While the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 quickly defeated the ruling Taliban, it has so far not led to the establishment of a successor government with power and influence beyond the capital, Kabul. Local militia leaders, many of them hostile to President Hamid Karzai’s interim government, hold sway in many parts of the country and there is little evidence to suggest that such “warlordism” will be contained at any point in the near future.
The country’s continued balkanization is likely to impede the implementation of a viable and meaningful constitution and could jeopardize nationwide elections planned for June 2004, according to Barnett Rubin, an Afghanistan expert who helped draft the 2001 Bonn process for Afghanistan’s political reconstruction. At a forum on April 11, 2003 at the Open Society Institute's New York offices, Rubin discussed the country’s current political and security situation and argued that the international community’s main priority should be to curtail the power of Afghan warlords in order to stave off renewed conflict and to create conditions in which a constitution will mean something.
Since its formation in June 2002, President Hamid Karzai’s interim administration has been hard pressed to extend its authority in Afghanistan’s regions. In many key provinces—such as Herat, in western Afghanistan, and Balkh in the North—the power of the central government in Kabul is eclipsed by local militia leaders. The relative weakness of centralized authority in Afghanistan poses a major threat to the successful implementation of the country’s new constitution, ratification of which is expected later this year.
“There is a risk that [the constitutional drafting process] could become a meaningless exercise,” said Rubin, who helped draft the 2001 Bonn process for Afghanistan’s political reconstruction.
“The most important thing outsiders can do is to create the conditions that will make it possible for the constitution to mean anything,” Rubin said in arguing for a more vigorous international effort to contain “warlordism” in Afghanistan.
“Most Afghans appear to support a strong central government,” Rubin continued. “What they mean by that is that they don’t want to be ruled by these local commanders.”
The effort to frame a new constitution is in full swing. Karzai appointed a nine-member drafting commission in the fall of 2002. A draft was supposed to have been ready by March, but the commission, whose proceedings are secret, has yet to submit its version. According to current plans, there will be a period for public debate of the draft. After some additional tinkering, the constitution is to be ratified at a specially convened Loya Jirga (a traditional assembly of Afghan elders and leaders), which is expected to convene this fall.
Rubin expressed concern about the hurried pace of the constitution’s drafting. After more than 22 years of nearly constant conflict, Rubin said that Afghanistan’s “potential political elite is fragmented, living in several countries, and its members don’t know each other.” He also voiced concern about the relatively short period allowed for public debate. The constitutional timetable may be untenable in a society that has no central registry of names and that lacks strong democratic traditions, he said.
The regional commanders who run their provinces, he added, figure to govern constitutional convention delegates’ behavior. “Given that they control courts and administration in the areas they command, they can intimidate people,” he said.
To improve the chances for the new constitution’s success, Rubin said the international community must assume greater responsibility for Afghan security. He said the UN’s International Security Assistance Force ought to expand its mandate outside of Kabul. Rubin said the international community should also do more to encourage the development of a unified Afghan army, while at the same time encouraging the demobilization of various Afghan militia groups.
In a somewhat ironic twist, the US army has over the past year provided support to some warlords who have been deemed potential assets in the ongoing campaign to root out Taliban and al Qaeda elements. “Most of these commanders were not chosen because of their adherence to secular democratic ideals,” Rubin said. “There were no such commanders available.”
Under the Bonn agreement, the constitution is to provide the framework for new elections, currently scheduled for June 2004. That vote is designed to mark the completion of Afghanistan’s political transition period. Rubin warned that, unless steps are taken to enhance central authority, there is a reasonable chance that the country could find itself saddled with an ineffectual constitution. The lack of a firm government framework, in turn, could easily set the stage for renewed violence in the conflict-ravaged country.
“You won’t just have bad elections,” Rubin said. “You’ll have a war.”
Rubin, recounted that an official told him: “If the security situation stays as it is now, it will be impossible to hold elections.”
At present, a constitutional power struggle appears to be taking shape, pitting regional warlords against the Karzai government in Kabul. Rubin said that at least two regional commanders—Ismail Khan in Herat and Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mazar-i-Shari—are advocating what they portray as a federal arrangement, in which provinces would enlarge into zones that operated semiautonomous administrations. This goes against Karzai’s plan, Rubin said, and against popular desires.
In part because so many people crave “an end to warlordism,” Rubin said, a rough consensus seems to have emerged that Afghanistan should have a strong executive, rather than a system in which the parliament is dominant. But Rubin noted that, in post-conflict societies, there is a risk that a strong presidency can foster renewed civil strife, especially in countries comprising many ethnic groups. To temper the potential risks associated with a strong chief executive, Rubin indicated that Afghanistan’s framers are considering adding a post of prime minister, or structuring the voting system in such a way that the president must secure more than a simple plurality or even a majority of the vote.