The Politics of Development in Pakistan

A recent report published by the Center for Global Development, titled Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan, discusses how the U.S. aid and development program in Pakistan is not working. The report makes suggestions to revamp the program in order to best meet the development needs of a country that is currently facing an economic crisis, a breakdown of law and order, and weak political institutions.

However, at the crux of the argument for promoting development in the country is that a stable Pakistan will also serve the security interests of the U.S. The report states that “insecurity in Pakistan is a critical threat to the safety and security of Americans and the stability of South Asia as a whole,” which is why development in Pakistan should and does matter to the U.S.

One often sees this connection between development and security since the declaration of the U.S.-led “war on terror.” The U.S.is not alone in its position of increasingly linking international development policy with security concerns—this change in the approach to development has come about in multilateral development organizations as well as bilateral donors that attempt to address security threats from developing/failing states to the developed world via development assistance. But this interdependence between security and development concerns presents new challenges for international development and can have negative ramifications for the developing world.

The development-security nexus holds legitimacy to the extent that there are some arguments in the international arena that support the claim that chronic poverty causes chronic conflict and vice versa. Recognition of this link has led to much debate on the importance of security in development. Two positions have emerged prominently in this debate.

The first of these is the “human security agenda” which is concerned with the security of people in conflict-prone areas in the developing world. The argument is that reducing poverty will lead to a fall in conflict and terrorism. However, there are no obvious links between poverty and terrorism (many studies have found that links between education, poverty, and terrorism are weak and indirect). The poverty-conflict spiral is too simplistic and undermines the human security agenda because it does not take into consideration a more nuanced understanding of the grievances that cause conflict. For instance, the violent revolt and conflict in Balochistan, in Pakistan’s southwest, is not just a result of the crippling poverty in the province but also, among other things, driven by complex political power struggles and issues of frustration along ethnic lines. Therefore, the entire premise that enhancing security depends on just development and poverty reduction is weak.

The second position, which I feel is more problematic, is the securitization of development—that is, concerns of the developed world of security threats to them due to underdevelopment in the developing world. Failed or failing states, like Pakistan, have become a policy concern for the U.S. Seen as the breeding ground for terrorism, Pakistan is seen as a threat not only to itself but also the U.S. and the entire global world. Development in Pakistan, therefore, has become a means to overcome global security concerns rather than an end in and of itself. Such an interlinking of security and development has serious detrimental effects on the development trajectory of Pakistan.

This is precisely one of the problems that Beyond Bullets and Bombs itself identifies with the U.S. development mission in Pakistan. It states that one of the reasons why development initiatives by the U.S.in Pakistan are failing is that, “the integrated ‘Af-Pak’ approach has muddled the development mission in Pakistan.” The “Af-Pak” approach was taken up under the Obama administration as an institutional structure for an integrated approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It merges development efforts for these two countries with broader diplomatic and defense policies. This entanglement of security and development policies has led to a myriad of obstacles for the development program in Pakistan.

For one, the giving of aid is determined by U.S. objectives in fighting the war on terror and not according to the development needs of Pakistan itself. The report states:

Integration has made long-term development issues in Pakistan more susceptible to distraction by the security and diplomatic emergencies of the moment. For instance, in the aftermath of the Raymond Davis incident in Lahore, the U.S. government cancelled plans for a trilateral economic summit, and the press reported widespread rumors that a congressional delegation visiting Pakistan threatened to cut U.S. aid.

When security concerns of the U.S. start dictating the delivery of development assistance to such an extent, poverty reduction measures can be undermined and the overall goal of human development can become obscure.

Linking development and security can also be a recipe for confusion and incoherence because it seeks to, situate military, political, and development aid projects as part of the same overall goal and in doing so sidelines constructive development in Pakistan. According to the report:

the integration of development, diplomacy, and defense has muddled the development mission and left the program without a clear, focused mandate. The Kerry-Lugar legislation lists no fewer than 11 different objectives of U.S. policy, including enhancing short-term stability, countering extremism, and improving the standing of the United States among Pakistanis.

The U.S. development program in Pakistan is aiming to do too much under the mandate of development, which ends up politicizing development initiatives. Thus, the development program is no longer perceived as being independent and neutral by the Pakistani public at large.

Although the report identifies the “securitization of development” to be one of the major hindrance to the success of the U.S. aid and development mission in Pakistan, making the pertinent suggestion that the Pakistan development mission needs to be separated from the security program, I think it falls into the trap of securitizing development itself.

The study group that put this report together claims that long term development in Pakistan is pertinent for the U.S. because it would serve their security interests. Development in Pakistan, therefore, is not seen as an end in itself and starts to be overtaken by security related instrumental calculations. Currently, the very goals that international development measures intend to achieve, such as poverty reduction and human rights, are being compromised in the name of development in Pakistan. I believe it is imperative that the development paradigm in Pakistan be kept separate from U.S. security concerns. Otherwise, the pursuit of development and betterment of humanity in the country is under threat.