Filip Noubel, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, discussed the internal opposition to Saparmurat Niyazov's authoritarian government in Turkmenistan in this OSI forum. Opposition to Niyazov is spreading within the country's national security apparatus, Noubel said, although increased restrictions on freedom of speech and access to education have left many Turkmenistani citizens with a "hopeless view" of the future.
Event Summary
Internal opposition to Saparmurat Niyazov’s authoritarian government in Turkmenistan is broader than commonly perceived outside the Central Asian nation, a leading political analyst contends. Opposition to Niyazov’s authority is spreading within the country’s national security apparatus. Meanwhile, restrictions on freedom of speech and access to education leave many Turkmen with a "hopeless view" of the future.
Filip Noubel, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group (ICG), sought to dispel the widely held impression that the mercurial Niyazov is firmly in charge in Turkmenistan. ‘The [November 25] assassination attempt shows that the country is not stable," Noubel said February 12 at a meeting sponsored by the Central Eurasia Project of the New York-based Open Society Institute.
Noubel, who visited Turkmenistan last summer on a fact-finding mission, identified several sources of potential civil conflict, the most serious of which is the growing dissatisfaction within the Committee for National Security (KNB) and military with Niyazov’s policies. Over the past year, Niyazov has carried out extensive purges of the KNB and military. The arbitrary action has turned many in both institutions from supporters of the regime into antagonists. "Some [KNB leaders] are disgruntled and are looking for revenge," Noubel said. He documented his finding in an ICG report, Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, published in January.
Noubel additionally described the picture as "bleak" within the military, indicating that the armed services’ reliability can no longer be assured. "People I talked to told me, ‘if we go into any kind of clannish or civil war, it is very unlikely that the military would obey [presidential] orders.’"
Prior to the purges, which began in March 2002, Niyazov relied on the KNB and military to buttress his cult of personality. Lately, however, he has become increasingly dependent on the recently created Presidential Guard. Noubel described the Presidential Guard as 3,000 strong, well armed and packed with people who have proven their loyalty to Niyazov.
"They have complete loyalty to the president and yet are completely hated by the people," said Noubel, adding that Niyazov has given the Presidential Guard freedom of action to defend the Turkmen leader’s interests. "This group [the Presidential Guard] is used to working outside of the framework of the law."
Increasingly, the domestic political dynamic is revolving around a power struggle between the KNB and Presidential Guard. "There is no way to know when and how this game will end," Noubel said.
The November assassination attempt has provided the only tangible evidence of the existing power struggle. Noubel explored several different scenarios surrounding the episode, suggesting that the truth may never been known about details of the attack. He suggested that Niyazov may have staged the attempt after learning that an exiled opposition group led by former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov was in contact with KNB and military elements to eliminate the president. "Probably there was an attempt to coordinate the KNB, the military and [Shikhmuradov’s wing of] the external opposition," Noubel said, reflecting conversations he had with observers. Authorities arrested Shikhmuradov in Turkmenistan and in December staged a show-trial during which he confessed to being part of a "criminal group."
Noubel went on to portray the external opposition as bitterly divided. One group, led by long-time reformist Avdy Kuliev, consists primarily of "intellectuals…who have very limited access to finance." The other group centers on the now-imprisoned Shikhmuradov, who did not enjoy widespread popular trust because of his decade-long service in Niyazov’s inner circle, Noubel said. "There are no signs of cooperation between the two main opposition groups."
The general Turkmen population is restive, though reluctant under existing conditions to organize public protests. Those who speak out, Noubel said, "have to fear [repercussions] for their entire family."
Noubel suggested that the population’s primary reaction to recent developments, in particular the fact that children now receive only nine years of formal education, is to seek a way to leave the country. At present, about 40 percent of the population is under 15 and most do not know Russian, which remains the lingua franca of the region, and is thus a key to decent employment prospects. "Many see no future for themselves, and especially no future for their children," he said. "We are speaking of a North Korean situation."
Turkmenistan’s abundant oil and gas reserves are unlikely to serve as a force for stabilization, Noubel stressed. He said energy-sector profits are not distributed in a manner that has significant benefits for Turkmen society. "All oil and gas money stays within his [Niyazov’s] hands."
Niyazov’s health is also a potential source of instability. Noubel said he received reports that Niyazov suffers from heart disease and is in need of an operation, which would be performed in a Western European nation. However, Niyazov is reportedly reluctant to undergo the procedure because it would require that he remain in Europe to convalesce for over a month, and he fears that during such a prolonged absence his opponents could mount another attempt against his authority.