Sentencing Advocacy and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

In the 40th year of Gideon, there is still much to be done to fulfill Gideon's promise of assistance of counsel for indigent persons accused of crime in the United States. Part I of this essay will examine the Supreme Court's evolving view of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel, from Powell v. Alabama to the recent case of Wiggins v. Smith. Part II will discuss Ake v. Oklahoma and the constitutional right of an indigent defendant to have the assistance of experts necessary to the preparation of a defense. Part III will examine the role which Wiggins and other ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases might play in determining the contours of an indigent defendant's right to have the assistance of experts, particularly insofar as these cases rely on performance standards. In conclusion, Part IV will discuss what all this might mean for the role of sentencing advocacy in noncapital cases.