particular from the anti-racist NGOs) were asked to join. The committee reflects the diversity of non-EU nationals in terms not only of nationalities but also in social and occupational backgrounds, seen in the various Parisian arrondissements. Members are not elected but appointed from among those who apply to join the committee: the right to be part of these councils is based on residency, with a balance of gender, age, profession and geographical origin (there is no community-based quota). Within the CCPNC, eight committees were also constituted, each with a specific domain of expertise: access to fundamental rights, international social services, cooperation, economic development and training, information and communication, youth, culture and education, quality of life, equality between men and women. These were conceived as temporary while the right to vote in local elections was not yet possible for foreigners.

Other advisory councils of this type have been set up in arrondissements, but only in the 19th and 20th. According to a council member of the 18th arrondissement responsible for

---


463 The selection of the members does not take into account ideological elements such as the membership of a political party.

464 On the participation of foreign residents in public life at the local level see Council of Europe, The participation of foreign residents in public life at local level: Consultative bodies, Studies and texts no. 78, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2003.
the PAD, ex-Council member Daniel Vaillant, the mayor of the 18th arrondissement, refused to institute a citizenship council of non-EU foreigners because there was one at the city of Paris level and he considered it sufficient. These citizenship councils now seem very useful at the arrondissement level because there are proportionally more resident foreigners, and because the City of Paris council does not deal with questions specific to the 18th arrondissement. As mentioned above, a council of that type has been created recently, after the Open Society Foundations research was conducted.

The development of advisory, deliberative and participatory structures at City Hall level in Paris followed the 2001 election of Bertrand Delanoë as mayor. The initial aim was to radically change traditional policymaking to increase transparency and accountability for residents. The local neighbourhood councils (Conseils de quartiers, CQ) put in place by the local arrondissements’ administrations are a typical illustration of this new dynamic. These councils are not only reserved for non-EU foreigners or persons of foreign origin, but are composed of members coming from non-EU countries. In the 18th arrondissement, there are eight neighbourhood councils. In the 18th, Daniel Vaillant, mayor since 1995, was already a key actor with the support of the law on local democracy passed in 2002 (Loi sur la démocratie de proximité).

According to Pascale Bonnet, a member of the local democracy office of the 18th arrondissement municipality, every neighbourhood council is composed of 23 people who are inhabitants. A random sampling method is used to select the members among the voluntary applications sent to the municipality. The online outreach carried out by the municipality to encourage voluntary applications does not reach people who do not use the internet or people who are not involved in public life and who do not know the role and policies of the city of Paris. Moreover, the random sampling method does not appear to lead to appointments to the advisory council that reflect the diversity of the neighbourhoods. For instance, analysis using family names as an indicator of background reveals that arrondissements such as La Goutte d’Or, Château-rouge and Porte de la Chapelle, which are well known for being home to people from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, appear to have few representative members in their neighbourhood council. This analysis found 25 persons with a family name suggesting an African background.

While people from particular backgrounds should not be present simply because of where they come from, since this council is meant to help the political expression of all the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, representation that does not reflect the diversity of the neighbourhoods raises questions about the efficiency of the random sampling method. Neighbourhood representatives might be better selected following a method

---

465 Interview with a council member of the 18th arrondissement responsible for the PAD, April 2008
that would allow a greater variety of backgrounds, that is, nationality (French and foreign citizens), social and occupational profiles, and gender. Outreach efforts should use more than one method to publicise the appeal for representatives from a broad range of residents. Moreover, the municipality could ask organisations working with the different ethnic and religious communities to suggest the names of inhabitants who might be interested in participating in the councils.

In 2007, a report assessed the work done in the neighbourhood councils of the 18th, which had been created in 2002. The council meets both in public sessions, often for information purposes, and in closed sessions. The council for the 18th La Goutte d’Or–Château-Rouge is a typical arena for the discussion of projects related to religious questions. Indeed, this 18th arrondissement council functions as an information exchange for predefined topics. In the November 2006 session, the public made critical comments about the Institute of Islamic Cultures (Institut des Cultures de l’Islam, ICI) project (see below) and pointed to the absence of discussion: such debate as took place was dominated by experts rather than residents and ordinary citizens, and was quite contentious. A report on this meeting identified the respondents in the audience as white, suggesting it did not reflect the social composition of the area.

Focus group participants felt that the neighbourhood council had been an ineffective forum, mostly because as a structure it seems to engineer confrontations between civic-minded and politicised citizens. They argued for authentic political and civil participation to be encouraged and not used by public and political authorities to serve their own objectives. Many felt that the participation of persons of foreign origin in the present French government was a political decision, using them as tokens and not as political partners, particularly at the national level. Rama Yade and Rachida Dati, ministers in the Sarkozy government at the time, were frequently mentioned. The CCPNC was not discussed in any of the focus groups, but participants insisted on the participation of the migrant populations and people of foreign origin in the NGOs and civic authorities.

10.4 Opinions on Civic and Political Participation

Several participants in the Foundations focus group on civic and political participation emphasised that discrimination against persons of foreign origin and Muslims is frequent and to some extent routine. The involvement of migrants, people of foreign origin and Muslims in public and the political debates was regarded as indispensable if they wanted to be represented in government at all levels. A long discussion took place

---

on Islamophobia in the NGOs and public institutions. Participants argued that many civil society organisations and public institutions have difficulties recognising religious discrimination and defending the victims and that some anti-racist associations had difficulties including religion on their agenda. In interviews with stakeholders, the issue of religious discrimination specifically targeting Muslims in the 18th was seen as a non-issue, even though these issues emerged in interviews.

The testimonies gathered during the focus group on civic and political participation showed that beyond the question of the representation of Muslims, it is important that the public authorities change their tack and do not stigmatise Muslims or encourage discrimination against them. According to many focus group participants, the majority of Muslims believe that political or institutional actors and civil society organisations project a negative image of Muslims. A woman who wore the hijab spoke about her experiences with feminist organisations. Along with other Muslim friends who wore the hijab, she tried to participate in a demonstration organised on International Women’s Day. Feminist organisations, however, refused to let the veiled women take part. In her experience these feminist groups in charge of organising this event systematically refused Muslim women’s organisations the right to be a part of the demonstration. According to her, these organisations see Muslim women who wear the veil as failing to defend the rights of women and symbols of women who are oppressed and who accept giving up their freedom. Focus group participants who wore the veil often found that the feminist organisations were responsible for prejudice against them, assuming women who wear the veil did so because of the pressure from their husbands or fathers but not in the name of their own religious commitment. This echoes the recurring discussion on the headscarf since 1989 that recently reappeared in the burqa affair.

A member of MRAP said that he recognised that Islamophobia was not a priority objective of his organisation. He explained that people involved in human rights organisations often have negative prejudices against Islam. For them, Islam is a synonym of radicalism and the oppression of women, so they find it difficult to prioritise the fight against Islamophobia.

It is impossible to assess how much immigrants or people of foreign origin are individually involved in the NGOs in the 18th arrondissement due to an absence of data. These organisations are particularly numerous and varied in the 18th, and some of their members are indeed immigrants or persons of foreign origin. The City of Paris has been offering measures to support and encourage the political expression of non-EU foreigners in general, but there are none for French citizens of foreign origin. Since they have the right to vote, it is up to them to participate in local and national elections and to be involved in associations or political parties.

468 These reflections were not only made in the focus group on political participation but in all the focus groups.
There are no positive discrimination initiatives in the political parties and municipal staff that facilitate the promotion of Muslim advisers, assistants, representatives or civil servants. People of foreign origin work both as Parisian municipal staff and 18th arrondissement staff. But their appointment is never presented as the consequence of affirmative action in favour of ethnic minorities, and few public actors mention them to underline the diversity within their team. For example, the deputy mayor in charge of social affairs in the 18th arrondissement, mentioned in an interview that she was glad to see that the project director of the urban policy programme in the La Chapelle-Porte d’Aubervilliers arrondissement is of North African origin. There is no affirmative action, but some municipal actors acknowledge more or less explicitly their interest in ensuring cultural and ethnic diversity among their staff. They recognise the discrimination situation, and reject the idea of developing specific policies to support the appointment of ethnic minorities. At the same time, they are ready to welcome ethnic-minority individuals to their staff because they think that it is necessary to encourage diversity, but not to impose it by law. According to them, practices have to change in the recruitment procedures and through the fight against prejudice among the employers in the public and the private sectors. Among Bertrand Delanoë’s staff, several council members are of foreign origin, such as Hamou Bouakkaz, who was in charge of the integration of disabled people and relations with the Muslim communities in the previous municipal team, and is currently deputy mayor in charge of local democracy and associative life.

Several women of North African background hold or held positions in City Hall. These include the former deputy mayor for the integration of non-EU foreigners, Khedidja Bourcart, the new deputy mayor for human rights and equality, Yamina Benguigui, and the deputy mayors responsible for child welfare, Fatima Lalem, and for gender equality, Myriam El Kormi. The deputy mayor for economy and social equality, Seybah Dagoma, is a young woman of Chadian origin.

10.5 Political Representation of the Muslim Community in Paris

10.5.1 The Institute of Islamic Cultures (Institut des Cultures d’Islam–ICI)

ICI is part of the Office for Cultural Affairs (Direction des affaires culturelles, DAC) of City Hall. ICI was “a political answer to an urban problem arising from the tiny available space in the arrondissement’s praying rooms and the praying in the streets for the Friday
prayer.” Then it became a wider cultural proposition, to give space to the expression of the diversity of Islamic cultures in Paris. In this respect, it can be said to fight unequal access to religious practice and to be part of the larger anti-discrimination agenda.

The ICI was created as a result of an individual initiative carried out by Hamou Bouakkaz, the then Islamic Relations Officer for the Mayor’s Office, as well as a political project addressing the local reality which was led by two dominant Muslim leaders, Mohammed Salah Hamza, the leader of the rue Myrrha mosque, and Moussa Diakité from the rue Polonceau mosque: “Those are people I have to work with, whether I like it or not. I like it sometimes. Sometimes I don’t.”

The ICI is also a religious association in charge of matters concerning worship, but the main part of the ICI’s activities are currently centred on promoting knowledge about Islam to the wider Parisian population, including exhibitions, teaching, conferences and public meetings. The purpose is to illustrate engagement with faith without breaking the law. The ICI project is innovative but also typical of the French dilemma with religion, because it houses a cultural centre and a place for worship. According to Hamou Bouakkaz, “It is our duty to help Islam to secularise.”

The ICI project in the 18th arrondissement has raised problems of how partnerships between Muslims and public authorities operate. The project combines a place of worship and cultural sections, including classrooms and an exhibition hall. The need for a new mosque in the area has been an important issue for quite some time, as the lack of space and capacity of the existing mosques mean that during Friday prayers the congregation spills out onto the streets. This is unsatisfactory for those attending Friday prayers as well as for those living in the surrounding streets, including the owners of the local businesses and their clients, who are hampered moving around the streets.

The municipality of the 18th arrondissement and the city of Paris had been trying to find a solution to this problem since 2001. The question of Muslim worship places has been a recurring issue in the 18th arrondissement. Hamou Bouakkaz, the deputy mayor in charge of relations with the Muslim community, suggested creating an Institute of Islamic Cultures (ICI), which would both be a cultural space promoting the culture of Islam and host a new place for worship in the arrondissement, to be administered by a religious association called the Association des musulmans de l’ouverture, AMO (Association of Muslims for Openness). Problems arose trying to find Muslim partners to create a religious organisation to work with the municipal authorities on the project, both on the cultural and the religious sides. In interviews, city officials involved in the

---

472 A staff member of the Institute of Islamic Cultures, April 2008, Paris.
473 Interview with the assistant to the mayor of Paris for local democracy and associative life (adjoint au maire de Paris pour la démocratie locale et la vie associative), 21 January 2008.
474 Interview with the assistant to the mayor of Paris for local democracy and associative life (adjoint au maire de Paris pour la démocratie locale et la vie associative), 21 January 2008.
project emphasised the difficulty of finding an intermediary with enough legitimacy in the Muslim community and also finding the funds and organisation to buy the places of worship and manage them.

The ICI's cultural and academic activities have been placed under the responsibility of a Law 1901 association composed of three partners (Paris City Hall, the department and l'École Pratique des Hautes Études). A Law 1905 association, AMO, will be the co-owner of the place and will buy all the worship sites (one floor in each building) and decide who will be the religious leader. The project has been delayed due to legal obstacles and the buildings are not expected to be ready for use until 2012–2013.

10.5.2 The CFCM

The most significant change in the public handling of Islam was the creation of the CFCM by the then minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy. Following a number of failed attempts by his predecessors, it took Sarkozy 18 months to bring Muslim leaders and associations together and to organise a national representative council that would engage with the state on issues of religion. With the CFCM, Muslims were finally represented in a centralised institution based on the coordination of regional boards or councils (the CRCM). The CFCM brings together various French Muslim organisations at the national level. Since its first mandate (May 2003), the members of this council and of its regional authorities (the regional Muslim Councils) are elected by delegates who are themselves appointed by each place of worship according to its own rules. The number of delegates a place of worship may appoint is determined by the size of the prayer room. Determining the number of delegates on the basis of capacity of the mosques disadvantages prayer rooms, like many in the 18th that are small but attract a high number of worshippers. In addition, many secular Muslims have criticised the fact that power is given only to the mosques, while numerous Muslims do not attend places of worship but nevertheless define themselves as Muslim,

475 They will buy the future building on the basis of plans (VEFA, ou Vente en l’État Futur d’Achèvement).

476 1901 associations (Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association, Law of 1 July 1901 relating to the contract of association) are different from 1905 associations (Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’État, Law of 9 December 1905 regarding the separation of church and state). Law 1901 associations are non-profit voluntary associations; Law 1905 associations are non-profit associations with restrictions limited by the religious nature of their activities (associations cultuelles); they ensure the exercise of worship and may accept only individual membership.

477 On the entire process for 2003, see the special issue of “L’islam de France” (Islam of France), Les Cahiers de l’orient (summer 2004) (the entire issue is dedicated to the CFCM, specifically the piece by Franck Frégosi and Bernard Godard).
and would like to give their opinion on the election of Muslim representatives and the management of the religion in France.\footnote{For instance, an organisation of secular Muslims published in May 2003 in a newspaper called \textit{Marianne} an appeal to Muslim citizens of France defending peace, justice, liberty and secularism. In the text, the movement tried to express its opposition to the development of a radical Islam in Europe and Muslim countries and wanted to encourage a debate about the reform of the religion and its adaptation to modernity: \textit{Marianne}, 5–11 May 2003.}

The CFCM focuses on religious affairs; however, its creation provided the impetus for the development of organisations that campaign on the need for action to ensure greater economic and political participation by Muslims. In 2004, Yazid Sabeg, a French corporate executive of Algerian origin,\footnote{His company, Communication and Systems, creates communication systems for the defence, security, aeronautics and transport sectors.} created a Secular Group for Equal Rights and the Promotion of French Muslims (\textit{Convention laïque pour l'égalité des droits et la participation des musulmans de France}). It is a think-tank promoting positive discrimination in favour of young people of Muslim origin in the economic sector. The former state secretary for sustainable development, Tokia Saïfi, created the French Council of Secular Muslims (\textit{Conseil français des musulmans laïques}) to facilitate the participation of secular French Muslims in political decisions. These movements especially aimed to represent an alternative to the CFCM, and to set up a structure mirroring the Council of French Jewish Organisations (\textit{Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France}) that can speak for the Muslim community in France. Nevertheless, most of them are not very well-known and have not managed to influence the public debate on Islam. There are many instances of such organisations, which show that Muslims attached to secular principles are very involved in supporting a moderate and modern conception of Islam and in participating in the debate on Islam and its place within French society.

\section*{10.6 Conclusion}

Speaking of Muslim participation does not make real sense in France, or indeed in the 18\textsuperscript{th}. It is clear, however, that the municipality (at the level of the city of Paris and the local \textit{arrondissement}) is aware of the political imperative to solve the public prayer problem, and has taken action offering temporary accommodation. This has been a recurring electoral argument and has been publicised by the Front National in a way that stigmatises the Muslim population as a whole. The ICI project is a political answer to this local problem of lack of space in local mosques. It is however not a bottom-up initiative and has not received unanimous support from Muslims or local residents.

A more significant issue is the reluctance of migrants and children of migrants to engage with politics at a local level. It seems urgent to support a more coherent policy on foreigners voting in local elections; along these lines, the local municipality, together with associations and political parties, organised a week of citizen elections.
from 16 May to 22 May 2011 under the label of “Ils vivent ici, ils bossent ici, ils votent ici: Votation citoyenne pour le droit de vote des étrangers” (They live here, they work here, they vote here: Citizenship voting for the right to vote of foreigners).
11. EXPERIENCES OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

This section is concerned with the relationship between Muslims and the media. It is based on the respondents’ answers to the Open Society Foundations’ questionnaires and the comments made during the focus group and roundtable sessions, as well as on secondary literature and expertise that have analysed the representation of Muslims and Islam in the French mainstream media.

The questionnaire and focus groups were conducted between two major events during which the media played a crucial role in the stigmatisation of Muslims. Fieldwork started after the enactment of the March 2004 Law and ended before the launching of the national identity debate in September 2009. Although Islam and Muslim-related issues have increasingly moved centre stage on French screens and in newspapers, the period during which the data were collected was relatively quiet in this respect, in comparison with recent periods of intense debate on the headscarf or the burqa.

11.1 Street Prayers

“La Goutte d’Or is the mecca for journalists who want to know what Arabs or Muslims think. This applies to all journalists,” said one of the roundtable participants.

Only recently, the 18th neighbourhood and its main mosque were thrust into the media spotlight when the leader of the National Front) Marine Le Pen, while campaigning in a party leadership election in December 2010, compared street prayers with the Nazi occupation of France during the Second World War. Six months earlier, a Facebook group, drawn from right-wing and far-right organisations, had tried to organise a giant alcohol and meat party (apéro pinard-saucisson) near the Khaled Ibn El Walid mosque on a Friday afternoon. The event was timed to take place a couple of hours before the kick-off of a World Cup football match between Algeria and England. Fearing that the gathering could trigger social disturbances in the highly multicultural neighbourhood, the Parisian police headquarters prohibited it. The debate eventually petered out in August 2011, when the temporary relocation of the Friday prayer to disused barracks was agreed between the mosque and the local authorities, followed by the ban on street prayers in September 2011.

While the street prayer debate never reached the scale of the debate on the hijab or that of the full-face veil, pictures showing streets crowded with Muslims praying have been regularly featured in the media and have to a certain extent gained iconic status as a snapshot of the Republic under threat. They crystallise many Islam-related fantasies: demographic growth, loss of control, a collective threat and male domination. They also serve as a discourse that persists in framing Islam as a foreign invasive religion. The

constant circulation of pictures showing a crowd of men praying in the open air can easily be associated with similar scenes in Middle Eastern countries, thus framing the Muslim population as “foreign”, pointing to their lack of respect for common rules of law, their potential disloyalty and their incompatibility with the Republican framework. During the 2007–2008 Paris mayoral campaign, opponents to Delanoé used this image repeatedly. Aware of the potential impact, ICI took a radically different standpoint by choosing to sponsor Martin Parr, the British photographer, to make a series of portraits of La Goutte d’Or residents, challenging the well-worn clichés.

11.2 Imaginary Islam

The media discourse on Islam has a powerful impact on the public perception and representation of Muslims in France. As one roundtable participant explained, the treatment of Muslims by the media is rarely fair, neutral or objective. It oscillates between two extremes: “on the one hand, the media insist on (talking to) the Muslims who succeed despite them being Muslims. On the other hand, they focus on the ‘threat’ Muslims represent and the fact that this threat is largely towards women.” (Foundations focus group).

Television and other media were instrumental in the 2003–2004 controversy that led to the law banning conspicuous religious symbols from public schools. Indeed, as Tévanian explains, the media, through a concerted campaign, played a vital role in orchestrating the shift of public opinion in favour of a prohibitive law.

As with 9/11, the media coverage of the headscarf issue has been coloured by partisan political concerns. Michelle Byng has noted: “Researchers found that negative media representations of hijab and the social exclusion of veiled Muslim women corresponded to efforts to prohibit veiling in Canadian and French public schools.” The idea that the mainstream national media has validated ideological positions on the headscarf and terrorism is reinforced by the repetition of stories which present national narratives as common sense.

The categories promoted by the media reflect a larger problem alluded to elsewhere in this report: “immigrants”, “French people of foreign origin”, “Muslims” are labels that do not correspond to anything precise but contribute to the formation of a complex socio-economic and cultural signifier. Some authors have tried to popularise alternative names, such as “French citizens of Muslim culture”, which is more satisfactory as it explicitly ties the fact of being a French citizen with a cultural distinction.

481 The exhibition of the pictures took place in June 2011 at ICI.
482 Pierre Tévanian, Le voile médiatique.
The role of television has been studied extensively as contributing to the creation of an imaginary Islam, actively fuelling the increase of Islamophobia in France. Pioneering research on the issue was completed by the journalist Thomas Deltombe who analysed a plethora of TV programmes on Islam and Muslims broadcast between 1975 and 2004 on French mainstream channels. Highlighting the fact that “Muslims” generally had little control over their own representations, he concluded that Islam in the French media was generally perceived through the lens of crises and events occurring outside France (Iranian Revolution, 9/11, Iraq war...), with the implicit meaning that “Muslims” were all the same.

Focus group participant put it this way:

In the media it is true, they start first with “there are wars in Muslim countries” and hop, here comes another report on “immigration laws”. Everything is mixed up and we don’t understand anything any more. This is why I don’t have TV.

Focus group participants held the media directly responsible for attaching negative associations to Islam and Muslims.

We started living with Islamophobia after 11 September. And it became unbearable. The media contributed to the universalising of Islamophobia. No other religion is treated like that, only Muslims. Even when they try to show their good will, even if they show tolerance, it doesn’t work. If you are a Muslim you have it in your genetic code, this conviction that violence is good.

Deltombe further argued that the representation of Islam on French screens is also shaped by problems and dynamics largely external to Islam itself, from the crisis in the French educational system and the banlieues, to the transformation of modern journalism. Thus the portrayal of Islam (and by extension of Muslims) “is less the reflection of a hypothetical ‘real Islam’ than the mirror of imaginaries running through the French society.”

Participants were not just concerned about the numerous negative portrayals of Islam, with Muslims depicted as the bad guys, but also with the media’s normalisation of the corrosive association between Islam and Muslims and problems. A Muslim participant remarked:

I try to imagine myself in the shoes of a Frenchman who lives in the centre of France. If I regularly see bomb attacks happening here and there on TV, where every time an Arab is responsible; if I see riots as happened in the suburbs which have absolutely no connection with the former but are the outcome of socio-economic specific conditions, not due to the fact that one is an Arab or a...

---

485 Deltombe’s work on French television is probably the most complete: see Deltombe, *L’islam imaginaire*, Geisser, *La nouvelle islamophobie*.
486 Deltombe, *L’islam imaginaire*.
487 Amiraux, “Suspicion publique et gouvernance de l’intime”.
Muslim ... If every time there is a crime, and if I always hear that it was committed by a person of African origin, then often his name is mentioned, even if he is French, they will insist on the fact that he is of foreign descent, from North Africa or Africa. … I say to myself that if I watch that with a completely fresh eye, there is a good chance that I will tell myself, “Yes, it’s true that Arabs are terrorists; that black people act this way.” It is true that I will think that way.

Another participant explained:

I have seen many non-fiction documentaries on French TV, from various channels. And I have thought about it. It is as if we, Muslims, have a DNA for violence. I don’t know why: why do they always stick to discourse where Islam is associated with violence? … Let me tell you this story: my aunt worked in an office for more than 30 years. Right after 11 September, she hears a comment from a 30-year-old colleague: “I cannot work with her any more because I don’t want to take the risk that she blows this place up.”

On the other side of the TV screen, Jean-Michel Riera, a film-maker, who made a movie about Parisian mosques, has emphasised the lack of ethics displayed by his fellow media workers when they visit neighbourhoods such as the 18th, and which is intertwined with the constraints imposed on contemporary journalism. Journalists turn up at the location when news dictates it, without either asking for permission to film or bothering to make appointments to cover topics which they are ill-prepared for, relying instead on common assumptions while suffering from the usual journalistic deadlines:

Media plus Muslims equals conflict, to say the least. I have done this film on mosques. The presence of a camera near the mosque was perceived negatively. They were suspicious of me, of my project. This negative assessment of media is systematic. The criticisms by Muslims are always the same: they point to certain channels, known for their negative comments about Muslims, or to certain ways of doing journalism (hidden camera). Most of the people in the mosques have accumulated much rancour, vis-a-vis journalists, mainly because of the recurrent representation of Muslims under the security lens, terrorism or as a cultural invader… Proper education needs to be done. On both sides … I realised I, myself, had been contaminated by this way of working.

As Riera stated, “Each mosque, each leader has its own style: you don’t film in the 19th as you do in the 18th.” When he made his movie on the mosques in the 18th, he went through the lengthy process of formal negotiations with Hamza, the imam of the overcrowded mosque, which was constantly under the media spotlight:

488 Interview with Jean-Michel Riera, June 2010.
489 Interview with Jean-Michel Riera, June 2010.
it was like OPEC negotiations during an oil crisis. Hamza is a local leader. He has the power and authority within the neighbourhood to have people remain calm and quiet, to accept a camera on Friday. He literally organised the event and everything went smoothly … he has real power. The other imam in Polonceau (Diakité) did not let me film. The youngsters were too excited … Hamza owns the mosque. He is at home.

Another significant problem raised during the focus group related to the question of who was speaking on behalf of the Muslims and representing them:

I would like to elaborate on the issue of representatives in the media. In general, media tend to discuss Islam always through the same type of experts, Orientalists and Arabic-speaking people who play their role … [but] we don’t see many Muslims in the media.

Finally, it is clear that the ordinary life of Muslims does also not attract media attention. As most of the roundtable participants emphasised, the media treatment of Muslims in France ignored the daily preoccupations of a significant segment of the French population; instead of being asked to express their feelings about common daily issues such as the cost of living or schooling, Muslims are only approached to discuss “Muslim issues” and thus are confined to their religious identity.

11.3 Ethnic Media

Asked about where they look for information about their neighbourhood, Muslims mostly relied on word of mouth, municipal offices, neighbours and local newspapers. For information about the city or country at large, similar to the rest of the population, Muslims relied on television, radio and national newspapers as the main sources of information, together with the internet. Local ethnic media are not that numerous in the 18th. The only local newspaper covering Paris and its surroundings is Le Parisien. France 3 Ile de France is the regional TV channel for the same area. In the 18th, citizens have access to local information providers that relay information exclusively on the arrondissement: for example, Le 18e du mois is a monthly newspaper, and dixhuitinfo.com is a website posting local information.

In other European countries, ethnic media play a role in facilitating the interaction between minorities and mainstream media. Rigoni highlights the fact that it is often in a context of extreme stigmatization that minority populations look for alternative

---

490 There are other websites on La Goutte d’Or providing information about shows, exhibitions and conferences, such as www.lagouttedor.net and www.rencontres-gouttedor.org. All local associations have their own websites (e.g. www.sallesaintbruno.org, www.institut-cultures-islam.org/ici).
An alternative media scene would thus be welcome in an environment of misrepresentation and stigmatisation, which is the situation for Muslims living in France. Despite this situation, many media outlets catering for the Muslim populations have been flourishing over the last decade, most noticeably those that are web-based. Among the examples are saphirnews.com (a Muslim website dedicated to news and religious issues), al-kanz.org (a blog concerned with Muslim consumer issues and in particular the burgeoning halal market) and the most popular of all, oumma.com, a highly regarded multimedia website which has impressively evolved since its inception in 1999 to offer a wide range of articles, news reports and conferences on issues traditionally related to Islam and Muslims but also on French and international current affairs. Ten years after its creation the website was receiving more than 1 million unique views per month.

---


12. CONCLUSIONS

In the introduction, three main questions were aired that the report is trying to address: What makes Muslims a specific population to deal with in an arrondissement such as the 18th in Paris? To what extent do their ordinary experiences as Paris citizens differ from those of non-Muslims? Is religion a predictable variable in the way individuals relate to the urban environment they live in, identify with and belong to, and how does it impact on the way public agencies treat them?

The 18th arrondissement and La Goutte d’Or neighbourhood emerge from this study as ambiguous territories where multiculturalism is side by side with segregation, where proximity does not mean interaction. Among the inhabitants of the arrondissement, the feeling of belonging to the neighbourhood is very strong, both for the Muslims as well as for the non-Muslims. In general, the inhabitants feel they belong to the arrondissement and are satisfied with living there, even attached to it. But they acknowledged they did not really come up against ethnic and cultural diversity. Many comments conveyed the feeling of a general lack of occasion for socialising and properly interacting with others: respondents found this to be true for all sectors of social life. In a way there is no multicultural sociability.

Another important aspect that came out of the survey is the complex articulation between local belonging and identification on the one hand and, on the other hand, the participants’ perception and representation of national issues and identities. None of the respondents used the notion of ghetto in describing their neighbourhood; however, in many ways, their way of relating to the neighbourhood has affiliations with this concept. Indeed, besides designating a delimited urban space or a set of institutions tied to a specific group, ghetto also alludes to values, symbols and ways of thinking implying the social and moral isolation of a stigmatised group of people. Here a ghetto refers to a place where people live and wish to escape from, but it also appears as a familiar and even friendly environment that protects individuals by providing them with familiar references, habits and landmarks. It has this double-faced character that Wacquant describes as articulating external hostility and internal affinity, sword and shield. This helps understand the persistence of a distance from national issues: France remains outside the neighbourhood.

The major findings emphasise the irrelevance of religion as a criterion for understanding the different attitudes between people in their assessment, for instance, of socio-economic difficulties, feelings of discrimination, of belonging. While ethnic diversity and socio-economic difficulties were clearly identified by respondents and participants as major issues with a significant impact on the daily life of the local citizens and a principal argument for their relation with local public institutions, religion remains marginal to them. Religion appears to have a less predictive value or at least to be a less significant factor for Muslims in the ways they are mistreated. This

493 Wacquant, “Les deux visages du ghetto”.
was more extensively discussed in the focus groups than in the questionnaires, where the important distinction among people was in most of the cases the place of birth and the length of the stay in France.

The absence of reliable data on the Muslim population was a major problem in writing this report. Public authorities prefer to avoid speaking about specific beneficiaries such as migrants, foreigners and people of foreign origin, which prevents bringing ethnic origin and the religious information into the debate, and maintains the illusion of equal access to public services. This behaviour can be construed as a form of hypocrisy in which public services do not take specific actions dedicated to particular populations, but at the same time recognise that some of their actions should be adapted to the needs of certain beneficiaries. In the health sector, in spite of the difficulties of access to health care for foreigners, and the existence of serious health problems in these populations, the services are still undecided on what approach to take in terms of prevention or treatment policies. This situation causes some temporary and unofficial adaptations to some requests coming from foreign populations without a clear and official public policy proposed by the city of Paris and the municipality.

While Islam as a social concern and a public problem is often described as a post-migration issue, the Open Society Foundations’ survey clearly illustrates how migration takes priority over every other factor in understanding the connections between discrimination and exclusion. However, social anxieties over the relationship between Islam and France’s social cohesion have multiplied, becoming an argument for very different political groups.
13. Recommendations

The various layers of French government are all key players in public policy. There is a plethora of decision-makers who function at the local, regional and national levels and this dispersal of power makes policy coordination difficult but vital. Directing the following recommendations is therefore problematic and implementation requires interagency cooperation and collaboration.

13.1 Identity, Belonging and Interaction

The Open Society Foundations’ research finds that Muslims respondents’ identification with Paris and France is strong, but that there is a complex relationship between the feelings of belonging to and identification with the city and country and the issues of nationality and identity. Religion does not necessarily lead to understanding the experiences and feelings of social and economic deprivation, exclusion and discrimination, as belief may be marginal to people’s everyday experiences. Governmental policy focusing on places of worship and religious practices cannot be the whole solution to meeting the needs of people with an immigrant background and in fact leads to a feeling of being collectivised and stigmatised. It also displaces the need for a discussion of the issues that face residents and communities regardless of their background, ethnicity and religion.

Recommendations

1. The City Hall of Paris, the Prefect of Paris and other relevant authorities are urged to develop strategies that build upon this report’s findings that Muslim respondents have a very strong and positive sense of belonging to their neighbourhoods and to Paris. The challenges and everyday concerns of Muslims are pragmatic and do not differ from other groups in society, namely employment and adequate and suitable housing, clean streets, safe neighbourhoods and public spaces for young people. Promoting an inclusive identity and society should ensure that everyone is an integral part of the city.

2. Regular dialogue between local authorities and inhabitants improves the morale of communities and their acceptance of policies. The City Hall of Paris and arrondissement councils should further develop mechanisms for greater coordination and implementation of local policies and initiatives that take into account the needs of inhabitants. This can be undertaken through, for example, the creation of residents’ councils and the involvement of migrant organisations.

3. While the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood is strong, there is a noticeable lack of interaction between people from different backgrounds. Improving dialogue and interaction would greatly assist in breaking down stereotypes and misperceptions between groups and decrease segregation.
District institutions might help create formal and informal contact between individuals and various groups, including cultural events which involve all groups from neighbourhoods, youths and women’s centres, and sports activities.

4. The government of France should place an emphasis on the implementation of anti-discrimination legislation at the local level in Paris and other French cities. The City Hall of Paris, arrondissement councils, equality and anti-discrimination bodies and NGOs across the city should set in motion campaigns which recognise that discrimination exists in many forms and demonstrate the kinds of actions needed to combat it. Local district offices or campaigns mandated to monitor discrimination, including in the 18th arrondissement, do exist but they should be improved in order to make their presence more visible and better aligned with inhabitants’ needs, in particular for those seeking access to legal advice and support for those seeking redress against religious discrimination.

5. Robust data are needed for the development of evidence-based public policies. Institutions at the local level are considering different ways to collect data which offer a useful picture of the experiences and needs of different minority groups, but there is little or no official data on religious groups and identity, mostly because of government policy. There are assertions at an official level that race, ethnicity and migration status are more important than religion as explanations of the social exclusion experienced by Muslims. They may be right. However, the absence of data on religion poses obstacles when attempting to devise policies that consider the religious needs and experiences of Muslims, and therefore the National Statistical Agency and the government of France are urged to consider the inclusion of a booster sample of minority groups which includes at least a question on religion, perceptions, experiences and attitudes towards Muslims and other minority groups.

13.2 Education

The carte scolaire system, the national education map of schools that assigns children to the public school closest to the parents’ residence, means that children from poorer areas attend schools which may not enjoy the same quality of teaching and facilities as private schools. Alongside lower education success rates, these public schools have a significant number of ethnic-minority pupils and therefore there are fewer opportunities for children to experience social mixing and diversity. The lack of interaction with people from different backgrounds, socio-economically and culturally, was a concern to respondents in this study and many parents are concerned about their children’s segregation. Private schools are viewed as the place where children will have the opportunity to mingle with children from other backgrounds.
Educational achievement is affected by low aspirations and a lack of support from teachers. Teaching an increasingly diverse cultural and religious student population is a challenge for which support and training are needed.

Bilingualism can be viewed as an asset and a challenge. Theoretically, early bilingualism is positive but when the language is non-European, it is seen as a hindrance to a child’s integration and learning. Learning the national language is vital to all aspects of life and this was highlighted by the importance attached to learning French by Muslim respondents of this report.

Recommendations

6. In order to improve integration between children of diverse backgrounds, the Ministry of Education and the various education authorities should propose the development of stronger links between private and public schools and schools where students are predominantly from one ethnic group. The carte scolaire system should be reviewed in order to ensure that such a policy does not lead to segregation.

7. The Ministry of Education and the education department of the City Hall of Paris should provide support for teachers in acquiring a greater understanding of the cultural heritage and background of different faith groups, including Muslims. There are many civil society and grass roots projects which could provide much needed resources to support teachers and students.

8. The City Hall of Paris and local educational authorities should ensure that bilingual pupils receive support for their language skills and needs in realising their full potential. In addition, support for the teaching of non-European languages would demonstrate recognition of pupils’ multiple identities and the value placed by the education system on diversity in society. The Department of Education and local educational departments should encourage the teaching and learning of non-European languages, such as Arabic and Turkish, as part of a culturally inclusive curriculum.

9. The district education authorities in Paris are urged to consider the part that can be played by mentors in improving the motivation and performance of pupils. Mentoring can encourage and support students to maximise their potential and develop their skills and career opportunities. Schools should consider professionals with a migrant background to form mentoring schemes which will assist pupils to develop networks as well as allow them to relate to individuals with similar backgrounds as role models. Employers from the private and public sector, in collaboration with local authorities, should support such initiatives by identifying employees within their organisations and offering them workplace apprenticeships.
13.3 Employment

Discrimination remains a key barrier to employment for people with minority backgrounds. The findings from this report suggest that origin and colour play a significant role in the experience of discrimination in the labour market.

The city of Paris has created Points of Access to Rights (Points d’accès au droit) across various districts in Paris. These offer free information and advice to victims of labour market discrimination. However, despite their presence, the number of cases and complaints are small in number. This is due to a lack of awareness of their existence and individual perceptions of what constitutes discrimination.

Competent employment departments in the city of Paris and at the district levels should consider the expansion of state sponsored languages course to older migrants. Currently, legislation means that all new migrants have to enrol on language course if they do not speak French fluently. As such, this disadvantages and discourages long settled migrants to enter the labour market.

Recommendations

10. In order to better understand and combat discrimination, the government of France, the City Hall of Paris, the Ministry of Employment and other bodies should commission research to evaluate the labour market experience of people from migrant backgrounds. Such research, together with existing studies, would offer evidence for policymakers to initiate action to better understand the barriers for particular groups and individuals and policies to improve the employment prospects of the economically inactive.

11. The district authorities where the Point of Access to Rights offices are located should vigorously promote the initiative and the support of local authorities, and leaders should endeavour to create a climate of trust and confidence in the state to combat prejudice. Existing civil society organisations mandated to promote equality are important partners in spreading awareness of such efforts.

13.4 Housing

Paris is faced with an increasing population and a growing demand for social housing. Respondents in this report mentioned City Hall as a place where people come to get information and advice. A number of housing NGOs and national organisations are involved in helping people apply for social housing. Despite the engagement of a number of groups, there remains a perception and experience of unequal access to housing (private and public) by both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in this report. This is partly due to a lack of information on the application procedures and the long waiting period before properties are allocated.
Physically appealing neighbourhoods create an environment of comfort and security and lead to better cohesion and interaction. Some of the biggest concerns among the respondents to this report were dirty streets and improving the attractiveness of living areas.

In one of the focus groups, the testimony of an owner confirmed that landlords are suspicious of foreigners and often refuse to rent apartments to them. The local city administration has already set up “solidarity renting” (Louez solidaire) to support families in their search for appropriate housing. This initiative establishes conventions with private tenants that commit to rent at moderate prices. In exchange, the city guarantees the rent.494

Recommendations

12. Housing associations and municipality and district housing offices should consider involving migrant and other organisations from different groups in raising awareness of the process and procedures relating to social housing as well as offering advice and support if and when discrimination occurs.

13. District housing departments should consider the creation or strengthening of neighbourhood action groups which can work with municipal services in order to promote civic responsibility from residents towards their neighbourhoods.

14. It is important to ensure that the social housing service is executed in collaboration with the municipality and located in the premises of the City Hall, in order to facilitate housing applications.

15. The service could also work with the private-sector housing owners in the 18th arrondissement where there is said to be systemic discrimination495 and could set up an information campaign to encourage owners to rent to foreign families or people of foreign origin. The service could also make arrangements with the owners to find them families with the necessary financial means to rent their accommodation. Finally, City Hall could offer a tax reduction to owners who agree to rent their accommodations to these families.

---

495 See for instance a report by the CNH on social housing and the private market of low-rent housing, which mentioned the systemic effects leading to the concentration of certain categories of population and adding to the length of the administrative procedures for allocating housing. The report explicitly mentions the nationality, the origin and racial/ethnic identity as the first criteria in discrimination in access to social housing: CNH, Discriminations dans l’accès au logement. Rapport du groupe de travail (Discrimination in access to housing. Report of the working group), 2005. A summary is available in FASILD, “Pour un égal accès au logement” (For an equal access to housing), Lettre du FASILD 64 (January 2006). See also Haut Conseil à l’intégration, Études et intégration.
16. The service could also offer its help with the problem of hotel rooms. Indeed, the service could list landlords (the “sleep peddlers”) profiting from the immigrants’ hardships by renting very expensive rooms and could lodge complaints against the owners of these hotels to denounce their fraud.

17. There appears therefore to be a need for a housing advocacy and support service for tenants at the arrondissement level. Such a service could thus respond to general questions about housing, and inform people how to file applications and how to make a complaint if problems with the landlord arise. It would also provide support to those who need translation and other services in dealing with housing issues. It could also work with the PAD office to provide support and information over housing discrimination and could address difficulties accessing the different housing offices in Paris, following perhaps the model from the health sector. The idea would be to work closely with the NGOs in the arrondissement and collect the applications, in order to help and support the applicants. The service could be in partnership with public services or NGOs already working in the arrondissement (such as the PAD). Advice on discrimination could be in partnership with an association like the MRAP, with mediators specialising in housing discrimination. The purpose of such a service would not be to co-opt the work already done by existing structures but to provide those structures with better visibility by hosting information offices.

13.5 Health

The health sector has a good image among the population and can be considered a success for local actors. It is performing efficiently in many ways: information, campaigning, reaching out to target groups and involving NGOs and other actors. Actions based on ethnic and religious identity currently concern only a few NGOs which are only able to respond in a spontaneous, unofficial and limited way. Organisations are dependent on funds from the public authorities but some do manage

---

496 The majority of participants in the focus group on housing underlined the role of NGOs in helping people to apply for social housing and to secure accommodation. So, the usefulness of these organisations seems to be well recognised by the inhabitants of the 18th.

497 The MRAP was created in 1949 and is one of the best known NGOs working on racism and discrimination issues. The deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development explained that he invited the MRAP to examine the work of the allocation commission in the 18th, to show the MRAP that discrimination was not taking place in the way it worked. Interview with the deputy mayor for planning, housing and sustainable development, 23 January 2008.

498 The housing coordination service could also propose specific help to people without documents who have difficulties getting support from the municipal services, which generally ask for them to be legally settled in the country. In the focus group on housing, several people described their difficulties getting help from official structures because of their illegal status in France.
to work on the needs of specific national/cultural communities combining their efforts to include wider groups of users.

Recommendations

18. Screenings in the migrant workers’ hostels should be increased and other screenings for HIV/AIDS or diabetes could be offered. Medical consultations inside the residences could be made more available. Although public health policies have laid emphasis on prevention and information, the old migrants’ need for medical advice and consultations should not be neglected. Moreover, a support system should be developed to help the residents in their applications for social benefits or social and health coverage. This type of support already exists in several migrant workers’ hostels but again it is necessary to improve the support by bringing in translators when the social workers do not speak the language of the residents. The residents often still do not speak French fluently, and even when they do, they sometimes have difficulties understanding how the French health system works. The language barrier can be a serious obstacle in the way of accessing rights. The translators could be residents whose linguistic capacities are sufficient to facilitate the dialogue between social workers and the residents.

13.6 Policing and Security

The police force in Paris is viewed with a certain amount of dissatisfaction by all groups. This is related to the perception of the police’s unfair treatment of minorities in their everyday interactions and tension and suspicion between young people of all backgrounds and the police. A common complaint during the study was the inexperience of officers, both in terms of age and intercultural issues.

Recommendations

19. Strategies to improve relations between the police and the community should ensure that policing on the streets is not seen as a symptom of crime-ridden areas and instead should seek to increase the confidence of all residents to feel protected and included. The prefecture of police in Paris and district police departments are encouraged to recruit individuals into the police force who personify diversity in France but also have experience of dynamics in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods.

20. As a step towards improving public confidence in the police, the prefecture of police in Paris and competent French authorities should review current mechanisms for overseeing the system for handling complaints made against police ill-treatment, with a view to creating an independent police complaints commission or an ombudsman who would be responsible for oversight of investigations of police complaints.
21. The prefecture of police in Paris and the competent French authorities should systematically record its use of stops, identity checks and searches. This should be done through stop forms which include the date, time, and place a police stop occurs, the name of the police officer, the legal ground of the stop, and if possible the ethnic origin and nationality of the person stopped. Stop forms can be used to monitor police practices and encourage officers to make well-grounded stops, and help local communities to hold the police accountable for their actions.

13.7 Participation and Citizenship

The research findings from this report point to a certain reluctance of older migrants and their children to engage with political processes. This is in part due to a number of long-term settled residents who do not have the right to vote in local or general elections. Local policymakers, including the mayor of Paris, are concerned about the democratic legitimacy of actions taken by city authorities in areas where a significant proportion of long-term settled populations are disenfranchised.

This report finds that although religion is an important aspect of identity for Muslims it is one part of a multiplicity of identities which can be important forms of social capital that support participation and integration.

Recommendations

22. The government of France can address unofficial political disenfranchisement by extending the right to vote in local elections to all those who are long-term settled residents in a city.

23. The government of France and city and district authorities should respond to the study’s findings that religion is not an obstacle to identity and belonging to Paris and France and the persistence of discrimination and prejudice contributes to corroding a sense of acceptance and belonging among Muslims and other minorities.

24. National authorities should invite experts and politicians to specifically think of “religion” in the framework of the public debate on ethnic statistics.
ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

In English


Annex 1. Bibliography


At Home in Europe Project 259

ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY


**In French**


Atelier Santé Ville Paris 18, *Diagnostic Santé. Quartiers de la Goutte d’Or, de La Chapelle-Porte d’Aubervilliers, Amiraux-Simplon, et des Portes Montmartre-Cignancourt-Moskova* (Health Diagnosis. Report for La Goutte d’Or, La Chapelle-Porte d’Aubervilliers,


Balibar, Étienne. “Le retour de la race” (Race coming back), Mouvements (March 2007). Available at www.mouvements.info/Le-retour-de-la-race.html


Birnbaum, Yaël and Annick Kieffer. “D’une génération à l’autre, les aspirations éducatives des familles immigrées: ambition et persévérance” (From one generation to the other, the educational expectations of immigrant families: ambition and perseverance), Education et Formations 72 (September 2005), pp. 53–75.


Calvès, Gwénaëlle. "Il n'y a pas de race ici" (There are no races here), Critique internationale 17 (2002), pp. 173–186.


Carde, Estelle. "De l'origine à la santé, quand l'ethnique et la race croisent la classe" (From origin to health: when ethnicity and race cross social class) Revue européenne des migrations internationales (forthcoming, 2012).


Cédiex, Eric, Fabrice Foroni and Hélène Garner. Discriminations à l'embauche fondée sur l'origine à l'encontre de jeunes Français(e)s peu qualifié(e)s: une enquête nationale par tests de discrimination ou testing. Premières informations et premières synthèses (Discrimination based on origin towards young French with low qualifications: a national survey by
Charmes, Éric. “Le retour à la rue comme support de la gentrification” (The return to the streets as support to gentrification), *Éspaces et sociétés* 3 (2005), pp. 115–135, p. 122.


Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (Action and Support Fund for Integration and the Fight against Discrimination, FASILD). “Pour un égal accès au logement” (For an equal access to housing), *Lettre du FASILD* 64 (January 2006).


Institut de veille sanitaire (Institute for Public Health Surveillance). “Parcours sociomédical des personnes originaires d’Afrique sub-saharienne atteintes par le VIH prises en charge dans les hôpitaux d’Ile-de-France” (Socio-medical trajectory of HIV-positive persons from sub-Saharan Africa and cured in Ile-de-France hospitals), *Bulletin Épidémiologique Hebdomadaire* 5 (27 January 2002).


International Crisis Group. “La France face à ses musulmans: émeutes, jihadisme et dépolitisation” (France facing its Muslims: riots, jihadism and depoliticisation), 9 March 2006. Available at www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/172_la_france_face_a_ ses_musulmans_emeutes__jihadisme_amended.ashx


Koussens, David. “Sous l’affaire de la *burqa* … quel visage de la laïcité française?” (Behind the burka affair … which face of French secularism?), *Sociologie et Sociétés* 41(2) (2009), pp. 327–347.


Marlière, Eric. “Les jeunes de cité et la police: de la tension à l’émeute” (Young people from the suburb and the police: from tension to riot), Empan 67 (March 2005).


Paoli, Jean-François and Alain Seksig, eds. L’école face à l’obscurantisme religieux (Schools facing religious obscurantism). Paris: Max Milo, 2006.


Rousseau-Giral, Anne Chantal, Dominique Tricard and Georges Crepey, eds. Lutte contre le saturnisme infantile lié à l’habitat indigne. Analyse du dispositif dans trois départements d’Ile-de-France (Fight against childhood lead poisoning due to inadequate housing. Analysis of the policy implemented in three departments of Ile-de-France). Paris: La Documentation française, 2004.


Saada, Emmanuelle. “La parole est aux Indigènes” (A word to the indigenous peoples) (special issue), Genèses 69(4) (2007).


Sala Pala, Valérie. “Le racisme institutionnel dans la politique du logement social” (Institutional racism in social housing policy), Sciences de la société 65 (May 2005), pp. 87–102.

Sala Pala, Valérie. “La politique du logement social au risque du client? Attributions de logements sociaux, construction sociale des clients et discriminations ethniques en France et en Grande-Bretagne” (Housing policy at the risk of the client? Allocations of social housing, social construction of the clients and ethnic discrimination in France and in Great Britain), Politiques et management public 24(3) (September 2006), pp. 77–92.
Sala-Pala, Valérie. "Le racisme institutionnel dans les attributions de logement social. Une comparaison franco-britannique" (Institutional racism in the allocation of social housing. A French-British comparison), Hommes & migrations 264 (November–December 2006).


Servan-Schreiber, Catherine and Vasooodeven Vuddamalay, eds. "Diasporas indiennes dans la ville" (Indian diasporas in the city), Hommes et migrations 1268–1269 (July–October 2007).


Stanojevich, Elodie Aïna and Arnaud Veïsse. "Repères sur la santé des migrants" (Key data on migrants’ health), La santé de l’homme 392 (November–December 2007).

ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY


Government and policy documents


Annex 1: Bibliography


MUSLIMS IN PARIS


 Laws, Acts and Decrees

Circulaire du 28 October 1997 relative à la mise en œuvre des contrats locaux de sécurité (Circular of 28 October 1997, regarding the implementation of the local security contracts), Ministère de l’Intérieur (Ministry of the Interior) NOR: INTK9700174C


Loi 48-1360 du 1er septembre 1948 portant modification et codification de la législation relative aux rapports des bailleurs et locataires ou occupants de locaux d’habitation ou à usage professionnel et instituant des allocations de logement (Law 48-1360 of 1 September 1948 including modification and codification of the legislation regarding relations between landlords and renters and creating housing allocations).

Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (Law 78-17 of 6 January 1978 concerning data processing and freedom).

Loi 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982 relative à l’organisation administrative de Paris, Marseille, Lyon et des établissements publics de coopération intercommunale (Law 82-1169 of 31 December 1982 concerning the administrative organisation of Paris, Lyon, Marseille and of the public offices of intercommunal cooperation).


Law 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004, Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées
public (Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 outlining, by application of the principle of laïcity, the wearing of signs or garments showing a belonging to a religion in public primary, lower and upper secondary schools).


Loi 2006-685 du 13 juin 2006 relative au droit de préemption et à la protection des locataires en cas de vente d’un immeuble (Law 2006-685 of 13 June 2006 concerning the right of pre-emption and the protection of the tenants in case of the selling of a building).

Loi 2007-290 du 5 mars 2007 instituant le droit au logement opposable et portant diverses mesures en faveur de la cohésion sociale (Law 2007-290 of 5 March 2007 creating the enforcement of the right to housing and containing various measures in favour of social cohesion).


### Table 27. Is this a close-knit neighbourhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Open Society Foundations
Chapter 5: Experiences of Muslim communities: Education

Table 29. Level of satisfaction with secondary schools in the neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in France %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside France %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations

Table 30. Frequency of meeting people from a different religion to yourself
(At school, at work)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
Table 34. In the last five years, have you been refused or turned down for a job in this country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has interviewee been refused a job in this country in last five years?</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim %</td>
<td>Non-Muslim %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has interviewee been discriminated against at work (i.e.: promotion) in last 5 years?</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim %</td>
<td>Non-Muslim %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
**Chapter 8: Experiences of Muslim communities: Health and Social Services**

**Table 47. Frequency of interaction with people from different ethnic groups in the last year in the health centre and hospital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least monthly</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor at all</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*

**Chapter 9: Experiences of Muslim Communities: Policing and Security**

**Table 55. Have you been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Open Society Foundations*
Table 56. If you have been a victim of a crime, where did this happen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born in EU %</th>
<th>Non-Muslims born outside EU %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local area</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Society Foundations
Whether citizens or migrants, native born or newly-arrived, Muslims are a growing and varied population that presents Europe with challenges and opportunities. The crucial tests facing Europe’s commitment to open society will be how it treats minorities such as Muslims and ensures equal rights for all in a climate of rapidly expanding diversity.

The Open Society Foundations’ At Home in Europe project is working to address these issues through monitoring and advocacy activities that examine the position of Muslims and other minorities in Europe. One of the project’s key efforts is this series of reports on Muslim communities in the 11 EU cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Leicester, London, Marseille, Paris, Rotterdam, and Stockholm. The reports aim to increase understanding of the needs and aspirations of diverse Muslim communities by examining how public policies in selected cities have helped or hindered the political, social, and economic participation of Muslims.

By fostering new dialogue and policy initiatives between Muslim communities, local officials, and international policymakers, the At Home in Europe project seeks to improve the participation and inclusion of Muslims in the wider society while enabling them to preserve the cultural, linguistic, and religious practices that are important to their identities.