

2010

# Revenue Watch Index

TRANSPARENCY: GOVERNMENTS AND THE OIL, GAS AND MINING INDUSTRIES



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### Revenue Watch Institute

The Revenue Watch Institute promotes the effective, transparent and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources for the public good. Through capacity building, technical assistance, research, funding and advocacy, we help countries to realize the development benefits of their natural resource wealth.

[www.revenuwatch.org](http://www.revenuwatch.org)

### Transparency International

Transparency International is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it.

[www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org)

*The Revenue Watch Index is a tool for citizens, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, corporations and the media to demand higher standards of disclosure on oil, gas and mining.*

## Preface

The Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International have cooperated in the Promoting Revenue Transparency project since 2007. Our objective is to promote good governance by improving awareness among governments, private and state-owned companies, experts and activists of the importance of revenue transparency in countries where oil, natural gas and minerals play a major role in the economy.

This project reflects the many efforts by civil society organizations to help those countries realize the benefits of their natural riches as well as minimize the potentially negative effects of extractive industries. These efforts included Save the Children's report *Beyond the Rhetoric* in 2005. Further down this road, the growing awareness of the importance of extractive industries for developing countries led to the publication of the Transparency International *Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies* in 2008.

Thanks in large measure to the efforts of international civil society, transparency and accountability in the management of extractive resources have moved in the last decade to the forefront of the international, national and regional policy agendas. Proper governance of the extractive sector is now seen as critical to the economic success of resource-rich countries. Yet the absence of an objective set of revenue transparency benchmarks for governments hampers efforts to promote the accountable, transparent and effective management of oil, gas and mineral revenues.

The Revenue Watch Index is meant to address this gap and to complement previous transparency assessments covering corporations. It is also intended to be an important resource for activists and policymakers, to guide their efforts to achieve higher standards of transparency and accountability in the extractive sector.

The Revenue Watch Index is a tool for citizens, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, corporations and the media to demand higher standards of disclosure and access to information from governments. Together with the companies' report, this index forms part of a sustained, collaborative effort to develop sound indicators to measure transparency and to promote accountability and good governance in resource-rich countries.




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## REVENUE WATCH INDEX COUNTRY RANKING



1. Comprehensive Revenue Transparency
2. Partial Revenue Transparency
3. Scant Revenue Transparency

Country scores are constructed as an average of the Revenue Watch Index's transparency indicators. Countries are ranked according to their average score.

To learn more and download report data, go to: [www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex](http://www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex).

## Executive Summary

*This Index assesses 41 resource-rich countries that contain almost half of the world population and are among the top producers of petroleum, gold, copper and diamonds.*

The Revenue Watch Index is the first attempt to measure and compare the information governments disclose about the oil, gas and mining industries, including payments to those governments, contracts, regulations and related data. The extractive sector plays a critical role in resource-rich countries and in the global economy. Petroleum and its derivatives account for 15 percent of world trade, and resource-related sovereign wealth funds—with some \$2 trillion in assets—are major players in global financial markets. Industrial economies depend heavily on imported minerals, and investment in extractives in developing countries is increasing dramatically. From 2000 through 2008, mineral resources accounted for 24 percent of Africa's GDP growth. Over the next 20 years, an estimated 90 percent of hydrocarbon production is expected to originate in developing countries. State-owned companies control approximately 80 percent of global hydrocarbon reserves. The quality of resource management in key countries affects the entire global economy.

This index assesses 41 resource-rich countries that have almost half of the world's population and are among the top producers of petroleum, gold, copper and diamonds. These include advanced industrial countries such as Norway and the United States as well as countries that rank among the world's poorest despite being endowed with vast natural resources. Political economists have noted that states that rely on oil, gas and mineral revenues may be particularly prone to mismanagement, high-level corruption, authoritarianism and entrenched conflict.

Revenue transparency is essential to confront challenges such as corruption and citizens' mistrust of government management of resource wealth. Transparent, accountable management of natural resource revenues is fundamental to the successful development and stability of all oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries.

### A New Tool for an Uncharted Field

To measure revenue transparency, the Revenue Watch Index evaluates the availability of information covering seven key areas of natural resource management:

- **Access to resources:** the availability of data detailing contracts and licensing terms and procedures, as well as the existing legal and regulatory mechanisms related to the accessibility of information.
- **Generation of revenue:** the availability of detailed information published by various government agencies on production and payments, as well as an assessment of its accessibility and frequency.
- **Institutional setting:** the rules, roles and responsibilities of the main actors involved in the management of revenue generation, as well as the presence of internal controls and other checks.
- **State-owned companies:** the availability of information regarding the governance structures of state-owned entities and the reporting practices related to their activities.
- **Natural resource funds:** the rules governing the operation of funds and their reporting practices.
- **Sub-national transfers:** the laws that regulate revenue sharing among different levels of government and the disclosure of information about revenue sharing.
- **Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI):** the extent to which member countries have fulfilled EITI criteria (i.e. publication of EITI reports, independent payment audits and reconciliations, and information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies).

Indicators were scored on a scale of 0 to 100, reflecting the variable availability of information to the public. The results were aggregated into a final *Revenue Transparency* score for each country. Based on the final results of the index, we identify three groups of countries, ranked according to their relative score out of a possible 100:

- **Comprehensive Revenue Transparency** (average score 67-100): countries in this group provide their citizens with substantial amounts of information about revenue from the extractive sector. Governments show strong reporting practices and tend to make available detailed or disaggregated data on the different areas of the extractive sector under their authority.
- **Partial Revenue Transparency** (average score 34-66): countries in the middle category of the ranking provide their citizens with information about their revenue from the extractive sector, yet have important transparency gaps in one or more specific categories of the index.
- **Scant Revenue Transparency** (average score 0-33): countries in the bottom of the ranking disclose the least amount of information and have poor reporting practices across all the categories the index covers.

In addition, *Legal and Regulatory Framework* indicators provide information regarding the institutional context in which oil, gas and mineral industries operate in these countries. This section examines laws and regulations calling for disclosure and access to information or placing checks on discretionary powers.

### Results: A Mixed Global Picture for Revenue Transparency

1. The Revenue Watch Index shows that the majority of countries examined by this report (29 out of 41) provide limited public information on their natural resource sector. This lack of transparency undermines the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account for their performance in managing public resources.
2. Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Russia, Timor-Leste and the United States provide relatively more information on production of minerals, hydrocarbons and their profits.
3. Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania and Turkmenistan provide scarce or very little information on their revenue from oil, gas and mining.
4. Contract transparency is rare among all the countries surveyed, with Colombia, Liberia, Peru, Timor-Leste and the United States being the only governments that publish their contracts (or leases) in full. Even in these cases, the information may be hard to find. Many governments do not disclose contracts even to their legislatures.

### The Way Forward

This index provides a detailed picture of the areas in which government efforts to increase transparency are urgently needed. We find substantial room for improvement in virtually all the countries surveyed.

The index results also suggest that claims regarding the need for confidentiality are without foundation. The index shows that many countries disclose information that other governments shroud in secrecy. Information is a prerequisite for accountability; it is also an essential tool for effective management of a complex sector. The ability of countries with substantial mineral or hydrocarbon reserves to use these resources for development may be severely hindered by low transparency.

The Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) and Transparency International (TI) call on governments, civil society, parliamentarians and companies to advance revenue transparency in order to improve management of oil, gas and mineral revenues and to promote accountable resource management for the public good.

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# Introduction

Mineral and hydrocarbon wealth helped fuel the success of older industrial economies like Australia, Canada, Sweden and the United States. It has the potential to finance rapid economic progress in less developed mineral-rich countries. Even after the recent global financial meltdown, oil prices remain high, while metals such as gold continue to break historical records. This price surge has greatly increased investment as well as export revenues from the extractive sector in countries producing these commodities, nations that account for almost half of the world's population.<sup>1</sup>

Many of these oil, gas and mineral producers are among the world's poorest nations, despite the promise of wealth generated by their extractive sectors. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the top ten oil and gas producers are projected to receive a cumulative \$4 trillion of oil and gas royalties and taxes during 2007-2030. Angola and Nigeria will receive the vast majority of those revenues.<sup>2</sup> Oil and mineral producers such as DRC and Sudan are also some of the most politically unstable. Despite the promise of extractive resources, there is a common association of abundant petroleum and minerals with extremely poor economic performance, an increased likelihood of authoritarian regimes and, in some cases, a high propensity to armed conflicts.<sup>3</sup>

The quality of governance plays a particularly critical role in extractive industries. Common to nearly all these countries is a constitutional norm designating subsoil natural resources as public assets belonging to the state. The revenues from oil, gas and mineral exploitation are therefore in principle managed *in trust* by the government on behalf of the population. It is reasonable to expect that public resource wealth be used to advance sustainable economic growth and long-term development. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), revenue derived from hydrocarbons and minerals accounted for an average of 40 percent of the total fiscal revenues generated by resource-rich countries during the 2000-07 period. However, in too many countries, citizens have little information about the sector. Without access to information, the public has very limited influence on the decisions governments make to manage the extractive sector, the terms for extraction, or the use of the money flowing from minerals exploitation and sales.

## 1.1 Why create the Revenue Watch Index?

Revenue transparency is particularly important in countries that rely on oil, gas and mineral revenues for the majority of their income. These revenues are volatile and can change significantly, as demonstrated by the commodity price crash of 2008-2009. The complicated formulas by which governments collect revenue from extractive activities and the large sums at stake leave countries particularly vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption. Mistrust in government stewardship of resource wealth and/or grievances about its redistribution throughout society can also lead to entrenched conflict, as is the case in DRC and the Niger Delta. This occurs not only at the national level but also with regional and local governments that are often uninformed about how much revenue they are due when redistribution is practiced. They then do not always share information about the revenue they receive with local citizens. Transparency is necessary to address these challenges. Regular, comprehensive information on extractive sector revenues allows governments, legislatures and citizens to have an informed debate about the best way to manage and utilize those resources. Revenue transparency encourages public scrutiny of a sector where graft and mismanagement can otherwise flourish behind closed doors. This is important no matter how institutionally

“advanced” a country may be, as scandals within the U.S. extractive industries demonstrate.<sup>4</sup> Finally, revenue transparency builds public trust in a government's intentions to manage resource wealth in its citizens' best interest.

The underlying assumption of this index is that transparent and accountable management of natural resource revenues is essential to the development and stability of all oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries. Recent studies find that countries with greater public access to information have better governance scores and higher economic growth.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, research shows that more transparent countries have better credit ratings, better fiscal discipline and less corruption.<sup>6</sup> Further evidence has emerged that countries with less transparency have lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP), lower foreign direct investment and higher capital costs than more transparent countries.<sup>7</sup>

Over the past decade, transparency in the extractive industries has gained attention, as demonstrated by the rapid growth of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the global Publish What You Pay (PWYP) civil society movement. The creation of an IMF *Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency* and the Natural Resource Charter as well as new programs of the United Nations, the World Bank, the African Union and others underscore growing interests in assisting resource-rich governments in improving their extractive sector governance.

However, definitions of revenue transparency have yet to go beyond relatively narrow disclosures of data on payments made by companies and received by governments. This kind of disclosure is essential, but it is insufficient to monitor and improve the use of natural resource wealth for broad-based development.

The Revenue Watch Index therefore broadens the definition of revenue transparency to include other relevant areas of the extractive sector. These include transparency in contracting and licensing procedures; legal framework; management of natural resource funds (NRFs); state-owned oil, gas and mining companies' operations; and distribution of revenue to sub-national governments.

The Revenue Watch Index uses this approach to measure and compare revenue transparency across a diverse group of oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries. The goal of the index is to contribute to the good governance debate by providing a concrete and specific definition of what extractive sector transparency means. It creates a comparative analytic framework to begin assessing individual countries' performances against best practices, as well as against their peers. The index provides civil society and parliaments with robust empirical data that can be used to critique their country's performance and demand higher standards of transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. This is the first effort to provide a comparative empirical assessment of how oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries perform with respect to the disclosure and public availability of information covering their extractive industries.<sup>8</sup>

To view or download report data, including country-specific documents and information, go to [www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex](http://www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex).

*Recent studies find that countries with greater public access to information have better governance and higher economic growth.*

Countries in Index, with almost 50 percent of world's population:

41

Highest score in Index: **Brazil**

97

Lowest score in Index: **Turkmenistan**

9.7

Amount of world trade from oil and gas products:

15%



## 2 Methodology

For data-gathering purposes, the Revenue Watch Institute developed a detailed questionnaire to identify information about a government's management of the extractive sector and define revenue transparency. This questionnaire is based on the standards put forward by EITI, the PWYP campaign and the IMF's *Guide on Revenue Transparency*.

The questionnaire assesses information that governments publish about the oil, gas and mining sector in a comprehensive manner. First, the questionnaire identifies a set of key documents published by governmental agencies that oversee extractive resources. These documents provide information about reporting practices and constitute a straightforward standard to compare different countries. Second, the questionnaire identifies publicly available information and institutional practices on a series of issues highlighted by international guidelines, experts and international campaigns on transparency.

### The Seven Categories of the Revenue Watch Index

The index is based on the collection of information covering seven categories that represent key areas of natural resource governance:

- **Access to resources:** availability of data detailing contracts and licensing procedures, as well as the existing legal and regulatory mechanisms related to the accessibility of information.
- **Generation of revenue:** the availability of detailed information published by various government agencies on production and payments as well as an assessment of its accessibility and periodicity.
- **Institutional setting:** the rules, roles and responsibilities of the main actors involved in the management of revenue generation, as well as the presence of internal controls and other checks.
- **State-owned companies (SOCs):** the availability of information regarding the governance structures of state-owned entities and the reporting practices related to their activities.
- **Natural resource funds:** the rules governing the operation of funds and the availability of information regarding their functioning.
- **Sub-national transfers:** the laws that regulate resource revenue sharing between different administrative and political units and assess the existing reporting practices in this regard.
- **EITI:** examines the extent to which members have fulfilled EITI criteria (i.e. publication of EITI reports, independent payment audits and reconciliations, and information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies).

The questionnaire distinguishes transparency aspects from the legal and regulatory framework. The transparency component refers to whether governments publish information relevant to each of the seven categories, as well as how comprehensive it is and how frequently it is published. The legal and regulatory framework dimension refers to the laws, regulations and institutions that delineate roles and responsibilities in the extractive sector and provide assurances of integrity in relevant categories.

*Researchers gathered the information from November 2009 to April 2010.*

Based on this questionnaire design, the Revenue Watch Index is constructed as a simple average of the transparency-related questions.<sup>9</sup> The scoring of each question is based on whether a document, regular publication or online database provides the information demanded in the questionnaire. Using only this type of question allows the index to compare whether information exists in periodical reports and documents, a straightforward way of establishing standards across countries.

For the legal and regulatory framework component, we draw from standards identified by the IMF guide and the Natural Resource Charter, among others, to select practices that facilitate comprehensive disclosure, offer greater access to information, or put a check on discretionary powers.<sup>10</sup> The rationale for including these questions springs from the recognition that transparency alone does not address all the problems faced by resource-rich countries. However, standards and good practices are still emerging and evolving. In some cases, policy recommendations can become prescriptive.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the index scores rely exclusively on transparency questions.

Questions related to the legal and regulatory framework track the existence of rules and organizational features, but do not assess how they are functioning in practice. The questions are meant to help civil society and parliamentarians further evaluate domestic institutions and improve their performance. In a separate section of this report, we provide a brief analysis of the legal and regulatory framework features using the information researchers collected. The index does not score the legal and regulatory framework, and the information gathered through these questions is useful to provide context for the countries included in this report.

## 2.1 Country coverage

Country selection began with the 55 countries that the IMF defines as having economies dependent on oil, gas or minerals. In addition, we considered countries that participate in the EITI. At the time this project started, this included 30 countries, all but six of which are in the IMF definition. Finally, we identified five important producers of hydrocarbons and minerals that are among the top 10 producers of mineral commodities, but did not fall in either of the two groupings (i.e. Australia, Brazil, Canada, China and the United States). These three categories produced a potential list of 66 countries.

For a balanced geographical selection, we identified six regions: (1) Africa, (2) Asia-Pacific, (3) Central Asia/Russia, (4) Latin America, (5) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and (6) Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. From these, we selected a sample of 41 countries out of the potential list of 66 for the first implementation of the Revenue Watch Index. Despite a nonrandom selection, the countries we analyze provide a balanced regional approach for comparative purposes. For this report, countries with a federal structure (e.g. Canada and Australia) were left out due to the challenges posed by the diverse nature of the authorities in charge of managing and taxing natural resources in terms of research and creating an aggregated score.

## 2.2 Research process

Independent consultants gathered the information to complete each country questionnaire from November 2009 to April 2010. Research concentrated on identifying publicly available information covering a period from January 2006 to December 2009. Reports published during this time but providing information prior to 2006 counted as historical data. A number of countries implementing the EITI produced new reports in 2010, and the disclosure of new information through such reports is likely to improve country scores in the next iteration of the index.

Each researcher covered countries within a particular region, of which they had expert knowledge (including relevant local languages) and prior work experience. Researchers filled in a detailed questionnaire for each country and provided evidence for their answers. Research was based on publicly

available information, which we define as information that any and all citizens might be able to obtain on an official Internet website or through a request to the public authority issuing the document (see "Key Documents"). If one or more of the key documents could be obtained only through means unavailable to the public, it was not taken into account in scoring the questionnaire. In addition, researchers conducted interviews, to the extent possible, with local experts, civil society activists and government officials to corroborate information, expand our sources of information and mitigate any technological or translation bias.

It is important to note that information published on Internet websites by governmental agencies is the main source of data for the index. This is because the purpose of the index is to test how much data governments make publicly available through channels easily accessible to citizens. All the governments in the survey maintain official websites and routinely publish relevant information on them. A preliminary test of our methodology in Angola, Ecuador, Gabon, Mexico, Norway, Peru and South Africa captured a significant percentage of relevant information from online sources and identified the agencies more commonly in charge of reporting.

## 2.3 Resource focus

The Revenue Watch Index includes 30 countries where oil and gas are produced and 11 where minerals are extracted. For the mineral producers, researchers sought to identify information covering the entire sector. However, while oil and gas are relatively standardized, mining is a complex sector producing numerous resources that have different metrics for calculating volume and value.

Analysis is further complicated by the fact that some hydrocarbon-rich countries are also important mining countries. In order to make comparisons across diverse countries, this research concentrates on the resource that earns the most revenue for the government as defined by the IMF guide. This decision means that our results do not cover the totality of the extractive sector in every country. Nonetheless, our findings and conclusions are valid for the resources that contribute the most to the government's fiscal income in the majority of countries reviewed here.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.4 Peer review

The research results were submitted to peer reviewers to verify the answers provided in each questionnaire. Every country questionnaire was reviewed by at least one expert.<sup>13</sup> Most peer reviewers were local experts familiar with the revenue transparency movement and with expertise on the specific country's extractive sector. Reviewers provided comments, suggested changes, challenged interpretations, provided overlooked evidence and/or identified mistakes. The resulting questionnaire was then sent back to RWI, which confirmed that all peer reviewers' comments followed the methodology and were consistent. All the comments were subsequently shared with the lead researchers, who responded to reviewers' comments. If the reviewers' evidence or suggestions led to changes in the answer choice for specific questions, researchers made changes and appropriate notes about any modification, mistake or correction. RWI staff checked for consistency of assumptions across countries when selecting scores and made final decisions on scoring. Finally, RWI collected information on the number of changes suggested by each reviewer and number of question scores changed after the reviewing process. We provide these as an indication of the discussions and the decision-making process behind the final calculations of the score (see Appendix 3). Peer review started in February 2010 and was completed by July 2010. The result of this process is an expert-based survey index, in which every answer is backed up by evidence as defined before.

## 2.5 Scoring and organization of results

As mentioned above, only transparency-related questions were factored into the Revenue Watch Index. The index follows the seven categories that compose the questionnaire: Category I Access to resources; Category II Generation of revenue; Category III Institutional setting; Category IV State-owned oil, gas

and mining companies; Category V Natural resource funds; Category VI Sub-national transfers; and Category VII EITI.

The most important section for the score is Category II on Generation of revenue, with 29 indicators, compared with 22 for all these other sections. The Revenue Watch Index questionnaire repeats five sets of questions covering information from the finance and extractive sector ministries, regulatory agencies, central banks and state-owned companies (or agencies performing relevant role in each case). This design stressed the need for comprehensive research of all the potential sources of information in every country. For the final score of this section in the Revenue Watch Index, we systematically chose the maximum value for each indicator from among the five available sets. This consolidated score avoids rewarding repetition of information and it forms the core of the index.<sup>14</sup>

Indicators for Category II highlight crucial elements of a country's fiscal system for the extractive sector; what types of payments governments receive for their oil, gas and minerals, and in what amount. The index captures all possible forms of payments, including royalties, special taxes, excise taxes, percentages of revenue share in production sharing agreements and others.

Each question was scored on a scale of 0 to 100, reflecting the variable availability of information to the public.<sup>15</sup> The final score is a simple average of all the values of the transparency-related questions. All questions (multiple-choice and yes/no questions) have a "not applicable" option as an answer. Scoring questions as "not applicable" was avoided in the index whenever possible. We used it only when the situation was truly not applicable, such as in response to questions about the existence of a state-owned company in a country that does not have one. If a question was scored "not applicable" by a researcher, the peer reviewer had to agree with the score, and RWI checked the evidence available before the score was final. "Not applicable" questions were dropped from the pool of questions used to determine a country's score in the Revenue Watch Index.

## Ranking the Countries

Based on the final results of the index, we identify three groups of countries, ranked according to their relative score out of a possible 100:

- **Comprehensive Revenue Transparency** (average score 67-100): countries in this group provide their citizens with substantial amounts of information regarding the management of their extractive sector. Their governmental agencies and/or SOCs show strong reporting practices and tend to make available detailed or disaggregated data on the different areas under their authority.
- **Partial Revenue Transparency** (average score 34-66): countries provide their citizens with information about the extractive sector yet show important transparency gaps in one or more specific categories of the index.
- **Scant Revenue Transparency** (average score 0-33): countries have the lowest levels of information disclosure and poor reporting practices all across the different categories that compose the index.

The results vary greatly among the countries included in the index, and the questionnaire is helpful in highlighting the specific areas where each country falls short of good practice. Therefore, even for countries with Comprehensive Revenue Transparency, a closer examination of their scores for specific indicators within each category demonstrates substantial room for improvement.

### 2.6 What the Revenue Watch Index does not cover

This index is not a measure of corruption or budget openness. There are other well-known and firmly established organizations that already produce reports on these issues. Readers interested in those

topics should refer to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, the International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index (OBI), Global Integrity's Global Integrity Report and the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, among others. In contrast, this index provides a new measure for a specific sector that has been overlooked by comparative governance indicators until now.

In a similar vein, the index does not measure whether a country's extractive sector effectively contributes to economic growth and development. Neither does it focus on the accuracy or completeness of the information disclosed and identified. Countries that may engage in unreported off-budget accounts would not be identified by the methodology followed in this study. Therefore, any claims on the basis of this research should be limited to the information we can support with primary documents and reports. Along these lines, future research for the index may test the reliability and accuracy of information that official sources provide, which could involve gathering quantitative data and cross-referencing with international or independent sources.

This index creates a baseline that enables country comparisons and provides a tool to assess whether and how countries are seizing opportunities to make their extractive sectors more transparent. The comparative nature of this index, as well as its specificity at the policy level, also provides a powerful tool for policy makers to assess their institutional performance and for local advocacy partners to articulate concrete areas in need of reform.

No single measure can capture all the dimensions of a country's institutional practice and governance. However, the Revenue Watch Index provides the best information available under the assumptions and rules explained in the methodology. This index is not a comprehensive overview of a country's governance—but it measures indicators for a specific sector that has been neglected until now.

## Key Documents

Using a similar standard as the International Budget Partnership (IBP)'s Open Budget Index, we define *publicly available* information as information that any and all citizens might be able to obtain through a request to the public authority issuing the document. During the information-gathering process, researchers inquired about the following documents:

- **Contracts or investment agreements:** the activities and operations of a country's agreement between a state (or any of the authorized agencies acting on its behalf) and resource companies that regulate access to resources. These are normally published by the ministry of the extractive sector or the SOC. the activities and operations of a country's government with regards to the extractive industry. While these are usually published by the government agencies, in some countries the central bank also publishes reports on its activities regarding the extractive sector.
- **Environmental and social impact reports:** assessments including information about the environmental and social impact of activities undertaken in the framework of the extractive sector. These tend to be published by the SOC or ministries of environmental protection.
- **EITI reports:** documents containing data of revenue flows from oil, gas and mining activities of a country. Normally an independent EITI report administrator writes these, and the country's multi-stakeholder group accepts them.<sup>16</sup>
- **Statistical reports/databases:** documents containing statistical information related to the extractive sector. In general, statistical reports are produced and published by the ministry of the extractive sector, statistical, and regulatory agencies or by the SOC.
- **Auditor reports:** either an annual report issued by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) attesting to the government agencies' year-end final accounts and reports from internal or external audit agencies that provide audited financial statements for the SOC or other agencies managing resource revenue.<sup>17</sup>
- **Annual and in-year reports:** annual and/or quarterly or monthly documents describing

## 2.7 Key documents identified by research on the Revenue Watch Index

The research for this index identifies a host of valuable information and documents. Primary official documents are identified as “Key Documents,” and these are the main evidence on which the Revenue Watch Index bases its scores. Definition of these documents relies on the IMF guide, EITI and other relevant international standards.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to collecting key documents, the Revenue Watch Index research identifies the degree of public access to key documents governments provide. Table 1 summarizes this information. Documents provided by researchers are evidence of countries actually producing and distributing key documents to the public. Our inference for the other three categories in the table relies on interviews with local experts and input from peer reviewers.

Table 1 demonstrates that contract transparency is very rare. Only five governments publish contracts on mineral resources in full. In contrast, annual and statistical reports from ministries of finance or oil and mining are fairly common. Regarding environmental and social impact reports, the majority of governments do not publish documents incorporating this type of information.

**TABLE 1**  
**ACCESS TO KEY DOCUMENTS**

	Countries producing and distributing documents to the public (e.g. in libraries, newspapers, online, etc.)	Countries producing documents but making them available to the public only on request	Countries producing documents for internal purposes, but not making them available to the public	Countries not producing documents, even for internal purposes
Contracts <sup>19</sup>	5	4	21	3
Environmental and social impact reports	15	6	5	15
Statistical reports / databases	38	0	0	3
Annual reports	39	0	0	2
In-year reports <sup>20</sup>	30	1	1	8
EITI reports	18	0	0	23
Auditor reports	22	3	8	8

*Countries in the top tier of the index still have substantial room for improvement.*

# 3

## Overall Results

The Revenue Watch Index shows that about three-quarters (29 out of 41) of the countries provide scant or partial information about their extractive sector. This means that citizens are missing essential information to know how much their governments are profiting from the exploitation of state-owned natural resources.

Table 2 (page 16) shows countries’ rankings and a breakdown by type of information of the Revenue Watch Index, followed by a more detailed description of each category.

### 3.1 Comprehensive Revenue Transparency

The 12 countries included in this category provide relatively comprehensive disaggregated disclosure of the revenue received by government agencies and/or state-owned companies. Countries in this group have an average score of 81 in the Revenue Watch Index and share some common features. Disclosure includes information on reserves, production volumes and value of production, companies operating in the country, and detailed information about the main payments to the government, such as royalties, taxes and special taxes, among others. The index research identified consistently strong reporting practices at their treasury, tax or statistical agencies. Multiple agencies provide detailed or disaggregated reporting on the different areas under their authority. In addition, several of the state-owned companies in these countries are publicly listed or partially listed, although maintaining preeminent state control, and therefore provide public reports for investors.

In this category Brazil comes on top of the ranking, slightly above Chile and Norway, both of which are also considered as models of good governance for oil, gas and mining. Kazakhstan and Russia appear in this category on account of reporting from tax and statistical agencies. Mexico exhibits comprehensive reporting by the ministries of Finance and Energy, and by its national oil company (NOC), which is fully state-owned but has successfully issued bonds in international and national securities markets for several years. For its part, Colombia has good reporting practices across agencies in the sector. Peru has been a pioneer in adopting access to information and reporting practices in the region, progress reflected in its ranking. In the United States, the Minerals Management Services, regulates the sector and publishes the full text of active leases (contracts) and relevant information about payments.<sup>21</sup> Finally, Timor-Leste has adopted high transparency standards as part of its state-building process.

Despite appearing at the top of the index, countries in this category still have substantial room for improvement. Progress in revenue transparency can be achieved by expanding the level of disaggregation to include all the payments, such as royalties, special taxes, bonuses, revenue share from production sharing contracts (PSCs) and other relevant fees the government receives from oil, gas and mining companies. Providing this information in easily accessible sources and formats would greatly facilitate disclosure and analysis. Improvements are also possible in opening SOCs’ operations to scrutiny and providing information on fiscal terms that governments negotiate with extractive companies, especially full disclosure of such contracts. Finally, implementation of EITI should be considered, as the Revenue Watch Index shows that the countries of this group already comply with the basic EITI disclosure criteria, and they could further benefit from international recognition stemming from the validation process.

**TABLE 2**  
**RESULTS OF THE REVENUE WATCH INDEX BY TYPE OF INFORMATION**

Country	1. Access to resources	2. Generation of revenue	3. Institutional setting	4. State-owned companies	5. Natural resource funds	6. Subnational transfers	7. EITI	Revenue Watch Index
Brazil	91.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	N/A	100.0	0.0	97.0
Norway	91.8	97.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	N/A	67.0	96.4
Russia	89.0	93.1	67.0	81.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	89.7
Mexico	83.3	79.0	100.0	94.5	91.8	100.0	0.0	83.4
Chile	66.7	84.0	100.0	95.3	91.8	53.2	0.0	80.6
Colombia	100.0	80.3	100.0	85.7	33.3	100.0	0.0	79.6
Kazakhstan	44.3	93.8	67.0	66.7	91.8	0.0	67.0	77.5
Peru	75.0	71.2	100.0	N/A	N/A	100.0	67.0	76.8
Azerbaijan	33.3	76.3	33.0	77.8	100.0	N/A	100.0	75.1
Ecuador	58.3	76.0	100.0	76.1	N/A	80.0	0.0	73.6
United States	100.0	63.4	100.0	N/A	75.0	86.6	0.0	71.4
Timor-Leste	58.3	69.5	100.0	0.0	100.0	N/A	67.0	70.5
Iraq	41.8	68.0	67.0	50.0	91.8	60.0	33.0	63.8
Venezuela	11.0	70.7	100.0	71.6	33.3	73.2	0.0	63.0
Trinidad and Tobago	58.3	64.2	100.0	85.7	91.8	0.0	0.0	61.9
Yemen	33.3	70.5	67.0	38.8	N/A	N/A	33.0	60.5
Liberia	75.0	63.8	67.0	N/A	0.0	N/A	100.0	60.5
South Africa	33.3	62.1	100.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	58.0
Bolivia	25.0	53.1	100.0	66.6	N/A	86.6	0.0	56.3
Papua New Guinea	66.8	51.3	100.0	71.4	0.0	20.0	0.0	51.1
Indonesia	58.3	52.4	67.0	33.3	N/A	60.0	0.0	50.0
Malaysia	11.0	64.1	33.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	48.4
Nigeria	25.0	47.4	67.0	52.3	0.0	80.0	67.0	46.5
Botswana	25.0	56.0	100.0	23.7	44.3	N/A	0.0	46.3
China	33.3	44.4	67.0	71.4	N/A	0.0	0.0	42.2
Gabon	25.0	49.2	67.0	N/A	41.8	0.0	67.0	41.8
Cameroon	58.3	46.0	67.0	57.1	0.0	0.0	67.0	41.8
Zambia	33.3	42.0	67.0	40.0	N/A	N/A	33.0	41.2
Sierra Leone	41.5	39.1	100.0	N/A	N/A	6.6	100.0	38.2
Mongolia	50.0	38.4	67.0	42.9	25.0	20.0	67.0	38.2
Sudan	0.0	36.6	0.0	26.6	50.0	86.6	0.0	37.4
Iran	44.3	43.2	33.0	42.7	16.5	6.6	0.0	36.1
Angola	41.8	44.4	67.0	38.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.7
Saudi Arabia	0.0	36.0	33.0	27.7	49.8	N/A	0.0	32.4
Ghana	25.0	33.3	67.0	100.0	0.0	N/A	67.0	32.3
Kuwait	0.0	30.3	33.0	51.6	25.0	N/A	0.0	29.8
Tanzania	25.0	27.8	100.0	16.7	N/A	N/A	33.0	27.8
Algeria	25.0	23.8	33.0	42.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.8
DRC	11.0	13.8	100.0	66.7	N/A	20.0	67.0	22.5
Equatorial Guinea	41.8	12.3	67.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.6
Turkmenistan	0.0	16.7	33.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.7
<b>Average</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>74.0</b>	<b>54.3</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>51.8</b>

*Five countries appear in the lowest tier of this group with uneven disclosure of information across the different categories.*

### 3.2 Partial Revenue Transparency

Twenty-one countries fall in this category with scores between 66-34 and a total average score of 48.5. Yet there is significant variance in disclosure of information practices among countries in this group. To highlight their diversity we distinguish three tiers: five countries with a score of more than 60, 11 with a score between 59 and 41, and five with less than 40.

Among the countries in the highest section of this category we find Iraq, Liberia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and Yemen. Although Iraq and Yemen show above-average reporting on generation of revenue, they present low levels of disclosure about access to resources and state-owned companies. Liberia publishes extensive information through its EITI process. Trinidad and Tobago has good reporting capacity, but its score is brought down by no reporting on sub-national transfers. In the case of Venezuela, although reporting on revenue generation appears strong, concerns have arisen in the past about the quality of official data.<sup>22</sup> However, the Revenue Watch Index did not test the data to discount this factor, and we chose to take the publicly available information at face value.

Eleven countries that differ substantially in terms of economic development, geographic location or political system belong to the middle tier of this category. South Africa and Botswana appear among the highest African countries included in this review, but with only average disclosure of information on revenue generation. Four out of 11 countries in this category are implementing EITI: Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria and Zambia. However, they have an average or below-average performance on the rest of the indicators. The remaining countries are Bolivia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea, which show below-average scores for information for revenue generation.

Five countries appear in the lowest tier of this group with uneven disclosure of information across the different categories. Two countries (Mongolia and Sierra Leone) are EITI members. Sudan, despite very low scores in most categories, shows some disclosure of information on revenue generation and on transfers of revenue to Southern Sudan.<sup>23</sup> Angola falls at the bottom of the category, with poor disclosure of information about its NOC and NRF.

### 3.3 Scant Revenue Transparency

The common features within this group, which includes eight countries with an average score of 23.6, are poor reporting on generation of revenue and low transparency on access to resources. Weak disclosure of information on those two sections brings down scores even for EITI participants such as DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and Tanzania. Some countries like Ghana or Tanzania show above-average scores in some sections, like transparency of natural resource funds or institutional setting, but that does not compensate for poor or untimely disclosure of information on payments the government received in the sectors covered by this index. The other four countries in this category—Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan—show no disclosure of information on the topics covered here, which is in line with their low rankings in other transparency measures such as the OBI.

5

Countries surveyed that publish contracts in full:

12

Countries that guarantee public access to information:

15

Countries that publish some assessment of environmental impacts:

1

Number of surveyed countries **without** state-owned oil, gas or mining companies:



# 4

## Results by Category

### 4.1 Access to resources

Low scores in this category indicate that countries do not provide their citizens with access to information nor public disclosure of major investment agreements in the oil, gas and mineral sector. In keeping with the findings of RWI's 2009 report *Contracts Confidential*, the Revenue Watch Index shows that licensing processes, social and environmental impact assessments, and contracts often remain beyond public scrutiny.<sup>24</sup>

The findings also demonstrate that contract transparency is rare. Among the countries surveyed, only Colombia, Liberia, Peru, Timor-Leste and the United States publish their valid contracts in full.<sup>25</sup> There is a danger that contract transparency can be reversed easily too. For example, in early 2010 Bolivia took down the government web page where contracts were previously disclosed. In some cases, contracts are published by the operating companies but not the government, as demonstrated in Azerbaijan where operating companies have published these agreements.

In numerous countries that perform poorly on the index, such as Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Turkmenistan, governments do not even disclose contracts to their legislatures. Also, most countries lack rules or legislation providing citizens with a right to information about their country's extractive industries. Notably, the worst performers in terms of freedom of information are the most highly resource-dependent countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, where the vast majority of public revenue comes directly from the oil, gas and/or mining sectors. The situation is even more striking when considering that only 12 of the countries surveyed have adopted legislation to protect freedom of information and guarantee access to public information; eight of these are in the Western Hemisphere.

Information about licensing procedures is more commonly disclosed than contracts, and 22 countries—almost all of them rich in petroleum—publish some information on this topic. The primary reason for this is that auctions have become widespread as means to allocate exploration and production rights in the hydrocarbon sector, as well as to identify service providers. On the other hand, the majority of mining countries surveyed by the index follow the “first-come, first-served” principle to allocate license rights. This process is less transparent than an auction, even if clearly established and predictable in the mining legislation.

Another important issue here is the publication of environmental and social impact reports by governments. Only 15 countries reviewed here (nine hydrocarbon and six mining countries) publish some assessment of environmental and social impacts. In some cases, these take the form of corporate social responsibility reports by state-owned companies. The diversity of practices identified by this index demonstrates the importance of further research on how governments report information on environmental issues, given that a global standard regarding production and publication of these reports is still emerging.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4.2 Generation of revenue<sup>27</sup>

A detailed analysis of the type of information that countries publish shows that governments are more likely to disclose operational rather than financial information. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Norway and the United States get the highest marks when it comes to publishing information on reserves, production volumes, prices, exports, investment, costs, companies operating in the country and disaggregated production volumes. The total average score for this section is 67.7, and the minimum score for this topic is 25.8 (Table 3).<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, disaggregated information about financial payments received by governments, such as profit shares in PSCs or royalties, special taxes, dividends, bonuses and extraction fees are less likely to be disclosed. The average score for all the countries is 46.7, and six countries do not publish this type of information.

*One reason why data on reserves and production volumes is more commonly disclosed is that governments often see it as a way to promote investment in the country.*

One reason why data on operations is more commonly disclosed is that governments often see it as a way to promote investment in the country. Publishing information on the country's reserves and production, as well as on total investment amounts, is an indication of future production capacity and also of ability to meet financial commitments. A second reason for disclosure of operations information is a trend for governments to turn their state-owned companies, especially in the hydrocarbon sector, into ones that are publicly or partially traded, or at least that issue bonds in stock and securities markets. State-owned (or controlled) companies from Brazil, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Russia are examples of these arrangements. Increased engagement with financial markets brings state-owned companies under the obligation to disclose substantial information on their operations and financial standing for investors.

Financial information is crucial to identify payments received by countries for the exploitation of their resources. This is a necessary step before turning attention to the use of profits from oil and mining. As the EITI and PWYP insist, this is a crucial aspect of accountability, and governments should commit to good practices of reporting and disclosure of information, including details on each type of payment they receive from the extractive sector.

The generation of revenue section also evaluates the quality and frequency of reporting. Quality of reporting is defined as whether reports are comprehensive and understandable, and periodicity relates to how often those reports are released. Overall, the results by governmental agency show notable differences in these categories (Table 4).

**TABLE 4**  
**QUALITY AND FREQUENCY OF REPORT SCORES**

Agency	Periodicity	Quality of report	Average
Central bank	68.4	68.5	68.4
Ministry of extractive sector	36.3	45.8	41.3
Ministry of finance	59.4	58.8	59.1
Regulatory agency	29.6	31.0	30.3
State-owned company	41.0	56.3	48.7
<b>Average</b>	<b>48.6</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>51.0</b>

**TABLE 3**  
**CATEGORY II SCORES – GENERATION OF REVENUE BY TYPE OF INFORMATION REPORTED**

Country	Financial	Operations
Norway	100.0	100.0
Brazil	100.0	100.0
Kazakhstan	100.0	100.0
Russia	95.9	92.7
Chile	75.0	100.0
Azerbaijan	95.9	70.6
United States	66.8	88.9
Colombia	58.4	100.0
Venezuela	62.5	88.9
Yemen	77.8	66.7
Trinidad and Tobago	54.3	85.2
Mexico	37.5	100.0
Iraq	62.5	77.8
Liberia	71.0	66.7
Timor-Leste	77.8	51.9
Malaysia	55.6	74.1
Ecuador	50.0	77.8
Peru	33.3	88.9
Iran	50.0	66.7
Bolivia	45.9	70.3
Cameroon	33.0	77.8
Indonesia	26.0	85.2
Gabon	41.5	66.7
Botswana	37.5	66.7
Nigeria	37.5	66.7
Angola	29.1	70.4
China	44.4	55.6
South Africa	57.1	44.3
Zambia	33.4	55.6
Mongolia	57.0	33.4
Sierra Leone	41.6	40.8
Papua New Guinea	33.3	48.1
Ghana	38.8	33.3
Saudi Arabia	0.0	66.7
Tanzania	0.0	59.3
Kuwait	18.5	44.3
Sudan	0.0	55.6
Algeria	16.5	33.1
Turkmenistan	0.0	44.6
Equatorial Guinea	0.0	29.6
DRC	0.0	25.8
<b>Average</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>67.7</b>

To view or download report data, including country-specific documents and information, go to [www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex](http://www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex).

Central banks commonly report information related to value of mineral exports, sector activities and prices. Although these topics are important for transparency of revenue, they are not the most relevant. Ministries of finance have a more relevant role in managing revenue from the extractive industries, and this research demonstrates that they are often in charge of providing information. Despite this mandate, they could improve the timeliness, periodicity, and comprehensiveness with which they report information on payments received from oil, gas and mining companies. Meanwhile, state-owned companies, ministries for the extractive sector and regulatory agencies on average publish less information less regularly and of lower quality. A problem commonly observed with these agencies is that reports are often published with considerable time lags and without normal periodic updates. In other words, the agencies most directly concerned with extractive industries have the worst reporting practices.

#### 4.3 Institutional setting

This type of information refers to whether governments publish detailed legislation for their oil, gas and mining sectors. Although the existence of clear rules and a predictable legal framework is important for good governance of the extractive industries, this research did not test how a country's legislation is implemented in practice. This is an important area for future research, particularly for civil society at the local level. For purposes of this index, high scores in this section may testify more to countries' aspirations than to reality.

Many countries at the bottom of the Revenue Watch Index get a very high score in this section. This should remind readers that legislation alone is not a perfect indicator of actual implementation and enforcement. Rules about management of the oil, gas and mining sectors do not translate into disclosure of contracts, financial or operational data.

#### 4.4 State-owned oil, gas and mining companies

SOCs operate in 28 out of the 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries reviewed in this report and in seven out of nine mining countries. Only the United States has no ownership interest in corporations related to exploration and production of oil, gas and minerals, while Gabon has officially announced its intention to create a NOC.<sup>29</sup> A few other countries have no responses in this section because of our concentration on a specific area of their mineral sector, but their governments certainly hold ownership rights in mineral-producing corporations.<sup>30</sup>

### State-owned Companies (SOCs)

SOCs differ both in the levels of state participation in their ownership structure as well as in their degree of exposure to international stock exchange listings. In the case of oil and gas, only Brazil, China, Colombia, Norway and Russia have national companies with partial private ownership. At the same time, StatoilHydro (Norway), Petrobras (Brazil), Ecopetrol (Colombia) and Gazprom and Rosneft (Russia) are the only SOCs listed on major international stock exchanges (New York and London).

Some countries list specific parts of their companies. For example, China has only listed subsidiary companies but not the parents. Kazakhstan is in a similar situation, as well as

Malaysia, which has listed subsidiary companies but not the upstream sector or the holding company. Moreover, certain SOCs have tried to improve their corporate practices and issue debt bonds in the international securities market but are not listed, such as Mexico's SOC.

As for the mining sector, SOCs are also generally fully owned by the governments of their respective countries, with Botswana, DRC and Zambia being the only countries that have opened their national mining companies to partial private ownership. Moreover, the national mining company of Zambia seems to be the only one that is listed on major international stock exchanges (London and Paris).

*The index found that only 10 countries publish some data on how their national oil companies spend oil revenue on public and social projects.*

In total, 14 countries have SOCs that publish full reports on their operations that include balance sheet and profit and loss statements; two publish reports that include data on revenues, taxes and net income; and eight publish information on operations but without disaggregated details. SOCs in 14 countries publish audited reports. Also, 22 governments publish information on joint ventures or equity participation with private resource companies. Some examples are Brazil, Colombia and Norway, all with publicly traded oil companies, while Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Russia's companies publish investor's reports. In one case—that of Ecuador—the NOC is subject to a freedom of information law that requires extensive reporting on subjects such as contracting, procurement and expenditures.

A key area of concern within this category is the disclosure of information on quasi-fiscal activities. The index found that only 10 countries publish some data on how their national oil companies spend oil revenue on public and social projects. Lack of transparency emerges when countries use state-owned companies for projects without accountability, placing them outside normal legislative approval process and thus making them susceptible to manipulation. Venezuela's PDVSA is an example of an SOC whose information was in the past questioned by international and national experts.<sup>31</sup> Other examples come from companies that have listed only partial areas of their operations that may not include exploration and production, as in the case of Kazakhstan's KazmunayGaz. In such examples, disclosure of information may not represent the entire range of ownership and interests of governments.

#### 4.5 Natural resource funds (NRFs)

Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) have attracted attention in recent years as the financial vehicle of choice for governments flush from unprecedented economic growth and the commodity price boom. NRFs are a sub-category of SWF, and the Revenue Watch Index considers only those funds specially designated to capture some share of oil, gas and mineral revenue. The purposes of the NRFs identified by this index are very diverse. They include intergenerational savings and stabilization funds, investment corporations and other arrangements that function as escrow accounts to transfer extractive revenues for several purposes that range from budget financing to development projects. The amounts that each fund manages also vary. Some examples include Iran and Mexico's oil stabilization funds, Kuwait's Investment Corporation, Norway's Pension Fund Global, Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund and even the U.S. Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF).<sup>32</sup> Overall, 29 countries reviewed have some form of natural resources account.

Fifteen of the funds covered in the index publish some information on their assets and transactions. Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund, for instance, publishes annual audited reports and quarterly statements, including a version in the local language (Tetum). In 10 cases, the authority in charge of the fund publishes audited reports at least once every year. The results of this section provide a glimpse only of whether countries publish the rules for their funds' operations, as well as periodic reports with audited information on assets and transactions. Readers interested in a more comprehensive picture of how resource-rich governments manage their oil, gas and mineral revenues should refer to the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) related to SWF governance (also known as the Santiago Principles), or to more specialized studies, such as the Peterson Institute of International Economics' Index for Sovereign Wealth Funds.<sup>33</sup>

#### 4.6 Sub-national transfers

This section assesses information published by governments on how revenue from oil, gas and minerals may be shared between central/federal governments and regional/local administrations.<sup>34</sup>

The Revenue Watch Index shows that among the 29 countries where sub-national transfers are relevant, only 13 governments publish information on transfers of resource revenue to sub-national administrations. Whether sub-national governments disclose information on their receipts of extractive

revenue is equally important. Although information is scarce, we were able to identify 10 countries where at least one local administration publishes some information on the transfers they receive from central governments. RWI projects at the sub-national level in Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria and Peru are examples of how local governments are starting to take a proactive stance on these issues.

However, almost all the countries in the Scant Revenue Transparency group do not provide information on how their governments share revenue with local governments (even discounting those that are unitary states). The lack of information about transfers creates problems for sub-national governments to predict available resources and do effective planning.

#### 4.7 EITI

EITI countries spread across the whole spectrum of the Revenue Transparency Index. Four appear in the Comprehensive Revenue Transparency group; 10 rank in the Partial Revenue Transparency category and four in the lowest sector of this index (Scant Revenue Transparency).

Participation in EITI, assessing their status in the initiative, was the only indicator included in the Revenue Transparency Index scores. However, research for the index also considered the implementation of other EITI criteria. These refer to whether a country is an EITI candidate country and has published an EITI report, and whether such a report includes audited payments and information from state-owned companies and has been reconciled by an independent administrator. At the time of research (November 2009-April 2010) the EITI validation process was ongoing, and certain countries (such as Equatorial Guinea) have since lost their EITI status, while others (Iraq) became candidates. Although the Revenue Transparency Index does not measure whether countries have complied with EITI criteria, this report presents a score of this implementation in Table 5. This is neither an assessment of the EITI process nor a substitute for validation in these countries.

*Participation in EITI, assessing their status in the initiative, was the only indicator included in the Revenue Transparency Index.*

**TABLE 5  
REVENUE WATCH INDEX SCORES OF EITI COUNTRIES**

Country	EITI criteria implementation	Revenue Watch Index
Norway	86.8	96.4
Kazakhstan	66.6	77.5
Peru	80.2	76.8
Azerbaijan	86.8	75.1
Timor-Leste	91.8	70.5
Iraq	16.5	63.8
Yemen	16.5	60.5
Liberia	83.3	60.5
Nigeria	86.8	46.5
Gabon	53.4	41.8
Cameroon	60.0	41.8
Zambia	16.5	41.2
Sierra Leone	83.3	38.2
Mongolia	80.2	38.2
Ghana	91.8	32.3
Tanzania	16.5	27.8
DRC	66.6	22.5
Equatorial Guinea	66.6	11.6
<b>Average</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>50.6</b>

## The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

From the information gathered for the Revenue Watch Index, we identify some countries that have a strong EITI performance regarding transparency criteria but fail on the test of revenue transparency (see Table 5). Countries such as DRC, Mongolia and Nigeria need to improve access to information despite a relatively high level of compliance with EITI criteria. The large discrepancy between EITI implementation and revenue transparency scores highlights the fact that in these countries EITI provides essential information to citizens that governments are not providing elsewhere. This is a reminder both of the importance of EITI in these countries as the only initiative to open the government to public scrutiny and of the need to go beyond its implementation to improve levels of information disclosure. In such countries, despite strong transparency through the EITI process, governments still need to provide comprehensive, periodic and timely reports to their citizens.

One example is Nigeria, which has produced two EITI reports covering the fiscal years 1999-2004 and 2005. These are the only documents that make information publicly available for many ministries in charge of managing the sector in Nigeria. Furthermore, EITI reports suffer from serious delays, and there is no source of comprehensive information after the year 2005. The same can be said about Cameroon and Ghana. This is a reminder that governments need to improve timeliness of their reporting practices and make disclosure of information a sustainable process instead of a one-time event.

Countries like Cameroon and Gabon perform relatively better at implementing EITI transparency criteria than on their overall revenue

transparency. However, Revenue Watch Index research finds that these countries have room for improvement even within EITI, reflecting criticism from local civil society that EITI reports in these two countries are superficial and insufficient for genuinely increasing levels of oil sector transparency and accountability.<sup>35</sup> Despite publishing an EITI report, both countries are close to the bottom on the Revenue Watch Index. Other significant cases in this respect are Liberia and Sierra Leone, which despite performing well on EITI implementation, display average revenue transparency scores. In Liberia's case, the EITI report is remarkably comprehensive and constitutes an example of good practice for this initiative.

Kazakhstan and Norway have similar levels of EITI transparency criteria implementation and revenue transparency. However, a closer look at section scores offers room for improvement. For instance, these countries could improve their levels of disclosure on contract and license transparency (in both cases), as well as disaggregated revenue reporting and access to resources (in the case of Kazakhstan).

At the time of writing this, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia had yet to publish EITI reports. Moving forward with this initiative should improve their levels of revenue transparency.

Finally, for EITI implementing countries, the index's results present evidence that the process has to be the beginning of reform, not an end in itself. Regular, periodical, timely and comprehensive disclosure of information has to be the standard, and EITI should not be an excuse for poor scores on this index.

# Revenue Watch Index

Rankings are based on the availability of information in seven key categories of natural resource governance. To view or download report data and additional country-specific information, go to [www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex](http://www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex).




## Generation of Revenue

Information on government payments received and other revenues from all extractive activities.



## Legend

- Comprehensive Revenue Transparency
- Partial Revenue Transparency
- Scant Revenue Transparency



## Access to Resources

Information on natural resource reserves and composition of a country's extractive sector.




## Institutional Setting

Information on the laws, regulations and administrative rules that govern the oil, gas and mining sectors.



## State-Owned Companies

Information on operation, governance and finances of oil, gas and mining companies controlled by the national government.



## Natural Resource Funds

Information on structure, regulation and finances of national funds designed to save natural resource revenues.



## Sub-National Transfers

Information on the transfer of natural resource revenues from the federal level to local and sub-national governments and communities.



## EITI

Status and/or progress of countries in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a voluntary standard for reporting and cross-sector cooperation.

## Legal and Regulatory Framework

For the legal and regulatory framework, the project identifies de jure rules on the management of the oil, gas and mineral industries. This research does not test the actual implementation of the legal and regulatory frameworks at the country level. However, the questions do provide important contextual information in three categories (Access to resources, Institutional setting and State-owned oil, gas and mining companies). Legal and regulatory framework questions inquire about the licensing processes countries follow to grant access to resources, whether they have agencies in charge of licensing that are separate from operating companies, and what checks exist on the authorities that negotiate access to resources.

Many countries have adopted competitive auction rounds for different aspects of exploration and production of oil and gas, from assigning licenses or production sharing agreements, to choosing service agreement partners or picking the best deal in service procurement. Algeria, Angola and Mexico offer examples of these varying approaches. Other governments have created complex sectors with differentiated rules to access oil, gas and mineral reserves, which leave room for arbitrary decisions, conflict of interest and opacity of rules, such as Bolivia, Cameroon, Ecuador and Venezuela. Finally, in some countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Turkmenistan, decisions as to which companies win access to reserves have been left to the discretion of the chief executive's office.

Country performance varies widely in having checks on discretionary decisions regarding the award of licenses. Almost half the countries included in the report have legislation that limits deviations from key principles or renegotiations after auction rounds or that requires approval of another independent authority for decisions with potential effects on fiscal or regulatory principles.

Nine countries also have rules requiring parliamentary ratification of oil, gas and mining contracts. However, in practice these rules do not necessarily guarantee improvements in revenue transparency, as evidenced by Bolivia, Ghana, Iran, Kuwait, Mongolia, South Africa, Venezuela and Yemen. Despite such parliamentary oversight, these countries do not provide comprehensive information about the rules governing access to resources. This is another example of the divide between de facto and de jure regulatory framework. Future research could examine how the implementation of laws affects de facto governance, as well as the availability and quality of information.

### Licensing Procedures

Countries ranked by the Revenue Watch Index diverge in the way governments award licenses to exploit natural resources. While most of the countries tend to use licensing procedures, others—including Kuwait, Mexico and Saudi Arabia—do not rely on this method. Some of the countries with the highest dependency on oil, gas and mineral revenues have national companies with monopolies on access to the

sector, or let these companies manage the licensing procedure, including Angola, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Turkmenistan. Other states rely on their respective ministries of the extractive sector to lead the process, as has been the case recently in Algeria and Venezuela.<sup>36</sup> Finally, in the case of Nigeria, recent licensing procedures are managed by its regulatory agency.

Notably, Ghana, Mongolia and South Africa provide abundant information about their legal and regulatory framework, but they are not among the top performers in the Revenue Watch Index. In these cases it appears that the existence of independent licensing agencies and operating companies, competitive licensing processes, limits on discretionary powers and legislative approval of contracts in the mining sector still has to translate into comprehensive disclosure of information to the public.

Research on the legal and regulatory framework also included questions about the separation of roles and authorities in the management of the extractive sector. The existence of internal and external controls for agencies receiving payments from resource companies was considered too, as well as features of auditing practices and the extent of parliamentary and civil society oversight.

Brazil, Colombia and Norway show strong legal and regulatory frameworks that model good practices through their separation of roles and authority across different agencies. According to this model, fiscal policy and tax collection is the finance ministry's domain, an autonomous agency regulates and sets policy for the extractive sector, and a state-owned company is in charge of purely commercial activities. The existence of autonomous regulatory agencies overseeing exploration and production of hydrocarbons with relatively strong tax systems and publicly listed yet state-controlled companies creates multiple sources of information on these countries' extractive sectors, which reflects strong disclosure of information. They therefore provide examples of strong legal and regulatory structures that, when implemented effectively, can enhance extractive sector transparency.

### Challenges of Exporting the Norwegian Model of State-NOC Structure

The organization of Norway's petroleum sector according to a formal separation of roles and powers—between a ministry in charge of policy formulation, an independent regulatory body in charge of monitoring and oversight, and a NOC with purely commercial functions—is often considered an international good practice. The success of the Norwegian model has inspired countries like Brazil to undertake energy sector reforms along these lines.

However, attempts to apply this model in Algeria and Nigeria stalled as reform faced resistance. Meanwhile, countries like Angola and Malaysia have been able to build up highly functioning oil industries in the absence of

a separation. Recent research suggests that while the Norwegian model may represent the best structure for many places, countries with extremely low institutional capacity or little history of formalized checks and balances may be better served by a second-best approach that does not try to simultaneously build and empower three institutions at once, but rather seeks to embed accountability incrementally, through mechanisms such as public reporting requirements and oversight boards.<sup>37</sup> The Revenue Watch Index treats the Norwegian model as good practice for state-NOC relations, but future versions will continue to track emerging analysis of its effectiveness globally.

Formal separation of powers, however, does not on its own reflect an effective system of checks and balances. The information from legal and regulatory framework questions shows that some of the best performers in terms of disclosure of information have an institutional setting that clearly separates roles and authority in the management of their extractive sector. However, countries such as DRC, Equatorial Guinea or Ghana that have adopted laws establishing a separation of roles and accountability mechanisms still provide scant information on how the government collects revenues from the extractive sector.

State-owned companies' questions refer to whether these companies follow internationally recognized accounting standards and whether audits cover all SOC subsidiaries. Notably, state-owned companies that are also publicly listed (or partially listed) comply with these practices. This is the case of companies from Brazil, Chile and Norway, which are countries that appear in the Comprehensive Revenue Transparency category. However, adopting internationally recognized accounting

standards and publishing audited reports are not circumscribed to publicly listed companies, as demonstrated by fully state-owned companies in Malaysia and Mexico.


One element highlighted during the research for the Revenue Watch Index is the difficulty in identifying accounting standards. In this research, we consider that state-owned companies use internationally recognized accounting standards when audits are performed by recognized accounting firms and when audit reports state the standards followed, either international financial reporting standards or generally accepted accounting principles. Under that assumption, companies in 19 countries follow internationally recognized accounting standards, but there are still 10 countries where state-owned companies need to improve their accounting practices. Strong action on that front is necessary when considering that some of those countries do not publish audited reports either, as is the case with companies from Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkmenistan, Yemen and Zambia.

*The MENA region has no countries at the top of the ranking and comes second-to-last on the regional average (40.9).*

# 6

## Results by Region

REVENUE WATCH INDEX AVERAGE RESULTS BY REGION



Regional averages of the Revenue Watch Index show a significant geographical variance. The region with the lowest scores is sub-Saharan Africa (38.6). Poor transparency on access to resources and lack of information on revenue transparency for the majority of countries are the drivers of low scores in the region, despite the good governance efforts of some countries, including EITI implementation.

The MENA region has no countries at the top of the ranking and comes second-to-last on the regional average (40.9). By and large, MENA countries perform badly in terms of information on access to resources, with no country scoring more than 50 in this section of the Revenue Watch Index, which is striking given the fact that the region holds more than half of the world's reserves for hydrocarbons. Countries in this region also perform poorly on access to information on generation of revenue, despite generating one third of the world's oil production.<sup>38</sup> Iraq has a strong performance on revenue transparency, doing very well on the Special Resource Fund in particular, a legacy of the Development Fund for Iraq created by UN Resolution 1483 in 2003. Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are in the lowest tiers across all the different categories of revenue transparency.

As for the Asia-Pacific region (average score of 50.1), all its countries except Timor-Leste hover in the Partial Revenue Transparency area of the table, despite the fact that EITI implementation is almost absent from the region. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia are the top performers of the Central Asia/Russia region (which has an average score of 63) and are included in the Comprehensive Revenue Transparency category. In part, this is explained by state agencies providing periodical reports, but also because of adoption of EITI in Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan performs poorly across all categories of revenue transparency.

All Latin American countries have average scores above 50 on the Revenue Watch Index (average score of 72.6), and the region dominates the highest tier of revenue transparency, although it could improve on EITI participation.<sup>39</sup> Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela appear at the bottom of the scores for this region, with Venezuela performing badly on transparency of information for access to resources and the special resource fund.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, OECD countries come on top of regional averages (82.9). Norway is at or near the top of all categories of the index, which shows why it is frequently used as an example of good practice. For the United States the research considers only the federal management of the Gulf of Mexico. Although the nation scores high on transparency of access to resources, it performs around average on transparency of generation of revenue and is not implementing EITI. Meanwhile, Chile represents the highest scoring for mining countries in terms of revenue transparency.

*In every resource-rich country, governments exert indirect guidance through regulation or direct control of exploration and extraction of mineral resources through state-owned companies.*

# 7

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The Revenue Watch Index shows that the majority of countries examined by this report provide limited public information on their natural resource sector. This lack of transparency undermines the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account for their performance in managing public resources.

Governments manage sub-surface resources as agents of their citizens. In every resource-rich country, governments exert indirect guidance through regulation or direct control of exploration and extraction of mineral resources through state-owned companies. They need to publish full accounts of what their countries produce, the terms and conditions of concessions, and the payments they receive in order to give citizens the opportunity to evaluate their performance.

This index provides a comprehensive picture of the areas in which governmental efforts to increase transparency—including public access to major investment agreements and comprehensive disclosure in the payments governments receive from the oil, gas and mining sectors—are needed. Some states have made significant advances in the quest to improve access to information, but we find substantial room for improvement. Despite a formal commitment by many governments to disclose payments and revenue from oil, gas and mining activities, essential public information remains incomplete.

The results from this index suggest that the justification for secrecy of resource data based on security or contractual confidentiality is largely unfounded. The report provides abundant evidence that many countries readily disclose information on topics that other governments still try to keep confidential without discernible adverse consequences.

Transparency alone is insufficient to counter the potential negative effects of extractive industries. However, the increased availability of credible and verifiable information has been demonstrated to improve the quality of resource management.

### Policy recommendations

#### To governments:

1. **Contract transparency needs to improve substantially in all resource-rich countries. Contracts, details about investment agreements and the fiscal regime in the extractive sector should be open to public scrutiny.** The index shows that licensing and contracting of access to resources is the area where disclosure of information is most limited. Only a few countries reviewed publish their contracts, making monitoring of revenue performance and compliance difficult. In many countries, contracts are not even shared with non-resource ministries. Publication of the fiscal terms of exploration and production should be mandatory, ideally by law. Publication of contracts, leases or licensing terms should be incorporated in EITI transparency templates.
2. **Countries that are important international financial hubs for extractive companies should take the lead in promoting transparency in the sector.** The United States is the largest economy in the world, one of the main consumers of natural resources as well as a host country for many

*EITI offers a simple mechanism for countries across the globe to ensure the systematic disclosure and dissemination of information on payments and revenue from the resource sector.*

of the most important petroleum and mining companies in the world. The U.S. government has recently demonstrated leadership in promoting transparency and good governance by approving financial reform legislation that includes requirements for resource companies to disclose detailed financial information on oil, gas and mining projects.<sup>41</sup> Other industrialized nations that are major players in oil, gas and mining markets should adopt similar disclosure requirements.

3. **All resource-rich countries should implement EITI.** The index shows that weak transparency performance is not limited to countries of a certain income level or region. EITI offers a simple mechanism for countries across the globe to ensure the systematic disclosure and dissemination of information on payments and revenue from the resource sector. EITI offers concrete methodologies and experiences for sharing information and findings with civil society organizations, protocols that are designed to build trust among very diverse stakeholders. Developed countries such as Norway are implementing this initiative. Implementation of EITI should also be adopted by resource-rich countries from the MENA region as well as countries like Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. **Resource ministries should meet the same standard of reporting and data provision as other public institutions controlling important public resources, notably the central banks and finance ministries.** The index shows that in the same country, the latter perform significantly better than the resource institutions. This is no accident. After multiple international sovereign debt and banking crises, governments have recognized a shared interest in ensuring greater transparency in the financial sectors. Through a cooperative international process, central banks and finance ministries have developed models for regular publication of standardized and comparable data. No such protocol for reporting of vital data in a standardized format exists among agencies charged with minerals management even though their potential impact on government finances is arguably as great. The IMF's *Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency* could be a starting point for governments of the major resource-producing countries to develop and agree a common data standard for resource-ministries and agencies.
5. **Governments should make periodic, comprehensive and timely reporting a mandatory requirement for their state-owned companies.** SOCs are present in almost all the countries in this index and account for nearly 80 percent of the world's hydrocarbon reserves. These companies should disclose all information on their operations and finances to their ultimate stakeholders, their citizens. Among the countries in the survey, only 14 have an SOC that publishes full reports on its operations, including a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement. This information is necessary for accountability, efficiency and to ensure that SOCs fulfill their mandate rather than become vehicles of private interest.
6. **Countries with natural resource funds should develop measurable benchmarks to monitor transparency and accountability of these accounts.** NRFs are common among countries in this index, with 20 out of 41 using this instrument to manage revenue from oil, gas and mining activities. However, transparency in NRFs remains uneven, and citizens often lack information on the rules governing the fund as well as timely, periodical and audited information about the funds' assets and expenditures. Many countries with NRFs adhere to the Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds, but transparency requirements should be strengthened and institutionalized.
7. **Governments should make information about resource revenue transfers available to all their citizens. Sub-national governments should be held to the same disclosure standards as national governments.** Sub-national transfers are arrangements that allow a proportion of revenues generated by oil and mining to be returned to producing regions or local governments. The absence of public information on transfers can increase the risk of mismanagement of revenues both at the

national level, from rent-seeking interests and individuals targeting centralized budgets, and at the local level, where sub-national governments could take advantage of the lack of transparency.

8. **Parliaments in resource-rich countries need to make better use of their oversight powers to provide more effective checks on executive powers.** Parliamentary oversight shows mixed results, with only four countries in the survey having parliaments approve contracts and 16 countries having parliamentary committees scrutinize resource-related revenue. RWI has been piloting projects with that goal in Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana.

**To international organizations:**

1. **The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) should approve reforms requiring companies to report key information about oil and mining activities on a country-by-country basis.** Disclosure should include details on reserves, volume, sales and costs of production, as well as benefit streams to governments. This information is valuable for investors as well as for the governments and citizens of resource-producing countries. An international accounting standard for extractive companies is all the more essential since U.S.' passage of the 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This reform would also help standardize reporting by state companies. Half the countries included in this survey have state-owned companies that have adopted internationally recognized accounting standards. Revised rules from the IASB would have an immediate impact on resource-rich countries' transparency and accountability.
2. **Policy makers in G20 countries should agree on a set of transparency standards for resource management and commit to follow good practices at home.** Revenue transparency should receive significant consideration within the framework of the financial reform discussions conducted at the G20 meetings. The eight countries in the Revenue Watch Index that are members of the G20 show a wide range of revenue transparency, with a maximum average score of 97 and a minimum of 32. G20 countries should disclose detailed information on their own extractive sectors and support transparency requirements in international financial reforms.
3. **International financial institutions and donors should support countries implementing EITI and promote contract transparency in the extractive sector.** The Revenue Watch Index should be used to assess progress of countries receiving support for improving natural resource management and implementing EITI. The World Bank Group should continue to promote greater disclosure of information—particularly investment agreements—from governments receiving financial support and also from private resource companies through the activities of the International Financial Corporation (IFC). The IFC should immediately require that projects in which it invests publish contracts or licenses.

**To the EITI international board and EITI members:**

1. **EITI requirements need to be strengthened.** EITI is the global minimum standard for extractive payment and revenue transparency, but a significant number of EITI countries still provide only partial or scant revenue information. The index results show that EITI guidelines are so general as to allow a very low level of transparency. New guidelines should be adopted to require a higher and more uniform transparency performance for countries to qualify for EITI validation. Disaggregation of company payments and type of payments should be standard. This will already be required of much of the extractive industry under the 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Publication of contracts should be added to the EITI module.

2. **Disclosure of information should be verifiable, regular, comprehensive and timely.** A significant number of EITI countries still provide only partial or scant revenue transparency, which is EITI's core purpose. The board should convene a panel of experts to refine the reporting templates. Disclosure of information should include credible, regular, comprehensive and timely reporting from all the agencies involved in overseeing or regulating exploration and production of natural resources.

**To civil society organizations:**

1. **Civil society organizations working on extractive sector issues should use this index as a tool to assess progress and weaknesses in resource revenue transparency.** This assessment, and international comparisons based on it, could be the basis of an objective dialogue with governments, media and oversight bodies to promote specific reforms aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability. In countries implementing EITI, civil society organizations can contribute to the success of this initiative by using the information provided by this index to expand work on accountability beyond the disclosure of revenues.
2. **The index can serve as a road map for action by civil society organizations, allowing them to focus their efforts on increasing transparency in major areas of weakness in countries where they operate.** For instance, they can use the index results to urge governments to disclose information on financial payments or use the scores to provide advice to advocacy campaigns. The results of the index can also empower citizens, since it provides information to launch an informed debate about the management of natural resources and good practices for revenue transparency in their respective countries. The index is a tool that citizens can use to require greater accountability from governments and companies involved in the extractive sector.

Appendix 1:  
**Revenue Watch Index Questions**

Question	Type of question																				
<b>A. ACCESS TO RESOURCES</b>																					
1. Has this country adopted a rule or legislation that provides for disclosure of information in the oil, gas and mineral sectors?	TR*																				
2. Are contracts, agreements or negotiated terms for exploration and production, regardless of the way they are granted, disclosed to the public?	TR																				
3. Does the government publish information on the licensing process during or after negotiations?	TR																				
4. Are reports with assessments of the expected environmental and/or social impact of oil, gas and mining projects published?	TR																				
5. Is the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts for mineral or hydrocarbon production independent of the state-owned company (SOC) or other operating companies?	LRF**																				
6. Is the licensing process intended to be open and competitive to all interested companies?	LRF																				
7. Does the licensing process or legislation impose limits to discretionary powers of the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts?	LRF																				
8. Does the legislative branch have the authority to ratify oil and mining contracts?	LRF																				
9. Is there a process to appeal licensing decisions?	LRF																				
<b>B. GENERATION OF REVENUE</b>																					
10. Does the ministry of finance publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR																				
<table border="0"> <tr> <td>a. Reserves</td> <td>f. Production costs</td> <td>j1. Production streams value</td> <td>j6. Bonuses</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b. Production volumes</td> <td>g. Names of companies operating in country</td> <td>j2. Government's share in PSC</td> <td>j7. License fees</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c. Information on prices</td> <td>h. Production data by company and/or block</td> <td>j3. Royalties</td> <td>j8. Acreage fees</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d. Value of resource exports</td> <td>i. Quasi-fiscal activities</td> <td>j4. Special taxes</td> <td>j9. Other</td> </tr> <tr> <td>e. Estimates of investment in exploration and development</td> <td>j. Disaggregated revenue streams</td> <td>j5. Dividends</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	a. Reserves	f. Production costs	j1. Production streams value	j6. Bonuses	b. Production volumes	g. Names of companies operating in country	j2. Government's share in PSC	j7. License fees	c. Information on prices	h. Production data by company and/or block	j3. Royalties	j8. Acreage fees	d. Value of resource exports	i. Quasi-fiscal activities	j4. Special taxes	j9. Other	e. Estimates of investment in exploration and development	j. Disaggregated revenue streams	j5. Dividends		
a. Reserves	f. Production costs	j1. Production streams value	j6. Bonuses																		
b. Production volumes	g. Names of companies operating in country	j2. Government's share in PSC	j7. License fees																		
c. Information on prices	h. Production data by company and/or block	j3. Royalties	j8. Acreage fees																		
d. Value of resource exports	i. Quasi-fiscal activities	j4. Special taxes	j9. Other																		
e. Estimates of investment in exploration and development	j. Disaggregated revenue streams	j5. Dividends																			
11. Are the reports or statistical databases published by the ministry of finance comprehensive and understandable?	TR																				
12. How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the ministry of finance?	TR																				
13. Does the ministry of the extractive sector publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? (Response items are the same as in question 10)	TR																				
14. Are the reports or statistical databases published by the ministry of the extractive sector comprehensive and understandable?	TR																				
15. How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the ministry of the extractive sector?	TR																				
16. Does the regulatory agency publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? (Response items are the same as in question 10)	TR																				

All data from the report and appendices, including the full questionnaire, is available online at [www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex](http://www.revenuwatch.org/rwindex).

\*TR: Transparency \*\*LRF: Legal and Regulatory Framework

Question	Type of Question
17. Are the reports or statistical databases published by the regulatory agency comprehensive and understandable?	TR
18. How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the regulatory agency?	TR
19. Does the central bank publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR
20. Are the reports or statistical databases published by the central bank comprehensive and understandable?	TR
21. How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the central bank?	TR
22. Does the state-owned company publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? (Response items are the same as in question 10)	TR
23. Are the reports or statistical databases published by the state-owned company comprehensive and understandable?	TR
24. How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the state-owned company?	TR

#### C. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

25. Are policy, regulatory and commercial roles in the extractive sector divided across separate institutions?	LRF
26. Has the government published detailed resource legislation?	TR
27. Does the agency (or agencies) in charge of receiving payments from resource companies have internal controls in place to monitor assets and prevent fraud?	LRF
28. Is there independent external validation of internal controls of agencies in charge of receiving payments from resource companies?	LRF
29. Are payments by resource companies to the government (either to the ministry of the resource sector or other authorized agency) subject to an independent audit?	LRF
30. Does a parliamentary committee scrutinize audit reports on resource-related revenues?	LRF
31. Can civil society participate in oversight of revenue generation, through EITI committees, board meetings of the resource regulatory authority, or other mechanisms?	LRF

#### D. STATE-OWNED OIL, GAS AND MINING COMPANIES

32. If an SOC exists, does the SOC publish information about its operations?	TR
33. Does the SOC follow internationally recognized accounting standards?	LRF
34. Are SOC reports audited, and are the audited reports published?	TR
35. Do SOC audits include consolidated accounts that cover all of the SOC subsidiaries?	LRF
36. Does the SOC publish information about quasi-fiscal activities?	TR
37. Does the ministry of finance publish the overall public sector balance including the SOC financial balance?	TR
38. If there are joint ventures, does the government (ministry of the sector or SOC) publish information on the SOC equity participation in joint ventures?	TR
39. Are government officials required to disclose information about their financial interest in any extractive activity or joint venture?	TR

Question	Type of Question
40. Does the SOC publish information on the composition of its board of directors?	TR

#### E. NATURAL RESOURCE FUND

41. If a resource fund exists, are the rules governing the fund publicly available? (This includes information on how the instrument is funded, as well as rules for disbursement.)	TR
42. If a resource fund exists, does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish information on its assets and transactions?	TR
43. How often does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish these reports?	TR
44. Are the fund financial reports audited, and are audited reports published?	TR

#### F. SUB-NATIONAL TRANSFERS

45. Are arrangements for resource revenue sharing between central and sub-national governments set in legislation?	LRF
46. Are the rules for revenue transfers from central to sub-national governments published, including the formula(s) for revenue sharing?	TR
47. Does the central government publish information on transfers of resource-related revenues to sub-national governments?	TR
48. How often does the central government publish information on transfers of resource related revenues to sub-national governments?	TR
49. Is the information on transfers of resource-related revenues comprehensive?	TR
50. Do sub-national governments publish information on transfers received from central governments?	TR

#### G. EITI

51. Is this country an EITI candidate or compliant country?	TR
52. If this country has adopted EITI, has this country published an EITI report?	TR
53. In the EITI report, have all the payments and revenue been audited by an independent auditor?	TR
54. In the EITI report, have all payments and revenue been reconciled by an independent administrator?	TR
55. In the EITI report, is information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies included?	TR

Appendix 2:  
Revenue Watch Index Scores

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea	
I	1		Has this country adopted a rule or legislation that provides for disclosure of information in the oil, gas and mineral sectors?	TR*	1	0	0	100	67	0	100	0	100	33	100	0	100	0	
I	2		Are contracts, agreements or negotiated terms for exploration and production, regardless of the way they are granted, disclosed to the public?	TR	1	0	67	0	33	0	67	33	0	0	100	33	33	67	
I	3		Does the government publish information on the licensing process during or after negotiations?	TR	1	100	100	N/A	0	0	100	100	N/A	100	100	N/A	100	100	
I	4		Are reports with assessments of the expected environmental and/or social impact of oil, gas and mining projects published?	TR	1	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	0	0	
I	5		Is the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts for mineral or hydrocarbon production independent of the state-owned company (SOC) or other operating companies?	LRF**	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	
I	6		Is the licensing process intended to be open and competitive to all interested companies?	LRF	0	33	100	100	0	67	100	0	67	33	100	33	0	0	
I	7		Does the licensing process or legislation impose limits to discretionary powers of the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts?	LRF	0	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	
I	8		Does the legislative branch have the authority to ratify oil and mining contracts?	LRF	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
I	9		Is there a process to appeal licensing decisions?	LRF	0	0	33	0	0	0	33	0	67	N/A	33	0	0	0	
II	10		Does the Ministry of Finance publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR															
II	10	a	Reserves	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	b	Production volumes	TR	0	N/A	33	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	c	Information on prices	TR	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	
II	10	d	Value of resource exports	TR	0	33	100	0	100	100	100	0	0	0	67	0	100	0	
II	10	e	Estimates of investment in exploration and development	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	
II	10	f	Production costs	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	g	Names of companies operating in country	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	h	Production data by company and/or block	TR	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	i	Quasi-fiscal activities	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	67	0	0	0	
II	10	j	Disaggregated revenue streams:	TR	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
II	10	j1	Production streams value	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j2	Government's share in PSC	TR	0	0	33	100	0	N/A	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j3	Royalties	TR	0	0	33	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	33	0	0	0	
II	10	j4	Special taxes	TR	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j5	Dividends	TR	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	
II	10	j6	Bonuses	TR	0	0	33	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j7	License fees	TR	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j8	Acreage fees	TR	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
II	10	j9	Other	TR	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	
II	11		Are the reports or statistical databases published by the Ministry of Finance comprehensive and understandable?	TR	1	33	100	N/A	100	67	100	0	0	67	33	0	100	0	

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	
0	67	100	0	0	N/A	0	100	0	100	33	0	100	0	100	N/A	0	33	100	0	0	33	100	0	100	0	0	33	
0	33	33	33	67	33	0	100	33	33	67	0	67	67	100	67	0	33	N/A	0	0	100	33	0	100	33	33	0	
100	0	100	N/A	100	100	0	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	0	
0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	
100	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	0	100	100	N/A	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	100	
0	100	67	0	100	67	0	100	33	100	67	33	100	100	100	0	0	100	67	0	67	100	100	0	100	0	100	100	
0	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	100	N/A	0	100	100	0	100	0	100	0	
0	100	0	67	0	0	67	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	67	0	
0	33	0	N/A	33	33	0	100	0	0	67	33	33	0	100	33	33	33	100	N/A	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	100	
0	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0	N/A	0	0	0	
100	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	N/A	0	0	100	100	100	0	67	0	N/A	0	0	100	
100	67	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	N/A	0	0	100	100	100	0	67	0	N/A	0	100	0	
100	33	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	100	100
0	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	100	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	100	0
0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	100
0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	0	0	100	0	67	N/A	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0
0	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	N/A	67	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
100	67	100	0	N/A	100	0	0	100	100	100	67	N/A	0	100	67	0	67	N/A	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	0
100	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	100	100	100	67	N/A	0	100	67	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	N/A	100	100	0
	67	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	100	N/A	0	0	100	100	0	67	0	0	100	0	0	0	67	0	0	100	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	67	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	0	67	0	67	100	0	0	0	67	0	0	N/A	0	100	0
N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	100	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
67	33	67	0	N/A	100	33	67	100	100	33	33	100	100	33	100	33	67	100	67	N/A	100	100	0	0	67	67	67	

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea
II	12		How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the ministry of finance?	TR	1	0	100	N/A	33	100	100	0	100	100	67	0	100	0
II	13		Does the Ministry of the extractive sector publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR														
II	13	a	Reserves	TR	0	33	33	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	100	33	N/A	0
II	13	b	Production volumes	TR	0	33	67	0	0	100	100	0	33	0	100	33	N/A	0
II	13	c	Information on prices	TR	0	0	67	0	100	0	100	0	33	0	100	0	N/A	0
II	13	d	Value of resource exports	TR	0	33	67	0	0	0	0	0	33	0	100	0	N/A	0
II	13	e	Estimates of investment in exploration and development	TR	0	33	67	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	33	N/A	0
II	13	f	Production costs	TR	0	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	g	Names of companies operating in country	TR	0	100	67	0	67	100	0	0	0	0	67	33	N/A	100
II	13	h	Production data by company and/or block	TR	0	33	67	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	67	33	N/A	67
II	13	i	Quasi-fiscal activities	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0
II	13	j	Disaggregated revenue streams:	TR	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
II	13	j1	Production streams value	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	j2	Government's share in PSC	TR	0	33	67	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	j3	Royalties	TR	0	33	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0
II	13	j4	Special taxes	TR	0	33	67	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0
II	13	j5	Dividends	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	j6	Bonuses	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0
II	13	j7	License fees	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	j8	Acreage fees	TR	0	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0
II	13	j9	Other	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0
II	14		Are the reports or statistical databases published by the Ministry of the extractive sector comprehensive and understandable?	TR	1	33	67	N/A	67	33	100	0	67	33	67	0	N/A	0
II	15		How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the ministry of the extractive sector?	TR	1	33	33	N/A	33	33	100	0	33	N/A	67	0	N/A	0
II	16		Does the regulatory agency publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR														
II	16	a	Reserves	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
II	16	b	Production volumes	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	0
II	16	c	Information on prices	TR	0	N/A	0	0	33	N/A	100	100	100	0	0	0	100	0
II	16	d	Value of resource exports	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	0	0	0	100	0
II	16	e	Estimates of investment in exploration and development	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	0	100	0	0	0
II	16	f	Production costs	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	100	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	16	g	Names of companies operating in country	TR	0	N/A	100	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	100
II	16	h	Production data by company and/or block	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	0	0	0	100	67
II	16	i	Quasi-fiscal activities	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	16	j	Disaggregated revenue streams:	TR	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	
33	67	67	0	N/A	100	33	33	33	100	100	N/A	100	100	100	100	33	33	100	67	N/A	33	33	0	0	33	100	100	
0	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	67	33	100	33	0	0	33	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	33	100	0	0	
100	33	100	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	67	0	33	33	100	67	100	0	100	N/A	67	N/A	100	67	100	100	100	0	
33	0	100	0	100	N/A	0	100	N/A	100	100	0	100	67	100	N/A	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	100	67	0	100	100	0	
33	0	0	0	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	67	0	33	0	100	67	0	33	100	N/A	67	N/A	100	67	0	33	100	0	
0	0	100	0	0	33	0	67	N/A	0	N/A	0	33	67	100	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	67	N/A	0	0	0	33	100	0	
0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	33	0	0
0	0	67	0	100	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	33	100	67	0	0	33	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	100	33	100	0	0
0	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	0	N/A	67	100	100	0	0	33	N/A	0	N/A	100	67	100	100	100	0	0
0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	33	0	N/A	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	33	100	0	
0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	
0	0	67	0	100	N/A	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	67	100	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	67	0	100	100	100	33	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	0	33	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	100	0	33	
0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	0	33	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	100	100	0	0
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	33	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	N/A	67	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	100	N/A	
33	0	67	0	67	67	0	67	N/A	100	67	0	N/A	100	100	67	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	33	33	100	67	67	0	
33	0	33	0	100	100	0	33	N/A	100	33	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	0	0	67	N/A	0	N/A	100	N/A	33	33	33	33	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	67	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	33	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	67	33	67	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	67	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	100	67	0	N/A	0	0	67	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	67	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	67	0	0	67	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea
II	16	j1	Production streams value	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	16	j2	Government's share in PSC	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	0	0	100	0
II	16	j3	Royalties	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0
II	16	j4	Special taxes	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	100	0	0	0
II	16	j5	Dividends	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	16	j6	Bonuses	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0
II	16	j7	License fees	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	16	j8	Acreage fees	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
II	16	j9	Other	TR	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
II	17		Are the reports or statistical databases published by the regulatory agency comprehensive and understandable?	TR	1	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	0
II	18		How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the regulatory agency?	TR	1	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	0
II	19		Does the central bank publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR														
II	19	a	Reserves	TR	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	b	Production volumes	TR	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	33
II	19	c	Information on prices	TR	0	0	33	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	100	33
II	19	d	Value of resource exports	TR	0	0	33	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	33
II	19	e	Estimates of investment in exploration and development	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
II	19	f	Production costs	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	g	Names of companies operating in country	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	h	Production data by company and/or block	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	i	Quasi-fiscal activities	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j	Disaggregated revenue streams:	TR	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
II	19	j1	Production streams value	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j2	Government's share in PSC	TR	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j3	Royalties	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j4	Special taxes	TR	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j5	Dividends	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j6	Bonuses	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j7	License fees	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j8	Acreage fees	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
II	19	j9	Other	TR	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
II	20		Are the reports or statistical databases published by the central bank comprehensive and understandable?	TR	1	0	33	N/A	67	100	100	100	67	0	100	33	100	33
II	21		How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the central bank?	TR	1	0	0	33	33	100	100	N/A	100	0	67	67	100	33
II	22		Does the state-owned company publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?	TR														
II	22	a	Reserves	TR	0	33	0	N/A	33	0	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	0	0
II	22	b	Production volumes	TR	0	33	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	
0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	67	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
N/A	0	0	0	67	100	0	N/A	0	67	33	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	67	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0
N/A	0	0	0	100	33	0	N/A	0	100	0	0	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0
0	0	0	100	100	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	0	0
100	0	0	100	100	N/A	33	100	100	33	0	100	0	0	100	N/A	100	100	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	100
100	100	0	100	100	100	33	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	33	100	0	67	0	N/A	0	0	100	
100	100	100	100	100	N/A	33	100	100	0	67	100	0	0	100	100	100	100	100	33	100	0	67	0	N/A	100	100	100	
0	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	67	33	N/A	0	100	0	
0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0	0	
100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	100	67	0	0	0	0	67	33	N/A	0	0	0	
100	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	100	N/A	0	0	0	33	0	0	67	33	N/A	0	0	0	
100	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
N/A	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	
N/A	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	N/A	0	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	67	
100	33	100	67	67	100	33	67	100	67	33	67	100	67	33	67	100	67	100	67	33	100	100	0	N/A	67	67	67	
33	100	33	100	100	100	33	33	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	100	100	33	33	100	67	100	100	100	0	N/A	100	100	100	
0	N/A	33	100	0	100	0	N/A	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	0	0	
0	N/A	33	100	0	100	55	N/A	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	33	N/A	100	100	0	

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea	
II	22	c	Information on prices	TR	0	0	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	0	
II	22	d	Value of resource exports	TR	0	33	0	100	67	0	100	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	0	
II	22	e	Estimates of investment in exploration and development	TR	0	33	0	67	67	0	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	
II	22	f	Production costs	TR	0	33	0	67	N/A	0	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	
II	22	g	Names of companies operating in country	TR	0	33	100	67	100	N/A	100	100	N/A	0	67	N/A	100	0	
II	22	h	Production data by company and/or block	TR	0	33	0	67	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	
II	22	i	Quasi-fiscal activities	TR	0	0	0	67	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	0	0	
II	22	j	Disaggregated revenue streams:	TR	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
II	22	j1	Production streams value	TR	0	33	0	67	0	0	100	0	100	100	0	N/A	100	0	
II	22	j2	Government's share in PSC	TR	0	33	0	0	67	N/A	100	0	100	100	67	N/A	100	0	
II	22	j3	Royalties	TR	0	33	0	0	0	N/A	100	0	100	0	33	N/A	100	0	
II	22	j4	Special taxes	TR	0	33	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	
II	22	j5	Dividends	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	0	0	
II	22	j6	Bonuses	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	
II	22	j7	License fees	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	
II	22	j8	Acreage fees	TR	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	
II	22	j9	Other	TR	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	
II	23		Are the reports or statistical databases published by the state-owned company comprehensive and understandable?	TR	1	33	0	67	67	33	100	33	100	67	100	N/A	100	0	
II	24		How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published by the state-owned company?	TR	1	33	0	100	33	33	100	33	100	33	100	N/A	100	0	
II	GOV	a	Consolidated Government Scores from Questions 10, 13, 16, 19 & 22	TR	1	33	33	0	33	0	100	0	100	100	100	33	0	0	
II	GOV	b		TR	1	33	67	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	33
II	GOV	c		TR	1	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	33	
II	GOV	d		TR	1	33	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	33	
II	GOV	e		TR	1	33	67	67	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	33	100	0	
II	GOV	f		TR	1	33	67	67	0	0	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	
II	GOV	g		TR	1	100	100	67	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	33	100	100	
II	GOV	h		TR	1	33	100	67	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	33	100	67	
II	GOV	i		TR	1	0	0	67	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	0	0	0	
II	GOV	j		TR	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
II	GOV	j1		TR	1	33	0	67	0	0	100	33	100	100	0	0	100	0	
II	GOV	j2		TR	1	33	67	100	67	0	100	33	100	100	67	N/A	100	0	
II	GOV	j3		TR	1	33	33	100	100	100	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	0	
II	GOV	j4		TR	1	33	100	100	100	100	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	0	
II	GOV	j5	TR	1	0	0	100	0	100	100	33	100	100	100	0	0	0		
II	GOV	j6	TR	1	0	33	100	0	0	100	33	100	0	0	0	0	0		
II	GOV	j7	TR	1	0	0	100	0	0	100	33	0	0	0	0	0	0		
II	GOV	j8	TR	1	0	0	100	100	0	100	33	0	0	100	0	0	0		
II	GOV	j9	TR	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
III	25		Are policy, regulatory, and commercial roles in the extractive sector divided across separate institutions?	LRF	0	N/A	0	67	67	67	100	0	100	N/A	100	100	67	100	

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	11	N/A	100	100	0	100	100	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	67	0	N/A	100	100	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	44	N/A	100	100	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	67	0	N/A	100	100	0	
0	N/A	33	0	0	100	55	N/A	100	100	0	0	100	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	33	N/A	100	100	0	
0	N/A	33	0	0	100	55	N/A	100	100	0	0	100	100	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	67	0	N/A	67	0	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	22	N/A	67	100	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	67	N/A	67	0	N/A	33	100	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	33	N/A	0	100	0	100	100	0	N/A	100	100	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	33	100	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	11	N/A	0	100	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	44	N/A	0	100	0	0	100	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	100	0	
0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	100	33	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0	100	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	100	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	
0	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	
0	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	17	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	
0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	
0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17	N/A	100	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A
0	N/A	100	0	0	100	100	N/A	100	100	0	100	100	67	N/A	100	67	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	33	0	N/A	67	67	0	
0	N/A	0	0	0	33	50	N/A	67	100	0	33	100	33	N/A	100	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	33	0	N/A	33	33	0	
0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	100	33	100	100	100	0	33	0	100	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	
100	33	100	100	100	100	55	100	100	100	67	100	100	33	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	67	100	100	100	100	
100	100	100	100	100	100	33	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	67	100	100	100	100	
100	100	100	100	100	100	44	100	100	100	67	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	67	100	100	100	100	
0	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	67	100	100	0	0	0	0	67	0	67	33	0	100	100	0	
0	0	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	67	0	0	
100	33	67	0	100	100	22	100	67	100	67	100	100	33	100	67	100	67	33	100	67	100	100	100	100	33	100	100	
100	0	0	0	100	100	33	100	0	100	0	100	100	67	100	100	0	33	100	0	67	100	67	100	100	100	100	100	
100	N/A	100	100	0	100	11	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	100	67	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	0	67	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	
33	N/A	0	0	0	100	33	N/A	100	0	N/A	0	100	0	N/A	100	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	100	0	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	
100	67	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	67	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	
100	33	0	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	100	67	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	N/A	100	100	67	
33	67	0	100	0	100	0	67	100	0	33	0	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	67	0	N/A	100	0	33		
33	N/A	67	0	100	100	0	67	0	0	33	33	N/A	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	0	0	
33	33	0	0	100	100	17	67	0	0	100	33																	

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea
III	26		Has the government published detailed resource legislation?	TR	1	33	67	33	100	100	100	67	100	67	100	100	100	67
III	27		Does the agency (or agencies) in charge of receiving payments from resource companies have internal controls in place to monitor assets and prevent fraud?	LRF	0	0	0	100	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	100	100	N/A
III	28		Is there independent external validation of internal controls of agencies in charge of receiving payments from resource companies?	LRF	0	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	100	N/A	100	0	0	0
III	29		Are payments by resource companies to the government (either to the Ministry of the resource sector or other authorized agency) subject to an independent audit?	LRF	0	0	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	100
III	30		Does a Parliamentary committee scrutinize audit reports on resource-related revenues?	LRF	0	0	0	67	0	0	100	0	100	0	33	N/A	0	0
III	31		Can civil society participate in oversight of revenue generation, through EITI committees, board meetings of the resource regulatory authority, or other mechanisms?	LRF	0	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	100	0	100
IV	32		If an SOC exists, does the SOC publish information about its operations?	TR	1	67	0	67	33	33	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0
IV	33		Does the SOC follow internationally recognized accounting standards?	LRF	0	0	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0
IV	34		Are SOC reports audited, and are the audited reports published?	TR	1	100	33	100	33	33	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	33	0
IV	35		Do SOC audits include consolidated accounts that cover all of the SOC subsidiaries?	LRF	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	N/A	100	0	0
IV	36		Does the SOC publish information about quasi-fiscal activities?	TR	1	33	0	100	0	0	100	0	100	33	67	N/A	0	0
IV	37		Does the Ministry of Finance publish the overall public sector balance including the SOC financial balance?	TR	1	0	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	67	67	33	0	100	0
IV	38		If there are joint ventures, does the government (Ministry of the sector or SOC) publish information on the SOC equity participation in joint ventures?	TR	1	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0
IV	39		Are government officials required to disclose information about their financial interest in any extractive activity or joint venture?	TR	1	0	0	100	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0
IV	40		Does the SOC publish information on the composition of its Board of Directors?	TR	1	100	N/A	0	100	0	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	0
V	41		If a resource fund exists, are the rules governing the fund publicly available? (This includes information on how the instrument is funded, as well as rules for disbursement.)	TR	1	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0
V	42		If a resource fund exists, does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish information on its assets and transactions?	TR	1	0	0	100	N/A	33	N/A	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0
V	43		How often does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish these reports?	TR	1	0	0	100	N/A	100	N/A	0	67	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0
V	44		Are the fund financial reports audited, and are audited reports published?	TR	1	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	0
VI	45		Are arrangements for resource revenue sharing between central and sub-national governments set in legislation?	LRF	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	100	100	100
VI	46		Are the rules for revenue transfers from central to sub-national governments published, including the formula(s) for revenue sharing?	TR	1	N/A	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	100	100	0
VI	47		Does the central government publish information on transfers of resource related revenues to Sub-national governments?	TR	1	N/A	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0
VI	48		How often does the central government publish information on transfers of resource related revenues to Sub-national governments?	TR	1	0	0	N/A	33	N/A	100	33	0	100	0	100	0	0
VI	49		Is the information on transfers of resource related revenues comprehensive?	TR	1	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	33	0	100	0	100	0

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia
67	67	67	33	67	67	33	67	33	100	67	67	100	100	100	67	33	100	100	0	100	100	100	33	100	100	67	67
0	100	100	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	100	100	100	N/A	0	100	N/A	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	100
0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	100
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	100	0
0	33	100	N/A	100	67	100	33	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	67	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	67	0	0	0	33	0	0	0
100	100	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	0	100	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	100	0	0	100	0	100	100
N/A	N/A	33	33	0	100	100	N/A	100	100	0	33	100	100	N/A	100	33	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	67	33	0
N/A	N/A	0	0	0	100	100	N/A	100	100	0	N/A	100	100	N/A	100	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A	100	0	0
N/A	N/A	33	33	33	100	100	N/A	33	100	0	33	100	100	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	33	100	N/A	100	0	N/A	67	0	0
N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	0	N/A	100	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A
N/A	N/A	0	33	0	0	11	N/A	0	100	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	67	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
N/A	N/A	67	0	67	0	0	N/A	67	67	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	67	100	N/A
N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	100	50	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	100	100	100
N/A	100	0	0	100	N/A	0	N/A	0	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	0	N/A	100	0	100
N/A	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	100	0	N/A	100	0	0
100	0	N/A	0	100	100	100	0	100	100	100	0	100	0	N/A	100	100	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	100	100	0	100	0	N/A	N/A
67	0	N/A	33	67	67	0	0	N/A	67	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	100	33	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	100	100	0	67	67	N/A	N/A
0	0	N/A	33	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	100	33	N/A	N/A	67	N/A	100	67	0	33	33	N/A	N/A
0	0	N/A	0	100	100	0	0	N/A	100	0	0	100	N/A	N/A	100	33	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	100	100	0	100	33	N/A	N/A
0	100	100	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	100	N/A	0
0	N/A	100	0	100	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	100	100	N/A	100	100	100	100	0	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	100	N/A	N/A
0	N/A	33	0	33	0	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	100	N/A	0	100	100	N/A	0	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	0	0	33	33	N/A	N/A
0	N/A	67	33	67	0	N/A		N/A	100	0	100	N/A	0	100	100	N/A	33	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	33	N/A	N/A

Section	Question #	SubQ	Question Text	Type of Question	Counted towards Revenue Watch Index calculations	Algeria	Angola	Azerbaijan	Bolivia	Botswana	Brazil	Cameroon	Chile	China	Colombia	DRC	Ecuador	Equatorial Guinea
VI	50		Do Sub-national governments publish information on transfers received from central governments?	TR	1	0	0	N/A	100	N/A	100	0	100	0	100	0	0	0
VII	51		Is this country an EITI candidate or compliant country?	TR	1	0	0	100	0	0	0	67	0	0	0	67	0	0
VII	52		If this country has adopted EITI, has this country published an EITI report?	TR	0	N/A	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	100
VII	53		In the EITI report, have all the payments and revenue been audited by an independent auditor?	TR	0	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	33
VII	54		In the EITI report, have all payments and revenue been reconciled by an independent administrator?	TR	0	N/A	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	100
VII	55		In the EITI report, is information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies included?	TR	0	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	100
<b>Revenue Watch Index</b>						<b>22.8</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>75.1</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>97.0</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>80.6</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>79.6</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>11.6</b>

Gabon	Ghana	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Kazakhstan	Kuwait	Liberia	Malaysia	Mexico	Mongolia	Nigeria	Norway	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Sierra Leone	South Africa	Sudan	Tanzania	Timor-Leste	Trinidad and Tobago	Turkmenistan	United States	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia
N/A	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	100	0	0	N/A	0	100	100	N/A	0	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	0	100	100	N/A	N/A
67	67	0	0	33	67	0	100	0	0	67	67	67	0	67	0	0	100	0	0	33	67	0	0	0	0	33	33
67	100	N/A	N/A	0	33	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	67	67	67	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	0	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0
33	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	67	100	100	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	33	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
100	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	100	100	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	100	100	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>41.8</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>83.4</b>	<b>38.2</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>96.4</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>89.7</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>38.2</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>70.5</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>41.2</b>

### Appendix 3: Number of Changes Adopted During Review Process

Country	Number of suggested changes by peer reviewer	Number of questions changed after peer and internal review
Algeria	0	0
Angola	2	1
Azerbaijan	22	21
Bolivia	7	7
Botswana	3	1
Brazil	11	6
Cameroon	8	11
Chile	3	8
China	5	4
Colombia	15	15
DRC	4	4
Ecuador	7	1
Equatorial Guinea	10	7
Gabon	0	8
Ghana	11	10
Indonesia	6	4
Iran	3	5
Iraq	0	0
Kazakhstan	16	14
Kuwait	6	5
Liberia	6	12
Malaysia	11	11
Mexico	9	4
Mongolia	21	25
Nigeria	14	15
Norway	10	9
Papua New Guinea	0	0
Peru	1	2
Russia	10	4
Saudi Arabia	15	9
Sierra Leone	4	3
South Africa	0	10
Sudan	0	0
Tanzania	6	1
Timor-Leste	8	8
Trinidad and Tobago	7	3
Turkmenistan	8	3
United States	9	8
Venezuela	27	24
Yemen	3	1
Zambia	5	0

### Glossary of Terms

**Annual or in-year report** – document published each year (annual) or quarterly or monthly (in-year), often by the ministry of the extractive sector, the central bank, or the resource companies, describing their activities and operations with regards to the extractive industry.

**Auditor's report** – either an annual report issued by the Supreme Audit Institution attesting to the government agencies' year-end final accounts, or a report from an internal or external audit agency that provides audited financial statements.

**Contract** – agreement between a state or any of the authorized agencies acting on its behalf and resource companies that regulates access to resources. We do not include procurement contracts for goods and services used in resource companies' operations.

**Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)** – a global standard that promotes revenue transparency that has a methodology for monitoring and reconciling company payments and government revenues at the country level. Participants from governments, companies and national civil society groups oversee the process.

**EITI report** – document that discusses a country's compliance with the standards and guidelines of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The report is produced periodically by a commission composed of representatives from the range of extractive-industry stakeholders in the country.

**Environmental and social impact reports** – documents, which governments may require resource companies to prepare, that analyze the side effects of resource extraction on the surrounding communities and environment.

**Foreign direct investment (FDI)** – according to the International Monetary Fund, FDI is "[t]he acquisition of at least ten percent of the ordinary shares or voting power in a public or private enterprise by nonresident investors. Direct investment involves a lasting interest in the management of an enterprise and includes reinvestment of profits."

**Freedom of information laws** – legislation specifying how citizens can obtain documents and data held by the state, as well as the limited exceptions a government can use to deny citizens' requests.

**Generally Accepted Accounting Principles** – uniform minimum standards and guidelines to financial accounting and reporting.

**Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP or Santiago Principles)** – a set of voluntary principles and practices for the good governance of sovereign wealth funds agreed upon by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds in 2008.

**Group of Twenty (G20)** – a group of countries established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.

**International Financial Reporting Standards** – a set of financial reporting standards adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board.

**IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency** – published in October 2007, the guide tailors the International Monetary Fund's Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency to the specific needs of resource-rich countries. The guide identifies a set of 130 practices, grouped into four pillars: clarity of roles and responsibilities; open budget process; public availability of information; and assurances of integrity.

**License** – an agreement between an international company and a host government concerning a specific geographical area and operations related to exploitation of natural resources.

**Petroleum, gas and mining statistical reports or databases** – periodically updated data sources produced and published by the ministry of the extractive sector, statistical agencies, regulatory agencies or by the state-owned company.

**Production sharing contracts (PSCs)** – agreements in which the contractor bears exploration costs and risks for development and production, in exchange for a share of the resulting production.

**Publicly available information** – information that any and all citizens might be able to obtain, either through a request to the public authority issuing the document or on the Internet.

**PWYP** – Publish What You Pay, a global civil society coalition that helps citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their governments accountable for the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries.

**Resource wealth** – both the reserves of and the revenue deriving from the extraction of oil, gas and minerals.

**Santiago Principles** – see Generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP)

**Special resource funds** – also referred to as "stabilization funds," "savings funds," or "future generations' funds," special resource funds are separate accounts set up by the government that are funded exclusively by natural resource revenues. They are designed to accumulate revenue when times are good; stabilize public spending; and finance public spending after the resources have been exhausted, thereby mitigating some of the negative consequences associated with natural resource dependence.

**Sub-national transfers** – in intergovernmental fiscal relations, sub-national transfers are payments from the central or national government to state, provincial, regional or local governments.

**Subsoil natural resources** – resources found underground below the topsoil. With the notable exception of the United States, subsoil resources typically belong to the state, not the owner of the land above.

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## Endnotes

1 EITI Fact Sheet: <http://eiti.org/document/factsheet>

2 See *World Energy Outlook* (2008).

3 Numerous explanations exist for this “paradox of plenty.” Among the best-known is the so-called “Dutch disease,” or the fact that the inflow of mineral and petroleum revenues tend to appreciate real exchange rates, which makes it cheaper to import rather than produce local goods; this resulting concentration of the economy on extractive activities is detrimental to the rest of the economy (Sachs and Warner, 2001). Volatility also presents countries with the challenge of preparing budgets closely tied to wildly fluctuating commodities, whose prices often crash around times of crisis, leading to revenue collapse and pushing governments into dire straits (Gelb, 1988). Moreover, extractive industries are easier to tax than individual income, and they provide incentives for state capture by elites interested in siphoning away revenue (Karl, 1997). Natural resources also generate “rentier” effects by which governments can use low tax rates and high spending to alleviate pressures for democracy, thereby fostering conditions for corruption and lack of accountability, especially under conditions of high inequality (Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2009). Additionally, recent research has shown that the “nontax” nature of commodity revenues tends to reinsure the stability of existing authoritarian regimes (Morrison, 2009). In terms of conflict, academic work has extensively proved how natural resources can play a major role in fueling civil war (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2003). At the same time, there is a growing literature suggesting that by improving the quality of institutions, enforcing the rule of law, strengthening accountability and controlling corruption, countries can keep the potential negative effects of the extractive industries in check. Good governance and management practices have allowed countries such as Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile and Norway to benefit from resource wealth (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007; Sala-i-Martin, 2003; IMF, 2007)

4 See Charlie Savage, “Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department,” *New York Times*, Sept. 10, 2008 ([www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html)).

5 Islam (2006).

6 Hameed (2005).

7 Kurtzman and Yago (2007).

8 The IMF produced a guide for resource revenue transparency in 2005 that was updated in 2007 and included in the IMF’s Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes. Yet, no systematic effort has been made to measure revenue transparency on a comparative basis.

9 These include questions 1 to 4, 10 to 24, 26, 32, 34, 36 to 44, and 46 to 51 of the Revenue Watch Index questionnaire.

10 The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department applied the principles of the *Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency* (2007) and *Manual on Fiscal Transparency* (2007) to the problems faced by resource-rich countries. The four organizing principles of these practices are: clarity of roles and responsibilities; open budget process; public availability of information; and assurances of integrity. The IMF approach is to comment on the transparency of institutional arrangements and not to identify the optimal ones. For the text of the Natural Resource Charter, see [www.naturalresourcecharter.org](http://www.naturalresourcecharter.org).

11 On this issue Calder and McPherson (2008) suggest that a clear definition of roles and authority will increase transparency, that separation of roles between regulator and licensing agencies will reduce conflict of interests, and that it can also minimize coordination problems among departments involved in managing revenue flows.

12 For three of the petroleum producers—Brazil, China and the United States— this resource is not their main source of fiscal income; furthermore, for the United States the research reviews only the federal administration of the Gulf of Mexico. However, the index includes these countries because their management of extractive industries offers valuable lessons for other countries. In the case of mining countries, this research follows the IMF guide to decide the resource target: for Botswana, diamonds; Chile, copper; DRC, diamonds; Ghana, gold; Liberia, diamonds; Mongolia, copper and gold; Peru, gold, copper and silver; Sierra Leone, diamonds; South Africa, gold; Tanzania, gold and diamonds; and Zambia, copper.

13 We were unable to find local peer reviewers in eight countries: China, DRC, Gabon, Iraq, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. For those countries, we use results that went through an internal review for fact-checking and methodological consistency.

14 In addition to avoiding repetition of information, we do not want to reward multiple publications of information and thus implicitly favoring redundant reporting. Also, taking the highest score for each indicator in this section recognizes the fact that oil, gas and mining sectors are commonly managed by different ministries and agencies in charge of different roles. Therefore, one should expect agencies to provide better information on the subject directly under their authority.

15 The assignment of a given numerical score for a given answer is a function of the number of choices, across which the assignment of points is divided evenly. For a yes/no question, a “yes” is equal to 100 points and a “no” to 0 points. For multiple-choice questions, the top choice “A” equals 100 points; the next “B”, 67 points; “C”, 33 points; and “D” with 0 points. All questions have “not applicable” as an option which drops the question from consideration in determining that country’s score.

16 For more information on EITI reports, see <http://eiti.org/document/eitireports>

17 See, for instance, the Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) or the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

18 For detailed standards on the reports that SAls should produce, refer to the Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts developed by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). See [www.intosai.org/en/portal/documents/intosai/general/lima\\_declaration/](http://www.intosai.org/en/portal/documents/intosai/general/lima_declaration/).

19 Despite providing information about contracts, a number of countries were excluded from this category due to the type of data made available. For instance, certain countries, like Venezuela, provide information about contracting and procurement opportunities but not about the final agreements. In other countries, like Ecuador, even if contracts are publicly available their validity is subject to discussion (see note 25). In Azerbaijan and Ghana, companies operating in the country publish contracts and environmental impact reports. However, the latter are not counted here as disclosed by the government. Mongolia and Ghana published a number of mining investment agreements after December 2009, thereby falling beyond the temporal scope of the index’s research, and their recent disclosure will be taken into account in future studies. DRC has disclosed numerous mining investment agreements for review, but we do not take this into consideration because the public availability of these remains limited. Finally, eight countries were considered “not applicable/other” cases in Table 2, given that they disclose certain parts of the agreements (like negotiation terms, for instance), but they do not publish the full text of the contracts.

20 There was one “not applicable/other” case.

21 See the RWI publication *Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries*, available at [www.revenuewatch.org/news/publications/contracts-confidential-ending-secret-deals-extractive-industries](http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/publications/contracts-confidential-ending-secret-deals-extractive-industries).

22 See, for instance, “Venezuela, Fiscal Transparency,” in *Oxford Analytica*, December 2006, available at <http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/assets/equities/international/permissible-2007/venezuela-fiscal-report-2006.pdf> Research for the *Oxford Analytica* paper was conducted in 2006. Further research on the topic would probably be needed.

23 However, the accuracy of the oil figures that the government provided has been put into question by a recent Global Witness report. See *Fueling Mistrust, A report by Global Witness*, September 2009: [www.globalwitness.org/media\\_library\\_detail.php/804/en/fuelling\\_mistrust\\_the\\_need\\_for\\_transparency\\_in\\_sud](http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/804/en/fuelling_mistrust_the_need_for_transparency_in_sud)

24 See note 21.

25 Ecuador has also published its contracts. However, a lengthy renegotiation process that started in 2007 to turn all previous petroleum-sharing agreements into service agreements has created legal uncertainty about the validity of the published contracts, while the contents of new agreement remained unknown at the time of research. At the same time, legislation approved in 2009 allows the government to enter into strategic agreements with SOCs that appear to be excluded from the obligation to disclose under Ecuador’s Freedom of Information and Access to Information Law.

26 This standard is based on a number of regional agreements requiring publication of environmental and social impact reports for country signatories, and on the fact that these reports are required for all extractive projects financed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). For instance, the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, best known as the Aarhus Convention, was adopted in June 1998 by the “Environment for Europe” process. This convention recognizes the need of government accountability on environmental protection. Also, the Global Reporting Initiative, a multi-stakeholder group, has been developing special guidance on reporting social and environmental impacts for the the oil, gas and mining industry. For more information, see [www.globalreporting.org](http://www.globalreporting.org).

27 The section is the most important component of the index based on the number of indicators (29 indicators compared with 22 for all the other sections combined), and it stresses the importance of this topic for revenue transparency. As mentioned in the methodological section, for this section we developed a single table per country, choosing the highest score for each sub-indicator and dropping from the score all indicators that were not relevant to evaluate the country’s particular system.

28 See Section II, sub-questions a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h and i, of the Revenue Watch Index questionnaire.

- 29 See "Gabon to launch national oil company by year-end", *Reuters*, April 22, 2010, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63L2ID20100422>
- 30 Peru and South Africa were excluded from scores for SOCs' operations; yet they do have ownership interests in companies operating in extractive ventures.
- 31 See note 22.
- 32 The LWCF receives funds from congressional appropriations, and since 2009 it has been supplemented by revenues from certain oil and gas leases in the Gulf of Mexico.
- 33 Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds. See [www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm](http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm) and Truman (2007).
- 34 Countries with centralized administrations and no sub-national transfers of extractive revenue were dropped from this evaluation. Research also avoided scoring countries where all fiscal (tax and nontax) revenue go to a central budget and then is distributed to local governments. The rationale for this is that indicators such as the Open Budget Index already cover the transparency of budgetary processes and anyone interested in this topic can consult those results for relevant resource-abundant countries.
- 35 For a critique of EITI reports on Cameroon and Gabon and their limitations, see Publish What You Pay reports available at [www.publishwhatyoupay.org](http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org).
- 36 It should be noted that in the case of Venezuela, the division of roles between the SOC and the ministry of the extractive sector is not clear-cut (e.g. the president of Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. is also the minister for Oil and Energy), and therefore the distinction between institutional actors in relation to management of licensing procedures might not be relevant.
- 37 See Thurber, Hults and Heller (2010).
- 38 See "BP Statistical Review of World Energy," [www.bp.com/liveassets/bp\\_internet/globalbp/globalbp\\_uk\\_english/reports\\_and\\_publications/statistical\\_energy\\_review\\_2008/STAGING/local\\_assets/2010\\_downloads/statistical\\_review\\_of\\_world\\_energy\\_full\\_report\\_2010.pdf](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf).
- 39 For the purposes of the analysis, the Latin America region excludes Mexico and Chile, which are included under the OECD regional grouping.
- 40 Interestingly for Latin America, the research process highlighted a negative effect of political instability on revenue transparency. There are two examples of this: in Bolivia the government removed previously published contracts with oil and gas companies from official websites early in 2010. Similarly, in Ecuador an ongoing process to modify production-sharing contracts into service agreements has resulted in contracts published by Petroecuador, which appear invalid while there are still no new agreements in place.
- 41 See "U.S. Financial Reform Sets New Standard for Energy and Mining Industry Transparency", Revenue Watch Institute, July 15, 2010, [www.revenuewatch.org/news/news-article/united-states/us-financial-reform-sets-new-standard-energy-and-mining-industry-tra](http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/news-article/united-states/us-financial-reform-sets-new-standard-energy-and-mining-industry-tra).

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### Photography

Cover, George Osodi/Panos Pictures: The Kårstø gas and oil processing plant of Norway's Statoil.

Page 8, Qilai Shen/Panos Pictures: Coal depot in Shanghai, China.

Page 18, Ed Kashi/VII: A cleanup worker at an abandoned well in Oloibiri in Nigeria's Bayelsa State. (photo illustration)

### Design

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