"HIGHER EDUCATION FOR REFUGEES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA"

A Conversation With Ben Rawlence
Moderator: Martha Loerke

ANNOUNCER:
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ADAM RADWAN:
For those of you who don't know me, my name is Adam Radwan. And I'm with the Open Society Fellowship Program. And very excited to introduce one of our own fellows today, Ben Rawlence, who was selected for the fellowship-- last year and will be completing this year, actually.
Ben's fellowship project has been-- he's been conducting ethnographic research on Somali youth and Kenyan refugees, documenting their lives, interviewing them, and following them, and seeing what-- what struggles are happening. And for today's discussion-- Ben will be talking about the opportunities and challenges to higher education in refugees. Moderating the discussion will be Martha Loerke, who is the director of the scholarships program here at O.S.F. So over to Ben.

BEN RAWLENCE:
All right, well-- thanks very much for having me. And I'm very grateful to O.S.F. for funding the work that I've been doing. I'd like to tell you just a little bit about what that is. And then I've got kind of three questions for the foundations, really, which have sprung out of conversations I've had with other-- other colleagues in Nairobi and London and based on my insights from the camp, suggestions for places that the foundations could engage or things to think about.
So as Adam said, the last -- 18 months, I've been spending a lot of time in Dadaab, which is the largest refugee camp in the world. Current population is about 350,000 people-- which is a little bit smaller than Atlanta. About the size of Zurich. It's a perm-- it's-- it-- it's nominally temporary, because it's a refugee camp. There's no permanent structures. There's no plumbing. There's no roads.

And yet, it's been there for 25 years since the outbreak of war-- the civil war in Somalia in 1991. So I've been spending time with people who-- who live there, some of whom were born there, who've never-- never left, because the refugees can't leave. Trying to see what life looks like from that very limited perspective-- to-- try and then make some suggestions about how-- how things could be done differently-- and also more broadly-- to-- the Kenyan government-- European governments, and the U.S. government about what that experience suggests about their foreign policy approach to the region, both how they deal with refugees, but also counterterror narratives in the Horn of Africa more widely.

Because at-- at present, they're very mu-- the refugees are very much demonized. Kenya blames them for-- a lot of the insecurity that is happening in their-- in their country. When, in fact, they-- they could be-- a real force-- for good, real allies w-- in-- in terms of Kenya's policy in Somalia, rather than-- being a scapegoat.

So spending that time-- hanging out with these young people and writing about them-- which will be-- the-- those-- those stories will be in a book that's gonna come out-- at the beginning of 2016, which I'm just putting the finishing touches to. A number of things-- a number of questions-- arose. The main concern of-- of those people, some of them-- about ten young people I've been following. Some of them-- have not been to school at all. Some of them have been to primary school. Some of them have been to primary school. Some of them have had some exposure to secondary education. And one or two have managed to get diplomas through distance learning-- in the camp that they have purchased-- from Nairobi, from the private universities in Nairobi.

And there are challenges-- there are educational challenges at all those three levels. So although this talk was, I think, h-- headlined higher education, actually my-- my point is-- about education generally. And why that's important. The enrollment rates in primary education are around 42%. The enrollment rates in secondary education are around 13%. So very few of the refugees in their camp are finding-- places in school. And that's because there are no-- there are not enough places. There are not enough teachers. It's a drastic problem.

And it's also because although education is supposed to be free-- there are actually very real financial barriers, because you have to have a uniform. You have to have a notebook. Things which cost money. And the economy of the camp is primarily a non-cash barter economy. Because people get their food aid rations from The World Food Program. And then they exchange those for other things.

So cash is often hard to come by. And it-- it might take weeks or even months of saving up-- selling part of your food rations to afford something like a school uniform. So the access to education is very, very limited. It's actually more or less
the same as numbers in Somalia, which is at war. So primary education enrollment and secondary education enrollment are similar. And you have therefore similar-- similar-- similar effects that the youth who are not involved-- in-- in education are at risk of either being pulled into-- armed groups or at risk of being exploited, the loss of child labor. And, of course, in a more general way, being very unaware of their rights and-- and-- and of their right to self-realization.

This is important, because the-- from the experience of talking to the-- to the kids, even the tiniest brush with primary education is enough to open up (UNINTEL) a window of ambition in their minds that's-- that their life could be something or could mean something other than simply survival and-- and getting by. The other window that-- that is opening up is a window of self-realization so that you can question some of the received assumptions of the clan and of the conservative society-- that's-- that exists in-- in-- in the Horn of Africa.

And for those people who have-- progressed through that, who've gone through secondary education, who-- and some of those who've got the-- the distance learning diplomas, there is a real generational struggle. So you have this-- this very unique generation, grown up in the camp, many of whom were born after '91-'92, who've never-- who've never left. But who have been raised in this kind of liberal bubble-- sponsored by the U.N. with a U.N. calendar, such as g-- Global Handwashing Day, Global Violence Against Women Day that they celebrate and that they-- and that they take very seriously.

In-- in a society that is dominated by the U.N., so there's a hierarchy-- of-- of aid agencies. And as in-- as with any society, we-- our ambition generally goes to the top of the hierarchy. And the top of the hierarchy is the u-- is the-- the U.N.H.C.R. So most of these young people want to work for the NGOs like CARE and Oxfam and Save the Children and the U.N. That is their dream.

And they have-- a much more liberal outlook. And there-- there's even-- they coined phrases like 20-40. And they call them-- they call themselves the generation who are aged between 20 and 40, i.e., they're-- the-- the-- anybody who's over 40 was an adult at the outbreak of the civil war and is therefore somehow complicit in the problems and is to-- to blame for the-- for the war.

Whereas those people who are under 40, who are children at the time, and-- those who are over 20, who are now, you know, conscious adults who have some responsibility. These are the people whom the youth refer to among themselves as having responsibility now for taking the country forward, for bringing piece. And there's-- there's a very sharp divide between those ones-- those people who come of age in the camp and the elders who have not.

And there's very-- very sharp differences in cultural outlook, as well, in terms of choosing your own husband or your own wife. In terms of your attitude to F.G.N. and-- female-- female cutting-- as well as the role of women as breadwinners, as teachers, as people with careers. So this-- this-- this generation represents, I think, a real opportunity for anybody who-- who's interested in helping them in what they
want to achieve with their home country. Both for-- for Kenya as a sort of rebuke to its-- counterterror policy, for the West that’s interested in sponsoring-- a middle class in Somalia, and for private foundations like this one that want to support people who can be catalysts for those things.

So I-- one-- one of the things I’m trying to argue for is to see that population-- as-- you know-- full of possibility rather than-- rather than-- as-- as a bunch of refugees who are-- who are trapped and who are-- who are simply kicking their heels and waiting to work for (UNINTEL). The-- the other point that I wanted to make about-- helping is that so far-- OSIA (?) and a lot of other-- donors, including Western governments in Kenya, their main approach to countering the-- the abuse of rights that comes along with the whole nexus of counterterror-- counterterror policy that we’re all very familiar with now is to support NGO-- rights-based NGOs, who are-- who make noise, who advocate on behalf of refugees or on behalf of other-- other people who are caught up in the sweep.

For example, there was this thing called Usalama Watch in Kenya, where the-- the Kenyan government wanted to round up anybody who looked like-- who looked Somali in Nairobi and Mombasa and ship them all to Dadaab or deport them back to Mogadishu. And it was basically-- a carte blanche for extortion, rape, a wide range of human rights abuses.

That’s a very sort of common-- common occurrence in Nairobi. And the-- the general approach on-- on all of these issues has to been-- has to fund-- being able to fund these very effective NGOs like Gitua Jasharia (PH), like Halameen Kimathi (PH) and people who OSIA-- grantees of OSIA, who have-- I’ve been working with at Human Rights Watch for-- for many years.

And that’s important. And it’s good. And it-- and it keeps the issues on the agenda. And it keeps-- it-- it does create a certain space. However-- the ability of NGOs to actually protect any of these people or to really change their circumstances is very limited. And it struck me that what about-- instead of-- or-- or in addition to the advocacy work, what about enabling the-- enabling these people to better protect themselves, to better defend their-- their own rights, and to work within their own communities-- to do a lot of this work, whether it’s simply documentation and-- and protest or whether it’s actually to create more-- abiding social structures to-- to-- to safeguard the rights of their people here.

It-- I-- I’m talking about for social, progressive advance more generally. And, you know, the-- the main complaint from the-- from-- and the-- the reason I’m coming out-- coming out with that criticism is the-- that the main complaint from the young refugees in the camp is not, you know, "My rights are being abused and I feel that the Kenyan governments is marginalizing me." It's "I want to go to school." And that starts with primary school, as well as secondary school, as well as educa-- as well as further education.

So I think there’s-- there’s a big opportunity there, where the Kenyan government is failing to provide universal education, not just for their refugees, but
also for the-- the Kenyan populations in Northern Somal-- in Northern Kenya. And instead of this quite antagonistic relationship that Open Society has and its Western donors have with the Kenyan government, which I know has been an issue for-- for OSIA, there's actually an opportunity here for them to be on the same side and to promote the same things.

And I think the Kenyan government might really like it, actually, if-- at-- at a very high level it ha-- it had a conversation with-- Open Society and said, "You know what? Instead of publishing these diagrams of conspiracy theories in the Kenyan newspapers about how we are-- you know, how you-- how you think we're trying to-- advocate for a regime change, actually we'd like to work with you to--" you know, instead-- instead of being hostile on your abuse of rights, we want to say, "Actually, maybe-- we can work with you to promote the rights of these groups of people.

"Not necessarily the-- the civil and political rights that we've been fighting about in the past, but maybe some of the social, economic, and cultural rights. Like education, which actually in the long run, would be in your interests." And to develop, actually, there a platform of commonality with the Kenyan government. There are all sorts of wrinkles, in terms of the-- the politics of how that might be implemented, 'cause it would need to be not just the refugees, but also other marginalized proclamations.

But that, for me, looking at the region as a whole is a ch-- are the-- the-- the twin threats to-- open-- to-- to the existence of open societies in the region, both in Somalia and in Kenya and in Ethiopia. In Somalia, it's more the existence of these extremist ideologies and the success of the madrasa model, because the madrasas are free. You don't have a un-- have a uniform. You write on a slate. They're-- they're very small. They're on every block. They're very accessible. And they're heavily funded by-- Saudi, U.A.E., Qatar, and so on.

So that investment-- on-- on the side of-- of the conservatives has not been matched on the-- on the side of the progressives or the more liberal agenda. The UNICEF fund on-- education in Somalia is 80% unfunded every year, year on year on year. And that's only maintaining this very, very minimum level that I've talked about, the 12% in secondary education and 42% in primary education. So Kenya here has-- and-- and-- and all of the-- all of the countries in the region have a job to do to-- to redress that balance.

So in Somalia, it's very much the-- the investment on the side of the conservatives that's the threat to open societies. In Ethiopia and Kenya, it's that, but coupled with the very heavy handed reaction then from the state against these marginalized populations who are struggling with v-- the very same dilemma. And it-- and-- and, of course, as we all know, the heavy-handed approach to those marginalized populations ends up actually making it worse by treating all-- the whole-- the whole community with the same brush.

And-- in-- in the approach to the-- to the refugee camp by squeezing all the opportunities in the camp by not letting people leave, by cutting the rations, by
forcing people back to Somalia, actually-- alienates more and more people who-- whom you should be looking to as allies in your-- in your-- in your goals. So what that means for-- Open Society in-- in my, you know, very humbled and limited opinion, 'cause I don't know very much about how this-- how the foundations work, is to question the-- the-- the focus on NGOs.

I think the focus on NGOs is good, but I wondered if there could be-- if that could be broadened to-- maybe formal educational structures. It does seem to me there’s a wariness in-- in the foundation with getting involved with primary education, secondary education. But in the-- in the Horn of Africa, in-- terms of the Open Society debate, that's the front line, very much the front line. In-- in Somalia, in the Muslim areas-- Somali areas of-- of Southern Ethiopia and the Somali areas and the Muslim areas of the coast, which are at risk of radicalization, Mombasa and so on.

It's very much at the primary schools where-- who are on the front line versus the madrasas. That’s where-- and I-- I’m not necessarily talking about-- v-- in very crude terms about the risks of-- of children going into-- groups, because those numbers are actually really small. I’m just talking about-- conservative forces in society-- which in-- in fact, is-- what’s probably more urgent there is the-- the position of women and girls in-- in Kenyan society or in Somali society.

Human rights more-- on-- on a more macro level, not necessarily just the instrumen-- mentalization of (UNINTEL) kids going to join al-Shabaab, but the tenor of an open democratic society, rather than one which is ruled by mullahs, who, you know, take their orders from some rather murky place. So that’s the first question is-- is whether or not there is a role-- in supporting somehow this-- the primary and secondary education-- both in-- in those countries, but also specifically-- with the refugees.

The second question is-- the-- that Somalia is at-- a crossroads. The nature of the conflict there has changed. It’s no longer a geographical one with front lines and areas of control. More or less now (UNINTEL) Somali federal government are assuming control of the main cities and al-Shabaab is in these pockets. But what’s-- it’s turned instead into a more guerilla-style conflict, where Shabaab is propping up and targeting particular people, particular convoys and installations.

Which means that a lot of people are coming back, the diaspora’s returning, that there is investment in new universities, in new infrastructure in Mogadishu. There’s an opportunity here-- to-- to be a part of adding to the balance of-- of liberal forces in Somalia versus the very heavy-- weights that are on the conservative side of the scales.

And there's a major need, because-- most of the money that goes to Somalia, at the moment, is in the security sector. There's an awful lot of corruption. And I think in-- in order for-- the-- the best way, in fact, for people to engage with the-- the Somali-- the Somali state or the Somali society in general is probably the private life in the way that the Turks are establishing a university, in the way that some of the diaspora have got together to build another university called Atlas in Mogadishu.

I was saying to Martha earlier, obviously, I’d like to see a Soros University (?) in
Mogadishu. But given that that’s probably not gonna happen-- wondering whether it might be possible to think about ways of supporting these secular, liberal institutions, which are going to be playing a crucial role in creating new leaders and a middle class in Somalia. And made links with the refugees, as well, that-- whether that might be possible.

And the-- and the second thing was-- stemming from that was supporting sec-- secular-- secondary education, whether in the camp there might be-- a role for a Soros secondary school or supporting some of the secondary schools. The Aga Khan-- the Ismaili-- community in East Africa has supported hospitals, universities, secondary schools.

The-- the Aga Khan School in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and Kampala, they are usually the best ones. And the plays-- a very major role in-- creating-- a liberal, Muslim space in-- in those societies, which I think are incredibly important. In-- when you have these governments that are so prejudiced. And that’s how-- in-- in fact, using those fault lines to-- to manipulate even further civil strife-- to obfuscate their own-- their own agenda, as we’ve seen with-- definitely in Kenya and increasingly in other countries in learning those games.

Stigmatizing and then raising the counterterror flag and then actually using that to get a lot of Western influence and Western space then-- to-- to-- to crack down on other human rights. It seems to be the sharp end of what-- what’s happening, certainly in Kenya, is that you-- you talk about the counterterror thing, you-- you-- you double down on the Somalis.

And then all of a sudden, you’re talking about "shoot to kill" more widely. You’re talking about suspending certain (UNINTEL) in the Constitution. It-- it’s the beginning of another conversation. So for many-- reasons, I think, this area is-- is key and thinking more creatively about how to get the government on sight or get into a position where you’re able to talk to the government and share goals, rather than this very, very oppositional thing, which is end-- basically, only gonna end up in everybody getting deported.

The-- the-- need to find some other kind of common ground and then also to think about how to enable-- how-- how to enable these communities to-- to support the positive elements within them-- rather than-- simply just shouting what-- every time they get-- they get jailed. And-- so those are my suggestions. I hope there are some here at least. (LAUGH) You’ve heard them--

(OVERTALK)

**MARTHA LOERKE:**

No problem, we'll go do it, right? (LAUGH) Done--
BEN RAWLENCE:
Whether or not you think they're good ideas.

MARTHA LOERKE:
--check.

BEN RAWLENCE:
But-- if you want to-- ask some questions, then I'm-- I'll stop there and we can do that.

MARTHA LOERKE:
My-- question, I-- I think, I would like to start-- 'cause I-- for me, it's a very new-- geography and a lot of-- I am aware that there's probably a lot of different layers that go on. And I'm-- I'm curious about how-- why-- the origins of the Kenyan-- discrimination against the Somalis in the first place. And that leads me to-- to question, in the camps are there-- you said that it was a little bit of a clan based society and what is that based on? Is it-- economic class based or is it simply different-- eth-- ethnicities?

To what extent are those tensions reflected-- in what's happening in Somalia also? And to what extent is there communication-- between the camps and people in Somalia? And I also found it-- it was instructive to me-- earlier, when we were talking-- how you described the fact that Somaliland is-- a separate sort of almost sounded like a little bit of an oasis in that area. And maybe just to share that and-- and corroborate it. I don't know if anybody else has experience-- in that area. But that's where-- a little bit on the-- the types of tensions that are-- are coming out in the camps and the way they relate to what's happening in Somalia itself, if at all.

BEN RAWLENCE:
Yeah, okay. What-- I'll try and answer that. And then if you want other questions, I can-- I'll add them in. The-- the geography-- Somaliland declared itself independent from the rest of Somalia at the outset of the civil war. And it's become a sort of haven of peace. They haven't been affected by the civil war that's wracked the rest of the country since '92.

And they managed to hold elections. They've got very good universities there. And it-- it-- it's-- it's definitely a source of tension with the South, because the South wants it to remain part of the federal Somalia. It's what used to be called British Somaliland and Southern area is what used to be called Italian Somaliland. And that
goes also to the heart of the-- the Kenyan prejudice. That, in fact, greater Somalia was an area that stretched all the way to the mountains of Ethiopia and all the way to the-- to Mount Kenya and the plains of Kenya in the South.

And that was historically the area across which Somali clans grazed and moved. But a third of-- basically, two thirds of that historic area has been taken away from Somalia. So-- a third of that greater Somalia is Northeast Province, which is now part of Kenya. The other third is the Ogaden Region of Southern Ethiopia. And then the remaining third is actually what we have S-- Somalia proper, which has now been subdivided into Somaliland and now Puntland and now lots of other little federal states all popping up.

Which unfortunately-- C.I.A. is supporting, because it wants ally-- warlord allies just like in Afghanistan, where it's (UNINTEL) particular local strongmen who then-- get paid bounties for kill and capture operations. So that-- that-- current involvement is sort of fueling the-- the breakup of-- the continued breakup of Somalia, even as al-Shabaad influence (UNINTEL).

So the clans, there-- there are four major clans that p-- to which people-- have some kind of affiliation. And their influence comes and goes. I mean, a lot of people would argue that the clan it-- is actually-- you know, a more recent construct, whose importance has been-- over-emphasized (UNINTEL) because of the civil war. And that it seems to be that because of the breakdown in-- in all the other social structures during the war that people then fell back on their clan.

But in the camp, their clan is-- is-- is less important. Because there are democratic-- elections run by the U.N., which are clean, and which are-- you know, basically one p- - one person one vote. And your-- your clan plays less of a role. There-- there is a role in terms of nominating candidates and so on. But people are more or less free to vote how they wish. The clan doesn't have any real control over-- justice mechanisms, because there are alternative ones in the camp. And also you have a lot of mixing-- because these people have been in this hotbox for 20 years, all forced to get along. And they've all been going to school together through the U.N. system that actually this-- the new generation-- is very disdainful of the clan.

So the-- the Youth Umbrella, which is one of the organizations that I've spent a lot of time with, conducts all of its business in English-- because there are some refugees who are from Sudan, who are from Ethiopia. And it-- ver-- you know, viscerally (UNINTEL) the-- the language of clan completely and-- and won't have it. And they-- and they have a lot of classes with their elders, who want them to marry in certain ways and so on.

There's-- there's-- quite a few songs and literature and poems now about how that's all wrong, you know? So there-- there's-- there's definitely a big cultural change. And the-- the roots of Kenyan prejudice is that they-- the Northeast Province was voted to join Somalia proper at independence in 1959. Somalia became independent in 1960, but Kenya didn't become independent until 1963.

And when Britain handed Kenya over to the Kenyan-- back to the Kenyans, it didn't
respect the wishes of the Northeast Province to join Somalia. And what happ-- the-- the beginning of independence in Kenya was also the inauguration of something called the shift of war, where Northeast Province was fighting for s-- to secede to join Somalia.

And that war continued into the '70s. And their state of emergency was only lifted in 1992, which is actually when the Somali civil war started. So in-- in a way, that area has been unstable ever since independence. And Soma-- Kenya-- the Kenyan government views Somalis as a sort of fifth column. A very numerous and-- rich fifth column, who have a lot of influence in Nairobi, as well. And-- so they're-- they're-- they're pr-- since then-- the war and since Kenya invaded Somalia to try and-- pacify it, there's been a lot of revenge bombings in Kenya of which the most-- spectacular was the Westgate siege in m-- in Nairobi last year. So that has been the sort of catalyst to unleash all of this latent prejudice against Somalis-- branding them all as al-Shabaab, basically.

MARTHA LOERKE:

Very good. Do we have some questions coming in from the-- the crowds on some of the-- if you-- if-- if you want to think for a second, I can keep going. (LAUGH) (UNINTEL) I'm-- I'm curious also about the-- I guess-- the political status (COUGH) within the-- the camps. This U.N. bubble and how that happens-- I suppose, I-- I just haven't been in U.N. bubbles all that much. But (LAUGH) you were describing earlier that each-- in that large camp, there's actually five separate camps. Each has its own U.N. headquarters sort of place. And it's a relatively-- tight security situation because of-- you being potentially-- a kidnap victim.

How do the kids you're talking to view the sort of local authority structures? And-- and how do they-- it-- it sounds-- just-- it-- it sounds almost too good to be true that they're all kind of super-tolerant (LAUGH) and singing songs. But it is-- I mean, where-- where-- I don't know-- what kind of-- political frameworks are they moving towards, do you think? Maybe they're too young to talk-- yet. Or if there isn't (NOISE) the-- a big draw towards the al-Shabaab type, you know, belonging to something, what it is that they are doing with their time? And how do they-- how do they avoid that pull? I would think it would be really difficult.

BEN RAWLENCE:

Well, the-- I mean, it-- it-- it's not all roses. It-- it's-- it's-- an ongoing humanitarian emergency. I mean, malnutrition is very high. Maternal mortality's really high. All of the-- all of the human development indicators are terrible. Kenya doesn't allow the tents to be replaced. It doesn't allow people to build concrete homes. So everybody's sleeping on the sand, either in the tent or in a hut.

So there's a lot of anger at Kenya. There's a lot of anger at the U.N., because people
want better services. They want a better situation. But -- at the same time -- you know, whenever -- a bomb goes off, it's -- it's to the Kenyan police or to the U.N. that they run. So there's a very sort of contradictory relationship that they -- they -- they rely on these people. They need them. They need the food.

And -- and yet they want more. They want more jobs. They want more -- shelter and so on. And I think the -- I think time is -- is a problem that once you've been through the school system and you're ejected into the world and you can't go anywhere and there are no jobs and you can't work, then you're -- you know, I think you are at risk, you know? And -- and you're -- and you're looking for -- for what to do. The -- the shocking thing to me is why more people don't join al-Shabaab or some other kind of militia. And yet, everybody I talk to is so hostile. There's a "How dare you suggest that? I'm an educated person." You know?

**MARTHA LOERKE:**

Good, well, that's--

**BEN RAWLENCE:**

"I've been to school." Even primary school kids will say that. "I've been to school. That's not for me." You know? So what they're doing is living their days in this kind of limbo, where they want to go back to Somalia, but is it safe? "And I've never been there. And all I hear about it is war." And on the other hand, "I'd really like to be Kenyan. And I'd like to go to Nairobi. And I'd like to work. But I can't."

And the third option, which is supposed to be what -- there's sort of three durable solutions, which is re-- resettlement, repatriation-- sorry, integration, resett-- repatriation, or resettlement abroad. The third option is to be-- be taken to a third country. So there are quotas every year for-- for people to be taken to the U.S., to the U.K., to Norway, to Sweden. And every year, another one of those countries says, "No, we don't want any more."

But before 9/11, the U.S. was taking about 2,000 or 3,000 a year. And then it all changed. And now they're taking about 200 or 300. And the U.K. takes about 20 or 30. Sweden takes about ten. So peop-- so that is the third dream that everybody has is to go away. And that's why they hate the U.N., because-- everybody-- who was taken-- there were large numbers of people leaving in the first ten years of the camp to go elsewhere. And now that-- that-- that-- flow has slowed to a trickle. So people feel very let down. You know, "I've been here since '92. It's my turn."

**MARTHA LOERKE:**

"It's my turn, yeah."
BEN RAWLENCE:
"It's my turn. It's not fair. You know, I should be taken somewhere other--" and, of course, they are-- to-- back to your point about communication. They're in touch with their friends who did go, who now have jobs and cars and, you know, they're on Facebook. They've all got Facebook on their phones. And they can see, you know, what's going on.

MARTHA LOERKE:
So are there-- are there remittances coming in to--

(OVERTALK)

BEN RAWLENCE:
Yeah, loads. No, I mean, that's really one of the only sources of-- of income is-- is the money coming back.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Well, the final question for me. And then I will-- share the time. But I'm just curious, the other dimension that usually seems to have-- an im-- impact on the various contexts where we work-- are what are the natural resources? And what are the nat-- or what are the-- who are the other international players-- in terms of being interested in what happens in Somalia or Somaliland for that matter?

And are there other forces at play beyond you'd mentioned-- Saudis being sort of supportive of the madrasas, but-- superficially, of course, all we read about these days are the-- the role of the Chinese in Africa. (LAUGH) And-- and-- and trying to work with the-- the extractive industries and so forth. Is that-- is that a dimension on this at all? Or is-- or can we leave that part aside?

BEN RAWLENCE:
It's-- it's-- it's getting there. It's-- it's becoming that way. Because Kenya discovered oil in (UNINTEL), in-- which is the neighboring-- province. And for a long time, there's been a lot of speculation about (COUGH) (UNINTEL) between Kenya and Somalia. And there's-- there's an ongoing dispute about the border. Somaliland, they started drilling with British companies.

And there were exploration contracts that were all halted in '91. So there is definitely some interest of oil companies getting back into Somalia. But I think from a geopolitical point of view, the main problem is that the-- the big powers in the world,
the-- the E.U. and the U.S., don't care enough.
It's not like Afghanistan, where the-- the levels of resources and commitments and political in-- investment is really high. Or, you know, the rest of the Middle East. Somalia-- I mean, you look at Marley. Marley, the peace-- the-- when-- when there was a threat-- from Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb there, France-- stumped up $1.1 billion.
And the-- the-- the London Conference on Somalia raised $300 million, which is nothing really. And-- and most of that is going to keep this very corrupt government afloat. And that kind of suits everybody. It’s actually-- an absence of-- of commitment to-- to peace in Somalia, rather than a sort of-- any-- any nefarious agenda, I don't think. And-- from the same point of view, Ethiopia and Kenya, both of whom now contribute forces, the A.U. peacekeeping force, both of whom have actually fought wars with Somalia over that-- the territory that they've taken from-- from Greater Somalia.
They have no interest in a stable, peaceful Somalia. And yet, they are presented in the-- in the international community as-- as helpful. So-- I-- I think that the geopolitical picture is that nobody-- nobody really cares enough. It's up to the Somalis themselves. And yet, the Somalis themselves-- are-- are so riven-- after 20 years of war that-- everybody's traumatized. You-- you could barely have a conversation without it, you know, deteriorating into a lot of victimhood. So that-- that-- it's-- it's-- you know, it's-- it's a very stubborn-- peace process--

(OVERTALK)

MARTHA LOERKE:
It seems like a blatant conflict of interest to have Ethiopia and Kenya involved in the--

BEN RAWLENCE:
You would have thought so. (LAUGH) Yes.

MARTHA LOERKE:
You know, anyway. Ideas or questions or observations? I'd hate to--

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
Could you tell us a little bit more about Somaliland? When-- how it'd remained a haven during the situation? How did they avoid the civil war or maybe even refugees of their own?
BEN RAWLENCE:

They’ve had refugees. They’ve had-- refugee camps there. It-- it’s majority Isaaq clan, which is one particular clan. And they got themselves together very quickly-- as-- as the rest of the country unraveled and realized what was happening and basically drew a line-- over their historical area-- and set up their own provisional government.

And they had-- a bit like the English House of Lords, they-- established a kind of upper chamber-- where they-- all the clan elders from the various subclans of the Isaaq got together and hammered things out. So there was a democratic chamber, but then there was also this kind of-- aristocratic chamber, as well. And that dual process was able to-- kind of midwife the government, which has been-- which has-- they kept their nose clean-- through the war.

But it’s a very interesting place for engagement, because Hargeisa is a Somali city with-- you know, good universities-- as I mentioned in an earlier talk about-- and there’s a teaching (UNINTEL) teaching hospital there-- that does a lot of-- a lot of good work. So there’s-- there are good entry points in Somaliland-- for the rest of the region.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

I just wanted to ask more about the educational structure within Dadaab. So there’s the U.N. school system. There's-- there are the madrasas. Is there-- is there a sense among students at the U.N.-- who go to the U.N. schools of dissatisfaction with the kind of-- with the sort of bureaucratic structure and the curriculum? Or is it generally regarded as a pretty good education? Is there a sense that the madrasas are more the schools of the people? Are there any alternatives to those two models? In other words, are there efforts to create kind of-- you know, grassroots schools that fill in gaps that the two existing-- structures don’t-- don’t manage to do?

BEN RAWLENCE:

Yeah, well, the-- the existing schools are-- formally, they’re under the authority of the Kenyan government. But the U.N. pays for everybody. Pays for the teachers. I think if there’s dissatisfaction, it’s because there are not enough teachers. And there are not enough textbooks. So often you have-- you know-- the textbook is with the teacher. And then you have 50 students who don’t have a textbook. So it’s materials. It’s-- the capacity of other teachers.

It’s sometimes the caliber of the teachers, because the Kenyan trained teachers are-- there’s only about 50%-- 50% of the-- of the teaching population-- are trained Kenyan teachers. The other 50% are refugee volunteers, who may or may not be trained. And the other thing that they’re-- that the students complain about, I think,
is the opportunities afterwards.
There’s-- if you don’t get-- one of these ten scholarships to a Canadian university run by the W-- World University Service Canada, then you-- you don’t-- basically don’t have an opportunity for further education at all. Unless you have rich relatives somewhere in the West, who can (UNINTEL). Because even a diploma is, you know, $500, $1,000. There’s a distance learning diploma from Nairobi.
So the-- the opportunities (COUGH) that come afterwards are really limited. In addition to those kind of official Kenyan state c-- state schools, there are a couple of private schools, which are run-- where diaspora people have contributed to build a school that-- that fills a gap. And those are 100% staffed by Somali volunteers.
They then have a struggle to get themselves registered for the Kenyan-- Examination Service, 'cause they have to prove that their curriculum is to a certain standard and so on. The-- I don't think-- I mean, people go to the madrasas anyway, because they want to learn the Quran. It’s not seen as-- as either/or. But what-- what it means is that if you can’t afford to go, then you don’t have a space to go to the secondary education, that’s all you end up with.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Great. All right, we’ve got two right next to each other. (LAUGH) (UNINTEL PHRASE).

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
I was wondering if there are any plans for or provisions for technical training? So you-- you mentioned earlier on we were talking with (UNINTEL) scholarships that it was based on the British systems in the '50s. So after secondary school, you’d split off to secondary (UNINTEL) and-- and into grammar school. And we-- I think we’ve been talking more about those that would be more academically focused, who would go onto scholarships. But what about-- is there any provision-- I know they may not have a job at the end. But is there any provision for that? And pro-- then providing (UNINTEL) within the camps themselves?

BEN RAWLENCE:
Yeah, do you want to ask your question, as well, and I'll answer that?

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
So I'd be interested-- I-- I think given the fact-- there’s this kind of resurgence of refugee situations around the world in other regions like Turkey and Syria-- what’s--
what are the sort of lessons from this case study of Dadaab? Or is it-- so unique because of its long-lasting nature and the fact that children have kind of grown up for decades in their-- are there lessons for other-- like, the way education is handled in other refugee camps, in-- in other geographic situations? And have they learned from Dadaab’s mistakes maybe, of other administrators?

**BEN RAWLENCE:**
Well, the-- on the vocational stuff. They-- there are other-- there are little short courses and things. And some of the agencies-- run these schemes called "income generating activities," where you learn a particular skill. It-- it always seems to be kind of hippy skills like basket making and soap making (LAUGH) and things that people want to buy that (UNINTEL PHRASE) aid workers might want to buy.

But-- there's other-- there are other things, too, like-- butchery-- stuff like that. So-- and that's all in the black market. So although there's no formal jobs, there is-- a very big gray economy. And-- and those-- so-- so people can-- learn those skills and-- and work in that way. But it-- it-- it's still only in the temporary city of the camp, you know? So adjusting your head to that idea as-- with a horizon, you know-- a business needs stability if you want to investment and grow and all of that kind of thing.

So people are always transient in their plans. And that creates a very kind of unstable identity. Not-- not (UNINTEL) an economy, but also an identity. In terms of the-- the-- the lessons learned, I-- there is a whole sort of movement called education in refugee camps, which is sponsored by the U.N. and which is-- around which there's a lot of research and academic stuff.

We-- I'm, you know, only kind of passingly familiar with it. But I don't think they've learned very much from Dadaab. And-- and I think that's-- what-- Dadaab is unique. Because it's been there for such a long time and because-- it's not going anywhere, it's-- you know, the-- the pop-- the population kind of fluctuates between 300,000 and 400,000. And-- and it's growing every-- every month by a hundred thou-- by 10,000. By 1,000, sorry. It's growing every year by-- by 10,000.

But the birth rate is a thousand a month. So it's not going anywhere any-- any time soon. And that means that you can-- engage with these-- with these-- institutions like schools. You can plan-- around-- educating whole cadres of people. I think probably-- especially in-- with-- with Syria, that agencies are going to have to learn from that and are going to have to get used to the fact that something like Zaatari is a city that's going to stay there.

You know, and-- and I think-- Kleinschmidt, the U.N. head of the Zaatari refugee camp has done a great job in actually getting the Jordans ready for the idea that this is probably going to be here for awhile. And-- structuring it and-- and financing it in a way-- like a city with the idea that it will grow with space to grow and so on. And that-- so I think he's definitely learned, because he's spent time at Dadaab and Mogadishu. And-- he came actually to-- I'm sorry, (UNINTEL) Mogadishu.
So-- I think that's good. In terms of the-- the educational system, I think the-- I-- I-- I-- Zaatari's the only one I know a bit-- a bit rather than the others like Burma and places like that. But there the-- the school system is evolving very like Dadaab, where you have-- a national system and a national curriculum and the U.N. is-- is providing the-- the-- the means. And-- and kids might go there for three years, for five years, but-- but I reckon it's gonna end up being-- ten, 20. And so the sooner you start treating these places as-- as-- as permanent the better, I think.

MARTHA LOERKE:
That gets--
(OVERTALK)

BEN RAWLENCE:
I'm preparing--

MARTHA LOERKE:
--doesn't it? (LAUGH)

BEN RAWLENCE:
I'm preparing the political-- it's the political underpinnings of it really that-- that-- that are reported. Because Zaatari, at least they are dealing with it in a sort of five to ten-year time plan, where as Dadaab, it's six months. They sort of (UNINTEL) that in six months they might all be gone. It's not gonna happen. And yet all of the plans are on this kind of very tight emergency humanitarian time table.

MARTHA LOERKE:
I was reading something-- earlier today-- on the Ofenar media listserv (PH)-- about the Syrian refugee-- education situation and some of the tensions that happen. I don't know-- I-- I think you were saying earlier that the-- you didn't think this was really-- pertained to the Somalis. But nevertheless, it-- the idea that there can be family pressures, particularly against young women in the family to pursue education. And-- and that can be-- particularly if you are in a refugee situation. I think here the difference could be important that in a Syrian context you're more recently a refugee. And so the-- the sort of trauma part of that might be more fresh. And I don't know if that would be true with-- with families that you've met. But another point that was, I think, being made by this-- this woman who's done some very interesting research.
I'll have to give you this name when we get back upstairs.

Was that it's important to have education efforts in these context incorporate at some level the family. And to not make it just for something for individual students to partake in or something like that, but to engage parents and extended family so that--that even--more people feel invested in the whole process of having, you know--more the child--one of the children or something--get further along in the education.

When you've done your interviews and your exchanges and--and conversations with the kids for your book--what's your sense of their family. And what's--it--does that play out? I mean, do you think—that, you know, is--'cause there can be--you were talking earlier, there's also this generational tension between those under 20 and those over 40. Is--is that playing out also in the families? It--and is there kind of the--resentment perhaps of--of one towards the other that would inhibit--the kids going further?

**BEN RAWLENCE:**

I mean, there are--there are as many stories as there are people. And--and--and I think you're right in the sense that--everybody's family situation has a major impact on the choices they make. And that's definitely--that definitely comes across with--in the individual stories of the people I've been following. So, for example--one kid--could have afforded to go to school, but chose to spend the money on supplementing his family's diet instead.

So he had a small job shining shoes. But, you know, some of his mates were using that money to go to school. But he was using that to support his--his family. Another boy--who wanted to--who was very good at sch--at school and won--became top of his class and go to secondary school, which was like, you know--that's like winning an O.S.I. fellowship, you know? (LAUGH) You're--you're really happy about that. To get into secondary school, it was a big party. And yet, he was thinking of dropping out, because his father had left his mother, had gone back to Mogadishu. And she needed money for formula for her child. And he was going to--quit that and get a job--in the--in the informal market, making mon--earning money to do that.

So there's those sorts of family obligations. There's--I didn't--ever encounter a family who said they didn't want their girl to go to school, because she was a girl. I found--I've met people who say we d--didn't want--I met a mother who said she didn't want her girl to go to school, because she needed to work. Because the family needed everybody to gather as many coins as they could, in order to supplement the income.

Because the U.N. rations is only, you know, 2,000 calories a day, which is very finely calibrated. And that's a certain number of rice--a certain amount of rice and beans and oil. And that's it. So--and if you want tea or sugar or greens or meat, then you've got to do something else, you know? Which is all these other--you know--hard jobs at the bottom of the food chain.
But-- and-- and then there's-- a case of another guy, who got all the way through-- school, finished secondary school, got a diploma, was offered a job for the Danish refugee camps-- in-- Mogadishu. And his father was so traumatized-- by the loss of his other children during the war, he said, "You're never going back to Somalia." So that would have been $2,000 a month to look after everybody. But no, you know, because he didn't want to lose another kid. So everybody's got these different stories. And everybody's got-- got an excuse why they dropped out of school. "Oh, it was because of this. Oh, it was because of that." So yeah.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Anybody else? Anybody else on the whole-- yeah, go ahead, sorry.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
I guess I have, like, several kind of questions. One when you were talking about-- refugees being settled into a third country and how the numbers have significantly decreased. What are some of the determining factors now that are being used to determine who gets the opportunity to resettle? Is one. The other one is you mentioned earlier the kind of-- opportunity-- very little opportunities for refugees in these camps and how some of 'em mainly just aspire to-- work for the U.N. or work for some large NGO is kind of their main goal.

And I wonder how do you almost-- it almost creates a sort of dependency if it's almost like-- instead of being given a ration, you are kind of working. But-- it-- it's not really determined how long these organizations will be there for the most part. I mean, it-- it is the goal for them to kind of stop. There's an end date. And I just wonder what are the sort of initiatives that are being used or if there are-- in terms of maybe moving them from the exclusionary and-- only offering within the camp and more inclusionary, whether inside of-- like, (UNINTEL) in the larger society? Is, like, the second. And the third, which kind of now escapes me. (LAUGH) (UNINTEL PHRASE).

BEN RAWLENCE:
Well, if you-- yeah, if you remember. The resettlement is-- yeah, it used to be a lot more generous. I-- I don't really know why it's shrinking, other than prejudice really. I mean, I don't-- I don't think there's any-- especially in Europe, the-- the-- the nationalist agenda in Europe is really causing them-- asylum space to shrink.

The-- the criteria for who gets chosen are supposed to be-- on the basis of-- of pr-- protection-- disability or discrimination. So-- or sorry, protection in-- in-- includes-- both of those things. Dis-- discrimination and-- and disabilities or medical reasons. So if you're from a minority and you're getting some sort of persecution in the camp,
then that-- you should be fast tracked there for resettlement.

If you have a medical emergency, that’s the same reason. And sometimes some countries have particular focuses on unaccompanied minors. Some countries have particular focuses on rape victims. And-- and they work with the U.N. and submit certain quotas. And then the U.N. will fill those quotas and send those people off. There was a big scandal in 2001, where-- there was-- basically-- a ring of people working for the U.N.H.C.R., who were selling these spots.

And-- and that still is the-- sort of the perception among the refugees. That it’s for sale. And I think to some extent, they’re probably right. But it’s very hard to-- to get to the bottom of all of that. (THROAT CLEARS) Working for the agencies and-- and whether that’s-- I mean-- it-- it-- any-- any kind of work is great.

So for-- in-- you know, in that situation and, yes, you don’t know where you’re gonna be in a year or two. "But at least I’ve got a job now. And I’ve been able to-- to support my family and to, you know-- a job means that we don’t just eat rice and beans. That’s really what it’s about. And we can afford clothes, you know?" And you can buy a radio. And your life can get a little bit better.

So they’re not-- nobody’s really thinking beyond 12 months, you know? There might be dreams and ideas beyond that time, but in prac-- prac-- for practical planning purposes, nobody’s really thinking beyond 12 months. So that’s the-- that’s the kind of psychological reality of living in this-- in this bounded place. And, I mean, one-- I-- I’ve perhaps neglected to mention. One of the things is if you do get to work for the agencies, the agencies could then employ you back in Somalia.

They can move you back. You could then shift from a volunteer contract, where you’re paid a stipend in the camp, to a proper salaried post. So the competition for the-- for the-- to be a volunteer for the agencies and-- and, you know, ‘cause they can’t-- the agencies can’t pay them accor-- as well as they pay Kenyans. Because the Kenyan-- because the Kenyan government doesn’t want their refugees to work and take the jobs of Kenyans.

It’s exactly the same as most countries, you know, have this sort of distinction. So people work for the agencies as volunteers. And they get paid a stipend. So that-- the reason there’s competition for that is not because-- is not only because they want the money, because also because they-- once they get friendly with the agency, there’s a possibility that they might be able to work somewhere else for the agency.

And in theory, there does exist the right for those agencies to hire people and get work permits and then put them elsewhere in Kenya. And then you might be able to begin a process of-- of-- of applying for citizenship and stuff like that. So-- there are many reasons why the agencies are-- are helpful. Not just because they’re the overlords. But also because of that.
MARTHA LOERKE:
I have a question-- you're-- you've-- you've made reference earlier to people having Facebook on their phones. But they have to work to get extra money to get more than rice and beans. How are they getting the phones? (LAUGH)

BEN RAWLENCE:
Well, because they're-- they're saving up that money.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Yeah, for that purpose?

BEN RAWLENCE:
Yep, they're begging those things from their uncles, from their cousins, from me. (LAUGH) From their-- from-- people from abroad. So, you know, it--

MARTHA LOERKE:
It's interesting.

BEN RAWLENCE:
And-- and lots of people have, you know, the--
(OVERTALK)

MARTHA LOERKE:
But the connectivity is good?

BEN RAWLENCE:
Yeah, there's a mobile (UNINTEL) over there. It's not 3G, but it's good enough.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Right, right, interesting. High connectivity, low (UNINTEL). (LAUGH)
BEN RAWLENCE:

And-- a lot of people have just the regular, like, Nokia phones that don't have smart functions. But then-- but the-- for the-- for the educated youth who've been to school, they probably do have one of these incentive jobs, intern jobs with the agencies. So they are earning $90 a month-- you know, which is enough to get yourself a phone.

MARTHA LOERKE:

Interesting. And just-- quickly-- I'm curious, as well, when-- when you talk about-- I guess I'm-- I-- I want to think more about that interaction with Mogadishu and the-- and the-- and the camps and so forth. And you mentioned the Danish Refugee Council being in Mogadishu. Who else just-- is it the usual, you know, menu of Save the Children, Oxfam, what not? Or any-- and how many universities are there and that sort of-- you know, what-- what is the state of Mogadishu, in terms of-- I don't know-- broadly in our-- in our shorthand, I guess, civil society? (LAUGH)

BEN RAWLENCE:

It's very active. I mean, there's a lot going on. There's a lot going on there. There's-- there's three universities I know of. I think there's more than that, though. There's-- there's a national university. There's a Turkish University. And there's this one called Atlas. But I think there's-- there's a technical university, as well. And-- and possibly something else.

So the-- and they've-- some of them have been-- have been going through the war-- on-- on real skeleton-- skeleton staff. But they've kept it going. The-- the money that's come in over the last kind of 18 to 24 months has been really quite astonishing. And that's mostly diaspora cash (?). So people investing back home, trying to-- get their-- the city running again.

And if you look at photos of how it was two years ago and how it is now, the change is really amazing, in terms of construction, in terms of streets, in terms of-- you know, traffic. So it's-- it-- it-- it's definitely-- a functioning city. There's-- there's a lot of civil society groups there. Some of them are under threat. But then, yeah, there's-- there's-- there's the whole range--

MARTHA LOERKE:

Interesting.
BEN RAWLENCE:
--that you’d expect. It’s not Nairobi. But-- you know, they’re-- they’re there. And they’re working. And they’re-- they’re trying it. Generally-- they-- the-- the good ones get over subscribed. But that’s probably true everywhere.

MARTHA LOERKE:
So go ahead.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
I’m curious if there’s any pressure being put on the Kenyan government, either by civil society organizations or perhaps even external actors to-- sort of-- to integrate some of the-- the refugees in-- or at least at the-- at the very least, provide some basic services, annotation, education. Is there any pressure coming from anywhere within Kenya?

BEN RAWLENCE:
No.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
No? Not--

BEN RAWLENCE:
There’s something called the refugee--

MARTHA LOERKE:
Or they do?

BEN RAWLENCE:
--count-- The Refugee Consortium of Kenya. That’s the only refugee rights organization that’s run by Kenyans.
AUDIENCE QUESTION:
Wow.

BEN RAWLENCE:
All of the NGOs that OCIA funds are mainly-- their focus is not refugees or Somalis, it's usually Muslim issues. So then-- that's the lens through which they see it. So the-- the-- the famous one is MUHURI, the Muslims for Human Rights in Kenya, who OSIA's been very strong funders of.

And they do great work. But they don't have-- a focus on refugees. They've all been-- working on refugee issues lately because of this-- Usalama Watch roundup of anybody that looks Somali. But they-- again, they've been coming at it mostly from a Muslim perspective that "This is-- this is an attack on Muslims. That this is an infringement of our rights. And we Muslims need to come together."

But the Somali sort of community is not very well integrated into the Muslim community in-- in Kenya. The Muslims are mostly Soma-- Swahilis from the coast and various other groups. But-- they-- they-- the-- the central government treats them as all the same. But actually, there's nobody in Nairobi standing up for-- for refugee rights. And that's a big problem.

MARTHA LOERKE:
And there's no other-- sorry, did you remember? (LAUGH) I-- I was just curious very quickly, because you made me think about what was the role of other African regional entities. IGAD doesn't engage on it or wouldn't have an interest in it?

BEN RAWLENCE:
They d-- I mean, they-- they-- they're all governmental agencies. So IGAD was the place where the K-- the Kenyan president announced that he wanted refugees to go back to Somalia, expecting Somalia-- the Somali government to help.

MARTHA LOERKE:
I see.

BEN RAWLENCE:
And the Somali government said, "Yes, we'll help." Because they-- obviously, they want all those able bodied people working in-- back home. But that-- there was no--
no refugees were consulted on that. They weren't present. Nothing to do with (UNINTEL). Yeah, it's just politics. And the A.U. is really about-- Somalia doesn't like A.U., because-- Ethiopia and Kenya use the A.U. to undermine it. So--

MARTHA LOERKE:
Sorry, back to you.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:
For the other question, you had mentioned some successful kind of organizations like the Aga Khan schools. And I was wondering how are they able to keep students in and make it through kind of primary and secondary education? And kind of combat some of the reasons why students aren't able to go to school, mostly related to, like, economic situations? How do they combat that?

VARIOUS:
The Aga Khan.

BEN RAWLENCE:
I don't know. I mean, I-- I-- I think that the Aga Khan--

MARTHA LOERKE:
(LAUGH) They've got a lot of money.

BEN RAWLENCE:
The Aga Khan schools I'm talking about are in cities-- in Nairobi and Dar Salaam and Mombasa. They're-- they're very well-funded. And there's a large portion of-- there are-- there are also, to some extent, serving their own community, the Ismailis-- who are generally very well off. But I think if you get to go to the (UNINTEL), then probably you don't have to worry about uniform and books and stuff. (UNINTEL) money probably.

MARTHA LOERKE:
So they're--
BEN RAWLENCE:
But I don't think--

MARTHA LOERKE:
--they're not trying to make inroads into the camps, per se?

BEN RAWLENCE:
Oh no, no, no, they're not in the camps.

MARTHA LOERKE:
They don't have an agenda that way? They're-- they're just--

BEN RAWLENCE:
They're not in the camps at all.

MARTHA LOERKE:
--sort of a model of good education nearby?

BEN RAWLENCE:
I was-- I was simply referring to them as a-- private foundation that runs-- formal education. And that-- and how I think it's good. That's all. But--

MARTHA LOERKE:
And that-- yeah-- Anne, you want to speak on behalf of HESS and-- and talk about the-- (LAUGH) the potential of building a university in Mogadishu? (LAUGH)

ANNE:
Well, sure--
(OVERTALK)
ANNE:  
--at the next board meeting.

MARTHA LOERKE:  
Our sole representative of the Higher Education Support Program. Did you meet-- Valdimore (PH), when you were in London?

BEN RAWLENCE:  
Yes.

MARTHA LOERKE:  
Yeah, the-- you-- he didn't offer you a couple million dollars?

BEN RAWLENCE:  
No.

MARTHA LOERKE:  
No? (LAUGH) HESS does that sort of thing. (LAUGH)

BEN RAWLENCE:  
So they're the ones I need to go-- (OVERTALK)

MARTHA LOERKE:  
Exactly, you need to-- yeah, exactly. Or Lenny, if you've met Lenny, yeah, hit him up for some cash. He's good for that. (LAUGH) I don't think we have-- responded to the challenges that you've put forward to O.S.I. And I-- although I-- I will say on behalf of-- scholarships, it is very much a question larger-- not just-- for the Somali situation, but what you've said about the situation in Somalia has really sort of changed my thinking-- about the potentials and-- and our own, you know, where we can make a little bit of difference perhaps. But it really does help if there is a potential for traction in the so-called home
country. And I think that-- that is something that we-- I'd be-- like to have more conversations about and-- and-- and to take further, in terms of what we could do-- earlier-- so the scholarships people here are aware of, Ben had suggested, you know, the idea of working with the universities in Mogadishu to offer scholarships there to Somalis and so that they could return-- back.

And that’s-- that’s a-- model that we haven't really done before in scholarships. But-- as I said, it-- it really is dependent on us having different communication with the OSIA staff and-- and sort of figuring out whether that's feasible. But I-- I'd certainly be interested in learning a little bit more about that, 'cause that sounds-- that sounds more like a window opening than closing.

So-- (LAUGH) and that's what usually makes the difference. And I'd be curious to know if the OSIA office-- I-- I know Ben Ifer (PH) was very excited about having you come and-- and-- and talk with us about this. But-- so I wonder if the changing situation or the changing sort of environment-- in Mogadishu and Somalia generally is having an impact on how OSIA's strategy in grant giving-- on related issues is--

(OVERTALK)

**BEN RAWLENCE:**

The only thing I know about that is-- is-- bad news. And that was that the-- the programs that they were funding in Northern Kenya were cut-- when I spoke to them. I had-- I spent time in their office in March. And-- and that was just at the time when that happened.

**MARTHA LOERKE:**

When it happened, yeah.

**BEN RAWLENCE:**

Yeah, which I was very sad about like I said. But, you know, I don't-- I mean, what I'm talkin' about is in-- is in any case doing things slightly differently. But the-- Nor-- Northern Kenya and the-- the intersection of-- of human rights, Muslim issues, Somali issues, and countering the general conservative side that's flowing down from Saudi-- is something that I think needs to be more creatively-- or need-- should-- should perhaps frame more the way that things are done in the region.

**MARTHA LOERKE:**

Right, right. Desensitized to it.
BEN RAWLENCE:
That's-- that's the way (UNINTEL).

MARTHA LOERKE:
It sounds logical. Anything more from you, Steve?

STEVE:
No, no, thank you, Ben.

MARTHA LOERKE:
Thank you all for joining.

BEN RAWLENCE:
Thanks for coming. (APPLAUSE)

* * *END OF TRANSCRIPT* * *